US sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port may look like just another chapter in Washington’s “maximum pressure” playbook, but they are far more ambitious and dangerous.
US axe falls on Chabahar
On September 16, the US announced that it was reimposing sanctions on Iran’s Chabahar Port that it co-developed with India. Revoking “the sanctions exception issued in 2018 under the Iran Freedom and Counter-Proliferation Act (IFCA) for Afghanistan reconstruction assistance and economic development,” the announcement further said that any “persons who operate the Chabahar Port or engage in other activities described in IFCA may expose themselves to sanctions under IFCA”.
The reference to any “persons” operating the port is to India, which has invested millions of dollars in the port in the last few years. India began to develop this port in a certain geopolitical context. Back then, New Delhi, supported by Washington, used this port to counter China’s Gwadar port in Pakistan. Accordingly, the US granted this port an exemption from sanctions. That exemption has now been taken away. Another imperative at that time was to allow India to use the port to provide supplies to Kabul to support the Karzai and Ghani administrations. Bypassing Pakistan—which Washington understood was supporting the Taliban—the US co-opted India to support the US-backed civilian regime. That geopolitical context, as it stands, no longer exists. The US no longer needs to support avenues to support the regime in Kabul that is no longer a Washington ally. In fact, Washington now prefers using the Chabahar Port issue to equally punish Kabul.
The Taliban leadership, already charting its course independently, is unlikely to view US sanctions as anything more than another act of hostility
The Geopolitics of Sanctions
By sanctioning Iran’s Chabahar Port, Washington is pursuing more than just another chapter in its “maximum pressure” campaign. It has three critical objectives in mind, the first of which is to punish India. The Trump administration’s ongoing trade war with New Delhi has already seen tariffs climb as high as 50 per cent on Indian exports to the US, dramatically undercutting India’s competitiveness. The withdrawal of the 2018 sanctions waiver on Chabahar effectively expands this economic conflict into the strategic realm. Not only are Indian goods 50 per cent more expensive in the US market, but now Indian exports to Central Asia through Chabahar are threatened by US sanctions as well. The message is blunt: New Delhi cannot expect privileged access to either American markets or regional transit corridors if it resists Washington’s terms.
Yet the dispute is not only about tariffs or trade balances. Chabahar has long symbolised a broader geopolitical opening—an India–Iran–Afghanistan transport corridor that could eventually link New Delhi to Russian and Central Asian energy markets. For India, the project promises a vital alternative to reliance on Persian Gulf suppliers or US-aligned routes. For Washington, this is precisely the problem. By crippling Chabahar, the US seeks to stymie the emergence of an energy corridor outside its sphere of influence and to foreclose India’s access to Iranian and Russian hydrocarbons. The ultimate goal is not simply to weaken Tehran but to pressure India into diverting its purchases toward US liquefied natural gas and crude exports.
The sanctions also reflect a deliberate attempt to recalibrate India’s relationship with Iran. If New Delhi is forced to retreat from Chabahar, Washington calculates, Iran’s isolation will deepen. The State Department’s September 16 statement left little ambiguity, identifying the “networks” that generate “millions for the Iranian military” as key targets of the new restrictions. Chabahar, as Iran’s flagship connectivity project with India and Afghanistan, sits squarely within those crosshairs. Unsurprisingly, the port will dominate the agenda when Ali Larijani, Tehran’s national security adviser and one of the most influential figures in the Iranian establishment, arrives in Delhi in the coming weeks.
The third objective at play is Afghanistan. In recent months, President Trump has openly pressed Kabul to hand back the Bagram airbase to American control, a demand the Taliban leadership has flatly rejected. For the Taliban, acquiescence would be politically ruinous, signaling subservience to the very power they fought for two decades to expel. By sanctioning Chabahar, Washington is attempting to narrow Afghanistan’s options, undermining its role as a vital overland bridge that could connect India and other South Asian states—excluding Pakistan—to Central Asian markets. This is not a trivial calculation. With relations between Kabul and Islamabad deteriorating, the Taliban regime has been cautiously exploring new partnerships in the region, and India has emerged as an obvious candidate. Earlier this year, the Taliban went so far as to call India a “significant regional partner.” Washington’s sanctions strategy is designed precisely to choke this opening, shrinking the diplomatic and economic space available to Kabul as it manoeuvres for new allies.
The US risks a massive backfire
Yet Washington’s gambit carries the risk of a serious backlash. Kabul has little incentive to heed American preferences, particularly after the Biden administration’s refusal to release Afghanistan’s frozen financial assets. The Taliban leadership, already charting its course independently, is unlikely to view US sanctions as anything more than another act of hostility. More consequential, however, is the potential fallout with India. By undermining New Delhi’s flagship connectivity project, Washington risks inflicting lasting damage on a relationship it has spent years cultivating. Alienated, India may lean more heavily on alternative partnerships with Russia and even China, eroding the very strategic alignment the US has sought to build through the Indo-Pacific framework. And if New Delhi ultimately withdraws from Chabahar under sanctions pressure, Washington may not secure the energy dominance it envisions. Instead, the vacuum could invite Beijing to step in, transforming Chabahar into a Chinese-controlled gateway for Central Asian energy, a scenario that would decisively undercut American aims.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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