Showing posts with label Shia-Sunni rivalry. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shia-Sunni rivalry. Show all posts

Thursday, October 03, 2019

Challenging our sectarianised histories

By Muhammad al-Asi

The blight of sectarianism has its roots in a chauvinism that has permeated our understandings of Islamic history. Eradicating it requires us to challenge these received histories and the language in which they are presented, argues Muhammad al-Asi

Dear committed Muslims, brothers and sisters. As you all know, I’m sure you who are here and most of you who tune in, some of you might not know but there’s about 50 other individuals who tune in on a daily basis after this Jum’a. So, in the course of the week, there are about 300-400 other individuals who listen to this khutba. Some of them are listening because they are sincere. Some of them are listening because they are troublemakers but especially you who are out here, you understand what is taking place in the real world around us. We have exerted our mental and our physical capacity in trying to expose the stratagem, the master plan of these shayateen, and towards that end we will continue with Allah’s help and with his guidance.

We mentioned earlier, many times, that ‘asabiyya, this self-centeredness, whether it’s a tribal self-centeredness is or whether it is a nationalistic self-centeredness or whether it’s a racist, self-centeredness… comes in many forms. Whatever it is, it is an enemy to the committed Muslims because it plays itself out in warfare, just like we are seeing in today’s real world.

These khutbas, you can place them in the context of the killings that are going on; explosions, pass-by shootings, throwing hand grenades, opening fire randomly in certain areas just because they belong to Sunnis or Shias or whatever, all of this is meant to resuscitate this ‘asabiyya that we have been exposing so that at least we don’t fall prey to their plans. So we’re going back to the formative years, the years that are cited by today’s ‘asabiyya people. That’s what they cite. They go back and they say, this is what Imam Ali did or said and this is what Muawiya did or said and that’s what Ayesha did or said. So they go back there to try to fuel their own social egos, in other words for ‘asabiyya.

So this has been in the course of these Jum’as with the Taqwa of Allah, our number one concern. We’re not here to play politics. Some of these masajid, they want to play politics. Some of these masajid, they just want numbers. Some of these masajid, they are just status quo, live and let live. Some of these masajid are the mercenary types and it goes on and on. We thank Allah we don’t fall into that category and I think we attest to the fact that just by being here that we have broken loose from these ‘asabiyyat we are here, Sunnis and Shias, we are here, black and white. We are here, males and females. We are here, rich and poor, in any which way you want to look at it we’ve broken through these ‘asabiyya barriers.

Now …. the major ‘asabiyya in this country, is the racist ‘asabiyya. That’s the major one. The sectarian ‘asabiyya is a newcomer and it’s not as prevalent as the racist ‘asabiyyat here. So we’re going to go back and deconstruct this sectarian ‘asabiyya. We’re going, we’ve been, and we have continued to be in the process of deconstructing it. Most agree, most Muslims agree and other objective thinkers agree, that much of today’s sectarian polarization, the sectarian misunderstandings can be traced to the time when Muawiya (at that time he wasn’t king) was a governor in As-Sham.

Muawiya spread the notion that he and his clan and those who agreed with him were the only ones who qualified to address the assassination of Uthman. They were seeking revenge for the assassination of Uthman, outside of law and order; they’re supposed to be the law and they’re supposed to be the leaders. They’re supposed to be a type of authority. They’re supposed to be an organized civic society as today’s words would have it. But he (Muawiya) broke with all of that. If all the Muslims had given (and this is what happened), all the Muslims gave bay’a to Imam Ali, why didn’t this person in that context agree with all the rest of the Muslims and place this responsibility in the hands of the central government in Al-Medina? He didn’t do that. Had he done that, we probably would not have been struggling with the history that we have, but that’s what happened. This is a fact. We’re stating something that actually happened.

So he forced Imam Ali to take the position of bringing into the context of law and order this breakaway Muawiya. Muawiya, he was the one who broke from Al-Jama’a. There are some either ignorant or some mercenary Sunnis who give the impression later on and it lives up until today that Shias broke away from Al-Jama’a. This is absolutely wrong. It was Muawiyah who broke away from Al-Jama’a. He broke away from the Imama, the leadership of Ali-bin-Abi Talib, and thus he broke away from the rest of the Muslims’ bay’a to Imam Ali. He took this province of As-Sham, the Levant, he took it under his firm control and from there he began to say that he was the one who was going to level off this issue of the killing of Uthman.

So we had two right opposite positions. I don’t care how you look at this or how you read it or how you explain it, this overall history belongs to all of us. It’s very unfortunate that in today’s world we have those who are the majority Muslims who have inherited the description of Sunnis. They don’t even know what it means….When I say they don’t know what it means, what I mean by that is they don’t know what it means in the political context. Of course, any Sunni would know what it means to be a Sunni as far as offering his prayers, his rituals, et cetera, et cetera. When it comes to this political context that we are trying to throw light on, they don’t know what it means. If they did know what it means, they would not be today fuelling their own ‘asabiyya by saying that the Shias, they are a breakaway sect from Islam. If we understood our own history, no one would say that, but that’s the mainstream information about this subject. So as these positions hardened, it was that al-Jamal, as-Siffeen and an-Nahrawan, the three major political, military battles that took place. As these positions hardened, there are some people, they might be in the right camp or they may be in the wrong camp, but in themselves, they’re sincere….So there’s a person who comes up, the person’s name is Shab’ath bin Rabi’. He comes up to Imam Ali, when he sees that this is becoming a very serious military division, it’s going to have the potential of splitting the Muslims probably forever. It’s a life and death issue. He comes up to him and he says, “Ya Amir al Mumineen”, those words, all Muslims know, “Ya Amir al Mumineen, would you not win over Muawiya by giving him some type of authority and also give him some type of status so that he can be, he can appreciate what you do to him for him?” I mean raise the person, give them some status; he’s already the governor of As-Sham. Okay? Everyone knows that, but right now he is in a renegade position. This person is saying to Imam Ali, try to contain this guy. Give him something, add a little more to what he has and have everyone know that you here are not in a position to fight him, but you’re in a position to contain him. Of course, Imam Ali knew Muawiya much better than this (maybe) person of goodwill. He knew him better than that, so decided he need not give him anything.

Once again, once again, what is at work here is ‘asabiyya. They had this ‘asabiyya, and from there this ‘asabiyya, right now has transformed itself into a political party, which has nothing to do with the words that we use nowadays. People exchange these words, Sunnis and Shias, what we’re looking at here has nothing to do with today’s average person’s understanding of those calling themselves Sunnis and those calling themselves Shias. So Imam Ali addresses this ‘asabiyya. Now before I quote Imam Ali, let me remind some of you of the ‘asabiyya that’s mentioned in the Qur’an. The children of Prophet Ya’qub (upon whom be peace), … Ya’qub had 10 or 12 or so many children.

They expressed ‘asabiyya, Yaqub’s children, children of a prophet, they expressed ‘asabiyya. The reason they could not get along with their brother, Yusuf; this is their brother, the reason they couldn’t get along with him and his brother is because of ‘asabiyya. They said to him, “We see that our father is inclined more towards our brother Yusuf and in his inclination to our brother Yusuf he’s like side-lining us being that we are an ‘usba among ourselves, put together, we are the members of an ‘asabiyya. From there on they are called Bani Isra’eel because of their ‘asabiyya. They become the Israelis and today they have explained their racist, discriminatory, militarist, murderous nation state on the basis of this ‘asabiyya and then they said “certainly our father (Ya’qub) he is in a manifest obscurity.”

The Prophet (pbuh), when this ‘asabiyyapresented itself during his time, he said “part with it because it has a foul odour to it.” Now we come to Imam Ali, what did he say about this ‘asabiyya that is now roaring. The ‘asabiyyabefore was sort of managed in a concealed manner; oh, it’s in a family, it’s in the family of Ya’qub. There was no propaganda to it. The ‘asabiyya that was about to break out in the time of Allah’s prophet in Medina between the Muhajireen and the Ansar…w as smothered because of the Prophet’s strict wording. Now this ‘asabiyya has taken on a military proportion. It has the thunder and the roar of the military. So Imam Ali said the following in this context: “extinguish what has been concealed in your hearts of the combustion of ‘asabiyya and put out the bad feelings of Jahiliyya. (because this ‘asabiyya could be traced all the way to the pre-Islamic times) for this fire in the belly, when it happens within a Muslim, it is because of the influence of as-Shaytaan. It’s because of the influence of as-Shaytaan.”

Now you can read this ‘asabiyya in history. I’m giving you the historical context, but you can also read it today, in today’s world, …you go to a certain masjid and you begin to sense there’s a sectarian ‘asabiyya in this masjid, or you begin to sense that there’s a racist ‘asabiyya in this masjid or you begin to sense there’s a nationalist ‘asabiyya in that masjid. It’s all ‘asabiyya.

‘Asabiyya was so pronounced that when Islam was there in the time that we are speaking about, remember this is the first century of Islam, during that time, there were tribes, one tribe that was split. Some of that tribe was with the Umawis and some of that tribe was with the Alawis. One tribe, and you can put together a bunch of these tribes and you’ll find some of them on this side and some of them on the other side. We’re taking right now a statement from a particular person who expressed the way he felt about this. He saw he was on one side with some of his tribe fighting against some of his tribe who belonged to the opposite side. They’re fighting, this is a war. He comes from the tribe of Azd and that Azdi tribe, part of it was in Iraq and part of it was in As-Sham and this person’s name was Mihnaf ibn Saleem. Here he’s expressing how he feels about this because now Islam, Islam meaning the commitment to Allah absent the ‘asabiyya, has forced the Muslims to be divided… He says, “one of the most serious and damaging problems is that we have been forced to face off against our own people. By Allah, what we are doing is we are cutting off our hands with our own hands and now we are clipping our own wings with our own sword.”

Let me be more to the point. You see part of your family on the other side of the firing line and you’re shooting and they’re shooting; both of you are shooting at each other. A person who still has an ‘asabiyya in him, this is the way he’ll think about it. And he expressed himself and this is just one expression of many that come to us or should come to us and inform us today so that we are not put in the same position to think of these affairs within an ‘asabi mind.

When Imam Ali made up his mind to go to Siffin, one of the individuals around him in his camp came to him protesting. He said, “Do you want to take us to our brothers from the people of As-Sham so that we kill them, the same way you took us to fight against the people of Basra, the ones we took on in warfare?” Another expression of how this thing was not an easy thing. This meaning, this military encounter between two sides was not an easy decision that was implemented by all who were involved.

There is a person whose name is Shimr ibn abd al-Khath’ami – don’t confuse one Shimr with another Shimr. This Shimr was from the people of As-Sham. He attacked another person, his name is Abu Ka’ab. Abu Ka’ab was the leader of the Khath’am ‘asabiyya in Al-Kufah. I want you to go to the heart of the issue. The heart of the issue is this ‘asabiyya confrontation. So he strikes him and he kills him. They belonged to the same extended family and (this happened) because of the ‘asabiyya that was fuelled by Muawiya.

So he turns around, he walks away and he’s crying, because he did this, not to any individual from his extended family. this was a noble person, a chieftain of his own Khath’am tribe. Remember this person, the killer, comes from As-Sham, meaning that he’s in Muawiya’s camp, he killed another one of his extended family in Imam Ali’s camp and he felt very sad, remorseful, very bad that all of this had happened. Then he said this, ‘May Allah have mercy on you Abu Ka’ab. I killed you to obey people and you are dearer to me than these people.’ Who’s the people he’s referring to? He’s referring to Muawiya’s camp. “But I don’t know what to say, the only thing I can see is Shaytaan has managed to place this sedition between us and among us. And I could only see Quraysh now playing with us.” Remember Quraysh is that argument that Muawiya had to justify his political position in taking revenge for the assassination of Uthman. A person like this saw through what he was doing.

Amr ibn al-‘As counsels Muawiya in the battle of Siffin, tells him the following: “We raised the Masahif (Qurans) on our swords and we say, whatever is in these Masahif is to judge our differences, the differences we have between each other, these Masahif serve to adjudicate the disputes that we have.” This was a move. This was a ploy to instigate within the camp of an Imam Ali, another form of ‘asabiyya; the holier than thou phenomenon. So when this happened in the camp that was on the right side of the issue because of this, a self-centeredness among certain elements in that camp, we had (arise) a new ‘asabiyya that Imam Ali would deal with later on in the Battle of Nahrawan. Nope. I’m going to stop here for a moment and ask you, can any one of you with the decades of your lifetime with you, can any one of you listening to all of this, can any one of you churn out this ‘asabiyya today that has Muslims killing Muslims? You’ve heard the narrative. What makes a Muslim, I asked you, what makes today a Muslim able to kill another Muslim citing the history that we are covering? Obviously, it is a wrong reading of this history. Otherwise if you’re just reading this like, like facts, try to cover this territory like your facts; gravity is a law of physics. When someone speaks about gravity, does anyone feel ‘asabiyya? Anyone feel charged against someone else? No, because it’s a fact and if we can revisit these events as facts minus this ‘asabiyya, we will clear this charged atmosphere that right now is fuelling civil wars. So when this new ploy was used, raise these Masahif, some people thought that there was goodwill on the other side. Right now they want to arbitrate these differences using the Masahif, the Qur’an, Allah’s words themselves, the ayaat and the surahs of the Qur’an. What more do you want?

So when Imam Ali realized that some people right now are beginning to form a new ‘asabiyyafor themselves. He said to them, “Woe to you. They don’t raise it for the purposes that you see. They are not even versed in its own meanings.” Its own meanings, meaning the meanings of these Masahif that they are raising.

What would cause anyone to feel ‘asabiyya, when we, when anyone mentions this, unless there’s some type of person who is covering this history, he himself is emitting ‘asabiyya. He himself is not able to present these issues as facts. So what he does, he talks through the subject matter verbally but non-verbally his gestures, his movements, they emit this poisonous ‘asabiyya. And here we go, that’s another fuel that’s high octane for this civil strife and these civil wars that these shayateenare planning. Imam Ali goes on to say, “The only reason that they raised this for you is to fool you, to outmanoeuvre you and to trap you.’ Some of his followers said to him, “Those folks, they’re calling us to Allah’s book and you are calling us to the sword. You will recall al-Ashtar (a military commander in one of the battles), and withhold him from killing other Muslims or else we’re going to do to you what we did to Uthman.”

What do you do when you’re put in a position like this? Imam Ali knew right now that we have a new ‘asabiyya, now this ‘asabiyya has come to his own camp. How are you going to deal with this? He had to deal with it in the best possible way. What you’re going to have right now, it’s not enough to have one civil war you’re going to have right now another internal civil war. You can’t have that happen. So he acquiesced not because he didn’t know the truth, not because he was weak and not because he was playing politics,  he was doing this to as much as possible shrink, collapse the ‘asabiyya that has shown its face in his own camp.

Now both sides have accepted the arbitration, there’s a person who is going between both sides. The person who’s going between both sides is al-Ash’ath and we notice one of the decisions that was a very major difference between him and Imam Ali. Remember both of them are in the same camp. Imam Ali wanted ‘Abdullah ibn ‘Abbas to represent his side in this arbitration. This Ash’ath did not want that to happen because of ‘asabiyya. Abd Allah ibn Abbas is the cousin of an Imam Ali. So he preferred Abu Musa al-Ash’ari and he eventually filled in that role. But the way the decision was made was to avoid complicating an internal ‘asabiyya, not to feed this ‘asabiyya anymore. And from here on, we knew how history developed, there was this class of people called al-Qurra in Iraq, they were the first ones who agreed with an Imam Ali to go to this tahkeem. They had to see the gimmicks and the shenanigans of the other side (because) they wouldn’t listen to what Imam Ali when he was advising them. They had to suffer, meet the other side and realize that they were being fooled, that they were tricked. And then they turned to an extreme that manifested an ‘asabiyya known as Khawarij.

And they hid under that word, “there is no governance except that which belongs to Allah.”. And Imam Ali said “they’re saying there shouldn’t be any type of governorship, but there has to be some type of governorship whether it is in the right direction or in the wrong direction”. Or else we’d rather be living in a jungle. When you don’t have an amara(governorship) go to a jungle and live there, there’s no amara there. But if you have civil society that civil society needs decision makers and those decision makers, whether they are making their decisions in a way that is in the virtue of Allah or whether they are making it in the way that is in the vice of as-Shaytaan,society requires it.

We’ve dealt with ‘asabiyya when it was beneath the surface. We dealt with ‘asabiyya when it was in transition and from here on this ‘asabiyyabecame what we call in today’s world political parties, and when we speak about political parties, we mean political parties that are, that have as their engine and as their fuel and as their transmission this ‘asabiyya.

Now, to try to give this a finishing touch, the word Shia, in today’s world because we’ve inherited 14 centuries of ‘asabiyya, in today’s world, the average person says, oh, shia, anyone who uses the word shia then automatically what comes to mind is those who in one way or the other, to one degree or the other with whatever explanation or the other, say that they are followers of Imam Ali. There are so many versions and so many interpretations of this that it goes beyond numbers. But anyone who says the word shia today, they automatically think, okay, these are the followers of an Imam Ali. This understanding today is a result of an accumulation of these ‘asabiyya, because the word shia doesn’t mean that, it doesn’t mean that in the linguistic depth of the word and it doesn’t mean that in the political definition of the word. In the Qur’an and in the Sunnah it doesn’t mean that.

I’m going to tell you what I mean by this. First of all, let me quote for you the tahkeem when both sides, the side of Imam Ali and the side of King Muawiyah, when they decided that they are going to arbitrate this whole affair, the following was written: “This is what both agreed to adjudicate. Ali ibn Abi Talib and Muawiya ibn Abu Sufyan, Ali on behalf of the people of Iraq and whoever is included in their partisanship inclusive of Muslims”. Okay. Up until here you say, okay, yes, this proves not what you’re saying. It proves that the Shia of Ali are the people of Iraq. So he has his Shia but it doesn’t stop here. The following sentence says “the adjudication of Muawiya on behalf of the people of Al-Sham and whoever is of their shi’a, Muawiya had his shi’a, in the wording of the tahkeem that was agreed upon between both sides. The same wording for the two different political and ideological positions, the same wording that Imam Ali had his shi’a, Muawiya had his shi’a and no one said, oh there’s something wrong with this wording, omit that and say Muawiya and his ansaruhu, his supporters or Muawiya and his ashabuhu, his companions. No one said that. This is the way the wording of the tahkeem was put together by both sides and when you review the word shi’ain the Qur’an it doesn’t have the meaning that was gained throughout these 14 centuries of a growing ‘asabiyya.

I know I’m going to be a little maybe too harsh for some of you. Does it matter? Bear with me. There’s something called tough love. The Prophet, because of the ‘asabiyya that we have, the Prophet, the people around the Prophet, are called the Sahaba. That’s also in looking at the word sahaba, just like we’re looking at the word shi’a. Does it mean something peculiar to Sunnis? 

It doesn’t mean that linguistically, it doesn’t mean that when you follow it in the Qur’an and even in the hadiths, it doesn’t mean that. So if shi’a doesn’t mean what it means to us today and sahaba doesn’t mean what it means to us today, if we can liberate ourselves, go back to the origin, go back to the source, linguistically and Qur’anically, who of you will feel comfortable? This is going to strike your own personal ‘asabiyya. Who of you will feel comfortable even though the Qur’an and the Sunnah validates what I’m going to say? Who feels comfortable to say shi’at Rasulillah,instead of saying ashabu Rasulillah you say shi’at Rasulillah. That throws a monkey wrench in the ‘asabiyya way of thinking. Instead of saying shi’at al-Imam Ali, you say ashabul Imam Ali. That also throws a monkey wrench in the ‘asabiyya mind because you’ve grown conditioned and accustomed and engineered to say certain things in certain ways without even thinking through what you said. You just inherit that. You hear a scholar you have confidence in or any person you have confidence in and you take it for granted. We think these issues have to be rethought so that we’re not out there killing ourselves.

Imam Muhammad al-Asi is currently working on the first-ever English Tafsir of the Qur’an titled: The Ascendant Qur’an: Realigning Man to the Divine Power Culture.  He is based in Washington D.C.  This article is the edited transcript of one of his Friday khutbahs delivered on 6 September 2013.

Monday, December 24, 2018

Political Commentator: No Conflicts between Muslim Countries in United Muslim Ummah

TEHRAN (FNA)- Ahmad Haj-Ali, Journalist and Political Commentator said the Muslim countries need to be united against the threats posed by world’s hegemonic powers.
Commenting on the practical steps Islamic countries should take to unite, he mentioned the duty of Muslim spiritual leaders to rise and walk in Imam Khomeini’s path of uniting Muslim nations.

Ahmad Haj-Ali is a Lebanese Moscow-based journalist and political commentator. He attended the 32nd International Islamic Unity Conference in the Iranian capital, Tehran, in late November 2018.

FNA has conducted an interview with Ahmad Haj-Ali on the necessity of unity among Muslims countries and the role Tehran’s Islamic Unity Conference plays to this end.
Below is the full text of the interview:

Q) How do you believe promoting unity and interfaith dialogue among Muslims can counter the onslaught against Islam?

A) Hegemonic powers initiated the crisis among Muslim nations, using a fascist doctrine alien to Islam: the doctrine of “ISIS”, “al-Nusra” and their affiliated groups. Takfiris killed and slaughtered Sunnis as well as Shiites. Hegemonic powers wanted them to dominate the Islamic world, targeting all traditional Islamic schools and sects. The United States, Zionist regime and Persian Gulf so-called kingdoms want to put the confrontation between Sunnis against Shiites. A united Muslim Ummah avoids confrontation between its parts; hence no more conflicts or crisis between Muslim countries.

Q) “Unity cannot be achieved with words and requires collective action.” What steps are needed to be taken to unite the Muslim Ummah?

A) We have to be closer to the spirit of Imam Khomeini’s revolution, to avoid Sunni Vs. Shiite communities. We need every effort to be implemented to fight Takfiris and hegemonic powers. Now, it is the duty of the Spiritual references to do what Imam Khomeini did decades ago. Imam Khomeini’s revolution was neither a Shiite nor Sunni revolution, but it was and still is an Islamic revolution uniting the Muslims. Arab Sunni world should rise and join the axis of resistance. It should get involved in the resistance against world’s hegemonic powers.

Q) Some Arab countries pay billions of dollars buying arms from the US, which in return, regard them as a milk cow which had to be milked. Why do they get the support of the West rather than a united Islamic nations to guaranty their security?

A) As far as the Arabic capitals and economic assets all over the world are in the hands of the United States and the Zionist lobbies, these marionettes so-called Arab Kings and princes are slaves to their western masters. So, majority of Arab leaders are not free in their political choices.

Other Muslim countries should break the western economic hegemony, for instance, by using their national currencies instead of US dollars. There will be some tough years, but it will bring freedom of political choices as well as freedom of our future generations.

Q) What role did Tehran 32nd International Islamic Unity Conference play in uniting Muslims? What was the significance of the conference?

A) In spite of the US-imposed sanctions, the Unity Conference witnessed more and more people attending the event, 32 years after it was first launched. The attendants were leaders of the Islamic world and well-known activists with progressive ideologies. They are part of the global resistance against the unipolar globalization and hegemony.

 The conference got more significance after Americans and Saudis threatened the guests of this round of the conference not to travel to Tehran; however, the attendants came to say they are a part of Imam Khomeini’s revolution and a support to meet his call to free Palestine.

Q) Is there room for non-Muslim countries to have ties with a united Islamic Ummah?

A) We have to work for unity not only among Muslims, but also among all conscious powers opposed to hegemony. Muslims have their allies all over the world, in all continents. Any resistance to the unipolar globalization can rely on the Muslim Ummah’s help and collaboration.

An instance is Russia, with the population of over 10 million Muslims. They were attacked by Wahhabi ideologies after the fall of the Soviet Union. Later, Russian Muslims started to realize the danger of Wahhabism. This made the historical pivotal event which was when the Russian Air Force came to the field to fight along with powers of resistance against the same enemy in Syria. Russian Muslims are partners in victories against Takfiri groups in Syria and Iraq.

Sunday, December 02, 2018

Iran holds no resentment towards Saudis: analyst

Iran holds no resentment towards Saudis: analystTEHRAN, Dec. 01 (MNA) – A political analyst has rejected the idea that Iran is an enemy of all Saudis and by extension all Sunnis.


“This long held belief that Iran is an enemy of all Saudis and by extension, all Sunnis is a lie,” Catherine Shakdam, researcher at al-Bayan Centre for Planning and Studies, tells the Tehran Times.
Shakdam says Iran as a country holds no anger and no resentment towards the Saudi people.
She also lauds Iran’s call for unity among Islamic nations, saying thanks to Iran’s efforts “bridges are being built and old prejudices are melting away.”
The following is the full transcript of the interview:
The 32nd edition of the International Islamic Unity Conference was held in Tehran on November 24-26 with the aim of laying the ground for unity and solidarity in the Islamic world. How do you evaluate the measures taken and speeches made during the conference with respect to its objective?
I’d like to begin by saying that Iran is the only country over the decades to have worked so tirelessly towards the promotion of Islamic unity, and beyond that the need for all communities to respect each other, as beyond all differences we all remain equal in our humanity.
I believe readers will benefit from knowing that amid the rise of sectarianism and Wahhabi-led religious radicalism across countless continents and region, Iran has held true to its calls for unity and solidarity for the sake of peace and justice.
It serves the purpose of the ongoing geo-political debate to clearly affirm Iran’s Islamic Republic as a nation dedicated to unity, cooperation, and peaceful collaboration in strengthening respectful bilateral relations. I believe Imam Khomeini set the tone for such a dialogue. Today it is his vision which continues under the leadership of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
As far as the conference goes I would say that Palestine remained, of course, a rallying call for action. It is difficult to imagine it could be any different when Palestine sits a constant reminder of how innocent can so easily be crushed under tyrants’ feet.
Many if not the majority of the tensions experienced throughout the Islamic world, and in particular of course, the Greater Middle East are tied up to the Palestinian dossier. It is impossible to divorce the many conflicts that have sprung across the region and throughout the decades without pinning back to the time of Al Nakhba, when Zionism declared war on Palestine and invaded its land.
What remains clear from the conference is that Iran’s call for the formulation of a united narrative for the benefit of all people is finally taking hold. Bridges are being built and old prejudices are melting away.
Of course such endeavor requires time and much patience, but I believe the path was set and minds ambition to such goals of unity. To refuse unity is to empower tyrants and encourage foreign meddling; to embrace unity however is to assert one’s sovereignty and right to political self-determination, freedom of religion, and freedom of speech.
What issues are the most important ones that the Muslim world faces today? And how can they be overcome?
As I mentioned earlier Palestine sits at the core of most matters. That being said I think Yemen has become such an embodiment of the principles and values of Resistance one cannot help but look towards Yemen and see what devastation disunity leads to. As so many great personalities have noted before me, Yemen is a modern-day Karbala – a brilliant example of a people rising in defense of their rights against the fury of authoritarianism. 
How can we not look upon Yemen and draw lessons from such a stand? Yemen is fighting for its very future with the fury and certainty of one’s righteous stand. I would like to think we have lessons to learn from Yemen – both in terms of sacrifice and determination to hold true to individuals’ right to choose. 
Yemen is many beliefs and many different communities, and yet all stand together under the Resistance’s flag. Many would argue that Yemen’s ability to resist was made possible through such unity.
I believe Ayatollah Khamenei has often encouraged all to rise above their differences so that they could be made stronger in their support of others. I believe such conferences to act powerful reminders to such calls.
Addressing the participants of the conference, Leader of the Islamic Revolution Ayatollah Ali Khamenei said certain countries in the region obey the US instead of Islam and the Quran. How does this issue threaten the unity among Islamic nations?
Well to identify as an Islamic country infers that one matrix is that of the Quran and Islamic principles. To identify as an Islamic country and yet exist in contradiction to Islam and the Quran is to exist in a state of cognitive dissonance that can only lead to tragedy. 
To accept Islam is to recognize that no other authority can take precedence. And today many countries have betrayed such covenant. I believe Ayatollah Khamenei’s remark to be both a warning and an invitation to mend attitudes so that harmony could be restored.
If we were to return to our common denominator: Islam, many disagreements could be overcome and old upsets disappeared.
War needs not to be a legacy we pass on to our children if only we could recognize our past mistakes for what they are: a betrayal against our collective interests for the sake of egocentrism and greed.
President Hassan Rouhani said during his speech that “we are ready to make every effort to protect the interests of Saudi people against terrorism and superpowers, in the same way that we helped the people of Iraq, Syria andAfghanistan.” How would such a message resonate with Saudi people? And what could be derived from Rouhani’s message, especially with regard to Iran’s policies toward other countries in the region?
Allow me to start with the second part of your question. I think it’s clear that Iran as a country holds no anger and no resentment towards Saudis. If anything Saudis are victims of the regime. For decades they have been robbed of their rights, their cultural identities, their ability to choose, think, believe and question. For decades they have lived under the thumb of a family whose very name was imprinted on the people it claims to rule over.
Saudis are but commodities to be disposed of and owned by Al Saud royals. 
Why would Iran hold any animosity towards such people when it itself knows all too well how bitter the bite of oppression is?
This long held belief that Iran is an enemy of all Saudis and by extension all Sunnis is a lie Riyadh has been only too keen to perpetuate and spread to justify its own existence.
All Iran has ever ambitioned is to empower Saudis against their despots, while all Al Sauds have done has been to destroy, murder, imprison and persecute. I believe the difference is stark.
Now, as far as helping Saudis against the threat of terrorism I believe President Rouhani wanted to warn against the insidious perversity of Wahhabism as it preaches bloodshed and persecution as the base of its doctrine.
Wahhabism literally gave birth to radical movements across the MENA region, plunging communities in the fires of war. If not for Iran’s intervention many communities would still suffer under such fires, and so it stands to reason for Iran to extend a friendly hand to those living under Wahhabism’s abominable rule.
President Rouhani is speaking peace and assistance to all Saudis. As for the regime, well I believe the recent murder of Jamal Khashoggi speaks volume of the nature of Al Saud’s system of governance.
Interview by: Mohammad Homaeefar

Saturday, December 01, 2018

Muslim Unity is Not an Illusion — It is an Obligation

By Abu Dharr



Nationalism is a sickness. Racism is a plague. And sectarianism is a cancer. These are the three major illnesses that afflict the Muslims — from the time the first Islamic country came into existence in Arabia over 14 centuries ago up to this very day. Here, we shall try to make a diagnosis of sectarianism, setting aside much of its history.
The words Sunni and Shi‘i have made their way into the political parlance of current events. You may want to review the news items and news commentaries of the Islamic world before the Islamic Revolution in Iran to find out how scarcely the words Sunni and Shi‘i figured into political articles and ideological books then. Now, though, you will find these words tucked into geopolitical analyses and sociopolitical studies about Muslim countries — ranging from the political right to the political left. Even Muslim writers are towing this highbrow line of thought! This “Sunni-Shi‘i” characterization of diplomacy and wars appears to be the fad of the near future.
We neither have the time nor are we straightaway interested in butting intellectual heads with writers and thinkers whose ideas are molded by the high god of Zionism and imperialism. Our immediate concern is with those Muslim writers and journalists who have shacked themselves in the sectarian fleapit.
To begin with, any rational Muslim will tell you that the Muslims of the world, excluding the enlightened ones, will consider themselves either Sunnis or Shi‘is. Ask them: was the Prophet (pbuh) a Sunni or was he a Shi‘i? And you will get an assortment of answers. Not much success there…
Then ask: is your definition of a Sunni or a Shi‘i a definition that brings all Muslims together? Does your definition exclude the other (Sunni or Shi‘i) from being considered an “equal Muslim”? Here, you will have him/her begin to think (quite an accomplishment; as many of these Muslims have inherited their identities without thinking about who they are).
Then ask them: as we all agree that the Qur’an is our ultimate reference, can you produce for me one ayah that substantiates your (hereditary) definition of who a Sunni is? Or who a Shi‘i is? If your interlocutor remains calm and honest, he will confess that there is no ayah in the Qur’an that validates his conventional definition of his own Sunni or Shi‘i assumptions.
Then ask: are there fanatic Sunnis and fanatic Shi‘is around? Can you identify them for me? What makes them fanatics? Is thereany ayah in the Qur’an or is there any consensual hadith, which is compatible with the Qur’an, that explains such fanaticism? If your interlocutor is open, reasonable, and candid he will begin to rethink his inbred beliefs.
All of these questions and similar ones are not meant to demean any Muslim as much as they are meant to reject and rule out the bigotry and the bias that many Muslims have toward each other — precisely the components of today’s sectarianism.
Say good-bye to your friend and take a moment to spend with yourself. Look at the Muslim world and observe how sectarianism has been manipulated by those who have power and wealth; inside the house of Islam and outside of it to wreak havoc on hundreds of millions of poor Muslims who just two generations ago were faintly aware that they are Sunnis or Shi‘is!
It would be asking too much to expect a Sunni to pray like a Shi‘i, or to expect a Shi‘i to pray like a Sunni; in other words, there is not enough maturity in both the Sunni and the Shi‘i Muslims to come to the point where they both exchange recognition of the other in practical terms. Pray like each other. Fast like each other. And perform the rituals of Islam like each other. It is because of this inability that we have Muslims at psychological distances from each other. This is where sectarianism begins.
Okay. Let us move on. If the average Muslim considers the “other” Muslim incorrect in the way he performs his rituals we end up fostering a form of bias and in some cases intolerance and discrimination. Case in point: when was the last time you saw a Sunni scholar give the Friday khutbah in a Shi‘i masjid, and vice versa? Has there ever been a Shi‘i scholar who led the prayers in al-Masjid al-Haram in Makkah, or al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Madinah? Has there ever been a Sunni scholar who led the jama‘ah prayers in Mashhad, or al-Najaf or Karbala’? And even if this was ever to occur, it should not be for public consumption or a showcase event. It should be done with a mass public Muslim recognition of the equality of the Islamic madhhabs (schools of thought). These narrow-minded-cum-mean-minded fiqhi variances attributed to the respected Islamic faqihs, and not to the Prophet (pbuh) himself, is what has kept us from assuming and resuming our socio-political responsibilities.
Taking this to another level, both the Sunni and the Shi‘i historical developments metastasized into bigoted and sectarian drifts. In the Sunni sphere there are those Wahhabis and Salafis who go to the extent of labeling the Shi‘is as kafirs. In the Shi‘i sphere there are those Safawis (Safavis in Persian) and Hujjatis who consider Sunnis to be outside the pale of Islam. Both of these represent the deadly outcome that comes from our initial inability to identify ourselves as equal Muslims (regardless of madhhab) and more importantly to express that by unifying our masjids in a way that it really does not matter whether a particular prayer leader prays according to a madhab other than mine.
There are larger fish to fry than to be sinking into the pits of circular arguments pertaining to ritualistic performances. There is a hadith from the Prophet (pbuh) that says, “Allah does not take into consideration your outward show; rather He takes into consideration your internal reality.”
The fanaticism in the Sunni context has taken a major blow — a potential knockout by the high crimes and misdemeanors of the Saudi tribal regime and the financial clout it has, or should we say had, throughout the world. Many Muslims are waking up and looking at an ugly and disgusting Saudi regime that is beginning to disintegrate due to its role in the war on populations in Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Libya, etc, not to mention its crimes against individuals who are its own citizens from Jamal Khashoggi to the hundreds of ‘ulema’ whao have been rounded up in a humiliating manner, thrown into prison, and either forgotten about or awaiting a kangaroo court to sentence them to long terms in prison or to put them on death row. Islamic activists, writers, scholars, and observers are speaking out against the tyranny and the lackey regime in Arabia that takes its orders from Zionist henchmen and imperialist bosses.
The fanaticism in the Shi‘i context is brewing beneath the surface. Our brothers and sisters in the Islamic Republic of Iran have been riding a crest of well-deserved successes as costly as they have been over 40 long years… But they have to begin to address the cancer of sectarianism in their midst; two scholars, among others, who did just that were the late Ayatullah Mutahhari and Dr. Ali Shariati. Their lessons, articles, and books on this subject, as far as this writer knows, do not circulate; this, in and of itself, proves that the sectarians do have sizeable clout within the Islamic Republic.
Our brothers in the Islamic Republic of Iran have shown the rest of the Muslims a very commendable character of civility and courtesy. Their efforts at bringing the Muslims together are admirable. Their bypassing of the ritualistic issues that divide the rest of the Muslims within the house of Islam is laudable. But we would be naive to make believe that Shi‘i sectarians are negligible and of no influence. Like all nations, Islamic Iran has its share of nationalists and even racists. But that does not concern us as much as the sectarians who can bring the Islamic Revolution to a halt, stifle the Islamic Republic, and reverse most if not all the progress of the past four decades. We dread a day in the future when the sectarian clout reverses Walayah al-Faqih and turns the clock back to the “negative/passive anticipation” of the Imam in occultation. Forewarned is forearmed.
O you who are faithfully committed to Allah [His power and authority]! Be on guard concerning Allah [His power presence and overriding authority] as is due to Him, and do not die except as Muslims [surrendering to His dominance] (3:102).

Thursday, November 17, 2016

Saudi Arabia’s Strategic Mistakes in Confrontation with Iran








Hossein Kebriaeezadeh and Kayhan Barzegar


As the Middle East is consumed by war and tensions, Saudi Arabia, which has a claim to be the leader of the Islamic world and the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, is beating the drums of war with its Muslim brethren. The country, which has taken an overtly hostile approach toward its regional rivals under its new monarch, King Salman, has gone as far as using religion as a tool to deprive Iranian Hajj pilgrims from taking part in the religious ceremony of Hajj, which is one of the most important rituals in Islam.

The fact that Saudi Arabia launches a military war on Yemen or, at domestic level, issues death sentence for such an influential cleric as Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, indicates that Riyadh is shifting its strategy from proxy war to direct confrontation with Iran.

Saudi Arabia’s failures in the region and the pursuit of a confrontational foreign policy with Iran should be considered among those strategic mistakes part of which stems from the country’s political order and its foreign policy, which lacks adequate support base. Another part of these measures has its roots in Saudi Arabia’s miscalculations with regard to its allies in the region and, in general, is due to Riyadh’s inability to correctly differentiate friend from enemy.

The roots of conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia are often assigned to ideological Shia-Sunni rivalry or geopolitical competition over each country’s role in the region. These were escalated by the Hajj incident last year in which hundreds of Iranian pilgrims died.

But one should not ignore another significant factor in the equation: the two states’ conflicting views on the presence of the US in the region and the security challenges which flow from it.

The Saudis have traditionally perceived the US presence in the region as supporting their interests and for regional security. From their perspective, such presence is essential for containing Iran’s growing regional role. They complain that, by overthrowing the Taliban and Saddam Hussein, the US changed the regional balance of power in favour of Iran. They fear that Barak Obama’s engagement policy in light of the nuclear deal means that Washington has embarked on the the path of accepting Iran’s dominant role in the region.

To counter this, the Saudis have adopted a two-pronged policy. First, they have embarked on an independent and offensive policy in the region, known as the Salman Doctrine, which is aimed primarily at containing Iran everywhere in the region and the world by all available political, military and economic means. Second, they are using intensive lobbying in the US Congress and US think-tanks in order to challenge the positive results of the nuclear deal between Iran and the US

Saudi Arabia took measures in Syria, Yemen and Iraq beyond its political capacities the main result of which was the growth of a phenomenon known as Daesh. Recently leaked emails sent by former US secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, clearly prove that Saudi Arabia has been providing financial and arms support to Daesh and other Sunni extremist groups. However, the empowerment of this Takfiri group not only gave Iran an upper hand in the region, but led to a strategic alliance between Iran and Russia in Syria through a change in goals and strategy of this terrorist group.



One of the most important reasons behind Saudi Arabia’s regional failures and the sense of threat it feels from Iran should be sought in Riyadh’s special viewpoint to the region. This country does not believe that regional equations are multidimensional and when formulating its aggressive foreign policy approach toward Iran, considers regional equations as only containing a single variable. As a result, Riyadh believes that its dwindling influence in the Middle East region is the result of the increasing clout of Iran in regional countries. This oversimplification of developments in the complicated Middle East region forces Saudi Arabia to choose the easiest way in its confrontational approaches toward its rivals. This comes while it is clear that in any geographical region from Latin America all the way to the Middle East, there are always at least two countries, which are rivals, but at the same time, they always prevent their rivalry from taking an aggressive and confrontational turn.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia lacks a correct and purposive viewpoint and strategy for rivalry with Iran. The policy of isolating Iran in the region is pursued by Saudi Arabia due to the spiritual influence that Riyadh sways among Islamic countries. However, apart from a few cases, which have proved successful through Saudi Arabia bribing those countries, this policy has generally failed in all other cases. At the same time, the nuclear deal that Iran clinched last year with the P5+1 group of world powers has practically removed obstacles in the way of Iran’s integration into the international community. On the other hand, developments in Syria have fared in Iran’s favor, as said before, after they led to closer cooperation among Iran, Russia and China.

Riyadh does not take advantage of suitable tools in its rivalry and confrontation with other countries. Supporting and organizing Takfiri groups has caused those groups to be a more serious threat to the international community and the West than being a threat for Iran and its allied countries, and has led to the establishment of  a global anti-Daesh front.

In the meantime, inefficiency of the Saudi-led Arab coalition in its war on Yemen has prevented it from changing the balance of power in favor of Riyadh as Saudi officials expected. On the other hand, diplomatic moves made by Saudi Arabia in the Middle East, especially in the Persian Gulf region, to convince its regional allies and create a coalition among all Sunni states against Iran have proven futile. Domestic tensions and differences between Persian Gulf littoral states and Saudi Arabia in addition to extreme weakness of these countries in military terms will practically render any possible military coalition among them ineffective. This is especially true taking into account that such militarily powerful countries as Pakistan and Turkey have not gone beyond lip service in their support for Riyadh.

After Saudi Arabia suffered frequent failures in the face of Iran, it could only take revenge on Iran, which had gotten rid of restrictions that were imposed on the country over its nuclear program, through a faceoff within the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). However, due to overreliance of Saudi Arabia’s economy on oil revenues and a budget deficit amounting to 98 billion dollars, this ageing tool cannot be a secure means for confrontation with Iran. Under conditions of sanctions, Iran learned that due to global economic conditions and the sway of political motivations over the international community, the policies of the Economy of Resistance must be pursued for transition from an oil-based economy.

The conditions, however, are different for Saudi Arabia due to its monocultural economy and high reliance on oil revenues. As a result, the first field to be affected by militarization of Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy is the Saudi society. At domestic level, delineating the country’s geopolitical strategy on the basis of threatening and having tension with neighboring countries has made it difficult for Saudi Arabia to achieve its vision goals for 2025, according to which Riyadh was supposed to promote its standing in the Middle East in terms of domestic welfare and economic achievements.

On the other hand, focusing on confrontation in relations with Iran has had untoward consequences for this country. Increasing domestic and regional costs and absence of balance in purposive and smart relations with neighboring countries in addition to political passivity have been major outcomes of Saudi Arabia’s effort to define Iran as an enemy. In line with this policy, Saudi Arabia’s unfortunate alignment with Israel, which is the black sheep in the eyes of Muslim nations, has been among those factors, which have served to tarnish the prestige of Riyadh among regional states.

At present, there are two perspectives in Iran for how to deal with Saudi Arabia’s offensive policies. One view maintains that Iran should take a tougher stance towards Saudi Arabia because it will otherwise send a wrong message to the US about Iran’s role and strength in the region and this might dismay Iran’s regional allies, subsequently weakening Iran’s regional stances.

But the other perspective, and this is the dominant one, supports a policy of patience towards the Saudis. From this perspective, Saudi Arabia is currently acting beyond its strategic capability and national strength and since the US is not in favour of getting involved militarily in Syria and Yemen, the Saudis’ current offensive and warmongering policy in these countries will not last long.

In fact, Iran’s continued policy of avoiding tension and conflict with Saudi Arabia is aimed at defusing the Saudis’ bid to involve or commit the US militarily in the region. The reality is that Obama’s non-intervention policy in Syria, along with stressing the necessity for all actors, especially Iran, to take part in any regional peace talks, is a strategic development toward enhancing multilateral diplomacy in the region.

This is the only way to reduce tension between Iran and Saudi Arabia. The next US president, whether it is Clinton or Trump, should continue this policy and thereby pave the way to sustainable peace and security in the region.