The Cradle
It was a name that moved from the economic shadows to the forefront of political decision-making at an extremely sensitive moment for Iraq, prompting questions before it gained acceptance.
Coming from the world of trade and banking investment, Zaidi had never previously left a visible mark on Iraq’s political scene. Yet his wide network of relations across the Iraqi political spectrum gives him, at the same time, the advantage of “apparent neutrality” and the dilemma of having no traditional political base.
Despite his extensive connections across the country’s diverse political landscape, a parallel “working relationship" quietly expanded access to Washington’s otherwise closed institutional circles.
Sources indicate that this was enabled by prominent US banker Dennis Edward Flannery, who advised Zaidi’s South Islamic Bank for over two years. He later became vice chairman of the bank, with a focus on compliance and international standards.
He also has experience working with the US Treasury, notably serving as a financial attaché at the US Embassy in Baghdad earlier in his career.
This layered relationship – combining political access across Iraq’s internal spectrum with institutional familiarity in western financial and regulatory circles – further strengthened Zaidi’s profile as a figure capable of navigating both local complexity and international expectations, reinforcing the perception that he may be uniquely positioned for a system seeking a new form of executive leadership.
Behind the nomination: international intersections in Baghdad
Nine days before the nomination, Esmail Qaani, commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ Quds Force, arrived in Baghdad. The visit followed the announcement of a ceasefire in West Asia and the Persian Gulf. According to some sources, the visit had been postponed more than once because of the regional confrontation and the security risks of traveling from Iran to Iraq.
Hours before Qaani’s arrival, political circles in Baghdad and Erbil circulated reports of a simultaneous visit to the Iraqi capital by the US ambassador in Ankara and by Special Envoy for Syria Tom Barrack.
Two figures who stood on opposite sides, yet both were responsible for the same file: Iraq.
At the time, a great deal of noise spread among observers, analysts, and those concerned with the country’s political affairs. It stemmed from what can be described as a “test of sovereignty,” the kind of test that has recurred at every decisive stage in the formation of power in Iraq since 2003.
Tehran’s envoy arrived while Washington’s envoy did not. Instead, he limited himself to several phone calls and directed the US chargé d’affaires in Baghdad to manage Washington’s perception of the final week of the constitutional deadline for naming the prime minister-designate. That responsibility belonged to the largest parliamentary bloc in Iraq’s Council of Representatives, the Coordination Framework.
The difficult process inside the Framework
On 10 April, after Nizar Amidi was elected president of the republic, the Coordination Framework began to exhaust the constitutional deadline for nominating a prime minister-designate, which the constitution sets at 15 days.
Weeks earlier, on 24 January, the Coordination Framework had unanimously put forward the name of Nouri al-Maliki for a third term as prime minister. Three days later, however, Maliki’s nomination collided with a post by US President Donald Trump on his Truth Social platform. In it, Trump threatened Iraq with a difficult period and US–Iraq disengagement if Maliki remained the candidate.
From that moment, the selection process entered a complex phase in which external wills and internal calculations intersected more clearly than at any previous stage.
Later Coordination Framework meetings were characterized by confusion, analysis, and multiple complex scenarios. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) backed efforts to mediate with Washington to persuade the Trump administration of the Framework’s stance.
In Kurdistan's political landscape, hawks favored Maliki over Mohammed Shia al-Sudani as an alternative candidate. However, the mediation failed to materialize when a split emerged within the Framework: some supported escalating their stance with Washington, while others argued, "We must adapt to the possibility of a president who might act on his warnings and threats.”
The Sudani option also began to weaken due to the “side effects” of the regional war. Most notable among them was his inability, while heading a caretaker government, to stop attacks on US and western interests in both Baghdad and the Kurdistan Region.
The Americans were working on an alternative approach, while the Iranians were deeply engaged in a severe existential war. In that specific gap, the focus shifted to finding a “third name” that would not directly conflict with either party.
The emergence of the ‘man of numbers’
Away from the spotlight, Iraqi judicial efforts, led by Judge Faiq Zaidan, president of the Supreme Judicial Council, began to surface.
According to The Cradle's sources, these efforts sought to strike a balance amid the political deadlock and to guide the chaos toward more stable conditions amid a storm of regional, international, and internal disputes. The goal was to establish common ground and soften the intensity of confrontations.
As disagreements within the Coordination Framework continued over two other names – Bassem al-Badri and Ihsan al-Awadi – the constitutional deadline was approaching. On the thirteenth day of the deadline, a group of Framework leaders moved toward choosing Badri. A press conference had even been prepared to announce his name, but it was postponed at the last moment.
The constitutional deadline passed. On 25 April, a tense meeting took place at Hammam Hammoudi's home. That evening concluded in yet another setback, which many knowledgeable about Iraq’s internal matters linked to the uncertainty over whether the question of “war and peace" was settled in the US-Israeli war on Iran.
Two days later, an opening quickly appeared at sunset in Baghdad. The evening of surprise arrived, and Ali Faleh al-Zaidi – the “man of numbers” – was officially presented as a compromise candidate. Most Coordination Framework leaders voted for him.
Reactions and international recognition
Since 2003, Iraq’s political system has shown no sign that non-politicians could hold sovereign legislative or executive roles. These positions have stayed with political figures supported by parties and popular support capable of electing MPs to the Iraqi parliament.
A number of Iraqi political leaders described the step as “in the right direction,” while others remained silent for hours. Positive reactions then came from across the political spectrum, signaling a new stage in the mentality of “leadership” and raising questions about the change in the general political mood.
The first cautious hours passed in silence from Iraqi factions on one side and Washington on the other. This was accompanied by an almost positive regional and international perception following calls by leaders in the Persian Gulf and Europe, along with posts and statements from Arab and western states.
At that time, Zaidi – as one figure close to the Coordination Framework put it – was certain that his mission still awaited a final decision from Washington and Tehran.
The US embassy welcomed the selection of Zaidi. For the first time in months, the embassy statement did not include a demand that Iran distance itself from the Iraqi scene.
On 30 April, Zaidi received a phone call from Trump. The US president did not wait for the Iraqi parliament to vote on Zaidi’s cabinet, in what amounted to an unprecedented diplomatic practice. Hours later, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi announced in a post on X that Tehran supported the decision of the Iraqis and wished Zaidi success in his mission.
After that, telegrams of congratulations and support poured in for the “man of numbers” from Arab, regional, and international sources. Iraqi political rivals appeared to give a blank check to the idea of “Zaidi.”
The scene reminded many of the support that self-appointed Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa (formerly known as Al-Qaeda and ISIS commander Abu Muhammad al-Julani) received.
Perhaps Zaidi, with his background in finance and investment, received information or opportunities at a faster pace than Sharaa, who came from a background of militancy and terrorism.
Features of the new government: technocrats and the economy
From Baghdad to Erbil, Zaidi landed in an atmosphere of unprecedented positivity and welcome. The same atmosphere prevailed during his visit to Sulaymaniyah.
Upon his return to Baghdad, Zaidi began a series of high-level political meetings to select the names of his ministerial cabinet, which he will present, according to informed sources within the Framework, in the middle of this month.
The Cradle examined various opinions on the anticipated structure of this cabinet. The consensus centered on Zaidi’s call for fresh faces in Iraq’s leadership: technocrats, young individuals, and those characterized by an economic and developmental focus. He also outlined his primary condition: “no political interference” in his government agenda.
If realized, this condition would establish a precedent in a governing environment that is more used to dividing influence than creating programs.
Other sources within the Coordination Framework suggest expanding Zaidi’s cabinet by three additional posts for ministers without ministries, who would serve as deputy prime ministers. The aim would be to facilitate the government’s passage through parliament and satisfy the political blocs under a win-win formula.
Conflict of interest and accumulated debts
Zaidi originates from the South Islamic Bank and holds investments across various sectors that collaborate with the public sector. His case has been likened to notable international and Arab figures, including former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, and U.S. President Donald Trump.
Through his economic bloc, Zaidi has placed the caretaker government in an awkward position because of accumulated financial dues owed by the government for services and investment projects implemented in previous years.
Iraqi reporting has also pointed to one of the most sensitive files facing Zaidi’s expected government: the conflict between his commercial interests and the state. According to the independent Iraqi outlet Jummar, financial data indicate that Zaidi has substantial outstanding receivables from state institutions, estimated at more than four trillion dinars, resulting from contracts and equipment linked to the Ministry of Trade.
This places him in the position of a creditor to the state, while part of his business activity still depends on government contracts, revealing a high level of overlap between the two sides.
In response, Zaidi announced that his government would be primarily concerned with addressing the balance of Iraq’s faltering economy. He said his main mission is to build a government that restores Iraq’s financial health, which has been damaged by several factors: the rentier economy, the effects of the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, the disruption of hard currency flows from Washington, and the imbalance in the management of public funds.
A survey conducted by The Cradle among various political partners and rivals in Iraq indicated that Zaidi enjoys broad acceptance, unlike the usual Iraqi patterns. This acceptance is driven by international and regional support, as well as an internal need to fulfill constitutional obligations.
Zaidi on a thin rope
Although the international support Zaidi received was synchronized and smooth, it does not constitute a settled arrangement. It signals backing for a temporary de-escalation phase.
Washington, preoccupied with reordering its priorities in West Asia, does not appear inclined to open a new, uncalculated front of tension in Iraq. Tehran, burdened by the cost of the regional conflict, is seeking to establish points of balance to prevent the Iraqi arena from sliding into uncalculated chaos.
These overlapping interests may hold for now, but they leave the rivalry intact. Zaidi’s task is to draw enough strength from the consensus that brought him forward without being trapped by it – and to preserve the room he needs to maneuver at home and abroad.
Internally, Zaidi’s mission appears more complicated than the general atmosphere of welcome suggests. Iraq’s political system is based on overlapping networks of influence that extend from political parties and armed factions to the economy and the bureaucratic administration.
The absence of a political base may give Zaidi flexibility in movement, but it also deprives him of the traditional tools of pressure used by those before him to manage balances.
On security, the most pressing question is whether Zaidi can bring armed activity under the authority of the state, or whether he will be forced into the familiar Iraqi bargain of containing the factions rather than confronting them.
The question is all the more urgent because some of these factions are tied to regional dynamics that no Iraqi government can fully control.
Economically, the challenges appear clearer, but they are not easier.
Restoring financial stability, diversifying income sources, and navigating the intricate relationship with the international financial system all demand bold decisions. However, each of these efforts can quickly confront political realities.
In light of these facts, three possible paths can be drawn for Zaidi’s government.
The first path is conditional success. In this scenario, Zaidi manages to pass his government by preserving the balance and benefiting from a critical regional moment, but without achieving fundamental breakthroughs.
The second path is gradual stumbling. Here, internal contradictions begin to surface, especially during the first real security or economic test, leading to the erosion of political support.
The third path is an early clash. This would occur if the international mood shifts or regional tensions escalate, with direct repercussions inside Iraq and pressure that could push his government toward collapse.
Beyond all these calculations, one question prevails:
Did Ali Faleh al-Zaidi emerge as a genuine consensus candidate within the Coordination Framework, or as the product of converging international and regional interests whose absence has long obstructed Iraq’s political path?
The answer will not come with the nomination or even the vote of confidence. It will come later, in Zaidi’s ability to manage the balances that follow – the hardest task in a political system built as much on contradiction as on consensus.
West Asia is increasingly led by figures born in the 1980s, a generation formed at the threshold between two eras: one before the noise of technology and another defined by total digitization.
In Zaidi’s case, that generational profile now meets Iraq’s oldest political test – whether adaptability can survive a system where every consensus carries the seeds of its next contradiction.
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