Hezbollah’s military thinking is layered, cumulative, and difficult to penetrate. No academic researcher, and not even an intelligence analyst, can credibly claim to have gathered all its components, analyzed them in full, or understood how they interact.
That complexity also shapes how the party learns and extracts lessons. Hezbollah’s added advantage, however, is the speed with which it adapts. The clearest evidence is the change in its security and military performance between two wars separated by only 15 months — a period in which the party remained under continuous fire.
The 2024 war forced Hezbollah into a painful review of how it fought, how it deployed, and how much of its command structure could survive when the opening blows came hard and fast. The lessons were not drawn in seminar rooms, but by fighters and commanders who had lived the previous battle, absorbed its losses, and then found themselves preparing for the next one before the smoke had cleared.
This account rests on interviews conducted over roughly a year after the 2024 war with Hezbollah security and military officials. They say no visual or audio documentation can be presented because of the latest “harsh security lessons.” Israel was conducting its own review at the same time, using the final months before the renewed confrontation to rehearse for a long, multi-front war that Hezbollah and Iran were watching closely.
Fighting from 2024 to 2026
In Tel Aviv’s planning view, the southern Lebanon battlefield is divided into two sectors: eastern and western. Its divisions are deployed accordingly, based on the type of force each sector requires and on near-compulsory entry routes imposed by the terrain — routes that have shaped the battlefield since 1978.
Hezbollah divides the south differently, into three sectors: western, central, and eastern. Responsibility is split between the Nasr Unit, which handles the eastern and central sectors south of the Litani River, and the Aziz Unit, which covers the western sector. The Badr Unit, now heavily discussed again in Israeli commentary during the 2026 confrontation, is responsible for the area north of the Litani.
The Radwan forces were among Israel’s central concerns in the previous war, when it demanded that they be pushed north of the Litani. Their presence has returned to Israeli discussion in the current war, with claims in early March that around 1,000 fighters were active. But Radwan is not tied to a fixed territory. It is an elite force that can be redeployed according to the needs of each battle.
The figure of 1,000 Radwan fighters cited by Israel comes from its own claim that 2,500 members of the unit remained combat-capable after the 2024 war, out of an original force of 5,000, most of whom were wounded in the pager and walkie-talkie attacks of September that year.
By Israel’s own account, then, another 1,500 Radwan fighters have yet to enter the battle. Hezbollah does not comment on these figures, either publicly or in the private meetings conducted for this article and series.
What stands out in discussions of numbers, however, is a repeated observation made by several planning commanders — including those working on information files — and by field commanders who fought in 2006, Syria, the “support” front, and the 2024 battle of the ‘Possessors of Great Strength.' They agree that the large number of fighters placed on alert along the front in 2024 sometimes obstructed operations and contributed to losses and martyrdoms.
A planning commander tells The Cradle:
“There is an area that can only hold, for example, eight brothers for defense... Any extra brother is effectively a martyr or wounded. In Uli al-Ba’s [Possessors of Great Strength], there was a major rush on several fronts that could not be controlled, and this is what increased the number of martyrs.”
A field commander puts the problem more concretely: “During my rounds, I would see excess numbers of fighters to the point that there were not enough trees for them to hide under... The lesson lies in studying the place, understanding the human need, movement lines, and the possibility of camouflage.”
By contrast, what stands out in this war — at least in the Israeli narrative — is repeated talk of smaller groups, usually no more than five or six fighters, and sometimes only three or four at forward points, particularly in ambushes. That suggests the lesson was absorbed. In Hezbollah’s own accounts, supply and rotation lines for fighters also improved and worked more effectively in the 2026 war.
Many of the villages and towns that witnessed fierce clashes in 2024 returned to the battlefield in 2026, though some names were absent because of the massive destruction Israel inflicted during the 15 months of the previous ceasefire agreement.
Adaisseh, a first-line confrontation point, saw intense clashes in the previous war but not in the current one, while Khiam was central in both. Taybeh and Rabb al-Thalathine in the eastern sector saw medium-intensity clashes in 2024 but became much hotter fronts this time. Beit Lif, the legendary Bint Jbeil, and Ainatha, among others, also stood out more clearly in the current round.
Even so, in both wars, Hezbollah worked to ensure that confrontation remained present along the main axes and within specific villages and towns, even if only to obstruct the enemy, for both symbolic and operational reasons.
Bayyadah, Maqam Shamaa, and the Ramiyeh–Qouzah–Aita al-Shaab triangle in the western sector remained active, as did Yaroun and Maroun al-Ras in the central sector, and Houla and Markaba in the east.
According to the former field commander, it was decided that each area would be handled on the basis that “the brothers would perform their duty there until their last breath,” or withdraw from it, based on fire cover from the second and third echelons in the confrontation, using new tools.
“In other words, any spot emptied of resistance will not necessarily be empty of resistance, because there are several means of dealing with the Israeli army there.”
As for the decision — whether to remain until the last breath, to hit and run, or to withdraw to another position or facility — it was left to the fighters on the ground to make autonomously and personally.
Lessons of the previous war
Because of the severe blows at the start of the war — the pagers and the assassination of commanders — along with the atmosphere of security suspicion around all devices, the disruption of parts of the command chain, and gaps in several missions, the defensive plan did not function well during the first month of the 66-day confrontation.
In the second month, the pattern became clearer. Hezbollah’s losses began to fall, while casualties among Israeli soldiers and vehicles increased with greater precision and effectiveness. For this reason, The Cradle’s conversations with cadres revealed frustration over the timing of the ceasefire agreement and what followed on the ground.
One commander says:
“With our full commitment to our assignment, the truce came at a time when we had begun to keep pace with the front and its requirements... Anyone who works in the military knows how difficult it is to stop when the fighter has regained the initiative. Even our use of qualitative missiles was subject to the organizational decision, not personal assessment.”
Based on the details gathered from these sources, the confrontation can be divided into two phases.
During the first month, in the first-echelon villages, there were individual clashes with the occupation, or clashes involving groups that had remained steadfast there. But a full, coordinated defensive plan was difficult to implement. Field improvisation dominated, especially because communication had been cut with many fighters.
In the second- and third-echelon villages, anti-armor fire was difficult because of intensive drone and warplane activity, the absence of Hezbollah air and naval defenses, and Israel’s deliberate preemptive bombing of any hill overlooking the battlefield, even if it had not been used, to deny the resistance any benefit from it.
The first month, in short, offered no possibility of establishing a clear defensive pattern, militarily or in security terms. The months of the “support” front during Operation Al-Aqsa Flood had already seen systematic Israeli efforts to prevent Hezbollah from forming any defensive operating pattern.
During the second month, clashes in the first-echelon villages intensified in accordance with the principle of “meeting” the enemy. This did not necessarily mean holding villages and towns in a static way. Fighters would withdraw or lie in wait inside a facility, then return to fight after heavy bombardment.
The effort often resembled martyrdom-style action. This pattern intensified in the western sector, while in the eastern and central sectors, “meeting” the enemy was harder because of exposed terrain and limited means. But whoever survived the bombardment continued to engage once enemy forces approached.
In the second- and third-echelon villages, the work of the Kornet and Almas teams improved noticeably, especially in the western sector — Blat, Zibqin, and other areas — where better visibility and easier firing allowed more tanks to be targeted.
Fighters would suddenly emerge from areas not recorded in the original defensive plan, as an additional security measure, then withdraw quickly. This newly developed tactic proved effective. The sources decline to publish the name of the force that carried it out.
By the second month, fire support from north of the Litani had also intensified and diversified, causing major Israeli losses, many of which were never announced.
The resistance’s own scorched earth
The final stage of the previous war included details now being disclosed for the first time, both in their nature and scale. Their effects became apparent quickly in the current war after further improvements and new techniques were introduced. When Israel’s “scorched earth” approach made direct engagement impossible in many positions before any incursion, Hezbollah began developing its own version within the limits of its capabilities.
Alongside the reconnaissance fed back by fighters on the ground who could still reach command, Hezbollah began using its own strikes to gather live battlefield intelligence. Each hit became a way to identify nearby vehicles, rescue teams, redeploying soldiers, or new positions — and then strike them again. This produced what sources describe as a compound method of action known as “parallel reconnaissance.”
For example, when an attack drone is launched against vehicles, its imaging is live, not recorded, and can be jammed — or when an Almas missile is fired, with live transmission and possible recording because it is controlled by fiber optics, that drone or missile transmits a live image of the wider position or adjacent vehicles.
At the same moment, coordinates are passed to artillery and rocket units north of the river: another position, nearby vehicles, rescue forces, or soldiers redeploying. These units need only minutes to enter the coordinates and hit the forces again.
To carry this out, Hezbollah used a two-stage pattern.
The first strike could be carried out by an attack drone with a 10–35 kg warhead, an Almas missile with a 7–15 kg warhead, or a Kornet with a range of 4–10 km. Its task was to land the first hit, inflict losses, and transmit new coordinates.
The second strike could be carried out by artillery of various calibers — 81, 105, 120, or 130 mm, depending on the required range — or by 107 mm rockets, the small Katyusha or Fajr-1 with a range of 12 km, 122 mm Grad rockets with a range of 20–40 km, upgraded Grad rockets with fragmentation warheads that disperse shrapnel before impact, or more advanced missiles such as Fajr-5, Malak-1 and 2, or Fadi-1 and 2. Their purpose was to deliver the second hit, then repeat the cycle.
If the first strike fails to produce confirmed losses, the second is designed to do so. And even when neither lands decisively, the attacking force is still thrown off balance, the advance loses momentum, and fighters along the contact lines gain the opening they need to move or strike.
In the final weeks of the war, Hezbollah used the “second strike/subsequent strikes” pattern in ways Israel did not expect, and which would become the anticipated solution. It used cruise missiles, for example, against forces advancing into Yaroun; Nasr-1 and Nasr-2 missiles against forces in Mays al-Jabal; and Fadi-1 and Fadi-2 missiles, as well as Noor and Qader-1 and 2 ballistic missiles, against forces in Khiam.
According to one operations-room account, the resistance recorded 150 Israeli soldiers killed or wounded in a single strike on Khiam. But the live feed showed that many of the faces appeared “Asian,” leading to an assessment that they were mercenaries previously observed during the 2023 standoff over Hezbollah’s reconnaissance tents near the occupied Shebaa Farms.
Numerically, Hezbollah recorded hundreds of fires of this kind, with confirmed hits on more than 66 tanks and vehicles by the end of November 2024, in addition to dozens of troop gatherings in open areas or inside houses, where a special type of Kornet was used.
At the time, Hezbollah’s official tally from 17 September to 27 November 2024 was 1,666 military operations, including 1,285 rocket attacks, 93 artillery fires, 166 drone attacks, and 86 guided-missile attacks using Kornet and similar systems.
Regarding rocket fire launched from south of the river until the end of the war, one fighter tells The Cradle:
“I had the opportunity to change the launcher’s location with every strike, but we decided to take the challenge to the highest level. We would fire from the same point three or four times despite repeated airstrikes on it. We worked in a pattern that made the occupation literally sick of this war ... We had to make it feel that it was repeating the same mission more than once with no result.”
The field result was that any Israeli army position, or anything resembling a semi-base, became a direct target and a “danger zone.” This explains Israel’s inability to occupy some villages and towns, despite the martyrdom of their entire garrisons, such as Adaisseh. It also explains how Hezbollah was able, in the final weeks, to move support forces through to places such as Khiam.
Israel, by contrast, followed a fixed sequence: enter after intensive fire-clearing, rush engineering units in to mine and demolish buildings, take showpiece photographs, then withdraw quickly. If the Israelis failed to kill the resistance fighters inside, they would quickly call in aircraft to bomb the entire building.
Resistance fighters attributed the speed of these airstrikes to the fact that every Israeli company commander had a drone — a Hermes, for example — directly under his command in the sky. This did not recur in the same way in the current war because of the confrontation with Iran, but Hezbollah also had its own solutions.
Heroism and surprises
Striking incidents were recorded in first-echelon towns outside the calculations of “operations.” In Yaroun, for example, contact was lost for more than a week with two groups of 13 fighters, and they were presumed martyred. After nine days of total silence, Israel announced that two tanks had been hit by anti-armor missiles in the same village.
Communication later returned with some of the fighters there, confirming that they were alive. They continued fighting for nearly a month until all of them were martyred. It also became clear that many of those bombed by aircraft had survived, although some remained trapped for weeks under rubble or inside small tunnels near the houses.
In Rabb Thalathin, the occupation discovered an underground facility extending for two kilometers. It released poison gas inside, then mined and detonated it using robots. Israeli soldiers were then surprised when six fighters who had taken shelter at the end of the facility emerged.
Three were martyred in the clash, while three others managed to withdraw. The occupation later blew up the facility completely, in what was almost the largest explosion in the south during the 2024 war, resembling the Qantara explosion of 2026.
There was also the well-known clash at Maqam Shamaa, in which a historical-biblical researcher who had entered the area with occupation soldiers was killed. According to the same sources, the fighting was not limited to the two martyrs who slipped inside the shrine. Other resistance fighters outside the site also joined the clash before withdrawing safely.
In the Qouzah–Ramiyeh–Aita al-Shaab triangle, a major explosive-device ambush struck Israeli vehicles. As several withdrew, they were hit with Kornet missiles. Some of those we interviewed saw the vehicles burning completely, quickly sent the coordinates to artillery before withdrawing, and the fleeing and rescue forces were then hit with “seven consecutive rocket salvos,” forcing Israel to withdraw at night through other routes toward Bayyadah.
On the explosive devices, a planning source says:
“In some cases, the devices were planted shortly before the confrontations. The reason is that a large part of the devices had either been exposed to the occupation in security terms, disabled by jamming technologies, detonated during fire belts, or were present but not armed at the right time. If 10 percent of the devices prepared in the war plan had exploded, no Israeli army would have remained in the south.”
Villages such as Houla, Markaba, and Maroun al-Ras also witnessed point-blank clashes involving defensive forces and other Radwan fighters. “Unfortunately, there was documentation, even from GoPro cameras,” a field source says, “but it was either damaged or later seized by the occupation.”
Among the observations recorded by resistance fighters while retrieving martyrs and wounded was that most had only 10 to 20 bullets left, meaning they had fought a real engagement before being targeted. One fighter adds: “Most of what we have are rifles and B7 shells. In some groups there are PKS machine guns, sniper rifles, and some Sijjil explosive devices.”
On the latter, the fighter explains: “This is a distinctive explosive device that the party worked for years to develop. When activated, it flies into the air and explodes to cause the largest number of fatal injuries.” It differs from the Palestinian version of Sijjil.
The resistance also benefited from the weather in October and November. It eased movement, helped the arrival of men and supplies, and made fire support more effective. Israel, by contrast, struggled to move its vehicles through the same conditions and brought in fast, light ATV vehicles, adapting in a way that itself resembled guerrilla warfare.
In villages such as Dhayra and Yarin, whose residents are Sunni, and Ain Ebel, Debel, and Rmeish, which are Christian, Hezbollah’s leadership decided to avoid engagement entirely. This was partly because residents were still present, and partly because of Lebanese internal considerations. Israel exploited this and advanced from the edges of those villages, a pattern it repeated in the following war.
In a well-known operation that resistance sources call the Adaisseh municipality ambush, two martyrs in particular — Abdullah Noureddine and Issa Jawad-Mirza — are said to have lured occupation forces at the start of their incursion and detonated explosive devices along a compulsory route, as soldiers sought to take a photograph beside the municipality building.
How Israel prepared for a multi-front war
As Hezbollah worked through the lessons of the previous war, Israel was conducting its own review. In the final six months of 2025, it carried out a series of integrated maneuvers and drew on the experience of the 12-day war with Iran, in which Hezbollah did not intervene. For Israel’s security establishment, that raised the possibility that the party might again stay out of a future confrontation.
Among these maneuvers was the large “Dawn” exercise in the occupied West Bank on Sunday, 10 August 2025, followed quickly by a naval exercise in the Red Sea off Eilat on 19 August. Also significant were the exercises along the Lebanese–Syrian–Golan strip from 19 to 23 October, and the aerial-refueling drills over Greece on 3 November.
Other exercises were held in the West Bank, including Lion’s Roar on 10 November, as well as parachute-landing drills that continued until February 2026 in an operational environment resembling the Bekaa and southern Lebanon. There were also exercises to repel a naval landing in the north and operations against gas platforms. All remained under the eyes of Hezbollah in Lebanon, as well as Iran, which had already anticipated a surprise attack in September 2025.
'Dawn' in the West Bank
The surprise “Dawn” exercise — Alot HaShachar — appears to have been among the most important of the drills because of its scale and the scenarios it rehearsed. Israeli reports said the exercise, launched on 10 August under Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir, tested the readiness of the General Staff and main command centers for a broad, complex, multi-arena event.
The exercise was not part of the declared annual schedule. It fell within what Israeli doctrine calls “Surprise Operational Tests,” an internal mechanism for measuring army readiness for multi-front emergency scenarios without prior notice to participating units.
The scenario simulated a wide, coordinated attack from the Jordanian-Palestinian border, involving ground infiltration through three main points along the eastern border, from the north through the central Jordan Valley and down to Wadi Araba in the south. It was an almost symbolic replay of the gaps exposed by Operation Al-Aqsa Flood.
Alongside the ground simulation, the scenario included explosive-drone attacks on Ramon Airport in the far south and long-range missile launches from Iran and Yemen, testing whether Israel’s air-defense systems could manage a multi-layered defense scenario.
Despite its performative character, Hebrew coverage pointed to real gaps in Israel’s rapid-response system. After the “Dawn” drill, a senior Israeli army officer said that although no 7 October-type failures had been found, the exercise exposed the difficulty of mobilizing large air, sea, and ground forces at short notice, especially when several threats unfold at once. In infiltration or fence-breach scenarios, he said, commanders have only a “30 to 60 minute window” to concentrate forces and block the threat.
Initial results showed that the deployment of ground and air reinforcements along the Jordanian border axis was slower than required. Some population centers near the border were left, according to the scenario, to face the threat alone until forces arrived, recalling the collapse of the defensive system around the Gaza envelope.
All of this pushed the General Staff toward immediate recommendations to develop the Emergency Readiness Plan, including advanced intervention centers along the eastern border and an expanded early-warning network in peripheral population areas.
Golan and Lebanon-border exercises
Forces of the 91st Division, responsible for the Lebanese strip from Ras al-Naqoura to the Shebaa Farms, carried out a comprehensive field maneuver over five consecutive days, from 19 to 23 October 2025. These are the same forces, most of which are fighting in southern Lebanon in the latest war.
According to information gathered from open sources, aerial imagery, and eyewitness accounts, the maneuver appears to have begun two to two and a half weeks before its official start date. Initial preparations were already visible in the final days of September, with activity underway by the beginning of October 2025.
What stands out is that the high command classified it as the first full divisional exercise conducted since the outbreak of war on 7 October 2023. It was based on the assumption of a multi-arena confrontation and designed to test the readiness and operational capacity of a full divisional formation under time and field pressures resembling real combat.
The scenarios included intensive rocket attacks, infiltration attempts, fighting inside populated areas, and procedures for shifting from maximum defense to organized attack after reserves were assembled and forces deployed. It resembled the model Israel had been anticipating since Hezbollah entered the confrontation.
Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir personally led field assessment visits to inspect command and control and the flow of information between command levels. Notably, armed units at the level of every settlement and kibbutz appeared among the participating cadres.
Their role was not limited to securing and evacuating civilians; it also included support and integration with army units in the event of engagement, maneuver, and withdrawal. This points to permanent preparation for a land or naval incursion by Hezbollah.
Even so, the exercise revealed weaknesses in rear structures, especially the continuity of command-and-control channels under jamming or partial disruption. This pushed those in charge to recommend strengthening self-protection mechanisms for vital systems and backup communications cells.
The intensity of the training showed that the 91st Division was being used to lead an integrated divisional maneuver model, drawing on its long experience in the north. The division command submitted operational reports on the need to improve rapid movement across multiple axes and reduce exposure to attacks during redeployment.
The circumstances of the maneuver suggest that the Israeli army was engineering a battlefield scenario aimed at creating a flanking breakthrough from the Syrian-Lebanese border strip, across several axes in the south, alongside scenarios for aerial and naval landings on Lebanese territory.
The exercise also clearly integrated support, logistics, and field-medicine systems inside the theater of operations. It tested procedures for evacuating the wounded under fire and activating flexible supply lines able to recover quickly after being targeted. It also included forward support stations capable of field maintenance, ammunition resupply, and replacement of damaged mobility assets within a short time.
The Greece air maneuver
On 3 November 2025, the Israeli air force carried out joint air maneuvers with its Greek counterpart in Greek airspace, focused on aerial refueling, one of the most technically and operationally complex forms of training.
The maneuver took place within the annual training program between the two sides and lasted for long hours, during which dozens of Greek fighter jets were refueled in flight. The exercise simulated long-range operations requiring aircraft to remain airborne for extended periods without returning to ground bases.
The training was led by Squadron 120 of the Israeli air force, which is responsible for aerial refueling and strategic transport missions. This was a real indicator of an approaching major air operation.
Tactically, aerial refueling is not merely the transfer of fuel. It is a precise operation involving timing, fixed distances, and stable speeds between aircraft. This explains why the Israeli and Greek air forces repeat these maneuvers three to four times a year to raise readiness and operational synchronization.
The timing of this maneuver, less than a month after other Israeli air force drills over the Mediterranean on 10 October 2025, pointed to an escalating training pattern focused on improving long-range operations and updating tactics for sustained flight.
‘Lion’s Roar’ in the West Bank
Based on the assessments of “Dawn,” a wide maneuver ‘Lion’s Roar’ was held in the West Bank from 10 to 12 November 2025, with the participation of at least two divisions, including the 96th, activated during 2025 and tasked with eastern-border missions, alongside air support, special units, engineering units, and personnel from the Shin Bet and police.
After lessons were drawn, the maneuver focused on three operational axes: reducing the time between detection and engagement by improving ISR and command-and-control networks; strengthening mobility and combat-engineering capabilities to prevent the adversary from exploiting terrain; and regulating interoperability between the army and police to ensure a coordinated, effective response.
No comments:
Post a Comment