Showing posts with label Dubai. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Dubai. Show all posts

Saturday, August 10, 2019

Abu Dhabi Can’t Afford To Keep Iran Out Of Dubai

The Dubai skyline (Jay Tamboli via Flickr)

by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
As the world teeters on the edge of another financial crisis, few places are being gripped by anxiety like Dubai. Every week a new headline portends the coming crisis in the city of skyscrapers. Dubai villa prices are at their lowest level in a decade, down 24 percent in just one year. A slump in tourism has seen Dubai hotels hit their lowest occupancy rate since the 2008 financial crisis, even as the country gears up to host the Expo 2020 next year. As Bloomberg’s Zainab Fattah reported in November of last year, Dubai has begun to “lose its shine,” its role as a center for global commerce “undermined by a global tariff war—and in particular by the U.S. drive to shut down commerce with nearby Iran.”
Dubai, an entrepôt where the workers are migrants and where property is king, is especially vulnerable to global recessions. In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2009, Dubai’s real estate market collapsed, threatening insolvency for several banks and major development companies, some of them state-linked. Abu Dhabi, which controls the UAE’s vast oil wealth, threw Dubai a lifeline with an initial $10 billion bailout, later expanded to $20 billion.
But there was a second, hidden “bailout” that helped keep Dubai afloat. When the Bush administration enacted the Iran Sanctions Act in 2006, deepening Iran’s economic turmoil under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there was a significant increase in the already significant volume of capital flight from Iran, most of which landed in Dubai. One 2009 estimate places the total value of Iranian investments in Dubai at $300 billion.
While global investors pulled their capital out of Dubai in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Iranian business community mostly stayed put, maintaining their deposits in Dubai’s teetering banks. Iranians continued to invest in Dubai’s ailing property market and used Dubai’s ports to conduct re-exports as sanctions restricted Iran’s direct access to global markets. For Iran’s captains of industry and finance, Dubai was not some far flung emerging market, but a vital channel to the global economy in the face of tightening sanctions. As Iranian economist Saeed Laylaz smartly observed in 2009, “Dubai is the most important city on earth to the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the exception of Tehran.”
The financial crisis and U.S. sanctions had served to deepen the mutual dependence between Dubai and Iran—an outcome that ran counter to the goals of policymakers in both Abu Dhabi and Washington.
The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the defacto ruler of the UAE, Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ), has long seen Iran as a rival. MBZ is hostile to Iranian influence over Dubai, where many of the leading trading families can trace their roots to Iran, a legacy of centuries of trade in the Persian Gulf. MBZ’s dream of an assertive UAE would have been undercut had Dubai continued to develop into the Hong Kong to Iran’s China.
The Obama administration’s effort to build a multilateral sanctions campaign offered MBZ the opportunity to curtail Iran’s presence in Dubai’s economy. As they sought to isolate Iran economically, U.S. officials traveled to Dubai to meet with banks and companies to discourage them from engaging in commercial activities with Iran. Rather than resisting U.S. interference in the UAE’s economic sovereignty, Abu Dhabi amplified the American message– the bailout had put Abu Dhabi in a position to dictate policy to Dubai. The new policy called for Dubai to close its doors to Iranian money.
In subsequent years, the presence of Iranians in Dubai’s economy has diminished significantly. Trade persists, but banks refuse Iran-origin funds, close the accounts of Iranian companies, and deny services to individuals who maintain Iranian citizenship. More recently, as the Trump administration cultivated ties with MBZ, the UAE began to reject more Iranian applications for residency and business visas were routinely denied. Nearly 50,000 Iranian residents have left the UAE in the last three years.
But there are new signs that Dubai may be seeking to repair its trade relationship with Iran. In a recent interview, Abdul Qader Faghihi, president of the Iranian Business Council in Dubai, declared that a “space for trade between Iran and the UAE has been reopened.” Though any opening remains in its initial stages, Faghihi referred to negotiations with “the rulers of Dubai” in which Dubai authorities “accepted that Iranians who have the capital and intend to conduct legitimate trade with the UAE will be granted business visas and that banks will open accounts for these Iranians on instruction from Dubai authorities.”
This small opening may be related to efforts to reduce tensions around the Strait of Hormuz as Abu Dhabi reconsiders its regional entanglements and the risk of conflict in the region—it is unlikely that Dubai would be able to extend an olive branch to the Iranian business community without the consent of Abu Dhabi. But economic fears, and not security concerns, provide the clearest reason why a change in policy may be on the cards—Dubai will soon need another “bailout” from Iran. Farshid Farzanegan, head of the Iran-UAE Joint Chamber of Commerce, recently stated “The UAE’s behavior towards Iranian businessmen has changed… and moves are being taken to resume relations… As the UAE economy slumps, officials have decided to cooperate with Iran.” 
Ten years on from the last financial crisis, Dubai is still repaying its debts to Abu Dhabi. As the UAE braces itself for the next global recession, Iran remains the only country capable of injecting significant capital into Dubai at a time when global investors will pullback. Iranian business leaders in Dubai are wondering—how long can Abu Dhabi afford to freeze them out?

Tuesday, August 06, 2019

The UAE And Iran’s Maritime Talks

Dubai Emir and UAE Vice President/Prime Minister Mohammed Bin Rashid Al Maktoum (World Economic Forum via Wikimedia Commons)
by Giorgio Cafiero and Dr. Khalid al-Jaber
Just over three and a half years ago, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) downgraded its relations with the Islamic Republic of Iran. In doing so, Emirati leaders reinforced their support for Riyadh in the longstanding Iranian-Saudi rivalry that flared up following the Saudis’ execution of Shia Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr and the subsequent violence directed against Saudi diplomatic missions in Tehran and Mashhad in January 2016. The decision to downgrade relations also came ten months after the UAE and Saudi Arabia launched their military operations against Iran-allied Houthi rebels in Yemen. Throughout Donald Trump’s presidency, Abu Dhabi has strongly supported the White House’s efforts to counter Iranian influence in the Middle East, making the UAE a critical player in the U.S. administration’s “maximum pressure” agenda against Tehran.
In May 2018, Abu Dhabi supported the White House’s decision to pull Washington out of the Iranian nuclear deal and the UAE’s leadership has strongly backed the imposition of U.S. sanctions on Iran that followed. Since May, Tehran has allegedly carried out low-intensity military actions against the UAE and its interests in the Sea of Oman, such as sabotaging oil tankers, in response to Abu Dhabi’s support for the Trump’s anti-Iranian agenda. If Iran bears responsibility for recent attacks against tankers in the area, such maritime actions could be best understood as Tehran targeting Emirati and Saudi oil/petrochemical exports to showcase the Islamic Republic’s ability to make Arab Persian Gulf monarchies pay a steep price for backing Trump’s Iran policy.
Despite such friction, two Emirati delegations went to Tehran last month. On July 26, an Emirati “peace delegation” (as the Iranian government described it to the media) visited Tehran for discussions, the topics of which remain unknown to the general public. Abu Dhabi did not deny dispatching this delegation to Iran. Four days later, another delegation led by coast guard commander Brigadier General Mohammed Ali Musleh al-Ahbabi went to Tehran too.
During the second delegation’s visit, officials from the two countries discussed maritime security against the backdrop of dangerous developments that have made the Persian Gulf’s security environment increasingly tense. Significantly, this was the first time in six years that officials from Abu Dhabi and Tehran held such a meeting, raising major questions about a possible change in Emirati foreign policy vis-à-vis the Islamic Republic.
An official in Abu Dhabi stated that the July 30 meeting addressed matters pertaining to border security and navigation in waters shared by the countries of the Persian Gulf. He explained that the talks represented “nothing new” and had no relation to political tensions between Abu Dhabi and Tehran. The UAE’s foreign ministry said that the meeting focused illegal entries, illicit activities, fishing, shared borders, and maritime issues in bilateral affairs. The director of the UAE’s International Security Cooperation Department, Salem Mohammed al-Zaabi, expressed satisfaction with the meeting. As he put it, “The objective behind the meeting is to ensure the safety of UAE citizens, including the country’s fishermen.”
Etemad (an Iranian daily) reported that the meeting’s purpose was to improve bilateral maritime security cooperation and that the UAE delegation met with General Ghasem Rezaei, Iran’s police border guard commander. Countless Iranian websites displayed photos of Rezaei shaking al-Ahbabi’s hand at their meeting in Tehran.
What drove the UAE’s decision to send these delegations to Iran? If Abu Dhabi was extremely supportive of the Trump administration’s efforts to isolate Tehran to the full extent possible, wouldn’t such public engagement with Iranian officials, especially in Iran’s capital, undermine this agenda?
Various analysts have attempted to explain the UAE’s motives. Some have speculated that the Emiratis are attempting to fundamentally change their relationship with Tehran by pursuing a “rapprochement.” Yet others dismissed the meeting as relatively insignificant, routine, and only related to fishing issues. The truth possibly lies in between. It appears that the UAE is seeking dialogue with Iran to better manage the risks of a major conflict erupting in the Persian Gulf, which would carry extremely dire implications for the UAE’s economic and security interests. In doing so, Emirati leaders are pragmatically utilizing their links with Iran, which have remained open notwithstanding mounting political tension between Abu Dhabi (and other Arab capitals) and Tehran in recent years, to foster badly needed dialogue.
For starters, in early 2016, the UAE (unlike Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Sudan) did not completely sever relations with Iran but instead merely downgraded them. By striking this balance, the UAE has kept open its embassy in Tehran while Dubai has continued welcoming Iranian tourists over the past three and a half years. Although Abu Dhabi drives much of UAE foreign policy, the concerns of Dubai and other northern emirates have tempered the UAE’s policy toward Iran, especially when compared with that of Saudi Arabia. Based on strong economic and cultural ties, Dubai’s links to Tehran have been historically special and markedly different from Abu Dhabi’s relationship with Tehran.
Dubai’s leaders look at their relationship with Iran through a commercial lens, prioritizing business relations above politics. Yet the Al Nahyan rulers in Abu Dhabi, who have consolidated their control over the UAE since the financial crash in 2009, view Iran through a security prism. In this respect, Abu Dhabi’s approach toward Iran is more like the leadership in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. These fundamental differences between Abu Dhabi and Dubai have complicated the bilateral relationship between the UAE and Iran. Notably, the ruler of Dubai, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum, welcomed the idea of lifting sanctions on Iran shortly after the interim nuclear agreement was signed in November 2013, leading to strong condemnation from a Saudi government adviser who blasted his comments as “mind boggling.” Unquestionably, the sanctions imposed on Iran as well as the blockade of Qatar have been received differently in Dubai than in Abu Dhabi. Dubai has suffered financially from both the US-led “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran as well as the siege of Doha, both of which Abu Dhabi has strongly supported.
Despite Abu Dhabi’s close alignment with Riyadh against Tehran, the Emiratis and Iranians have maintained a “quiet intelligence backchannel” between their two countries. At this juncture, the UAE is seeking to take advantage of their channels of communication with Iran to promote dialogue. Doing so, from Abu Dhabi’s perspective, is key to avoiding scenarios that could result in the Emirates being caught in the middle of an international armed conflict beyond any one state’s control—a conflict that would likely be fought, at least partially, on Emirati land and/or in its waters.
Indeed, this meeting in Iran’s capital took place against the backdrop of numerous developments in the region that have concerned Abu Dhabi. The Emirati delegation’s visit to Tehran must be viewed in the context of the UAE’s much reported partial pullout from Yemen. Also, Abu Dhabi’s cautious response to the tanker attacks off the UAE’s east coast on May 12—refusing to join Washington and Riyadh in explicitly blaming Iran—pointed to Emirati concerns about moves that could result in tension boiling over into a military confrontation that could easily spiral out of control.
While supportive of the Trump administration’s ramped up pressure on Tehran, officials in Abu Dhabi do not want to see a new war break out in the Persian Gulf. As Emirati Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Anwar Gargash said on May 15, “We need to address Iran’s behavior clearly, but at the same time not to be baited into crisis… This is the region we live in and it’s important for us that we manage this crisis.” This view articulated by Gargash is pragmatic, given that any escalation in the Persian Gulf could severely undermine the UAE’s vital interests. From Abu Dhabi’s perspective, there is incentive to engage the Islamic Republic’s leadership and attempt to de-escalate tensions through a dialogue rather than risk the UAE or UAE-related interests becoming Iran’s future targets.
It will be important to see to what extent the UAE and Iran’s recent maritime talks can build into something greater and, if they do, how Washington and Riyadh will react. The lack of any official response, to date, from the Trump administration suggests that perhaps the White House has taken a wait-and-see approach. As Middle East expert Hussein Ibish explained, “If [the Emirati outreach to Tehran] succeeds and builds, perhaps there will be something for Trump to work with. If it fails, that comes at no cost to the U.S. administration.” If something fruitful can be achieved from this dialogue, the U.S. could potentially become a major beneficiary. Trump, who for mainly domestic factors has vested interests in appearing “tough” on Iran yet not bringing war-weary America into a new Middle Eastern conflict, may have seen the Emirati-Iranian meetings in Tehran positively.
The View from Riyadh
In terms of Saudi Arabia, it is not clear how the Kingdom’s leadership views Abu Dhabi’s outreach to the Iranian government. On one hand, it is easy to imagine how the Saudis could see this as further Emirati “betrayal” in the aftermath of the UAE’s partial pullout from Yemen. Indeed, sensitive questions remain open about how the UAE withdrawal will impact the relationship between Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and his mentor, Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). The Emiratis have been working with proxies on the ground to establish a newly independent South Yemen. This vision inevitably clashes with Riyadh’s interest in preserving Yemen’s post-1990 north-south unity. Furthermore, now that the UAE has redeployed a significant number of its troops out of Yemen, the Saudis face a far more difficult war against the Houthis. The Saudi military, which is markedly less capable than the UAE’s, will need to fight the Houthis basically all on its own.
By the same token, Riyadh could see the Emirati-Iranian meetings in Tehran last month as a potential opportunity to see the extent to which Iranian officials might be willing to go to demonstrate their commitment to dialogue. As Ibish put it: “While this outreach to Iran signals a shift in the UAE’s diplomatic tactics, it is important not to mistake these gestures for a significant change in policy. The same, of course, applies to Iran. But the door between the UAE and Iran, while never fully shut, has been cracked open a bit more and over time, that could enhance the prospects for dialogue between the United States, or Saudi Arabia, and Iran as well.”
In any event, Saudi media is putting its spin on events and pushing its own narratives. As Samuel Ramani explained, media platforms in the Kingdom have emphasized three key points. First, they’ve stressed that the UAE is not abandoning Yemen. Second, they’ve alleged that any talk of a rift in the Saudi-Emirati alliance comes exclusively from Qatari and Iranian propaganda. Third, they’ve argued that any disagreements between the Kingdom and the UAE are merely tactical, like disagreements that Riyadh has with Cairo and Kuwait City.
Need for Sober Assessment 
In the interest of cooling tensions in the Persian Gulf and across the Middle East, there is some reason to view these recent meetings in Tehran optimistically. But it would be misguided to make too much of them. Undoubtedly, the UAE and Iran will remain opposing stakeholders in countless regional hotspots from Iraq to Yemen and Bahrain to Lebanon. The two countries’ sovereign dispute over three Persian Gulf islands also remains a major stumbling block to any significant improvement in bilateral ties.
MbZ and those in his inner circle will continue viewing the Iranian regime that has been in power for the past 40 years as a predatory actor that represents an overwhelming threat to the UAE and other Arabian states. In mid-2010, the UAE’s ambassador to Washington explained the Emirati perspective on Iran’s regime: “I think out of every country in the region, the UAE is most vulnerable to Iran. Our military, who has existed for the past 40 years, wake up, dream, breathe, eat, sleep the Iranian threat. It’s the only conventional military threat our military plans for, trains for, equips for, that’s it, there’s no other threat, there’s no country in the region that is a threat to the UAE, it’s only Iran.” Abu Dhabi’s narrative about the Iranian threat has not changed over the past nine years. The Emirati delegation’s recent visit to Iran, or any other upcoming diplomatic engagement, will not change the realities that have led to an overall extremely negative relationship between Abu Dhabi and Tehran.
Ultimately, the UAE’s modest outreach to Tehran is not about any Emirati plans for a rapprochement. Rather, the decision to dispatch two delegations to Iran was driven by a realization of the ways in the UAE stands to gain by reevaluating its strategies for dealing with regional crises that involve Iran.

Friday, April 12, 2019

The Dis-United Arab Emirates

The Dis-United Arab Emirates
A recent Beverly Hills, California political campaign fundraiser for Donald Trump, co-sponsored by Republican National Committee deputy national finance chairman Elliott Broidy – whose Los Angeles office was raided in March of this year by the Federal Bureau of Investigation – is raising eyebrows in Middle Eastern capitals. Broidy, a major figure in the Republican Jewish Coalition, is under law enforcement investigation for selling access to Trump and other administration officials. FBI agents seized documents in Broidy’s office related to potentially illegal “pay-to-play” operations involving Broidy’s firms and the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, in addition to a Broidy extortion attempt against Qatar.
FBI agents also raided the Colfax Law Office, the Beverly Hills law practice founded by Robin Rosenzweig, Broidy’s wife. Broidy and his wife represent the apex of Israel’s influence-peddling moguls in the Los Angeles area and they are major players in both Trump campaign fundraising among the Hollywood elite. The FBI is particularly interested in Broidy’s reported attempt to raise $1 billion in contracts for his private security company from the Saudis and Emiratis, in return for pressing Trump to steer US foreign policy toward Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and away from Qatar.
Broidy’s association with the Saudis and Emiratis remains very suspect in the eyes of US law enforcement, as well as Arab interests skeptical of the close relationships between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi and Broidy and other agents of influence for Israel, such as Trump’s son-in-law, Jared Kushner. After attending the Beverly Hills fundraiser, an event that was not attended by a single Hollywood A-List celebrity, Trump flew off to Las Vegas to speak to the annual meeting of the Republican Jewish Coalition. In the audience was Adelson, a deep-pocketed donor to Trump and other Republicans, who was wearing a red yarmulke bearing the name “Trump.”
Pro-Israeli billionaires like Adelson have gotten their money’s worth from Trump. Trump has done everything asked of him by the Binyamin Netanyahu government of Israel, including withdrawing from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear program, recognizing Jerusalem as the Israeli capital and moving the American embassy there from Tel Aviv, recognizing Israeli sovereignty over Syria’s Golan Heights, and declaring the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps a “foreign terrorist organization.” There is a strong belief that Netanyahu has such a hold on Trump, via the influence of individuals like Adelson, Kushner, Broidy, and others, that Trump will soon commute the prison sentence of convicted Israeli spy Jonathan Pollards and be among the first to recognize Israeli sovereignty over the West Bank.
Therefore, the close relationship between Broidy and the UAE, particularly its Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) al Nahayan, has many Emiratis questioning the loyalty of MbZ and the Nahayan clan to the Palestinian cause. The aggressiveness of the Nahayan family toward Iran, with which the northern emirates have close commercial relations, and Qatar, which almost became a member of a wider federation of emirates after Britain’s announcement that it was pulling out of the region in 1968. The federation between Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial States never materialized because of in-fighting between the prospective members. In December 1971, six of the seven Trucial States formed the UAE at a meeting in Dubai. The seventh, Ras al-Khaimah, was reluctant to join. However, in January 1972, Ras al-Khaimah acceded to the new union.
Iran, then ruled by the Shah, invaded three islands, Greater Tunb and Lesser Tunb, which were claimed by Ras al-Khaimah, and Abu Musa, claimed by Sharjah. The emir of Sharjah, Sheikh Khalid bin Mohammed Al Qasimi, negotiated a deal with Iran, whereby the Iranians leased Abu Musa for $3 million a year. Around the time of the agreement with Iran, Sheikh Khalid was killed while trying to put down a Nasserite coup by his cousin, Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi, who was the emir of Sharjah, but was deposed by his family and exiled to Cairo in 1965. The mercenary force that Sheikh Saqr led to Sharjah was loyal to anti-UAE members of the Qasimi royal family, which ruled both Sharjah and Ras al-Khaimah. The plans by Sheikh Saqr to lead Sharjah out of the UAE and Ras al-Khaimah’s initial reluctance to join the federation continue to influence inter-emirate relations in the UAE.
From the outset, the ruling families of the seven UAE states bickered over everything from territory to sharing financial resources. The Nahayan family used its influence to have Abu Dhabi declared the UAE capital and the Emir of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayan and his successors named as presidents of the UAE.
Although Dubai soon became the commercial and architectural gem of the Arabian Peninsula, Abu Dhabi and the Nahayan family continued to exercise strong political control over the UAE. Two deaths of two of the founders of the UAE, Sheikh Zayed bin Sultan Al Nahayan of Abu Dhabi in 2004 and Sheikh Maktoum bin Rashid Al Maktoum of Dubai in 2006, brought to power in Abu Dhabi Sheikh Zayed’s son, Sheikh Khalifa bin Zayed Al Nahayan, and Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum in Dubai. Although Khalifa bin Zayed became the president of the UAE, Mohammed bin Rashid held the positions of vice president and prime minister of the federation. Suspicions remain about the sudden death of Sheikh Maktoum. He reportedly died of a sudden heart attack at the age of 62 while staying at the Palazzo Versace Hotel in Queensland, Australia. His brother, Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid, succeeded him. But, in 2015, the second oldest son of the Dubai emir and nephew of the late Sheikh Maktoum, Sheikh Rashid bin Mohammed bin Rashid, died of a heart attack in Dubai at the age of 33.
In 2008, Rashid bin Mohammed, the Crown Prince of Dubai since his older brother, Marwan, had a Greek mother and was ineligible, was fired as Crown Prince because he reportedly killed a servant in a drug-induced pique of anger. Rashid bin Mohammed’s younger brother, Hamdan, was named Crown Prince.
Emir Rashid turned Dubai into a global city and major financial and transportation and shipping hub. However, he overextended himself financially by building the Burj Dubai, the world’s tallest building. When Dubai’s finances faltered, it was Abu Dhabi that bailed out Rashid and his building. In return, the building was named the Burj Khalifa, in honor of the UAE president and Emir of Abu Dhabi.
Rashid’s relationship with Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince and UAE Minister of Defense Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ). However, MbZ’s close ties to Saudi Arabia’s impetuous Crown Prince, Mohammed bin Salman (MbS), and pro-Israelis close to the Trump administration like Broidy and Kushner has irritated Dubai’s business community and the northern UAE states that have profited from commerce with Iran. MbS and MbZ have supported the Gulf Cooperation Council’s (GCC) sanctions on Qatar, primarily because that nation refused to join the GCC and the United States in increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on Iran.
A split began to emerge among the seven emirs. The smaller and poorer emirates of the north – Sharjah, Ajman, Ras-al Khaimah, and Umm al Qaiwain – were envious of the power wielded by the rulers of Abu Dhabi and Dubai.
Another royal rivalry has broken out in Ras al-Khaimah. In 1974 Sheikh Saqr bin Moḥammed Al Qasimi appointed his oldest son, Sheikh Khalid bin Saqr Al Qasimi, as Crown Prince. In 2003, Saqr replaced Khalid as Crown Prince with another son, Sheikh Sheikh Saud bin Saqr Al Qasimi. Khalid was exiled to Muscat, Oman amid UAE tanks and troops being stationed at all of Ras al-Khaimah’s sensitive facilities. Khalid, like his cousin, Sheikh Saqr bin Sultan Al Qasimi – who launched the unsuccessful coup in Sharjah – is a reformer and possibly not so keen on the autocrats in Abu Dhabi and Dubai calling all the shots in the UAE. It is known that Khalid opposed the US invasion of Iraq and even burnt an American flag in protest. In October 2010, when Ras al-Khaimah emir Saqr died and Crown Prince Saud acceded to the throne, Sheikh Khalid sent out a video on the Internet proclaiming himself as the rightful emir of Ras al-Khaimah.
In 2009, Sheikh Khalid hired the Washington, DC lobbying firm, SNS Global, to advance his cause. SNS Global’s chief is Glenn Simpson, the former Wall Street Journal reporter who is also the co-founder of Fusion GPS, the private intelligence firm at the center of the controversies surrounding the 2016 US presidential election. It is known that Sheik Khalid attended Barack Obama’s inauguration in 2009.
As can be seen with the palace rivalries among the emirates of the UAE and the monarchies in the GCC, the region is prone to outside provocateurs and influence-peddlers. The fact that Broidy, Kushner, and Blackwater founder Erik Prince – whose sister is Donald Trump’s Education Secretary – have all shown up in the area marketing their “wares,” comes as no surprise.
Wayne MADSEN
Investigative journalist, author and syndicated columnist. A member of the Society of Professional Journalists (SPJ) and the National Press Club