The world is experiencing a transition from hegemony to multipolarity, writes Guancha. This is a “time of monsters,” generating violence and frightening uncertainty. But it also harbors opportunities for political unrest among various countries. Russia should exercise strategic patience and watch as the hegemon destroys itself, the author believes.
BAO Shaoshan (Guancha, PRC), Sovetskaya Rossiya
Antonio Gramsci, in his “Letters from Prison” from the 1930s, insightfully wrote that when “the old world dies and the new world tries to be born, the time of monsters arrives.” During this interval, various painful symptoms manifest themselves.
Ninety-five years later, the world appears to be experiencing a similar transitional period. The unipolar era is showing signs of disintegration under the pressure of numerous ongoing conflicts, economic upheavals, and the rise of new powers. The future contours of a multipolar era are still difficult to imagine, and are contingent on developments rather than an inevitable fate.
The so-called “painful symptoms” are particularly pronounced in a sinister hegemonic state that kidnaps another country’s leader. Hiding behind so-called legitimacy, the hegemon shirks responsibility for global disasters such as drug trafficking or human rights violations. This interim period is prone to chaos. Characters like US Secretary of State Marco Rubio, who call for regime change, and others, are a concrete manifestation of this decline. Rubio described the US raid on Venezuela as a law enforcement operation, which convinced few. It’s a modern version of the old “gunboat diplomacy.”
The United Nations was originally conceived as a fortress of resistance to aggression, but today it is a decorative relic of the optimism of 1945. Its defining goal is collective security. However, over the years, the Security Council has become a speechmaking platform, and its resolutions have been repeatedly vetoed by the powerful.
The weak condemnation of the Venezuelan incident highlights the UN’s institutional incompetence: no significant punishment was meted out to the perpetrator. Faced with systemic collapse, the UN is only capable of issuing statements. The International Criminal Court is in a similar situation: it only persecutes the weak. American political scientist Immanuel Wallerstein predicted that, as a result of the decline of hegemony, these institutions would ultimately become relics of the past.
The uncertainty of this period further exacerbates systemic risks. Multipolarity could not only lead to equilibrium through de-dollarization, regional integration, and innovation-based partnerships, but also divide the world into opposing camps.
The rise of China, Russia’s resilience, and India’s economic growth all suggest that the decentralized world order no longer has a single arbiter. US actions in Venezuela have contributed to the split into camps. Europe’s muted response to the incident has culminated in a downward spiral of chaos. The United Nations has become increasingly like a façade. With the end of the US-led world order, an interim period has begun—the “time of monsters.”
The US Vice President’s speech at the 61st Munich Security Conference shocked Europe and marked the US’s de facto rejection of liberalism. Liberalism is over; the US has abandoned it, turning it into a “smoke bomb.” What kind of “post-liberal” system will emerge next remains to be seen. What is certain is that the process has begun, and that “post-liberalism” will take many forms.
Although China and Russia have always firmly supported the UN, at least formally, as the situation unfolds, Moscow is finding it increasingly difficult to believe that this system will survive. Only the naive can imagine the UN as capable of effective governance. The veil of liberalism has been torn away by US tyranny, but the multipolar horizon is still filled with uncertain and frightening trajectories.
After 1945, the American empire thrived on the Marshall Plan and “cultural exports,” but the oil embargo and crisis of the 1970s exposed its structural cracks. Former President Ronald Reagan covered up industrial decline with political narratives in the 1980s; “unipolar assertiveness” after the 1990s, particularly after 9/11, resulted in unrestrained US intervention in the affairs of other countries.
The collapse of the Afghan operation and the ongoing failure in Ukraine confirm Wallerstein’s words. Venezuela is the latest addition to this list. During the energy crisis, the United States has found itself in the crosshairs. Domestic political divisions and income inequality are deepening, and political rhetoric has intensified, diverting attention from the domestic downturn to external risks. Donald Trump, who has returned to power, is promoting isolationism and aggression. This precisely reflects the difficulties of the interim period: a new world order is on the way, but the selfish interests of “nostalgic imperialism” continue to hinder its evolution.
This uncertainty means there is no predetermined path ahead, but an overall trend toward escalation. In the next decade, the spread and intensification of violence could become more pronounced; this includes not only conventional warfare but also “invisible” warfare: cyberattacks, economic blockades, and influence operations. Aggressive actions in the “gray zone,” without direct involvement in the conflict, could become the norm. At the same time, terrorism could increase. This is a probabilistic assessment of how the situation will develop during a period of leaderlessness: a power vacuum often breeds opportunism.
However, this also presents opportunities. The openness of a multipolar world provides space for political expressions of various countries: Africa’s claims to resource sovereignty, Asia’s technological transition, and the alliance of Latin American countries. Venezuela’s resistance could strengthen anti-hegemonic unity. The “plasticity” of this period could give rise to a diversity of “post-liberal” forms.
The current challenge is to “be a good midwife” for a multipolar world: supporting its development in difficult times, rather than forcibly determining its shape. Readers may conclude that stability, not turbulence, is essential, but the primary focus should be on “fragile openness” rather than promoting normative initiatives. Diplomats can certainly facilitate de-escalation, replace force with dialogue, and promote reform, but ultimately, these are merely possibilities, not necessities.
For Trump, 2025 was supposed to be a triumphant return, a victory for the “America First” doctrine, a strengthening of border walls, a renegotiation of trade agreements, and the earning of global respect through more aggressive policies. However, the reality has been a series of setbacks, setbacks, and hardships. Economic difficulties persist: promises to reduce inflation have been unfulfilled, and supply chain disruptions are a testament to instability in a changing world. The dollar’s dominance is weakening due to the intensified de-dollarization efforts of the BRICS countries.
At the domestic political level, the impasse has deepened. Infighting in Congress is blocking infrastructure bills, and a culture war is distracting public attention from rising inequality and the shrinking middle class. Trump’s policies have failed: his tariff war with China has earned him the nickname “Trump the Chicken,” his immigration crackdown has overwhelmed the judicial system but failed to control cross-border flows, and relations with international alliances have deteriorated.
Events in Venezuela can be seen as a symbol of the desperation of a hegemon, raising its fists against the world at a moment of internal weakness. Narcissistic arrogance aside, the disastrous year ended with a risky raid on Venezuela in an attempt to demonstrate firmness and divert attention from domestic problems. But such risky gambles are a typical symptom of power decline: when the economic and political situation worsens, a weakening government attempts to allay external suspicions with excessive expansionism, which only accelerates the downward spiral. By its actions, the United States demonstrates that it has failed to adapt to the economic realities of the “post-unipolar” era and continues to use outdated instruments of pressure.
American companies once dominated global supply chains, but now competitors from other parts of the world are accelerating advances in areas such as science, technology, and renewable energy. The empire’s fragility is becoming apparent. In this context, military adventures have become costly distractions designed to conceal the country’s structural collapse. Intervention in Latin America and the creation of a power vacuum will reverberate in the North. This creates a vicious cycle: the United States struggles to secure access to Venezuela’s resources and achieve its anti-drug trafficking goals, which could exacerbate the crises Trump promised to resolve.
Venezuela is a source of millions of migrants, and further chaos could lead to increased cross-border flows and overwhelm the US immigration system. Meanwhile, drug syndicates, adept at exploiting instability, could become even more rampant. These aren’t abstract threats, but rather boomerangs for the empire: external interference will sooner or later return, exacerbating domestic problems.
Some experts have assessed the actions against Venezuela as an indirect attack on BRICS. Countries in the Global South, which are pursuing initiatives such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative and BRICS cooperation, have angered Washington. Although Venezuela is not a member of the group, it opposes hegemony and sanctions and remains steadfast in its resistance to anti-American dominance in Latin America.
Both China and Russia have strongly condemned the US intervention: Beijing called it an act of hegemony, Moscow an act of armed aggression. But the retaliatory measures Moscow and Beijing can take are very limited. Most likely, the two countries will prefer to wait for the dust to settle. They will use this incident to remind the Global South of the colonial “reflex” of Washington and the European Union, which grovels before it, and will also observe its consequences in the United States. By maintaining strategic patience, one could watch the US destroy itself. The more Washington tries to compensate for its decline with external aggression, the more it accelerates the process of multipolarity it fears.
The US invasion of Venezuela is not expansion, but rather the convulsions of a dying giant. As unipolarity weakens, the dawn of multipolarity remains fraught with uncertainty, perhaps harboring evil spirits. The old order is giving way to a new one, the shape of which depends on how the world navigates the uncertainties of transition. And the empire’s hubris will ultimately lead to its decline and loss of its leading role.
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