Beirut of Two Frames: How Can We See the Real Lebanon?

Alwaght- These days, Lebanon more than any other time in recent years is narrated in two different and sometimes contrasting ways. These two narratives have challenged a cohesive understanding of reality of this country, as if it is two various countries.

While Lebanon is grappling with foreign aggression and full-scale war, gaps are deepening between government of Joseph Aoun and Hezbollah and its allies over a set of important issues like defense and negotiations, Hezbollah’s weapons, and relationship with Iran as an ally of Hezbollah and backer of Lebanon in the face of the Israeli hostility. These disputes have long since left the closed-door negotiating tables of politicians and their backroom meetings. Now, no one hesitates to bring them up from official podiums. This situation has raised a pressing question: through which lens, then, can one see the real Lebanon emerging from this duality of narratives?

Dispute between Aoun and Hezbollah over war

No united voice and narrative is emerging from Lebanon about the most basic priority of the country against ground advances of the Israeli regime in large tracts of land and endangering the very territorial integrity of the country.

Despite the 45-day extension of the so-called truce in mid-May according to the UN Security Council's resolution 1701, Israel continues its ground operations inside Lebanon. The occupation army has even gone beyond its stated buffer zone, re-occupying about 800 square kilometers of the Lebanese territory.

Meanwhile, in the middle of ongoing ceasefire talks in Washington between the Lebanese government and Tel Aviv, the Israeli cabinet has doubled down by approving even more aggressive plans. More destructive still is the pattern of behavior by Israeli forces on the battlefield. Reports have documented the deliberate killing of civilians, widespread looting, and the systematic destruction of civilian homes by Israeli army soldiers. By demolishing infrastructure and issuing evacuation orders for large parts of southern areas, Israel has created a massive wave of internal displacement.

But while there are reports that even the US has asked Israel to halt its attacks to advance the negotiations, the stance of President Aoun's government and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has been politically catastrophic.

In his official statements, Aoun voices opposition to foreign aggression and occupation of Lebanon’s lands not as a national priority but within the framework to disarm Hezbollah. He laid out this exact argument to Security Council members back in December 2025, warning that "continued Israeli violations only strengthen Hezbollah's narrative that the resistance's weapons are what protect Lebanon's security and territorial integrity, while simultaneously eroding the Lebanese state's authority.

Since the November 2024 ceasefire, the Aoun-Salam government has essentially been acting as the mouthpiece for the US and Israeli narrative on ceasefire violations, continued occupation, and fresh aggression against Lebanese soil. Even though after the ceasefire, the Israeli army maintained its military presence in five points inside Lebanon in direct violation of the agreements, the Lebanese government issued an end-of-2025 deadline for the army to disarm Hezbollah.

The plan's pro-Israeli nature was so blatant that even Lebanese Army Commander General Rudolf Haykal warned during the Security Council's visit in December 2025 that the Lebanese army would not "act as Israel's representative" by forcing its way into private homes in southern Lebanon.

After that, even as Israel launched attacks and prepared for a ground incursion into Lebanon, the government officially banned Hezbollah's military activities on March 2, effectively rubber-stamping Israel's justification for its aggression.

All this while experts believe Netanyahu's stated goal, which is complete dismantlement of Hezbollah's weapons and permanently removing the threat against Israel's northern regions, reveals the Israeli cabinet's real plan for an open-ended occupation of Lebanese territory. The doctrine behind the Israeli army's bombing and destruction campaign pursues one strategic outcome: mountains of rubble designed to ensure displaced populations never return and to destroy communal life in southern Lebanon for good, all in the name of securing Israel's northern areas.

Now the question is that what is keeping the Lebanese government from shouldering its responsibilities? Especially while it ignores its duty of saving territorial integrity, it focuses all of its efforts on countering Hezbollah as the only force defending the country, lingering the conflict and increasing the country’s costs.

There is no justification accepted by the public opinion since Hezbollah has shown that even with bare hands it can defend Lebanon, as these days it is operating low-cost, basic-tech, fiber-optic drones drones, inflicting heavy damages on the Israeli occupation forces. On the opposite side, the government has shown it no only does not do its national duty, but also it is seeking to put the skids under Hezbollah's resistance agenda. An example of this hostile approach is detention of Hezbollah fighters transferring arms to the fronts and trying them for defending the country. 

But the resistance discourse represents the other side of Lebanon’s current reality. In his latest speech, Hezbollah Secretary-General Sheikh Naim Qassem once again laid out the movement’s unwavering stance against aggression, making it clear that Hezbollah is committed only to a comprehensive ceasefire and the full withdrawal of the Israeli army from Lebanon. 

"We will not accept any separation between the south and other parts of Lebanon, and we grant the enemy no ‘license to kill, ” he said. 

He added: “As long as our villages remain unsafe and subject to bombardment, Israeli settlements will also remain unsafe. And they will witness both our wrath and our resilience.”

Direct talks: Humiliating surrender or the remedy?

Given these developments, there are questions about if the direct negotiations with the Israeli regime are serving national interests.

As said earlier, this government’s top priority is disarming Hezbollah, not defending the country’s territorial integrity against Israeli incursions. So it views the enemy’s aggression not as a threat to Lebanon’s survival and security, but as an opportunity to execute that plan. The Aoun-Salam government’s token condemnation of the Israeli regime’s attacks stems from a fear that any real outcry would actually justify resistance weapons—by proving once again that the army is incapable of defending Lebanese soil. That is why it is willing to come to the negotiating table from a position of weakness and accept a ceasefire that cements the occupier’s hold on Lebanese land while stripping the country’s defenders of their right to resist.

On the opposite side, Hezbollah believes that the true path to ending the war and restoring stability is not negotiation and accepting Tel Aviv’s terms but ensuring the Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Lebanese territories. 

In this connection, Sheikh Qassem said that the recent Washington plan is an outcome of the humiliating talks that are seeking to bring Lebanon to its knees in the face of the so-called "Greater Israel" project. He continued that the main aim of the enemy behind this deal is disarming the resistance forces, which means destroying Lebanon’s power and posing an existential threat to its people. 

Who is Lebanon’s friend? 

Another key issue lies in the dual narrative emerging from Lebanon and crossing its borders: the role of Iran as the main ally of Hezbolla in its fight against Israeli aggression.

Tehran has every incentive to prevent Lebanon from being swallowed by Israel as part of the latter’s strategic goal of balkanizing the region under a so-called “New Middle East.” No powerful country, after all, confines itself strictly to its territorial borders when it comes to protecting its security interests. In the fierce ongoing battle to redraw the region’s new security order, Iran simply cannot afford to be a bystander to Lebanon’s fate.

The Islamic Republic has made the cessation of Israeli attacks on Lebanon a key condition for any preliminary agreement with Washington. Yet the government of President Aoun and Prime Minister Salam labels Iran as an obstacle to peace and stability in Lebanon.

On the other side, Sheikh Qassem, rejecting these hostile stances from Lebanon’s Western-leaning government, said: “We thank Iran for its support in reclaiming our land and our rights against joint American-Israeli aggression.” He made it clear: “Iran is working to establish a comprehensive ceasefire in Lebanon alongside halting the aggression against itself.”

What is certain is that a growing number of Lebanese, watching their towns and villages emptied by destruction and looting, do not see their own government as their guarantor. Instead, they see the force that is fighting, and the country backing that fight, as their friend and ally.

Mosaic society: Is Aoun-Salam government representing the Lebanon’s majority?

Now, we should return to the first question: In this duality of narrative, how we should see the real Lebanon? Does the ruling faction hold the parliamentary majority to call it representative of the majority of people of Lebanon? Do the Aoun-Salam positions represent those of all Lebanese officials?

Lebanon’s government structure stems from the country’s mosaic-like society, where posts are allocated by quota to ensure all minorities have a share in power. This arrangement was embedded in the constitution after a 15-year civil war as a mechanism for maintaining stability. As a result, Lebanese governments have always been, by necessity, coalitions of the country’s main political currents.

Yet here’s the paradox: in parliamentary systems, severe crises such as war and foreign aggression usually lead to the formation of broad, maximalist unity cabinets. But in Lebanon, the Israeli regime’s 66-day war in 2024 and the recent conflict have pushed political strife in the opposite direction. One faction, exploiting the country’s exceptional circumstances, is now trying to seize full control of power and eliminate a deep-rooted, major political current.

Actually, the positions voiced by the president, prime minister, and foreign minister represent only narrow segments of society and specific political factions. For example, among Christians, the Free Patriotic Movement, and among Shiites, the Amal Movement, are both deeply rooted forces and allies of Hezbollah. And neither aligns with the president or prime minister’s stances.

So the real Lebanon cannot be confined to the official statements of its president, prime minister, or foreign minister. The current government, which was formed under US pressure and in the shadow of ceasefire agreements, may wear the costume of official power, but it only echoes the voices of limited slices of Lebanon’s mosaic society.

Any observer seeking a broad picture of today's Lebanon should look through the lens of this fragmented, plural, and sometimes paradoxical reality of Lebanon, one in which Hezbollah is still on the front line and the government does nothing but facilitating the enemy’s project. Actually, real Lebanon should be sought in the bombed streets of the south, not in the presidential palace of Beirut.