How not to fall for the fake “free” media

by Waseem Shehzad October, 2012 Muslims need to develop greater sophistication in determining the validity of alternate media, especially outlets like Al Jazeera. Many media outlets project themselves as the so-called alternate critical sources of news in the world today. In reality, most are not really critical and certainly cannot be considered as alternate. Media outlets directly linked with or dependent on the US-imposed imperialist global order are no longer trusted as sources of news. Even within the US, people are losing trust in media outlets that market Washington’s official policies. A survey published by Gallup in September 2011 found 55% of Americans do not trust the fairness and accuracy of the US media. This necessitates the creation of alternate sources to fill the trust and fairness deficit that has emerged globally. It is, therefore, necessary to examine the agenda and concepts behind the so-called critical and alternate media outlets today. Al-Jazeera myth Unsophisticated media literacy skills of a large number of people makes them think that if a certain media outlet criticizes the establishment occasionally, it must be honest, fair and credible. This assumption is flawed. Simple criticism does not mean that a certain media outlet offers a genuine alternative. Let us take al-Jazeera as an example. While most Muslims and others assume that al-Jazeera is truly an alternative source of news, a closer look at its track record reveals that in many instances it is as wedded to promoting the establishment’s views as the others. True, al-Jazeera has produced some critical and alternate journalistic works; it is also true that in many aspects, before it fired most of its Islamic editorial staff during the 2003 Iraq war, al-Jazeera revolutionized journalism in the Muslim East. However, when it comes to strategic issues, al-Jazeera is no different than its mainstream peers that propagate the US designed secular and materialistic perspective on global issues. When security forces of the popularly elected government of Hamas prevented the US-backed militias of Mohamed Dahlan from overthrowing the Palestinian government in Gaza, al-Jazeera, like all other news sources, presented events in Gaza as a “coup d’ état” by Hamas. During the 2009 US-instigated riots in Tehran, al-Jazeera’s perspective and rhetoric was no different than the al-Jazeera or CNN. The Islamic government in Iran was demonized and all vandalism and violence in Iran was legitimized through the narrative of “fraudulent elections.” Finally, the 2010–2011 uprisings in the Muslim East totally exposed al-Jazeera as a channel financed and managed by the un-elected Qatari tribal regime for the strategic interests of its paymasters. Al-Jazeera’s constant focus on and exaggeration of events in Syria and its skimpy coverage of uprisings in Bahrain and the Saudi-ruled Arabian Peninsula have exposed its true nature. Coverage of Islamic awakenings further revealed al-Jazeera to be no different than CNN, which is customized for Middle Eastern audiences by forces imposing the current oppressive global order. Al-Jazeera represents a tailored concept and methodology of Western secularism and hedonism. Myth of western media freedom Many people living in countries with Western-backed authoritarian regimes that read, listen and watch Western media or its affiliates naively assume that there is genuine freedom of speech and opinion in the West. Yes, it is true that to a certain degree media in the US and many other Western countries appear freer than media outlets in Morocco or Bahrain, but it has less to do with actual freedom, and more to do with the sophistication of the oppressive systems of governance in the West. Tactical criticism in Saudi-occupied Arabian Peninsula is not allowed because the Saudi regime is too weak, discredited and despised; it is, therefore, much more vulnerable even to basic forms of criticism. The US government is not as weak and it has some support, especially among the ignorant masses. Therefore, tactical criticism does not harm US strategic interests internally or externally. However, as the US power started to decline sharply since 2001, even Washington and its allies resorted to crude tactics of media censorship. The expulsion of Octavia Nasr from CNN in 2010 and the recent closure of PressTV in the UK are clear examples of these oppressive tactics now being replicated by Western imperialist regimes. Key concepts in media battle The general concept of the apparent media freedom today is that criticism is allowed as long as it is tactical and does not offer an alternative to the imposed global order. Currently almost all media outlets criticize the economic policies of the IMF, the World Bank and the US government. It is fine to criticize the current global financial system as long as one does not present an alternative financial system such as the Islamic model or talk about alternate institutions to the current global financial set up. Criticism of Western democracy is tolerated as long as no alternative is prescribed. It is fine to criticize the illegitimate US-installed autocratic regimes worldwide as long as no alternative model beyond the secular/materialist framework drawn up by the US is offered. Criticism of Mahmoud Abbas is absolutely in order but Hamas must not be presented as a viable alternative. Criticizing secular dogma is acceptable but an Islamic system of governance must not be presented as an alternative. Wearing Che Guevara t-shirts is mainstream fashion today because his views are no longer considered a strategic threat even though Che Guevara fought and probably killed US security personnel. Try wearing a t-shirt with an image of Hassan Nasrallah or Khalid Meshaal and walk in the streets of North America or Western Europe and see what happens. Unlike Che’s ideology, their Islamic vision offers a concrete socio-political solution to hundreds of millions of Muslims worldwide who aspire to establish an Islamic system of governance in their societies. Media outlets must be examined based not on their criticism of certain policies but how deep and rational their criticism is and whether its agenda offers an alternative to the system or policies it criticizes. The unfortunate reality is that in many parts of the world Western corporate concepts of journalism frame the nature of discourse. The public is made to believe that media must be “neutral.” Neutral media is not only nonexistent, but also impossible. Every media organization has editorial policies that are based on the ideas of people, states, and societies that run them. The media in Europe and US are secular and propagate post-Renaissance values and dogmas. Of course, there is nothing wrong with this as long as these media outlets openly proclaim that they follow a certain agenda and the information they feed to people is derived from an ideology they see as the best form of governance for humanity. They should also make a reasonable attempt to present the opposite side to their ideas. People everywhere must improve their media literacy skills in order to tell apart authentic alternative news sources from fake ones.

How the foreign-backed conspiracy to overthrow Asad is failing in Syria

by Crescent-Online.net

October, 2012 What has upset foreign conspirators the most is the resilience of the Asad regime. It has lasted 21 months of incessant attacks from inside and out and there are no signs that it is about to collapse. Dubai, Crescent- online October 11, 2012, 00:00 EST The only certainty in war is its uncertainty. As any general, no matter how brilliant, would testify, the best-laid plans are quickly rendered useless by the vagaries of war. This is even more so in internal conflicts where there are far too many variables to make accurate predictions or plans. This thesis is best illustrated by events unfolding in Syria, especially over the last four months. The conspiracy against Bashar al-Asad's regime was hatched in February 2011 in a Paris cafe. The conspirators included in addition to some members of the Syrian opposition, Jeffrey Feltman, an American arch-Zionist, Dan Shapiro, US ambassador to Israel, Bandar bin Sultan, then Saudi Security chief and currently the kingdom's intelligence chief, as well as a representative of Saad Hariri, the playboy and former Lebanese prime minister. According to this plan, the uprising was to be launched in Deraa, a small town in the middle of nowhere. Deraa was chosen because of its proximity to the Jordanian border from where weapons were to be smuggled in. Both the conspirators and Syrian opposition groups were misled by the ease with which Colonel Muammar Qaddafi was overthrown in Libya. It was assumed that like Qaddafi, Asad too would be disposed of in a matter of months if not weeks. The tiny Emirate of Qatar also quickly signed on. Flushed with billions of gas dollars, Qatar is punching way above its weight in regional politics. Initially, Turkey, the most important regional player, was reluctant to jump into the fray. The Turks thought because of their importance, they could persuade Asad to do what they wanted him to do. In May 2011, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu visited Damascus and in a meeting with President Bashar al-Asad, gave him what was essentially a list of demands. Asad gave him a polite hearing but was not going to accept foreign dictation. When Asad refused to comply with Turkish demands, perhaps drawn out with Saudi help (the Saudis cannot stand the Asad clan or the Alawites although for the record Asad is not Alawite but Sunni although that is neither here or there), the Turks took offense and joined the anti-Asad alliance. Weapons started to flood into Syria from Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey. The French, Americans, British, and Turks also provided logistical support as well as intelligence. The Saudis and Qataris offered to buy any senior civilian or military Syrian official willing to defect. There have been few takers. Brigadier Manaf Tlas is the highest ranking military officer to defect. The foreign conspirators faced another problem. The Syrian National Council they cobbled together out of exiled Syrians has no support inside Syria. Further, Syrian opposition groups inside the country detest these rank opportunists whose only ambition seems to be to get their hands on as much foreign cash as possible while people inside the country die. What has upset foreign conspirators the most is the resilience of the Asad regime. It has lasted 21 months of incessant attacks from inside and out and there are no signs that it is about to collapse. Instead, the foreign conspirators are beginning to panic. Saudi King Abdullah in particular is greatly worried. As the crisis drags on, he feels it will make life more difficult for him in the kingdom where the succession battle is already intensifying with the first generation of Saudi royals heading to their graves. He has mooted a Yemeni-style transition in Syria. He would be content with Tlas taking over from Asad. This is the other version of the Davutoglu plan whereby he said on October 7 that Turkey would accept Farouk el-Sharaa replacing Asad. These proposals clearly point to the fact that the military option, a la Libya, is not viable in Syria. There are other worries as well. The influx of a large number of foreign mercenaries into Syria is causing great concern for the Saudis, Jordanians and Americans. The Americans have already had a blowback in Benghazi when ambassador Chris Stevens was killed by a Libyan terrorist outfit that was trained and armed by NATO to overthrow Qaddafi. There is also disagreement on how to proceed. A meeting between the intelligence chiefs of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, France and the US in Turkey last month failed to produce a clear plan of action. This was followed on October 10 by a meeting between Saudi intelligence chief Bandar bin Sultan and the Qatari Emir, Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani in Doha, Qatar. This too failed to produce any tangible result because Qatar wants to intensify the war in Syria while the Saudis want a face-saving way out. Of course, Qatar has no army to speak of; it can only provide soccer players that only know how to swing in a night club but cannot handle guns. While the Saudis are getting cold feet, Qatar continues to punch above its weight. Next week it is convening another meeting of Syrian opposition groups to try and unite them. It may be easier to convince the mice to work with cats that Syrian opposition groups to work together. As Shadi Hamid of the Brookings Institution in Doha said: "It's all a bit of a mess." Yes, indeed, it is, and all of their own making. They have nobody but themselves to blame. Those playing with fire are likely to get their fingers burnt.

Rethink history: undo sectarianism

by Abu Dharr 



 Sectarianism exists on both sides of the divide. It is imperative to understand the root problems to overcome it, urges Abu Dharr.

Sectarianism is a hard nut to crack. This is so because each sectarian today (and this applies equally to Sunnis and Shi‘is) is calcified within centuries of self-righteousness that feeds on the other’s self-unrighteousness as it is perceived from each side of the sectarian divide. To illustrate this simple fact we shall take those two words that for sectarians justify their superiority. One of them is the word Ahl al-Bayt. In the “Shi‘i” sectarian understanding of history this refers to a select line of descent from the Prophet (pbuh). And here we have a variety of “Shi‘i” schools of political thought that identifies a line of the Prophet’s (pbuh) progeny who are the only Ahl al-Bayt, or the only ones qualified to stand in for the Ahl al-Bayt heritage. We shall spare ourselves the details that are to be found in this area between and among those who belong to the assorted narratives that fall under the title of Shi‘i. This type of transmitted understanding cannot comfortably accommodate the Prophet’s (pbuh) statement, “Salmanu minna Ahl al-Bayt: Salman is one of us — Ahl al-Bayt.” Salman [the Persian] was not from the Prophet’s lineage of descent.

On the other hand we have sectarians who come from the Sunni calcified traditions belonging to generations of Muslims who absented their minds from the political realm altogether. They speak highly of some sahabah while either barely mentioning other equal sahabah or neglecting some others of them altogether. Possession of power or lack thereof seems to have influenced such sectarians who belong to this narrative of history. In the course of Islamic history there were sahabah who took issue with other sahabah and in the trickle-down of information about such events the ones who had no power had no sahabah aura to them. Who can deny the fact that Abu Dharr is a sahabi? But because power did not play to his advantage as he took issue with the financial and economic privileges and refractory of certain other sahabis he does not occupy a prominent position within the pantheon of sahabah. Others who were in the mold of Abu Dharr in his and later generations do not fit the honorific of sahabah or tabi‘een. To name a few: ‘Amir ibn ‘Abd Qays, Kumayl ibn Ziyad, Zayd ibn Sawhan, al-Hasan al-Basri, and the list goes on.

If this is straining your memory of history, who is it that offers Imam ‘Ali, Imam al-Hasan, and Imam al-Husayn the honorific of sahabah? Sectarianism has made it impossible for some sahabah to belong to Ahl al-Bayt and for some from Ahl al-Bayt to be identified as prominent sahabah! Many committed Muslims of conscience and action have been shunted by this sectarianism that lives on. Power figures in the Umayyad regime capitalized on this sectarian dichotomy and got away with the unspeakable: they destroyed the Ka‘bah, they laid waste to Madinah, and they even killed with their own justification the Prophet’s (pbuh) grandsons. That justification for murder and mayhem has not been exposed and repudiated by today’s Muslims simply because the sectarian construct survives up until this very day, making it unlikely for Qur’anic common sense to prevail. As a result, powerless people lived in fear. The dynasties were not concerned with Allah’s (swt) power and authority as much as they were concerned with their political survival and any sectarian slant that served their purpose.

Why should anyone with a Qur’anic and Prophetic mind be unable to see Umayyad and ‘Abbasid power-mongers pursuing their own agendas and giving them an air of legitimacy by invoking whatever blank sanctity to their version of events? The tragedy of Karbala in particular should be an eye opener and a call to freedom of conscience and thought away from the sectarianism that surrounded it — by friend and foe alike. In plain language the Umayyad and ‘Abbasid rulers were dunya-centered. In lay language: they were in it for the money and for power. The Prophet (pbuh) is reported to have said,

Ma al-faqru akhsha ‘alaykum; wa lakin akhsha ‘alaykum al-dunya, an tunafisuha kama tanafasaha al-ladhina min qablikum, fa-tuhlikukum kama ahlakat-hum: It is not poverty that I fear bearing down on you; [rather] fear that the dunya [the desire for wealth and material possessions] will bear down on you; [I fear that] you will compete materialistically as those in times past did. At that time the dunya will ruin you as it ruined them.

It is this dunya that has brought us to where we are today: no din priorities, no hot-pursuit of knowledge, no soul-clinging to justice, no intra-Islamic tolerance, and no self-confidence resulting from altruism.

Even during the time of the Prophet (pbuh) the Quran was revealed to adjust and correct committed Muslims. Listen and learn,

[Hence], O you who are securely committed [to Allah’s power and authority], when you embark on a [military] task in Allah’s cause, use your discernment, and do not — out of a desire for the fleeting gains of this worldly life — say to anyone who offers you the greetings of peace, “You are not a person of commitment,” for with Allah there are gains abundant… (4:94).

There was in the time of Allah’s Prophet (pbuh) those who thought they were committed Muslims and wanted people to think that they were committed Muslims. But Islamic commitment is ascertained by behavioral evidence and a transparent social character. After our beloved Prophet (pbuh) passed away the revelation of the Qur’an ended and it is left up to us — the carriers of this meaningful Qur’an — to examine and evaluate policies and politicians in particular. You will notice that during the Prophet’s (pbuh) lifetime when revelation was still in progress there were numerous ayat to evaluate military efforts. Look at Badr’s evaluation in Surah al-Anfal, Uhud’s evaluation in Surah Aal ‘Imran, and al-Khandaq’s evaluation in Surah al-Ahzab, etc. In this close reading of the Qur’an we observe how Allah (swt) reconstructs those critical times and retraces what they did from a position beyond their “selves” and their “lives”. If in that process they made mistakes, He points them out,

…[remember what you felt] when they came upon you from above you and from below you, and when [your] eyes became dim and [your] hearts came up to [your] throats, and [when] most conflicting thoughts about Allah passed through your minds… (33:10).

All this and much more for those who follow Allah’s words carefully and thoughtfully is in the Qur’an concerning that first and unique generation of committed Muslims. But none of this was meant to give them a halo of infallibility; even they knew that they were not self-righteous and holier-than-thou.

Sectarianism has made it impossible for some sahabah to belong to Ahl al-Bayt and for some from Ahl al-Bayt to be identified as prominent sahabah! Many committed Muslims of conscience and action have been shunted by this sectarianism that lives on.

It is a sad comment to say that the Umayyad and other dynasties were to use the qualities of that humble generation around the Prophet (pbuh) with all its imperfections yet with all its selflessness and sacrifices to legitimize their usurpation of power and then cast that into the sectarian mold that we still suffer from today. From here on in, it was the regimes and dynasties that would evaluate and assess individuals and people. When committed Muslims were wrong in the time of Allah’s Prophet (pbuh) the faultless Qur’an would tell them directly and objectively that they were wrong and that they had to correct themselves. And with the Prophet’s (pbuh) leadership they did.

But when errant regimes and dynasties took over the leadership of Muslims they began to use opinions of some live-and-let-live scholars to justify their credibility and rationalize their legitimacy. Facilitating this whole process was the sectarian divide. The opposition to dynastic and autocratic rulers came from many who initially identified with Imam ‘Ali. So they had to be labeled. And labeled they were. Money and power back then acted like money and power do today. Establishments and governments can label the most honest person around as a weirdo, a goof-ball, or as may be more understood in today’s political climate an anti-Semite — and lo and behold that tag sticks like white on rice! This happens to almost all opposition forces in history. In our time we have the pejorative of “socialist” or “communist,” we have the derisive of “subversive” or “radical,” and in the Islamic sphere we have the derogative “Shi‘i” or “Ikhwani” just to name a few. But it should be clear to the discerning.

We know that this exposition may have touched on some raw nerves. But we have no choice but to speak the truth with the kind heart of brothers who seek justice,

There has now come to you an admonition from your Sustainer, and a cure for all [the ill] that may be in men’s hearts, and guidance and grace to all who are committed [to His power and authority] (10:57).

House of Saud heads into the dustbin of history?

Yusuf Dhia-Allah

Opposition to the House of Saud is growing among all segments of the population. How long can it last in power?

Reality is quickly catching up with inbuilt contradictions in the policies pursued by the House of Saud. While presenting itself as champions of the “Sunni” world — a claim hotly contested by the overwhelming majority of Sunnis because of the Saudis’ narrow and extremist interpretations — its policies are becoming increasingly untenable. For instance, the Saudis have made much noise about their support for the “Sunni’” uprising against the Alawite regime of Bashar al-Asad in Syria. It has also used the sectarian card to justify its invasion of Bahrain to prop up the minority Khalifa family in power where the majority population is Shi‘i, as is that in the Eastern province of the Arabian Peninsula.

But this is where the contradictions have caught up with them; the populations in both Tunisia and Egypt are overwhelmingly Sunni so Muslims ask: how could the self-proclaimed champions of Sunnis (the Saudi rulers) be giving refuge to dictator Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and how could they have supported the brutal dictator and US-Zionist agent Hosni Mubarak for so many years? Both Ben Ali and Mubarak brutalized their Sunni populations for decades. The Saudis’ claims are becoming exposed at the same time as their policy against the Asad regime in Syria is crumbling. Despite sending hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of arms and buying any Syrian willing to defect from the government or the army, the Saudi and Qatari financed rebels have not had much success.

Reality is quickly catching up with inbuilt contradictions in the policies pursued by the House of Saud. While presenting itself as champions of the “Sunni” world — a claim hotly contested by the overwhelming majority of Sunnis because of the Saudis’ narrow and extremist interpretations — its policies are becoming increasingly untenable.

In fact, the July 18 attack in Damascus that killed four top security officials was the direct result of Saudi involvement. While it dented the Syrian regime’s image and shook it somewhat, the terrorist act also stiffened its resolve to deal with the US-Zionist-Saudi-backed terrorists with an iron fist. The regime’s response was swift and brutal: the rebels were first flushed out of Damascus and later dealt with in Aleppo where they are still being pounded. The plot to cause the regime’s collapse failed. It still has enough staying capacity and firepower to deal with such blows. Similarly, foreign players — mainly Russia and China — are not prepared to allow the fall of the Asad regime, thereby creating another Libyan-style situation in Syria. Russia has the most to lose if the regime is overthrown by armed insurrection. It would lose its only naval base at Tartus in the Mediterranean.

These developments have caused nightmares in Riyadh hence King Abdullah’s panicked call for a meeting of the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (previously called Organization of the Islamic Conference – OIC) in Makkah on August 15–16. While the OIC meeting was ostensibly called to deal with the Syrian crisis — Syria was expelled from the OIC — there was another, more serious matter bothering the ailing and aged king: how to deal with sectarian tensions in the region?

It is interesting to note that while the Saudis are the principal instigators of sectarianism in the Muslim world they suddenly felt compelled to address it. At the OIC Makkah summit, the Saudi king called for establishing a Centre in Riyadh for dialogue among the different Schools of Thought in Islam. Has the Saudi king, in his twilight years, finally realized that sectarianism is a double-edged sword and could just as easily work against him? His regime has used sectarianism with deadly effect against others. Is it too difficult to figure out that the horrible sectarian killings in Pakistan — of which there have been far too many in recent weeks and months — are the direct result of the poisonous ideology being spread from the Arabian Peninsula that has infected Pakistani society through the influx of Saudi petrodollars? True, sectarian killings also serve the interests of the Pakistani elite, hence no effective measures against sectarianism have been taken but the fact is that such extremism has come on the gravy train from Riyadh that has liberally financed madrasahs, which produce the primitive savages doing the sectarian killings.

But sectarianism is beginning to haunt the Saudis as well. In Bahrain the majority is Shi‘i and is demanding civil and political rights. Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province is also overwhelmingly Shi‘i and the region that produces the bulk of kingdom’s oil. Yet the population there suffers massive discrimination in jobs, lack of economic opportunities as well as discrimination in areas of social and political representation. The regime, however, faces a dilemma. Hitherto, it had given a free hand to the court ‘ulama to indulge in whatever sectarianism they wanted. Reining them in now would become a problem since the regime already faces many other challenges not the least of which is the increasing assertiveness of people to demand their rights, the rising tide of Islamic awakening in the region and that inevitable challenge for which there is no cure: old age of the senior princes.

Senior Saudi princes are shuffling to their grave in rapid succession. King Abdullah is nearly 90 years old although one would be hard pressed to tell this from his pitch black beard and moustache, thanks to generous use of Grecian formula. One wonders why at his age, Abdullah is so concerned with his looks, especially his beard, when his bones must also now be withering away? The crisis of succession is looming large and it cannot be discounted that a civil war may break out among the hordes of princes vying for power and control.

There is, however, an even more serious challenge facing the regime: opposition to the House of Saud appears to have transcended the sectarian divide. The Hijaz, where the two holy cities of Makkah and Madinah are located, has always been opposed to the literalist interpretations of the Najdis whom they consider uncouthed and unsophisticated desert bedouins. But opposition to the ruling family is now becoming widespread even in the regime’s heartland, Riyadh.

While the regime has attempted to present opposition to its policies as being instigated by the Shi‘is, it has failed to explain why there are more than 30,000 political prisoners in the kingdom, the overwhelming majority of them Sunnis? Further, many people ask why should decisions be made by a small coterie of Saudi princes and the rest of them, more educated than the rulers, be excluded from this process?

Success of the uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen and to a lesser extent in Libya has given Saudi youth new ideas about freedom. At least 60% of them are under 20 years old. Widespread corruption and the rulers’ extreme laziness have resulted in 40% of Saudis living in poverty despite the regime taking in $360 billion annually in oil revenues. At least 70% of the people cannot afford to own a home and women are prohibited from driving cars. Most of the back-breaking menial jobs are performed by foreign workers that account for 90% of the private sector work force while unemployment among the 20–24 year-old Saudis stands at nearly 40%.

Given these grim statistics and coupled with the looming crisis of succession, Saudi Arabia is waiting to explode. What will emerge following this explosion is difficult to speculate now but there is near certainty that the kingdom is heading for turbulent times.