Abutalib Albohaya - The Cradle
Into this vacuum stepped not foreign allies or state institutions, but a volunteer army of the poor, the pious, and the fiercely committed. The Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), or ‘Hashd al-Shaabi,’ emerged not as a militia but as a people’s army summoned by a fatwa to defend Iraq when the state could not.
Under the religious edict of “sufficient jihad” (al-jihad al-kifa’i) issued by the Najaf-based Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, the highest Shia religious authority, thousands emerged from homes and poor neighborhoods not to form a new militia, but to defend what their failing state could not: Iraq’s borders, cities, and national existence.
What began as an emergency response to an existential threat soon evolved into a sprawling security apparatus. In doing so, it raised questions that still shape Iraqi politics today: Who commands this force? Is it an auxiliary of the state or a parallel sovereign entity? And does its strength buttress Iraq’s sovereignty? Or eclipse it?
From volunteer resistance to institutional backbone
The PMU’s formal inception came after Sistani’s fatwa mobilized thousands to fight ISIS. The Iraqi military had collapsed across Mosul, Anbar, and Salah al-Din, and the self-proclaimed caliphate stood on Baghdad’s doorstep. These nascent Iraqi forces emerged as Iraq’s last line of defence.
Comprising veteran formations like the Badr Organization, Kataib Hezbollah (KH), Asaib Ahl al-Haq, and newer factions born on the frontlines, the PMU was never a monolith. Its expansion would later expand to include Sunni, Yazidi, Christian, and Shabak units, each filling defense roles across a fragmented security map.
Over time, the PMU transformed from a popular mobilization force into an official institution. In 2016, the Iraqi parliament passed legislation integrating the PMU into the national security framework, nominally placing it under the prime minister’s command.
But the line between integration and autonomy remains blurry. Factions with strong ties to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and West Asia’s Axis of Resistance have operated across borders, sparking concern among political elites – including Shia allies – over sovereignty breaches and dual loyalties.
Supporters and opponents
Supporters frame the PMU as a “national force working under the state’s banner,” a claim repeated by both its leadership and government documents. But as Erbil-based security analyst Wafaa Mohammed Karim tells The Cradle, “The political reality differs from official claims,” pointing to “a deep division over the PMU that mirrors the broader division about the meaning of the state itself in Iraq.”
He also notes “individual actions by some PMU brigades in different areas of Iraq, operating militarily and security-wise outside their mandate and the orders of the general command.” Karim cites incidents like the deadly clash in the Dora district south of Baghdad, where a PMU faction confronted federal security forces, as evidence of factions acting beyond Baghdad’s control.
According to Iraq’s Joint Operations Command, armed elements affiliated with KH stormed a Ministry of Agriculture office, reportedly triggered by a leadership dispute following the appointment of a new director and the refusal of the former official to step down.
Within the PMU, there is no singular ideological current. For instance, the Abbas Combat Division, officially affiliated with the Abbas shrine in Karbala, defines itself through its close association with the religious institution in Najaf – not any political party, movement, or armed faction. It insists on a purely Iraqi mandate. Its leaders oppose foreign entanglements and demand legal frameworks to govern the PMU’s existence.
In several statements, the Abbas Division has advocated confining arms to the state, legal regulation of the PMU, and its integration into official security forces, while retaining its role as a national reserve force when needed.
By contrast, other formations, particularly those more closely aligned with Iran's regional outlook, view themselves as an extension of the Axis of Resistance. A commander of one such faction in Baghdad tells The Cradle the PMU is Iraq’s “strategic depth” against foreign incursion – akin to Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon or the IRGC’s own doctrine of asymmetrical deterrence.
On the other side, Sunni and Kurdish political forces hold mixed positions. Some express concern over the PMU’s excessive power in Sunni-majority or Kurdish-bordering areas, citing fears of Shia sectarian expansion – whether ideological or interest-driven. Others view the PMU as a stabilizing force that can fill a potential power vacuum or prevent the return of extremist groups.
State command and ideological independence
The PMU’s complexity is best captured in one question: Who really commands it? Analysts describe it as a “three-headed beast”: Najaf-loyalist brigades, Iranian-aligned factions, and local tribal units operating as regional power brokers.
This structure has fueled accusations – some substantiated, others politically motivated – of “undisciplined” behavior. As Karim tells The Cradle:
“Many of the attacks on US interests and coalition bases were carried out from PMU-controlled camps. It is widely known that some PMU brigades control several border crossings, collect informal taxes, and engage in suspicious investments. Additionally, security officials in Kurdistan have recently accused some brigades of attacking oil infrastructure in the region – though no accusation was made against the PMU as a whole.”
From its wartime peak of 100,000 fighters, PMU forces have doubled, now comprising over 230,000 personnel. Iraq’s 2024 budget allocates approximately $2.6 billion to the PMU Commission – a staggering institutionalization for what was once a temporary mobilization.
Others, however, argue that such generalizations are unjust, noting that many PMU brigades fought honorably and remained disciplined under state orders, especially during the premiership of Mohammed Shia al-Sudani.
Journalist Hussein al-Fayyad, who specializes in armed groups, explains to The Cradle:
“Many factions made great sacrifices in the war against ISIS. They were partners with the Iraqi army, the Peshmerga, and the Counter-Terrorism Forces. These sacrifices shouldn’t be tarnished by isolated actions from individuals pursuing foreign agendas that do not represent the PMU’s political or ideological leadership – if such acts are even confirmed.”
The structural paradox: Resistance or reform?
The central contradiction is that the PMU cannot be easily dissolved or restructured without endangering the very security it helped restore. As one informed source from one of the PMU factions tells The Cradle:
“Dismantling the PMU is not being considered – neither within the Coordination Framework, nor among the religious authorities, nor in their recent messages. It is unacceptable to the PMU’s leadership. The PMU is an institution under the prime minister and follows the Commander-in-Chief, but it differs from other security institutions because it is ideological and religious, established by a fatwa. Therefore, its dissolution is not an option under any political circumstance."
“Calls to confine weapons to the state are, in our view, aimed at the armed factions – not the PMU – because the factions have not fully joined its structure. Instead, they’ve contributed brigades while maintaining their independence,” the source explains, adding:
“These factions believe the issue is with loose weapons and tribal arms, not resistance arms. They view their weapons as part of the resistance, supportive of the state, and assert that their combat decisions are tied to religious authority – whether from Najaf or Iran’s Wilayat al-Faqih.”
Factions like Sayyid al-Shuhada Brigades, for instance, contribute official brigades to the PMU command, but retain their own political and military chains of command.
For his part, Prime Minister Sudani – who enjoys the support of the Coordination Framework that backs the PMU’s presence within Iraq’s state structure – recently stated:
“Monopolizing weapons in the hands of the state is a fundamental pillar of a strong, respected state. No party has the right to override this decision or replace the state and its authorities.”
This came as Washington urged Baghdad not to approve any legislation that might formalize the PMU’s administrative structure, referring to the “Popular Mobilization Law” in its second parliamentary reading, which was recently introduced after waves of political contention. But the same source from one of the PMU factions tells The Cradle:
“We’re fully aware of the American position on the PMU law in parliament. There’s tremendous political pressure on various partners in the Iraqi political process to prevent its passage. We see this as a direct challenge to Iraqi sovereignty, which obliges the government to act in defense of Iraq’s internal affairs."
Interestingly, Sudani’s statement was made during a tribal gathering commemorating the 1920 revolution against British occupation in Iraq – suggesting layered political messaging.
Between Tehran, Washington, and Baghdad
The PMU’s geopolitical entanglements mirror its internal contradictions. With Iran, the PMU’s ideological wing functions as a forward military outpost for the Axis of Resistance. It receives IRGC support, coordinates with Hezbollah, and previously deployed fighters to Syria – particularly in Qusayr and Al-Bukamal.
With the US, relations remain confrontational. Following the shocking American assassinations of PMU Deputy Chief Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis and IRGC Commander Qassem Soleimani in 2020, the PMU entered a new phase of confrontation. Some factions took part in the 2025 Israel–Iran war, with reports of involvement in undisclosed theaters.
Persian Gulf capitals are divided. Saudi Arabia views the PMU as a geopolitical obstacle, while the UAE and Qatar discreetly engage its moderate factions. Turkiye has cultivated ties with Sunni PMU affiliates to reassert influence in northern Iraq.
The future of the PMU is still being contested – between foreign agendas, internal divisions, and the unresolved question of the Iraqi state itself.
One path, pushed by Tehran, would maintain the current dual structure: the PMU remains formally under the Iraqi prime minister’s command, while its ideological factions continue to operate as autonomous arms of the Resistance Axis.
Washington’s preferred outcome is the opposite: dismantle the unruly factions, fold the rest into Iraq’s regular military, gut the PMU’s funding, and sideline the Coordination Framework that shields it politically.
A third option is gaining ground among Iraqi voices seeking a national compromise. This would see disciplined brigades brought under one unified command within the Iraqi army, preserve the religious legitimacy of the original fatwa, and shield the institution from regional power plays. But it would require coordination between Najaf and Tehran, and a rare internal consensus among the PMU’s many factions.
What is clear is that the PMU cannot be wished away. It is at once a defender of the state's security and a challenge to its monopoly on power – a structure shaped by war, sanctified by sacrifice, and embedded in Iraq’s post-ISIS order.
However it evolves, the PMU will remain central to Iraq’s unfinished struggle for sovereignty.
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