By Ali Jezzini
Source: Al Mayadeen English
US forces have amassed in Jordan ahead of a possible war on Iran, aiming to shift early retaliation away from Israelis, and exploit US airpower, while risking strategic miscalculation and overreach.
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This buildup, which can be tracked using publicly available satellite images, comes against the backdrop of Iranian warnings to retaliate against American bases in the region should Washington — or its allies — launch an attack on Iranian territory. It also follows movements of US forces and dependents at several regional posts as a staging for possible offensive operations. The intensification of US deployments has thrust installations like Muwaffaq Salti, long a strategic node in Western forces' deployment in West Asia, into the spotlight as both a potential launch point for attacks and a possible target in any wider conflict.
Why Jordan's Muwaffaq Salti Air Base?
Part of the United States’ increasing focus on Jordan’s Muwaffaq Salti Air Base is not simply due to its distance from Iran’s most accurate short-range ballistic missiles, approximately 800–900 kilometers from Iran’s borders, but also because it may be intended to function as a primary Iranian target, or punching bag, in any initial phase of a wider war.
What follows is an attempt to analyze American strategic thinking, though it does not claim that events will necessarily unfold in this precise manner. From Washington’s perspective, “Israel” remains the crown jewel of the imperial order, an extension of US polity itself. During the most recent phase of confrontation, “Israel” encountered serious difficulties intercepting Iranian ballistic missiles, threats it now equates with nuclear weapons in strategic gravity. This urgency explains the current haste, as Iranians ought to possess much greater defensive capabilities in the future, coupled with the baptism by fire they endured during the June 12-day war.
Destroying Iran’s missile program outright is unrealistic, since large parts of the supply and production chains are dispersed in highly fortified underground facilities. As a result, targeting the Islamic system itself, seeking regime change, and sustaining what the US deems as acceptable costs may appear more logical to American planners. In their calculation, such an outcome would justify heavy losses, provided it ends the conflict definitively.
Israeli claims regarding the self-sufficiency and effectiveness of their air defenses are among the most exaggerated on earth. In reality, NATO intelligence and military capabilities played a decisive role in interception efforts, operating out of Jordan. This included US, Jordanian, and French air forces taking off from Jordanian bases, in addition to extensive intelligence, logistics, and aerial refueling missions done by NATO countries, including the UK.
Israeli leadership attempted to strike early under ideal surprise conditions before defensive gaps accumulated and before they were drawn into a prolonged escalation cycle they could not sustain. Even internal measures, such as preventing Israeli settlers from leaving during the war, reflected an acute awareness of how fragile the situation could become if panic spread; that kind of optics is strategically disastrous for a regime that sells itself as secure, resilient, and permanent.
Most interception during the last confrontation in June 2025 was conducted by US naval assets using SM-3 interceptors and THAAD systems. Roughly 25 percent of all THAAD interceptors ever produced were reportedly consumed in that single episode. The persistent exaggeration of Israeli offensive and defensive capabilities, while significant but short-winded, serves two purposes:
- First, it counters the internal Israeli narrative that the United States "saved Israel" after October 7, a deeply sensitive issue tied to Israeli national security self-perception that panics at the idea of having such a level of dependency on the US.
- Second, it preserves an image of invincibility before regional actors, enhancing the regime's deterrence.
The American assumption is that they would then be able to launch a major air campaign to destroy Iranian missile production, storage, and launch sites. This would pave the way for an Israeli entry into a second phase of the war, one in which it would no longer face missile volumes it cannot absorb, as it almost did in the June war, as it was running out of interceptors after a presumed US airpower success in weakening the system and reducing launch capacity.
From Iran’s standpoint, directly starting with "Israel" may actually be more rational. An Israeli participation in any war appears almost inevitable, either immediately or at a later stage, for multiple reasons.
Despite the massive US buildup, which includes more than 36 F-15Es, an aircraft carrier, and several destroyers with capabilities to launch cruise missiles, Israelis still retain greater immediate regional firepower than the United States, but it seeks to avoid sudden, large-scale damage to its own infrastructure.
American intentions likely go beyond limited bombings, assassinations, or “decapitation” strikes, as seen previously, if their attack would make sense in terms of weighing gains and possible losses. They may include direct strikes targeting the Iranian leadership, severe economic and energy infrastructure degradation, and long-term destabilization designed to enable internal regime change, added to the sanctions.
The withdrawal of American aircraft from Gulf bases was not only due to their vulnerability to short-range, high-precision weapons that Iran's arsenal is full of, but also to protect Gulf oil production in the event of war. Gulf states, for their part, would publicly distance themselves from hostilities to shield their economies and prevent market shocks, particularly to avoid upsetting Trump amid any market volatility.
While it is possible to disrupt US operations at Muwaffaq Salti Air Base, expending large numbers of ballistic missiles there, missiles that could instead strike high-value counter force and counter value Israeli targets, may be less strategically viable than other options if the US is prepared to escalate toward total confrontation regardless. Completely and permanently disabling the base would be difficult, and the strategic outcome would likely remain unchanged.
American planners appear convinced that Iran will avoid targeting Jordanian state infrastructure or attempting to destabilize the Jordanian monarchy, as such actions can be used for counterpropaganda. They assume Iran will focus on Western and Israeli forces, confining hostilities to sparsely populated desert areas that Jordan can absorb.
Jordan, governed by a monarchy heavily dependent on Western and Gulf countries' political and economic support, appears to share this assessment. King Abdullah likely believes his rule faces no serious internal risk and that alignment with Western strategy is the safer course, as his country was credited for being "Israel's" shield against Iranian drones in the June 2025 war.
Under this framework, the US would launch an air campaign using aircraft operating from Jordan to strike western Iran, while carrier-based aircraft in the Arabian Sea attempt to open corridors toward central Iran from the Gulf. This would allow heavy bombers from Diego Garcia to penetrate deeper and strike strategic targets. The Israeli occupation would then enter at a later stage.
The simplest counter-strategy is to do precisely what the Americans do not expect, and to inflict maximum cost. The theory that remains largely unrefuted: Trump is risk-averse. As Western media itself jokes, TACO (Trump Always Chickens Out), he dislikes long wars, favors last-minute, flashy interventions, and avoids sustained attrition. This suggests a vulnerability: American short-termism and reluctance to absorb prolonged pain, particularly when multiple theaters remain active.
Some may ask why Iran does not simply launch a preemptive strike. This is a clear option, but not an uncomplicated one. An initial Iranian strike could rally American public opinion behind a longer war, granting Trump broader authority, resources, and popular support. While it would disrupt US planning and cause early damage, it might ultimately strengthen Washington’s domestic position. By contrast, an American-initiated war, prolonged, unpopular, and costly, would be far more vulnerable to internal pressure, especially if American losses mount.
Adding to the complexity, two Emirati Il-76 cargo aircraft reportedly landed in Tel Aviv before flying on to Turkmenistan. These aircraft are known to be used by the UAE to supply proxy forces with weapons, particularly in Sudan and Somalia, raising the possibility that they were transporting drones or intelligence equipment for regional operations.
The picture remains highly complex, and it is entirely possible that nothing will happen. Still, based on current force deployments and escalation patterns, the probability of a US attack appears to have risen beyond a 50-50 threshold.
This analysis reflects what American planners may be thinking, not what will necessarily occur. It should be noted that after the previous war, many US and Israeli officials declared that Iran’s nuclear and missile programs had been torpedoed, and the system effectively destroyed, assessments that quickly proved false. Now, only months later, they appear to believe that an even more violent war is required to achieve what the last one supposedly already accomplished.
On the other hand, if endurance is possible and the United States is forced to retreat, Trump TACOs or abandon Israelis mid-conflict — an outcome not inconceivable under a president like Trump — the cumulative effects of "Israel's" recent dominance and coercion across the region may yet be reversed.
As mentioned earlier, the US buildup is not sufficient to start a prolonged attack against Iran with the high goals of regime change. The buildup still does seem as defensive posturing shielding the Israelis, so a chance the Israelis might initiate and use the limited US and Western buildup as a shield is still significant. A scenario similar to what happened in the last war, but that does entail Israeli losses in the opening phase.
Conclusion
What emerges from this assessment is a US strategy built on supposed escalation control, risk displacement, and the assumption that others will behave within predefined limits. Washington appears to believe it can shape the battlefield geographically, pushing early phases of the war away from the fragile "Israel", absorbing initial retaliation through peripheral bases, and then intervening decisively to reshape the balance before handing the fight back to Israelis under more favorable conditions. This is not a strategy aimed at victory in the classical sense, but at managing exposure and buying time.
The weakness in this thinking lies in its dependence on predictability. It assumes Iran will refrain from actions that collapse the carefully constructed sequencing of the war, that regional systems will remain stable under strain, and that American political leadership will tolerate the costs long enough to reach a decisive point. None of these assumptions is guaranteed. If any one of them fails, the entire escalation ladder becomes unstable.
Ultimately, the outcome of any confrontation will not be decided by the opening phase or by claims of technological superiority, but by endurance, political cohesion, and the ability to impose sustained costs on an adversary unwilling to absorb them.
The United States may possess overwhelming firepower, but it remains constrained by limited strategic patience and domestic vulnerability. If those constraints are effectively exploited, the very war designed to resolve the Iranian question may instead deepen American entanglement and erode the regional order it seeks to preserve.
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