Explosive Devices: From A Weapon of Necessity to A Doctrine of Attrition

By Mohammad Doeibes

Improvised explosive devices in southern Lebanon were not merely a temporary combat tool; over the decades, they evolved into a defining feature of an entire phase of the conflict, and one of the most prominent hallmarks of the “war of attrition” that reshaped the concept of asymmetric warfare. From the dirt roads of villages in the 1980s to what the enemy today calls the “buffer zone,” this weapon has continued to develop while preserving its essence: the silent strike that shifts the balance of power.

When the weapon was born out of necessity

With the “Israeli” invasion of Lebanon in 1982, the resistance did not possess a conventional arsenal capable of confronting a superior regular army. Here, improvised explosive devices emerged as a practical option: low-cost, high-impact, and reliant more on geography than on technology.

During that period, these devices became associated with operations targeting Zionist military patrols and vehicles on narrow roads, where the “theater” itself- within the then-occupied border strip- became part of the weapon. Southern roads turned into spaces laden with potential danger, where passing through became a daily risk and a source of fear for enemy soldiers and their collaborators.

The 1990s: the “Lebanese quagmire”

During the years of occupation in the 1990s, improvised explosive devices reached the height of their prominence. Even “Israeli” media later described that period as the “Lebanese quagmire,” where such devices were a “nightmare” haunting every Zionist and South Lebanon Army (Lahad) soldier and unit- from the Marjayoun device in 1996, to the Markaba device that destroyed the “Al-Jawz” in 1999, and in between, the Ansariya ambush in 1997.

The device was no longer just an explosion; it became part of an integrated tactic:
●    Long-term emplacement and waiting for the target
●    Using terrain and villages as cover for concealment
●    Combining explosive devices with fire ambushes

This cumulative approach contributed to wearing down the enemy and its collaborators, and—alongside the storming of positions and martyrdom operations—paved the way for the liberation in May 2000.

Post-liberation: evolution in quality, not quantity

After 2000, improvised explosive devices did not disappear; rather, they entered a more complex phase. The aim was no longer only to inflict losses, but to control the enemy’s movement and impose field equations. They became a defining feature of Hezbollah’s operations during that period in the occupied Shebaa Farms, between late 2000 and 2006.

This evolution included:
●    Improving detonation methods [remote, pressure-based, timed]
●    Concealing devices within civilian structures or underground
●    Integrating them into a broader network of operations

2006 and beyond: from tactic to doctrine

During the July War of 2006, improvised explosive devices proved they were not merely a supporting weapon, but a key factor in slowing ground advances. Over time, they became part of a broader “attrition doctrine” based on restricting the enemy’s freedom of movement rather than confronting it head-on.

Today, during the more recent confrontations- referred to as Al-Asf Al-Makoul Operation and what followed- improvised explosive devices have once again come to the forefront, but with multiplied effectiveness. They have become a central pillar in the process of attrition and in responding to violations. “Israeli” media has again described them as a “deadly trap,” following reports of killed and wounded soldiers within short periods as a result of explosions and scattered security incidents.

This evolution reflects a clear equation: the more detection methods advance, the more concealment techniques evolve- an open-ended race with no decisive conclusion.

A weapon that encapsulates a philosophy of confrontation

Improvised explosive devices in southern Lebanon are not merely a military tool, but an expression of an entire mode of combat thinking: a weapon measured not by its size, but by its results. For more than four decades, these devices have demonstrated that wars are not always decided by technological superiority, but sometimes by the smarter strike.