Mehran Maldari – Secretary of the Zionist Studies Institute of Imam Sadeq University (AS)
After the beginning of the October 7 war, the Zionist regime faced a wave of attacks, although according to some experts, no success was achieved in recapturing the occupied lands. Still, such actions became a turning point in challenging the military-security doctrine of the Israeli regime. The Israeli regime, which in the past years had built its military-security strategies based on offensive defense and proclaimed the slogan of democracy all over the world while providing security and maintaining all the occupied lands, concluded that it had installed its security structure on the water.
Indeed, one of the components of psychological security for the settlers has been the dream of the invincibility of the Zionist army, which turned into a terrible nightmare with the capture of 252 settlers, and this means the collapse of one of the main pillars of the psychological security of the Israeli society, which the current doctrine of this regime is unable to protect.
The Gaza war, the new era of Lebanon’s Hezbollah
In recent weeks, Hezbollah was able to achieve three goals with some deterrent measures, such as collecting and disseminating information on the bases of the Israeli regime or some targeted military actions against the Zionist spying tools in the north. First, increasing its military authority and making it famous to increase deterrence due to the advancement of technical facilities. Second, pressure on the Israeli regime to decentralize Rafah and Gaza. Third, disproving the idea of the impossibility of a conflict between the Israeli regime and Hezbollah to put pressure on the officials of this regime and the settlers. Among the mentioned cases, the third case is very important Because the second pillar of the Israeli regime’s national security, the ability to provide security in the occupied territories, failed and collapsed. According to published statistics, about 95,000 settlers have been forced to leave their settlements due to Hezbollah attacks in the north, which, apart from jeopardizing the psychological security of the Israeli society, has caused billions of dollars in losses to the economy of the occupied territories.
According to the aforementioned considerations, the Zionist regime seems to be facing four scenarios in the face of Hezbollah. Of course, the realization of each of them depends on very complex variables.
FIRST SCENARIO: Gradual elimination
After the Israeli army failed to achieve much success in occupying the lands of Gaza and Rafah, the best decision for the cabinet of the Zionist regime is to withdraw the army and control the security governance of areas such as Rafah and Gaza in order to gather intelligence to organize a network of targeted assassinations of the leaders of the Resistance front and use it to take revenge on the operatives of the Operation Al-Aqsa Storm and to sterilize the Palestinian Resistance groups. Of course, it should be kept in mind that these actions are not only in the field of Palestine, and definitely, the goals of Hezbollah and even Iran will have a great influence on the future equations of the region. However, the feedback that the Zionist regime received in this series of operations did not only indicate the improvement of the situation; Rather, these measures themselves have acted as a stimulus in increasing the extent of expansion and accelerating the end of strategic patience, an example of which was well displayed in the operation of True Promise. The important point is that the experience gained by the Israeli regime in the past months can be a decisive factor in these attacks so that it manages the conditions of the Gaza war in such a way that by eliminating several important people of the Resistance groups, other than the senior military commanders, but effective to reach its goals. In this case, such actions for the Resistance front in the cost-benefit balance will not be profitable for the expansion of the war, while the Israeli regime will reach its technical goals in the logistics of the war. This scenario is very likely to happen.
SECOND SCENARIO: the calculation error of the spiral of revenge.
In this scenario, the Israeli army will continue to seek to arrest the effective agents of Hamas in Gaza and Rafah. However, the tensions of the northern borders may cause both sides of the conflict to make a strategic mistake, so that in the spiral of revenge, they will be subjected to border military attacks, and these border conflicts will lead to a vertical escalation of the crisis. In this case, using the principle of surprise in the early hours, the Zionist army will bombard large areas of Lebanon where some Hezbollah officials, missile arsenals, and resistance tunnels are likely to be located. The violence of this all-out war will not decrease, except when the Israeli regime drives the Hezbollah forces to the other side of the Litani River and creates a barrier between its borders for greater security. But it should be noted that such an adventurous action will bring all the allies of Hezbollah into the campaign so that in just a few days, the Middle East will flare up, and the possibility of a confrontation between Iran and the allies of the Zionist regime will increase.
THIRD SCENARIO: preventive war
The American officials have repeatedly emphasized the unwillingness of conflict in the northern borders of the occupied territories in announcing their positions and have invited the parties to exercise restraint. But it should be noted that with the pressure of some radical members of the cabinet and social dissatisfaction, the Zionist regime may enter into a full-scale war in a preemptive attack. This scenario is in contrast with the military movements of the Zionist regime last month because, basically, this regime does not have the ability and possibility to open another battlefront until it reaches a result in the south. On the other hand, the senior officials of Hezbollah have repeatedly admitted that they are not looking for an increase in tension and an all-out conflict.
FOURTH SCENARIO: ceasefire and de-escalation for the first time after declaring its existence; the Zionist regime has experienced war for more than nine months, and this has brought opportunities and limitations for this regime. One of these restrictions is the protests of the families of the prisoners and the Israeli society, which increases the gap between the government and the people of Israel day by day. The Israeli regime will be willing to accept a ceasefire to settle the internal situation and escape from the pressure of the prisoners’ families. If this scenario happens, the end of the northern conflicts, which will definitely be part of the Israeli regime’s ceasefire conditions, will give the parties a short chance to repair the effects of the conflict. In this period, it is expected that the parties’ disputes will be resolved with the mediation of France and the United States, and Hezbollah will move its forces up to 8 miles away from the borders. But the point is, why exactly 8 miles? The reason for this 8 miles goes back to Hezbollah’s surface-to-surface and anti-armor missiles in Kornet and Dehlawiya class, which has caused the Zionist regime to see this equipment as an obstacle to its tactical advance in the northern borders and is trying to keep Hezbollah’s forces as far away as possible to be safe from the sting of these weapons. But in general, this scenario will be far from expected because, assuming the end of the war, Netanyahu’s political life will end.
Last Word
In recent years, Hezbollah has multiplied its military power in its southern borders, which it has used well after the Al-Aqsa storm operation. In the past year, Hezbollah was able to deal deadly blows to the security-military body of this regime in the battle with the Zionist regime. As mentioned in the above scenarios, if any of these cases come true, the positive security doctrine of the Zionist regime will face failure, and this regime has no choice but to revise its security policies.
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