Six years after the Abraham Accords, a new report by a former Israeli intelligence chief outlines a doctrine treating peace deals as temporary and regional instability as an asset
Mohamad Elmasry
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No one, least of all experts, is surprised.
From the moment the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Morocco formally normalised relations with Israel in 2020, the agreements - named the Abraham Accords by US President Donald Trump - were widely dismissed by critics as a farce.
Even before the accords were signed, Middle East experts argued that they represented an act of political theatre and deception, seemingly throwing the Palestinian cause under the bus while pretending to create peace and brotherhood between the "sons of Abraham".
Shortly before the signings, British-Palestinian academic Kamel Hawwash said the Israelis were taking the Emiratis "for a ride" that promised the continuation and acceleration of Israel's occupation and apartheid policies.
Around the same time, Joseph Massad, a professor of modern Arab politics, described the accords as a way of rewriting "the horrific colonial reality of Zionism and Israel in terms of religious and fraternal discord".
A new Israeli security report may provide important insights into Israel's strategic thinking when it signed the accords, as well as its policies in the years since.
Even before the accords were signed, Middle East experts argued that they represented an act of political theatre and deception
In the report, published on 12 October by Israel's Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), Tamir Hayman, a former head of Israeli military intelligence who now runs the institute, sets out what he calls Israel's "new security policy".
The report states that Israel does not view Arab countries as true nations, but instead as mere "collections of tribes and ethnic groups". As a result, undermining their stability "is viewed as a natural process" that Israel "should even encourage".
Indeed, the policy treats weak, fragmented Arab states as a source of security, since instability is something Israel "can manage more effectively than it can contend with strong nation-states".
It further defines Israel's approach as "perpetual preemptive war", with Israeli expansion - including into Syria and Lebanon - serving a broad objective of Arab "destabilization".
Destabilisation in practice
Hayman argues that Israel considers Middle East peace agreements as fundamentally "unattainable". When agreements are signed, they are "merely technical and temporary arrangements" designed to serve Israeli strategic objectives.
This is key to understanding not only how Israel approaches the Abraham Accords, but also its current regional posture, from Gaza and the West Bank to Syria and Lebanon.
Almost as soon as Syrians overthrew the longtime dictator Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Israel started working to destabilise the country.
The Israeli military has reportedly carried out hundreds of attacks on Syrian territory, destroyed much of Syria's defence capabilities, occupied large swaths of territory and armed militia groups opposed to the new government.
In Lebanon, Israel has been arguably even more aggressive. There, it occupies between six percent and 20 percent of Lebanese territory.
Since signing a ceasefire agreement with Hezbollah in November 2024, Israel has repeatedly attacked Lebanon, killing thousands.
For the past several months, Israel has been engaged in peace talks with the Lebanese government. American mediators said in June that a tentative framework signed by Israeli and Lebanese leaders would lead to a "comprehensive peace" between the two countries.
The security doctrine outlined by Hayman, however, suggests that Israel may have signed the agreement as cover for continuing its occupation and further destabilising Lebanon. Indications are that Israel has no intention of withdrawing from the Lebanese territory it has occupied.
Hayman admits his report is partly subjective and that Israeli leadership has not formally acknowledged the new security doctrine he outlines.
Recent Israeli conduct, however, makes Hayman's analysis certainly plausible, if not probable. His background as former head of military intelligence adds weight to his interpretation.
A widening war
If Hayman's basic premises are accurate, the implications for the Middle East could be deeply troubling.
Israel may continue pursuing territorial expansion and Palestinian displacement in Gaza and the West Bank, while consolidating positions in Syria and Lebanon. Its confrontation with Iran could also escalate, with devastating consequences for the region.
The US-Israeli war on Iran has already generated significant chaos, including ongoing spillover into Yemen and Saudi Arabia.
Israel would welcome the Saudi-led war against Yemen's Houthis spreading further into the region, particularly if the widening conflict leads to additional destabilisation in important Arab countries.
In this context, Egypt's possible entry into the Yemen war on Saudi Arabia's side could serve Israeli strategic interests.
On 17 October, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi requested parliamentary approval to provide military assistance to Saudi Arabia if Riyadh asks for it. Parliament has since postponed its vote until 26 October.
If Egypt does join the war, Israel could benefit in one of two ways.
On the one hand, the swift crushing of the Houthis would eliminate a threat to Israel and allow Israeli leaders to boast of the defeat as a successful extension of their 28 February attack on Iran.
On the other hand, if Egyptian help does not finish off the Houthis, the war could further widen. If nothing else, prolonged Egyptian involvement could drain resources and bog down a large, important Arab country on Israel's doorstep.
Furthermore, Israel's strategic partnership with the UAE deserves scrutiny. As I have previously argued, the two countries share interests in weakening and fragmenting Arab states. Both countries have supported non-state separatist actors across the region.
Normalisation as cover
Even the two countries that normalised relations with Israel decades ago - Egypt and Jordan - have reason to be concerned.
Since the start of the Gaza genocide, Israel has been accused of violating its Camp David agreement with Egypt. During the genocide, Israel took control of the Philadelphi Corridor, and more recently it has built new military fortifications in Rafah, a few kilometres from the Egyptian border.
Earlier this month, Israeli Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich issued an explicit threat to Egypt, warning that there would be "no Sinai" if it attacked Israel.
Arab governments seeking security through normalisation may instead be helping to undermine their own
Last year, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu expressed support for "Greater Israel", raising concerns in Jordan that Israel planned to expand beyond the Palestinian territories.
Despite all this, Arab governments continue to cooperate with Israel. Morocco upgraded its diplomatic relations with Israel last month, and Netanyahu travelled to the UAE in late September for talks that reportedly included officials from several other Arab countries.
Saudi Arabia, which appeared close to normalisation in 2023, continues to insist that it will not establish ties with Israel unless an independent Palestinian state is established.
Israeli media reported on 16 October, however, that Trump believes Saudi-Israeli normalisation is "back on the table". Israel's i24 news quoted Trump saying that Israel has provided assistance to Riyadh in its ongoing war against the Houthis in Yemen.
Why, then, would any Arab government contemplate engagement with Israel? Economic incentives, American pressure and security concerns undoubtedly help explain their calculations.
Normalisation, cooperation and meetings with Israel also offer Israel important diplomatic cover. Netanyahu has repeatedly argued that the Abraham Accords constitute evidence that Arab leaders do not care about the Palestinian cause and that some Arab leaders support Israel's war on Gaza.
What kind of peace can Arab governments expect from a state whose security doctrine treats neighbouring states' weakness as a strategic advantage?
The Abraham Accords were sold as a pathway to regional peace. Six years later, Hayman's analysis of Israel's security doctrine raises the possibility that Arab governments seeking security through normalisation may instead be helping to undermine their own.
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