Showing posts with label Abu Dhabi’s Muhammad Bin-Zayed. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Abu Dhabi’s Muhammad Bin-Zayed. Show all posts

Saturday, August 10, 2019

Abu Dhabi Can’t Afford To Keep Iran Out Of Dubai

The Dubai skyline (Jay Tamboli via Flickr)

by Esfandyar Batmanghelidj
As the world teeters on the edge of another financial crisis, few places are being gripped by anxiety like Dubai. Every week a new headline portends the coming crisis in the city of skyscrapers. Dubai villa prices are at their lowest level in a decade, down 24 percent in just one year. A slump in tourism has seen Dubai hotels hit their lowest occupancy rate since the 2008 financial crisis, even as the country gears up to host the Expo 2020 next year. As Bloomberg’s Zainab Fattah reported in November of last year, Dubai has begun to “lose its shine,” its role as a center for global commerce “undermined by a global tariff war—and in particular by the U.S. drive to shut down commerce with nearby Iran.”
Dubai, an entrepôt where the workers are migrants and where property is king, is especially vulnerable to global recessions. In the immediate aftermath of the global financial crisis in 2009, Dubai’s real estate market collapsed, threatening insolvency for several banks and major development companies, some of them state-linked. Abu Dhabi, which controls the UAE’s vast oil wealth, threw Dubai a lifeline with an initial $10 billion bailout, later expanded to $20 billion.
But there was a second, hidden “bailout” that helped keep Dubai afloat. When the Bush administration enacted the Iran Sanctions Act in 2006, deepening Iran’s economic turmoil under President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, there was a significant increase in the already significant volume of capital flight from Iran, most of which landed in Dubai. One 2009 estimate places the total value of Iranian investments in Dubai at $300 billion.
While global investors pulled their capital out of Dubai in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the Iranian business community mostly stayed put, maintaining their deposits in Dubai’s teetering banks. Iranians continued to invest in Dubai’s ailing property market and used Dubai’s ports to conduct re-exports as sanctions restricted Iran’s direct access to global markets. For Iran’s captains of industry and finance, Dubai was not some far flung emerging market, but a vital channel to the global economy in the face of tightening sanctions. As Iranian economist Saeed Laylaz smartly observed in 2009, “Dubai is the most important city on earth to the Islamic Republic of Iran, with the exception of Tehran.”
The financial crisis and U.S. sanctions had served to deepen the mutual dependence between Dubai and Iran—an outcome that ran counter to the goals of policymakers in both Abu Dhabi and Washington.
The Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and the defacto ruler of the UAE, Sheikh Mohammad bin Zayed (MBZ), has long seen Iran as a rival. MBZ is hostile to Iranian influence over Dubai, where many of the leading trading families can trace their roots to Iran, a legacy of centuries of trade in the Persian Gulf. MBZ’s dream of an assertive UAE would have been undercut had Dubai continued to develop into the Hong Kong to Iran’s China.
The Obama administration’s effort to build a multilateral sanctions campaign offered MBZ the opportunity to curtail Iran’s presence in Dubai’s economy. As they sought to isolate Iran economically, U.S. officials traveled to Dubai to meet with banks and companies to discourage them from engaging in commercial activities with Iran. Rather than resisting U.S. interference in the UAE’s economic sovereignty, Abu Dhabi amplified the American message– the bailout had put Abu Dhabi in a position to dictate policy to Dubai. The new policy called for Dubai to close its doors to Iranian money.
In subsequent years, the presence of Iranians in Dubai’s economy has diminished significantly. Trade persists, but banks refuse Iran-origin funds, close the accounts of Iranian companies, and deny services to individuals who maintain Iranian citizenship. More recently, as the Trump administration cultivated ties with MBZ, the UAE began to reject more Iranian applications for residency and business visas were routinely denied. Nearly 50,000 Iranian residents have left the UAE in the last three years.
But there are new signs that Dubai may be seeking to repair its trade relationship with Iran. In a recent interview, Abdul Qader Faghihi, president of the Iranian Business Council in Dubai, declared that a “space for trade between Iran and the UAE has been reopened.” Though any opening remains in its initial stages, Faghihi referred to negotiations with “the rulers of Dubai” in which Dubai authorities “accepted that Iranians who have the capital and intend to conduct legitimate trade with the UAE will be granted business visas and that banks will open accounts for these Iranians on instruction from Dubai authorities.”
This small opening may be related to efforts to reduce tensions around the Strait of Hormuz as Abu Dhabi reconsiders its regional entanglements and the risk of conflict in the region—it is unlikely that Dubai would be able to extend an olive branch to the Iranian business community without the consent of Abu Dhabi. But economic fears, and not security concerns, provide the clearest reason why a change in policy may be on the cards—Dubai will soon need another “bailout” from Iran. Farshid Farzanegan, head of the Iran-UAE Joint Chamber of Commerce, recently stated “The UAE’s behavior towards Iranian businessmen has changed… and moves are being taken to resume relations… As the UAE economy slumps, officials have decided to cooperate with Iran.” 
Ten years on from the last financial crisis, Dubai is still repaying its debts to Abu Dhabi. As the UAE braces itself for the next global recession, Iran remains the only country capable of injecting significant capital into Dubai at a time when global investors will pullback. Iranian business leaders in Dubai are wondering—how long can Abu Dhabi afford to freeze them out?

Saturday, July 13, 2019

War With Iran Would Not Mean Happy Ending For Middle East

by Shireen T. Hunter
A recent article by veteran Washington Post columnist David Ignatius urges Democratic Party politicians to adopt a harder posture on Iran. He seems to suggest that if Iran were to stop interfering in Middle East politics, all of the region’s problems would be solved. Ignatius quotes Karim Sajadpour of the Carnegie Endowment for Peace: “Tehran’s behavior is a constant source of friction in the region; really stability and security won’t be possible until Iran backs off.”
Such reasoning implies that Iran is at the root of all of the region’s problems. Yet a more balanced look at the history of Middle East’s problems and conflicts shows that since the Islamic revolution in 1979, Iran’s activities have at most complicated some of these conflicts rather than caused them.
Indeed, the Islamic revolution itself was partly the consequence of these disputes. For example, throughout the 1960s and the 1970s, various radical Arab states—from Nasser’s Egypt to Iraq’s Saddam Hussein and Libya’s Muammar Qadhafi plus various Palestinian groups—helped Islamist and leftist opposition groups in Iran with money and training, including in the PLO camps in Jordan and Lebanon.
The Israeli-Palestinian Dispute
According to a pervasive view since the 1990s, had it not been for Iran’s nefarious activities, the Palestinians and Israelis would now be living in peace.
True, Iran has supported some Palestinian groups such as Hamas. However, Iran has never been in a position to dictate to these groups or to prevent agreements between Israel and the Palestinian groups. For example, Iran could not prevent the Oslo accords of 1993. Nor was Iran responsible for their failure. Rather, the political dynamics of Israel and the Palestinians played the more decisive role.
Today, if President Donald Trump’s “Deal of the Century” is less than a resounding success—despite the support of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE along with the acquiescence of Jordan, Egypt, and Morocco—it will be because of the intrinsic dynamics of the problem. The bottom line is that no country can either force the Palestinians into an accommodation that they view as unfair or prevent them from reaching an accommodation if the offer is fair.  In short, no country can either deliver the Palestinians or block peace between them and Israel. Therefore, even in the aftermath of a war with Iran, the Palestinian issue would remain as intractable as it is today.
Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq
Lebanon’s present-day predicament is also a direct consequence of the Palestinian problem. Lebanon plunged into a long civil war when King Hussein of Jordan, during the so-called Black September Operations of 1970, kicked the PLO out of Jordan and into Lebanon. Then came the 1982 Israeli invasion of the country. This opened the way for now revolutionary Iran to create a toehold for itself. Iranian influence, through its relationship with the Hezbollah, has made Lebanese relations with Israel more problematic. However, Hezbollah is only able to do so because of the ongoing and unresolved Palestinian problem. If a viable agreement is reached between Israel and the Palestinians, Hezbollah’s ability to influence Arab politics would plummet.
No doubt, Iran’s help to Bashar al-Assad’s government in Syria has helped bolster it. But the real game- changer in the Syrian drama was Russia’s decision to stick by Assad. It was Russia’s entry into the conflict that raised the stakes of an extended American military intervention in Syria, not the presence of some ragtag Shia militia. Again, if the Israelis and the Western powers had offered Assad an attractive enough deal, such as the return of the Golan Heights, he would have ended his alliance of convenience with Iran. Even if Assad goes, no Syrian government with any legitimacy would forgo claims to the Golan. Thus Iran or no Iran, there would always be tension between Israel and any viable Syrian government. Only a truncated Syria could be persuaded to give up its claim to Golan.
Iran’s influence in Baghdad, which is much exaggerated, is the direct result of the 2003 American invasion of Iraq. This war was also waged under the misapprehension that once Saddam Hussein was gone, a thousand democratic flowers would bloom and the winds of democratic change would also topple Iran’s Islamist regime.
Yet the war only succeeded in bringing into the open Iraq’s ethnic and sectarian divisions and unleashing intense regional competition for influence within Iraq’s new political setup. If Iran disappeared from the map of the Middle East, Iraqi Shias would not likely submit to Saudi Arabia. In fact, more than Iranian machinations, it was the behavior of Iraq’s Sunnis towards the new government in Baghdad and the Saudi, Turkish, and Qatari sabotage of Iraq’s Shia-dominated government that led the country to turn towards Iran. It would also be naïve to assume that any Iranian government would have allowed Iraq to become a source of threat. The memory of Saddam Hussein’s 1980 invasion of Iran and the eight-year-long war is still very much alive.
Meanwhile, war with Iran would almost certainly extend into Iraq and could result in its total dismemberment.
Yemen
Yemen’s problems, too, have deeper roots related to its own ethnic and sectarian makeup and the impact of intra-Arab politics going back to the pro-Nasser coup d’etat of 1962 and the ensuing civil war. Saudi Arabia’s predatory approach to Yemen also dates back to the 1930s as part of the House of Saud’s conquest of Arabia. The current Houthi rebellion is the continuation of an as-yet-unresolved civil war.
Iran has used the Houthi rebellion as leverage against Saudi Arabia. However, when the Saudi King asks the United States to “cut the head of this snake”—Iran—no wonder Tehran wants to create trouble for Riyadh. Saudi Arabia is currently facing an utter mess not because of Iran but as a result of the behavior of its reckless crown prince Mohammad bin Salman. In a hurry to assert his position at home and in the Arab world, he embarked on a foolish adventure by launching the attack on Yemen. Moreover, the Yemen situation has become more complicated because another reckless crown prince, in the UAE, has seen the war as an opportunity to stake his claim to regional influence.
A war against Iran is more likely to complicate the situation in Yemen than to resolve it in any way satisfactory to the West and its Arab allies.
The notion that the Middle East’s problems are caused by a single country or a single personality has always been faulty. In the 1950s, it was thought that once you got rid of Mossadegh and later Gamal Abdel Nasser then everything would be fine. Then the focus shifted to Hafez al-Assad, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Qadhafi. Even the shah of Iran, whose ambitions were once seen in the mid-1970s as dangerous for the Middle East, did not escape unscathed from this mind set.
None of these personalities has survived, and their countries are in turmoil. So is the Middle East despite many wars and coup d’etats. Another war would only make the situation worse for all concerned. In fact, the Middle East’s problems are partially the result of these external interventions. Real peace in the Middle East will come only if the legitimate security interests of all countries and peoples are addressed. Efforts at absolute subjugation always lead to new rebellions.
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SHIREEN HUNTER

Shireen T. Hunter is a Research Professor at Georgetown University's School of Foreign Service. Her latest book is Iran's Relations with Arab States: Dynamics of Conflict and Accommodation (Rowman & Littlefield, forthcoming May 2019).