Allahkaram Moshtaqi, an analyst of West Asian affairs and former Iranian diplomat in Lebanon, in an interview with the SCFR Online website, examined the recent political and military developments of Hezbollah Lebanon and its role in the Ramadan War in support of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Dividing Hezbollah’s political and military conduct into four chronological phases, he stated: “The first phase spans from the beginning of ‘Al-Aqsa Flood’ in Mehr 1402 [September-October 2023] until prior to the Zionist regime’s ground invasion of Lebanon in Mehr 1403 [September-October 2024]. The second phase began in Mehr 1403, concurrent with late-Shahrivar events involving the pager incident and the martyrdom of several senior political and military commanders of Hezbollah, including Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and continued until Azar 1403 [November-December 2024], coinciding with the ceasefire and the fall of the Bashar al-Assad government. The third phase encompasses the period from the fall of the Syrian government until Esfand 1404 [February-March 2026], and the fourth phase commenced in Esfand 1404, concurrent with the military aggression of the United States and the Zionist regime against Iran.”
The Enemy’s Miscalculation Regarding the Collapse of the “Unity of Fronts” Strategy
Moshtaqi, referring to US and Zionist regime assessments of the Axis of Resistance’s situation, stated: “Their assumption was that Iran-backed groups in the region had been severely weakened and lacked even the capacity for self-defense, let alone the ability to assist Iran. Furthermore, given Iran’s failure to request assistance from its allies during the 12-day war, the perception emerged that the ‘Unity of Fronts’ strategy had collapsed. On the other hand, they believed that Hezbollah, due to internal challenges and logistical constraints, lacked the capacity to enter the battlefield and open a new front—even if it possessed the will to do so.”
He added: “Developments during the second and third phases—from Mehr 1403 to Esfand 1404—created conditions under which Hezbollah’s assistance to Iran or the opening of a new front against the Zionist regime from Lebanon appeared impossible. During this same period, Hezbollah repeatedly announced that it was focused on reconstructing damaged areas, resettling displaced persons, and politically organizing its internal situation; moreover, it did not demonstrate any direct military response to Zionist regime attacks during this time—a fact that reinforced the perception that Hezbollah would not engage in confrontation.”
The Wisdom of the Shiite Movement in Lebanon and Its Challenges
This analyst, referring to the role of the “Amal” and Hezbollah coalition in Lebanon, emphasized: “The strategic wisdom of the Shiite movement in Lebanon enabled Hezbollah to pursue military operations. In this regard, the proposal to suspend Lebanese parliamentary elections for one year—initially put forward by France and Saudi Arabia—was transformed, through the wisdom of Nabih Berri, into a two-year suspension. This decision freed Hezbollah from focusing on electoral competition and internal matters, allowing it to redirect its energy toward other domains.”
Moshtaqi continued: “The suspension of elections also alleviated Hezbollah’s concerns regarding the participation of southern displaced persons in voting, as Lebanese law requires citizens to vote in their place of birth. On the other hand, Hezbollah endeavored to avoid internal political confrontations and even adopted a conciliatory approach in the face of hostile media and political actions by certain factions. Furthermore, domestic opponents have not yet reached a level of audacity that would enable them to undertake military or security actions against this group.”
Describing Hezbollah’s current situation, he stated: “This group has currently concentrated its capabilities and capacities in two domains: social and military-security. In the social sphere, managing displaced persons—particularly following the loss of Syria’s geographical support—has become one of its serious challenges. Additionally, the high number of martyrs and wounded among supporters of the Resistance has exerted significant pressure on this movement.”
According to Moshtaqi, approximately 1,500 Lebanese citizens who are supporters of the Resistance have been martyred in Lebanon over the past 40 days, with over 4,000 wounded, and millions displaced alongside them.
He added: “Considering that approximately 60 percent of Lebanon’s population supports the Resistance, with Shiites constituting 30 percent of this base, social pressure remains extremely high.”
This expert further emphasized: “Despite these conditions, Hezbollah has continued to conduct military operations in Lebanon—operations that, within a geography under constant surveillance and attacks by the Zionist regime, have been exceedingly difficult, yet are being carried out daily, extensively, and with special initiatives.”
He added: “A significant portion of Lebanese society views this war not as a sign of weakness but as an indication of Hezbollah’s resurgence and demonstration of power; contrary to certain attacks and damages, public perception of this group has not turned negative.”
Lebanon’s Political Conditions Favor Hezbollah
This former diplomat, regarding the Lebanese government’s position, stated: “If we examine the government through the framework of the army, presidency, and premiership, it cannot be said that the dominant approach is anti-Hezbollah. Although some factions seek to constrain this group, conditions for practical action against it are not feasible.”
He continued: “Anti-Hezbollah actions are primarily undertaken by factions such as the ‘Lebanese Forces’ band led by Samir Geagea and certain ministers; these actions are often framed as national initiatives, as otherwise, they would not dare to implement them as direct confrontation with Hezbollah.”
Moshtaqi emphasized: “Hezbollah is currently part of the Lebanese governmental structure; together with the Amal Movement, it holds five ministerial portfolios in the government and maintains influence within the army and security apparatuses. Therefore, the Lebanese government cannot be considered absolutely anti-Hezbollah.”
He concluded by noting: “Regarding the presidency as well, given the moderate and rational approach of Joseph Aoun, Hezbollah is not regarded as an enemy; indeed, in certain instances, the hardline positions of Youssef Raji are moderated. Furthermore, reports indicate that the Prime Minister has, in some cases, sought to avoid provocative actions by Raji against Hezbollah.”
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