Iran exposed the fragility beneath American air dominance. Beijing is studying every loss. When the United States and Israel launched coordinated strikes against Iran on February 28, 2026, Washington anticipated swift, overwhelming dominance. The arithmetic seemed straightforward: the world’s most advanced air force against a sanctions-hobbled regional power.
Salman Rafi Sheikh
The Myth of Invulnerability
The losses span the full architecture of American air power. According to the CRS report, they include four F-15E Strike Eagles, one F-35A Lightning II stealth fighter, an A-10 Thunderbolt II, seven KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft, an E-3 Sentry airborne early warning aircraft, two MC-130J Commando II special operations aircraft, 24 MQ-9 Reaper drones, and an MQ-4C Triton high-altitude surveillance drone. Some of these platforms are no longer in production and therefore irreplaceable in the near term. The report assessed that, “it is unclear how the extent of aircraft losses may affect DOD’s ability to meet current operational requirements, maintain global force posture, and respond to unforeseen contingencies”.
Operation Epic Fury has exposed the gap between the assumption of air dominance and its operational reality, and that gap matters enormously when the hypothetical adversary is not Iran
No single loss carries more strategic weight than the damage to the F-35A. Iran’s Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi seized on the CRS findings immediately, claiming Iran was “first to strike down a touted F-35” and warning of “many more surprises” should hostilities resume. For two decades, the F-35 program has been sold to allies and adversaries alike as a near-invulnerable platform, a fifth-generation leap guaranteeing air superiority in any conceivable theater. An Iranian ground force, operating under crushing sanctions with a fraction of America’s defense budget, has now punctured that narrative.
The tanker losses compound the damage. Seven KC-135 Stratotankers were lost or damaged, including a catastrophic incident on March 12 in which one aircraft went down over western Iraq, killing all six crew members — the only confirmed fatalities in the CRS report. The aerial refueling fleet is the circulatory system of American global power projection; without it, fighters cannot sustain operations over the vast distances that any Pacific contingency, for instance, would demand. Losing seven in a single, relatively contained Middle Eastern campaign is a figure that, while it commands serious attention, shows the actual American military might.
What Beijing Is Learning
China has watched Operation Epic Fury—which, by all means, is little more than Operation Epic Loss—the same way the US military once studied Soviet-equipped adversaries during the Cold War, i.e., as a live laboratory. It remains to be confirmed, but the aircraft losses may reflect not only tactical errors but also resilient Iranian air defenses, doctrinal vulnerabilities, and — critically — enhanced Iranian strike capabilities reportedly supported by Chinese and Russian assistance. Iran may not have fought alone, and the weapons that damaged American aircraft were shaped, in part, by the very adversary the United States most needs to deter.
The implications for industrial capacity are no less sobering. Can America continue to build up and rearm itself at the same pace as it was able to during the Cold War? Even though it is spending more, it does not necessarily have tactical superiority.
Congressional concern is mounting. Lawmakers are assessing whether the Pentagon has provided an adequate accounting of losses, amid fears that gaps in aging, high-demand platforms such as the E-3 Sentry could create capability deficiencies across other global theaters. Acting Pentagon Comptroller Jules W. Hurst III testified before Congress this month that the estimated cost of military operations in Iran has reached $29 billion — a figure that does not account for damage to US bases across the Middle East that came under Iranian retaliatory fire. The real bill, financial and strategic, is almost certainly higher.
The Pacific Question
None of this amounts to a direct and categorical verdict that the United States cannot prevail in a future Pacific conflict. American alliances in the Indo-Pacific are deepening; the AUKUS partnership, expanded basing arrangements with the Philippines, and accelerating defense cooperation with Japan and South Korea represent genuine strategic assets. But Operation Epic Fury has exposed the gap between the assumption of air dominance and its operational reality, and that gap matters enormously when the hypothetical adversary is not Iran.
China’s integrated air defense network is much more sophisticated than Tehran’s. The People’s Liberation Army has spent three decades studying American doctrine and investing in precisely the anti-access, area-denial systems designed to deny the United States the air supremacy it has taken for granted since 1991. If a battered Iranian military, operating under decades of sanctions, can damage an F-35 and destroy a quarter of the MQ-9 Reaper fleet, the question is not just whether China could inflict comparable losses; it is also whether the United States retains the industrial base, the munitions stockpiles, and the doctrinal flexibility to absorb them and fight on.
The more consequential question may be one of transparency and trust. The CRS figures were compiled not by the Pentagon but by congressional researchers piecing together press statements and CENTCOM briefings because the Department of Defense has not published a comprehensive accounting of its own losses. Allies contemplating whether to stand alongside Washington in a Taiwan contingency deserve a clearer picture than that. Already, US allies are facing shortages of supplies from Washington. Deterrence is built not only on capability but also on credibility, and credibility requires a willingness to reckon honestly with failure.
Operation Epic Fury will be studied for years. The more important question is whether Washington studies it first and whether the lessons translate into reform fast enough to matter. China’s military planners are not waiting.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of international relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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