The Most Honored Martyr in the Eyes of the Egyptians

By Ihab Shawqi

Egyptians have a long history with the most honored martyr, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah. It began with their following Hezbollah and its heroic operations in the south, reached its peak during the July 2006 War, and did not end even after his blessed martyrdom. He became a symbol and a member of the list of honored figures and leaders whom Egyptians hold in high esteem.

Because Egypt is the largest Arab population center, with a population exceeding 120 million [109 million inside the country and 11 million abroad], accounting on its own for roughly a quarter of the Arab world’s population [approximately 460 million], it contains numerous popular segments, most of which support and admire the martyr, as reflected in the general public mood and the nature of the Egyptian people, as demonstrated by the majority on numerous occasions.

This can be gauged through gatherings that displayed images of Sayyed Nasrallah alongside those of leader Gamal Abdel Nasser, the many seminars and conferences celebrating the Resistance and its leader, as well as observing popular circles and their discussions about the Sayyed’s leadership, manliness, and courage. It can also be seen in the writings of Egypt’s leading intellectuals, foremost among them the late writer Mohamed Hassanein Heikal, in addition to social media platforms and the prevailing sentiments expressed there. Most of these converge on according Sayyed Nasrallah a special status, even among those who express disagreement with certain religiously oriented Resistance movements. Overall, there is agreement that the Sayyed of the Nation’s Martyrs, Hassan Nasrallah, holds a distinctive position as a Resistance leader and major symbol.

The Ibn Khaldun Center Poll

What is noteworthy is that several attempts have been made to measure public opinion, including a poll conducted in 2006 by the Ibn Khaldun Center, which held controversial normalization-related positions in Egypt, contrary to the choice of Resistance and alignment with its cause and its leader.

In this scientific public opinion poll, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah ranked first in popularity among Egyptians, receiving 82%, in a field of 20 Egyptian, Arab, and Muslim public figures. Notably, the person who came in second at the time was Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, with 71%. The author presents this as an early indication of Egyptian support for Iran in its ongoing war against Zionist-American aggression.

There is no doubt that several factors brought the Sayyed and the Egyptians together, relating both to the nature of the Egyptian people and to Sayyed Nasrallah himself. These can be summarized as follows:

First: The Nature of the Egyptian People

To understand the secret behind this Egyptian affection for Sayyed Nasrallah, one must examine the nature of Egyptians, including their love of leaders and heroic figures—something deeply rooted in their popular heritage.

Egyptians have a profound affection for leaders throughout the history of Egypt, the Arab world, and the world at large, without being driven by racism. They admire Saad Zaghloul, Mustafa Kamel, and Gamal Abdel Nasser, while also admiring Omar al-Mukhtar, Che Guevara, and others whose heroic deeds have been recorded by history.

Egyptians are also not inherently sectarian or doctrinally fanatical, with the exception of limited segments that emerged following the Wahhabi incursion during the Sadat era. Consequently, differences in religion or Islamic denomination do not prevent Egyptians from rallying around, respecting, and loving any leader or hero.

This is especially true given the distinctive status of the Prophet’s Household [Ahl al-Bayt] in Egypt, the widespread presence of their revered shrines, and Egyptians’ affection for them. This creates a bond with followers of Ahl al-Bayt in Lebanon, Iraq, and Iran, and the majority of Egyptians do not view them through the lens of sectarian prejudice found among certain other peoples.

Moreover, Egypt’s longstanding conflict with the Zionists, extending from the establishment of the entity until 1973, created a deeply rooted hostility. Every Egyptian family has lost a martyr, either from within the family or among its relatives. Egyptians also reject normalization in its entirety, considering normalization a stigma and an accusation against anyone involved in it. This means that Egyptians align themselves with anyone who resists the entity.

Second: The Nature of the Martyr Sayyed Nasrallah

In addition, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah’s political outlook was characterized by unity, and his rhetoric was inclusive. People did not view him as a religious or sectarian leader. Rather, his discourse was Arabist and nationalist, bringing together Nasserists and nationalists.

His rhetoric advocated support for the oppressed and the establishment of justice, and in its details, it came close to the principles of social justice, which do not conflict with the broad left-wing movement. At the same time, it had a unifying Islamic orientation, which does not conflict with most Islamic currents.

Consequently, when Sayyed Nasrallah emerged at the forefront of the conflict with the Zionist and American enemy, speaking in an inclusive language, he found receptive ears and open hearts. The only exceptions were groups of fanatics or mercenaries affiliated with the Zionist, American, and Gulf embassies.

Egyptians’ View of the Evolution of Hezbollah and Sayyed Nasrallah’s Leadership

Perhaps some segments of Egyptian society were persuaded by the claims of peace following the Camp David Accords. However, political currents with popular support continued to uphold the option of Resistance and reject the agreement.

Over time, opposition expanded and the ranks of those supporting the so-called peace diminished, as people came to recognize the enemy’s exploitation of Egypt’s withdrawal from the confrontation to attack the remaining fronts.

Among these was the Lebanese front, which had been torn apart by civil war. They also saw Iraq engaged in a major war with Iran, with both sides exhausting one another. The features of Gulf hypocrisy began to emerge: the Gulf states had convinced the populations that they opposed the enemy and had severed relations with the Egyptian regime that signed the peace treaty.

This changed following revelations of secret Gulf contacts with the “Israeli” enemy that coincided with the Oslo Accords, as well as the earlier discovery of the extent of coordination with the United States, the sponsor of the entity in the region.

All of this fostered the conviction that Resistance was inevitable, and that the role played by the Resistance in Palestine and Lebanon was indispensable. The Resistance fighters, in this view, were acting on behalf of an entire nation that had abandoned its dignity and laid down its arms in the middle of the battle.

It was at this point that news from the Lebanese front began arriving in succession, with its echoes reverberating throughout the Arab and Islamic worlds until liberation was achieved. This fostered a growing conviction that the center of gravity of the Resistance had shifted to Lebanon, and that Hezbollah had become a major source of hope for restraining an enemy that appeared to have free rein after Arab regimes abandoned Resistance.

This came after the enemy had succeeded in dispersing the Palestine Liberation Organization and trapping its leadership in the so-called peace process.

The July War

The peak of Egyptian admiration for the Sayyed of the Nation’s Martyrs, Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, and Hezbollah came during the July 2006 War.

Sayyed’s speeches were explicitly compared with those of the late Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser. Sayyed’s announcement concerning the sinking of the Saar warship was compared to Nasser’s declaration of the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

Images of Sayyed Nasrallah were spontaneously raised in public squares alongside images of Abdel Nasser, expressing Egyptians’ longing for leadership and opposition to the Zionist enemy.

This was accompanied by the many conferences and celebrations of the Lebanese victory that filled trade union headquarters and halls across Egypt.

The Support Front

With the launch of the Al-Aqsa Flood operation, eyes turned toward Hezbollah, anticipating its intervention. This materialized immediately, beginning on the second day, when Sayyed announced the party’s participation in supporting Gaza and its refusal to abandon it.

People began eagerly awaiting a statement, speech, or decision from Sayyed, seeing him as a source of hope for supporting Palestine and protecting Gaza.

This intervention was met with overwhelming joy and great hope that Gaza could be saved, the pressure on it reduced, and its population protected from genocide.

Egyptians also looked to Hezbollah’s operations, following their development and escalation. Some who had been influenced by the extensive sectarian propaganda directed against the party began to reconsider their views, seeing Hezbollah defend and sacrifice martyrs on the road to Al-Quds and in pursuit of a broader Islamic and national cause unrelated to the alleged sectarianism.

His Blessed Martyrdom

The martyrdom of Sayyed was an immense and overwhelming source of pain for numerous segments of the Egyptian population, causing profound grief. Yet Sayyed Nasrallah’s noble legacy remained that of a Resistance symbol on the list of honorable and heroic figures embraced by the sound Egyptian conscience.

Egyptians also welcomed Hezbollah’s continuation of the Resistance and its engagement in the battles of Uli al-Ba’s and Al-Asf al-Ma’kul, as well as its retention of its readiness and weapons.

They became convinced that Sheikh Naim was a continuation of Sayyed Nasrallah, and that the Resistance remained strong, was fulfilling its duty, and would remain faithful to its commitment.

Israel’s Opposition Coalition: A Final Nail in the Netanyahu’s Coffin?

Alwaght- A month to the Israeli parliamentary elections, talks are growing heated for forming political coalitions. Leaders of the opposition political parties who in the past entered elections independently are now moving closer to each other to form a united front against Benjamin Netanyahu.

Leaders of the so-called "Change Group" gathered Saturday at the home of opposition leader Yair Lapid, vowing to halt their mutual attacks. The meeting brought together Lapid, head of Yesh Atid, Gadi Eisenkot of Yashar, Naftali Bennett of Together, Avigdor Lieberman of Yisrael Beiteinu; and Yair Golan of the Democrats.

The gathering aimed to coordinate party efforts, court more voters and strengthen the opposition bloc's odds of winning a majority and forming the next government.

Under a joint document, each party committed to working within its own ranks to boost turnout and draw voters from diverse constituencies so the opposition alliance can secure a majority and build a new coalition. The bloc has infuriated Netanyahu, who fired back at his rivals: "Only a big Likud will stop them."

Reasons for unity

The opposition parties' coalition should not be seen just as a electoral convergence, but it is an outcome of a complex of political, security, and social developments, most important part of which is driven by the Netanyahu’s performance.

The first flashpoint was hardline ministers' push to overhaul the judiciary, which triggered mass protests from the very start of the government's formation.

Opponents argued the proposed changes would gut the courts' independence and tilt the balance of power toward the executive, a fight that became a central driver of domestic unrest and deepened the country's political fault lines.

Alongside the domestic crisis, the government's security policies have opened multiple fronts against Tel Aviv and fueled growing security fears. Much of the public and Netanyahu's critics believe he has sacrificed the state's interests for personal gain to cling to power and dodge his domestic woes, a course they say has imposed heavy costs on society and sharpened a sense of insecurity.

Corruption charges against Netanyahu also continue to cast a long shadow over his political future, with opponents insisting the prime minister must answer for the cases. Rivals are aiming to beat him at the polls and pave the way for him to face trial.

What sets this election apart is that while past races centered on who would be the next prime minister, Netanyahu's opponents are now less focused on a particular person or party than on a single shared goal: blocking him from another term. "No to Netanyahu" has become the rallying point for factions that may disagree on almost everything else.

Influence of opposition unity in the Israeli society

The unity of Netanyahu’s opponents can impact the political atmosphere of the Israeli society more than ever. The significance of this coalition does not lie just in sitting beside each other, but the main message to the society is that they are pushing to cross the political fragmentation and to create a united front against the ruling coalition and this issue can draw support of part of society which is still undecided on who to back.

Independent and undecided voters, along with intellectuals still weighing their options now loom especially large. Their stance could shift in the final weeks of the campaign, particularly if Netanyahu's opponents can project a coherent, clear vision of the political future.

Polls published in recent weeks point to a tight race, with the opposition parties' combined seats holding an edge over Likud and its right-wing allies, a sign the electoral landscape remains fluid and that undecided voters could still upend the political equation in the campaign's closing weeks.

Opposition's hope to win

The opposition camp, reading the political winds, appears to have entered the campaign's final weeks with growing confidence and high hopes of victory, so much so that Bennett has said outright he is certain the opposition parties can capture 63 seats and form a new government. Lieberman echoed the sentiment: "On October 27, we will put Israel back on the right track", a clear signal of the bloc's intent to replace Netanyahu and build a new government.

The confidence of Netanyahu's rivals has increased since his contentious UN speech, as events after the address did not unfold as the prime minister had hoped. A Ma'ariv poll found Netanyahu's coalition lost ground after the General Assembly speech while opposition support is climbing, making it hard to imagine the right closing a 12-seat gap to form a government.

Netanyahu, for his part, had hoped political backing from the US President Donald Trump would shore up his standing. But Trump's failure to meet him in New York once again laid bare signs of friction between the two, and under such conditions, even White House support may not be enough to repair Netanyahu's political fortunes. Given Israelis' sensitivity to Trump's dealings with Netanyahu, overt Trump backing on the eve of the election could backfire rather than bolster him, playing into his rivals' hands.

Three Cases in a Secret Trip: Netanyahu’s Mystery in Abu Dhabi

Alwaght- A review of reports published through September 28 shows that the core fact of Benjamin Netanyahu's covert trip to Abu Dhabi and his meeting with the UAE ruler Mohammed bin Zayed is more reliable than some of the details surrounding the visit.

Netanyahu's unannounced, one-day trip to Abu Dhabi on Sunday and his meeting with bin Zayed were confirmed to Reuters by a senior Israeli official. Reports say Netanyahu flew to Abu Dhabi on a private plane, and his office offered no explanation of the meeting's details.

But the significance of the trip lies not merely in its secrecy, but in its timing, which lends the meeting special political weight.

It must be added that the trip came just as Tel Aviv was once again consumed by debate over what Netanyahu knew before the October 7, 2023 attack.

In early September, Haaretz reported, based on investigations by two of its journalists, that roughly 10 days before the attack, Mohammed bin Zayed warned Netanyahu in a phone call lasting about 45 minutes that Yahya Sinwar, the late head of Hamas's political bureau, was preparing a major operation.

What is interesting is that this account is still under debate. Netanyahu's office described it a "outright lie", adding that such phone conversation never happened. Emirates officials more than once have avoided directly confirming the phone call was made. In a formal statement, an Emirati official said that Abu Dhabi shares security matters with other countries through related institutions and that it does not discuss details of such matters the with leaders of countries.

So, here we should consider a gap between Haaretz report and the proven reality.

Why has Netanyahu's trip become important at present time?

It needs to be added that a fresh Haaretz report on the Abu Dhabi trip claims Netanyahu asked bin Zayed during their meeting to deny the report about the pre-October 7 warning. According to that report, the prime minister of the usurping Zionist regime also sought some form of political or moral backing from the Emirati president. This claim, too, rests on unnamed sources, and Israeli and Emirati officials have not formally released details of the meeting.

If the report is accurate, the meaning of the trip changes: Netanyahu would not necessarily have gone to Abu Dhabi to launch a new regional initiative, but might have made the journey in part to manage the political fallout from an old case that has suddenly returned to life.

Seen that way, the case is critical for Netanyahu because the debate is no longer merely about an intelligence warning; the bigger question is whether, in the days leading up to October 7, warning information reached the highest political level, and if so, why no commensurate decision was made.

A more important document: Where is really Saudi Arabia involved in the case?

But Saudi Arabia is involved in the case in a various form and it is the normalization negotiations that preceded the October 7 attack.

A report published by the New York Times on September 25 and echoed by the Times of Israel, based on minutes from an October 1, 2023, security meeting, claims that after receiving the Emirati warning, Netanyahu stressed the need to maintain calm in Gaza during a meeting with the regime's security officials. The reason cited in the report was that military action against Hamas could damage US-mediated talks on normalization with Saudi Arabia.

If this account and the documents cited by the New York Times are deemed credible, the issue becomes far more complicated than a single ignored warning.

In that case, a paradox in pre-October 7 political calculations comes into view: preserving calm to advance a major diplomatic shift in the region versus the need for a security response to signs of mounting Hamas activity.

That distinction in wording matters, because there is still not enough public documentation about the details of the meeting, particularly regarding any Saudi presence.

Finally, it should be added that Netanyahu's secret trip to Abu Dhabi cannot be seen as merely an ordinary meeting between two leaders. The timing of the trip, the pre-October 7 warning case, and the return of the Saudi normalization case to the center of the Israeli regime's political disputes, is what gives it special weight.

At the same time, it should not be concluded that the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israeli regime have entered a unified coalition, or that Saudi representatives attended the meeting. There is not enough public evidence for such a conclusion.

What is more firmly documented for now is that serious report about bin Zayed's pre-October 7 warning has been published, Netanyahu has denied it, the UAE has taken a cautious position on its details, and now, just weeks before elections in the occupied territories, Netanyahu has personally met with the same Emirati leader.

From this aspect, the UAE is not just a geographical destination, but it is a confluence of three cases: The political responsibility of the October 7, the Israeli regime's relations with Arab countries, and the future of Netanyahu’s position in the Israeli home policy.

And perhaps key questions remain unanswered: If the so-called warning was made, who did receive it? Who did make a decision about it? Why did not it trigger an effective security response? Answer to these questions more than any denial or secret meeting can give a real picture of what happened before October 7.

Shalamcheh and Chazabeh Crossings: How’s Border Closure Impacting Iran-Iraq Trade?

Alwaght- Land transportation routes and border terminals and crossings as key pillars of regional security and international trade play a growing role in the Iranian economic bonds with neighboring states. Therefore, any disruption of these trade arteries can fast impact foreign trade, something showing itself on the Iranian-Iraqi borders these days. 

Iraq closed its land borders with Iran on Saturday, shutting down the Shalamcheh and Chazabeh crossings and suspending flights from Basra to Iran.

Iraq's Security Media Center announced that relevant security agencies have launched administrative and security restructuring operations at several border crossings, necessitating their temporary closure.

According to the center, a series of required legal measures has been taken, and intelligence, investigative and inquiry efforts have been intensified to determine the circumstances behind violations that occurred at these crossings and to develop appropriate remedies. Two crossings, Zurbatiyah and Al-Mundhiriyah, remain open to travelers.

The deputy governor of the Iranian border province of Khuzestan for security and law enforcement announced that, according to Iraqi authorities, the Shalamcheh and Chazabeh borders are closed to pilgrims and traders until further notice. Accordingly, merchants, drivers and passengers have been urged to refrain from heading to these border terminals until an official reopening is announced.

Economic significance of Shalamcheh and Chazabeh

While the closure of Iran-Iraq land borders may prove short-lived, the weight of Baghdad's decision comes into sharper focus when you consider the role the two crossings play in trade between the two neighbors.

Shalamcheh is one of the most important land crossings between the two nations, and its closure has left exporters, importers, truckers and transport companies grappling with stalled shipments and rising trade costs.

Iran and Iraq share extensive, multi-layered commercial ties, with everything from foodstuffs and agricultural products to construction materials, steel, petrochemicals, consumer goods and energy moving across these same land borders.

Baghdad has put the two countries' trade volume in 2025 at roughly $12 billion. Iranian customs figures show non-oil exports to Iraq at about $11.9 billion, meaning Iraq accounts for roughly one-fifth of Iran's non-oil exports. Under current targets, annual trade is meant to climb to $30 billion in the coming years.

The importance of these two crossings is also evident in the sheer volume of goods passing through them. Between March 2025 and March 2026, more than 4 million tons of goods moved through Shalamcheh and Chazabeh. Shalamcheh accounted for about 2,522,000 tons and Chazabeh roughly 1,521,000 tons. Over the same period, nearly 80,000 trucks passed through Shalamcheh and more than 69,000 through Chazabeh.

Put simply, the two crossings have handled over 4 million tons of goods in a single year, an average of about 11,000 tons a day. That figure does not mean a steady daily flow; trade volumes fluctuate month to month depending on market conditions and the pace of exports and imports.

A considerable share of Iran's exports to Iraq consists of food, agricultural products and consumer goods, many of them perishable. A prolonged halt at these crossings could therefore pile pressure on various segments of the Iraqi market.

Trucks carrying fruit, vegetables and other agricultural products cannot wait indefinitely in border queues or parking lots on either side, and each day of delay can erode quality, drive up spoilage and ultimately raise prices for consumers.

Drop in supply in Iraqi market will impose higher and additional costs for meeting needs from alternative sources and even can lead to waves of public discontentment should the supply rates drop further.

Yahya Aleh Eshaq, the head of the Joint Chamber of Commerce of Iran and Iraq, highlighting the need for the settlement of the problems fast, said that disruption will be short, however warning about downplaying its consequences.

Saying that a significant portion of the trade is food and other perishable products, Aleh Eshaq added that several-day stop will perish the shipments and consequent costs to the producers and exporters. 

In April, Reuters had reported on the temporary halt of Shalamcheh crossing activity, describing the crossing as one of the main routes of imports of vegetables and good from Iran to Iraq. The outlet said that lengthy disruption of its activity will impact supply of goods to the Iraqi local markets.

Construction materials and industries to take impact 

The fallout from the border closure is not limited to food. The Khuzestan-to-Iraq trade corridors also carry steel, rebar, cement, tiles, petrochemicals and other industrial goods.

Unlike fruit and vegetables, these goods do not spoil, but stalled shipments can still drive up production and construction costs. If both crossings stay shut for just a day or two, the first effects will show up in truck queues, delayed deliveries and higher transport costs. But if the closure stretches to weeks, what began as a simple logistics snag becomes a full-blown supply chain disruption.

Iraqi industries and construction projects that depend on imports of Iranian steel, cement, tiles, ceramics, petrochemicals and other industrial products will face delays in securing raw materials, along with higher transport and substitution costs.

Therefore, if the border remains closed for several days, the Iraqi market can partly meet its needs from existing stockpiles. But as the situation drags on, Iraqi importers will be forced to seek alternative supply routes, through Turkey, Persian Gulf states or by sea.

The longer the closures last, however, the harder it becomes to replace the Iranian route for goods that can not be quickly sourced elsewhere. A product shipped by truck directly from an Iranian factory to Iraq may, via alternative routes, first have to be moved to a port, then unloaded and reloaded, and finally delivered to the Iraqi market by another path, and every extra step means higher costs, longer transit times and the likelihood of a higher final price.

With this in mind, if the closures persist, the first consequence won't necessarily be outright shortages in the Iraqi market. Rather, rising prices, slower deliveries and higher transport costs will be among the most immediate effects.

Nor is Iraq alone in bearing the cost. Iranian exporters, truckers, transport companies and manufacturers who have made the Iraqi market their primary destination will also face falling sales, stalled shipments and rising operating costs.

Past experience shows that prolonged closures of land borders between the two countries can inflict significant losses on exporters and importers on both sides and disrupt the flow of trade and goods.

For example, Iraqi government closed several border crossings with Iran in March 2020 in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. Shalamcheh, Chazabeh, Mehran and Khosravi crossings faced serious restrictions on commercial and passenger traffic at various points, and on some routes truck movement was capped at set numbers on designated days.

The restrictions affected trade directly. S&P Global reported in March 2020 that Iraq's closure of five land borders with Iran had disrupted the steel trade, with some Iraqi traders holding off on signing new contracts amid uncertainty over the border situation.

Finally, Iranian-Iraqi borders are not just lines on the map, but are crucial trade arteries that link the two neighbors' markets, production, and transit networks, and their short-term halts are bearable and manageable, but continued restrictions for weeks or months can have impacts going beyond the border crossings and raise the costs and press the prices higher in the Iraqi market. 

Iraq’s long, dark night ends: 23 years of American lies, occupation, abuse end in humiliating ouster

By Press TV Strategic Analysis Desk

The formal drawdown of US occupation forces from Iraq on Wednesday, September 30, 2026, marks the end of a disastrous 23-year military project that began with a lie, was sustained by violence, and concluded in a defeat as profound as the one America suffered in Afghanistan.

What the US war machine presented as a mission to liberate Iraq from the Ba’athist dictatorship more than two decades ago and eliminate the so-called “weapons of mass destruction” became a case study in imperial overreach, leaving behind a shattered country, millions dead, and a region destabilized for generations.

The US-led coalition military presence in the Arab country started in early 2003, before they were forced to leave in 2011. However, three years later, in 2014, they returned as part of the so-called international campaign against the Daesh terrorist group.

The brutal invasion launched on March 20, 2003, fundamentally rested on a false premise: that the Saddam Hussein-led regime possessed weapons of mass destruction and posed an imminent threat to global security. The George W. Bush administration presented it as a central reason for US military intervention in the Arab country.

This claim, promoted by the Bush administration with theatrical certainty – including Secretary of State Colin Powell's infamous presentation to the United Nations – was proven to be a hoax. No stockpiles of chemical or biological weapons were found. No active nuclear program was discovered.

The Iraq Survey Group concluded that Iraq had destroyed its undeclared chemical weapons stockpile in 1991 and found no credible evidence that it had resumed production of chemical weapons afterward. The postwar findings fundamentally undermined the intelligence assessments on which the WMD case had been built in the first place.

Saddam was a brutal dictator who had committed horrendous crimes against his own people and against neighboring countries, including Iran during the devastating 1980-1988 war in which he used chemical weapons with Western complicity. The repression of Kurdish and Shi'a communities in Iraq was also one of the crimes he was proud of.

But the US military invasion was illegal, launched without UN Security Council authorization, and based on intelligence that was either fabricated or deliberately distorted. The US appointed itself judge, jury, and executioner, and ended up replacing one tyranny with a chaos far worse.

Acknowledging Saddam's crimes does not mean the US war machine had the right to impose itself on the Iraqi people and replace Saddam’s regime through prolonged military occupation.  

The human toll

The cost of the US military invasion in human lives is staggering and unforgivable. During the 2003-2011 occupation alone, conservative estimates place Iraqi civilian killings at over 110,000, with some credible studies suggesting figures exceeding 650,000 from US military violence, while acknowledging that these figures represent only a fraction of the true toll.

Taken together, more than half a million Iraqi civilians were killed during this period. The United Nations estimated that 1.75 million Iraqis became refugees, either fleeing abroad or displaced within their own country. However, other independent studies have put the figure much higher. Brown University's Costs of War project estimated that the wars in Iraq and Syria from 2003 to 2023 incurred the financial cost of approximately $2.89 trillion.

These figures represent only the direct casualties of war. They do not account for the wounded, the orphaned, the widowed, or the millions whose lives were shattered by the destruction of Iraq's infrastructure, healthcare system, and social fabric due to US military invasion.

They do not count the children who grew up without parents, the families who lost everything, or the generation of Iraqis whose futures were stolen by a war they never asked for.

 A litany of US war crimes

The US record in Iraq is stained with the most horrendous war crimes that remain largely unaccounted for. The Abu Ghraib torture scandal exposed the systemic abuse of Iraqi and foreign detainees – physical beatings, sexual humiliation, psychological torture, and worse – yet accountability never reached senior officers and policymakers also escaped justice.

International human rights organizations documented unlawful killings and excessive or indiscriminate force against detainees. The abuses could not simply be dismissed as isolated misconduct by a handful of US soldiers. The ruthless interrogation and detention policies helped create the conditions in which abuse occurred and flourished.

The use of white phosphorus, depleted uranium, and cluster bombs in civilian areas caused lasting health and environmental damage, with birth defects and cancer rates skyrocketing in affected regions. The attacks on Fallujah in 2004 involved deliberate targeting of civilians and denial of access to hospitals for the wounded, leaving hundreds dead and the city in ruins.

Tens of thousands of Iraqis disappeared into detention facilities, many never to be seen again, their fates buried in secret graves or anonymous morgues.

The Haditha massacre in 2005, in which US Marines killed 24 unarmed civilians, including women and children, was initially covered up before emerging as one of the most documented atrocities of the disastrous war.  The list of crimes is too long to enumerate fully, but each represents a life destroyed, a family shattered, a community traumatized.

The creation of Daesh

Perhaps the most damning indictment of the US occupation in Iraq was its role in creating the very threat it later claimed to fight. Before the invasion, Iraq had never experienced an insurgency of any significance. The US occupation changed this fundamentally.

The so-called Coalition Provisional Authority's decision to disband the Iraqi army and pursue de-Ba’athification left hundreds of thousands of soldiers unemployed, humiliated, and available for recruitment by extremist groups. The result was not simply the removal of Saddam, but the wanton destruction and reconstruction of the Iraqi state under foreign occupation, amid widespread insecurity, insurgency, violence and institutional collapse.

When US occupation forces initially withdrew in 2011, they left behind a hollow Iraqi military that collapsed rapidly when Daesh swept across the country in 2014, capturing Mosul and declaring a so-called caliphate.

Ironically, the United States returned in 2014, claiming to fight the very monster its occupation had helped create, prolonging its presence and perpetuating the cycle of violence. It is difficult to understand the rise of Daesh without understanding the environment produced by the American invasion, occupation, insurgency, polarization and collapse of Iraqi institutions.

As per many observers, the creation and rise of the Daesh terrorist group after the withdrawal of the US-led coalition forces in 2011 provided a pretext for them to return, which indicates that there was more to it than meets the eye. The CIA had a direct role in the creation of Daesh.

The Iraqi demand for US withdrawal

The turning point came on January 3, 2020, when a US drone strike assassinated General Qassem Soleimani, Iran's top anti-terror commander, and Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, deputy commander of Iraq's Popular Mobilization Forces, as their convoy left Baghdad airport.

The terrorist strike was a gross violation of Iraqi sovereignty, conducted without Iraqi permission. Prime Minister Adil Abdul Mahdi stated that his government had denied Washington authorization for the attack, yet it proceeded anyway – an act of war against a sovereign nation that has been occupied for years.

The response was swift and unequivocal. On January 5, 2020, Iraq's parliament passed a resolution calling for the expulsion of all foreign troops from Iraqi soil and the cancellation of the request for military assistance from the US-led coalition. The resolution was supported by approximately 180 lawmakers, which was politically significant, although not legally binding.

At the time, Muqtada al-Sadr, the influential politician and cleric, called the parliamentary move insufficient and demanded that the US embassy be shut down and American troops expelled in a humiliating manner. His demand reflected the mood in the country.

For years afterward, Iraqi MPs, the Iraqi people, and resistance movements repeatedly demanded the implementation of this resolution. The delay reflected the complex political and security dynamics at play, but the demand never faded.

Finally, in 2024, Baghdad and Washington agreed on a timetable, setting September 30, 2026, as the date for completing the coalition's military mission.

A defeated force departs

US-led coalition's presence in Iraq has finally ended. Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi declared October 1, the day following the coalition's departure, as Sovereignty Day, a national occasion that affirms the completion of Iraq's path toward independence and sovereignty.

This US departure comes after 23 years of failed policy. Like Afghanistan, the United States is leaving Iraq as a defeated force – defeated militarily, strategically, politically, and morally.

The invasion 23 years ago was based on a lie, the occupation was marked by horrendous crimes, and the outcome was the opposite of what was initially promised.

America entered Iraq promising security, stability, democracy and a transformation of the region. Instead, the invasion became a prolonged crisis that cost enormous sums, killed vast numbers of ordinary people, generated massive displacement, caused irreparable damage to US credibility and helped produce the conditions from which Daesh emerged.

Americans are leaving the country in a much worse state than 2003, just like it left Afghanistan five years ago, handing over the country to the forces it claimed to fight for 20 years.

So, what did 23 years of American military occupation ultimately accomplish relative to what Washington originally sought to achieve? The answer is a resounding ‘nothing.’

A moment of reckoning

The economic cost to the United States alone is staggering. A Joint Economic Committee report estimated that the total economic costs of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan could reach $3.5 trillion, most of which was wasted. These figures – the US taxpayer money – represent borrowed money, displaced investment, and shattered futures.

For Iraq, the reckoning is more profound. The country now has the opportunity to reclaim its sovereignty and chart its own path without foreign military occupation. But the scars of 23 years of war will take generations to heal.

The American withdrawal from Iraq is a moment for honest accounting. The United States invaded a sovereign nation under false pretenses, killed hundreds of thousands of people, created the conditions for the rise of Daesh, committed documented war crimes, and then spent two decades refusing to leave despite Iraqi demands. That it is finally departing is a testament to Iraqi persistence.

The international community should support Iraq's reconstruction and reconciliation efforts, but it must do so without the arrogance and interference that characterized the US occupation. Iraq's future must be determined by Iraqis, not by Washington.

Iraq may emerge from this ordeal stronger and more unified – or it may continue to struggle with the divisions the US occupation exacerbated. Either way, the responsibility now rests with Iraqis themselves. The long and dark night of American occupation is over for good.

Syriafication of Sahel Region: Powers Wrestling to Redefine Strategic Foothold

Alwaght- In recent years, the Sahel region of Africa has become one of the most important areas where the balance of power in African continent is redefined. It is a region where amid gradual drawdown of the French and other Western powers' presence, it has witnessed expansion of Russian and Chinese weight. Military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, the withdrawal of the Western forces, and the emergence of new security arrangements have given Moscow and Beijing a fresh opportunity to consolidate their position in one of Africa's geopolitically most sensitive regions. The significance of Sahel, indeed, is not the same to these Eastern powers. Russia has majorly entered through security cooperation, arms sales, and military partnership, while China most importantly focuses on investment, infrastructure, trade, and access to resources. However, the difference of the tools does not necessarily mean clash of interests, and signs suggest a king of complementariness between the two approaches is in the making.

Sahel, power vacuum and Russian opportunity

The developments of 2023 in the Sahel, above all the coup in Niger, laid bare a deep crisis in the region's established security order. The military juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have not only scaled back ties with the West but have moved to deepen relations with Moscow. Into this vacuum, Russia has promoted itself as an alternative security partner, a path paved by the withdrawal of French forces and the broader Western pullback, which has handed Moscow more room to maneuver.

A telling sign of this shift came in September 2023, when Yunus-Bek Yevkurov, Russia's deputy defense minister, met with the leaders of Mali and Burkina Faso and Niger's defense minister, with an agenda announced as deepening military-technical and security cooperation. In the same vein, the three countries formed the Alliance of Sahel States, a bloc best understood as part of their widening departure from the old French-led security architecture.

The changing shape of Russia's presence matters greatly. The move from Wagner to the "Africa Corps" signals Moscow's shift from a deniable proxy force toward a more formal presence tied to the Russian Defense Ministry. As a result, Russia's role in the Sahel is no longer confined to the activities of security contractors; it can now be read as an extension of the state's official security and military policy.

This approach dovetails with Africa's rising place in Russia's foreign-policy documents. Moscow's 2023 foreign-policy doctrine names Africa as a priority region and stresses support for African sovereignty, including through security assistance. Russia had already sought to cast itself as a security provider at its 2019 summit with African nations, an effort that gathered pace after France's position in the Sahel weakened.

Security vs. interests: Russian pattern

Russian foothold in this part of Africa faces a key limit, too, which is that Russian economic power is never comparable to that of China or the European Union. Its trade with African states was less than $20 billion in 2022, which this amount for EU was $275 billion and for China around $200 billion. This drives Moscow to rely on an advantage where it has more competitive power: security and military equipment.

Here we can see the logic of "security vs. economic interests" of Russia, meaning that provides security, military training, and protection of key sites and facilities as a tool of influence in expectation of economic and political cooperation and strategic access. This model has allowed the Russians to, while not having the same investment capacity of China, build an effective place in the Sahel states.

China: Building foothold using economy and infrastructure

On the other side, China has pursued a different playbook. For years, Beijing has steadily expanded its economic ties with the Sahel countries, working to build a long-term foothold without framing its cooperation as a direct confrontation with the West.

China's declared policy rests on practical cooperation, mutual benefit, and multilateral partnership, an approach that has allowed Beijing to keep engaging with governments of all stripes.

China's footprint in Niger is a case in point. Chinese firms have been active in natural resources, oil, and infrastructure. The China National Nuclear Corporation entered in 2007 with a $300 million investment to develop a uranium mine, and the China National Petroleum Corporation held a 60 percent stake in the Zinder refinery project. At the same time, Chinese companies have helped build industrial parks, special economic zones, roads, railways, and medical facilities.

Niger's resource wealth matters enough to China that political upheaval there does not necessarily mean an end to economic cooperation. Beyond uranium, Niger's oil reserves are of interest to Beijing, and Sinopec signed a memorandum of understanding in 2023 on developing new oil blocks. China's approach, then, hinges less on the type of government in power than on preserving relative stability and continued economic access.

The same model has played out in Mali, where China kept its economic cooperation going after the 2020 coup and signed an agreement in 2022 to build two joint textile spinning plants in Bamako and Koutiala, creating roughly 5,000 jobs.

China is money, Russia is muscle

The contrast between the two models of influence can be summed up in a phrase: China supplies "money and infrastructure," Russia supplies "security and military muscle." Through the Belt and Road Initiative, loans, and the building of roads, ports, telecom networks, and big-ticket economic projects, China creates long-term dependencies. By 2025, it had signed roughly $61.2 billion in construction contracts across Africa and become the continent's largest official bilateral creditor. At the same time, China's security footprint is expanding: in 2017, Beijing opened its first overseas military base, in Djibouti.

Russia, by contrast, plays to its comparative advantage in environments where governments face security threats, terrorism, and weak military institutions. That is precisely what has let Moscow gain ground faster amid the security vacuum left by France's exit and the West's shrinking presence. Moscow has also moved to transfer Russian military equipment, weapons, and hardware to Madagascar, BMP-3 armored vehicles in particular, as part of a strategy of steadily deepening its foothold across African countries.

At the same time, Moscow has trained its sights on cultural influence. The Russian Orthodox Church has established an exarchate in Africa, complete with hundreds of churches, while the Russian Foreign Ministry works in parallel to strengthen cooperation with governments and media outlets.

Russian scientific institutions, meanwhile, are reportedly preparing expeditions to Africa under the banner of cultural heritage preservation, notably in Namibia and Ethiopia.

Cooperation or competition?

Despite the serious difference in the tools and paths, the the available evidence do not necessarily suggest there is a direct Russian-Chinese competition in Sahel countries. Both countries lean on anti-colonial rhetoric and criticism of the West's interventionist policies, and in a joint statement in March 2023 they stressed support for African nations' efforts to solve their own problems independently. Their cooperation on infrastructure, energy, and industrialization under the Belt and Road Initiative, along with their shared participation in frameworks like BRICS, shows that Moscow and Beijing have common interests.

Another example is the Russian and Chinese firms operating in diamond extraction in the Central African Republic, which shows that the two sides' economic cooperation in Africa goes beyond the political realm. Seen this way, an informal division of labor, Russia's security muscle paired with China's economic heft, could let both powers expand their influence without necessarily sliding into direct competition.

Strategic fallout for the West

The expansion of this dual model is not merely a matter of economic or security competition in Africa. The Sahel sits near Europe's southern borders, and its instability, terrorism, migration, and security shifts bear directly on European countries.

Russia's presence at bases, airfields, and logistics hubs across the region, coupled with China's economic and infrastructure reach, has effectively created a new strategic environment facing Europe.

Ultimately, the Sahel matters to both Russia and China because it offers a rare combination like a security vacuum, substantial natural resources, a sensitive geographic position, and governments eager to reduce their dependence on the West. Russia, leaning on hard power and security cooperation, and China, wielding capital, trade, and infrastructure, have carved out two distinct but largely complementary paths to influence.

West seeking to repeat Syria pattern in Sahel

The April attack by a coalition of Tuareg separatist militias and the rdical group Jama'at Nasr al-Islam wal-Muslimin, which claims affiliation to al-Qaeda, on the strategic northern Malian city of Kidal, an assault that forced Africa Corps forces to withdraw, showed that Europe is taking the competition in this strategic environment seriously and has turned to equipping and organizing militia groups to counter Russian presence and influence in the Sahel.

The coordinated, multi-pronged assault on the capital, Bamako, the military camp at Kati, and strategic points across the country's north, including Kidal, Gao, Sevare, and Mopti, points to a central command and an integrated command-and-control system, one capable of directing simultaneous operations by different units across a vast territory. That command-and-control model appears to have taken shape with foreign backing and expertise.

One of the first and most sensitive targets was the residence of Mali's defense minister, General Sadio Camara, who was killed when a bomb detonated in his vehicle. A successful strike on the home of such a senior official requires precise, up-to-date intelligence on his movements and daily routine. That suggests the insurgents have significant intelligence networks and possibly penetration at the highest levels of Mali's power structure. On that basis, the possibility has also been raised that actors linked to Western countries were used to provide intelligence and operational support to separatist and terrorist groups, a path the West previously followed to counter Russian influence in Syria.

Generally, though it is too early to talk about rise of a full-scale Russian-Chinese axis in Sahel region, the current developments show that cooperation and coordination of the two powers, at least in the present time, outweighs direct competition. The future of this cooperation is contingent on the developments of the Sahel Alliance, the extent of the Western retreat, and Moscow-Beijing camp's capability to coordinate their varying interests in this region.