Showing posts with label Israel and Egypt. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Israel and Egypt. Show all posts

Saturday, June 29, 2019

US’ standard of ‘normal nation’

The US, which is notorious for its destructive behaviour all over the world calls the Islamic Republic of Iran a ‘destabilizing’ factor in the region, an accusation which is far from facts and realities, especially when one glances at the bleak, black and bloody record of the dictatorships that Washington supports.
Stay with us for an interesting article that appeared on the ‘Lobelog’ site, titled: “US’ Standard Of Normal Nation”, by Pouya Aali-Maqaam, who teaches modern history of the West Asia-North Africa region at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
On June 2, 2019, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stated that the United States would be willing to engage with Iran as long as “the Iranians…behave like a normal nation.”
Aside from the condescension of talking to Iranians as if they are children who need to “behave,” Pompeo’s remark begs the question as to what it means to act like a “normal nation.” A brief look at US-Iran relations before the Islamic Revolution and a short survey of America’s long-time allies in the West Asia-North Africa region today help shed light on how Washington’s foreign policy establishment defines “normal” behaviour.
Let us take a look at Iran under the Shah. Before the revolution in 1979, Iran was ruled by Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi—an autocrat installed by Britain and the United States after they orchestrated the overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected government in 1953. Prime Minister Dr. Mohammad Mosaddeq had defied imperial Britain by nationalizing the country’s oil resources for the benefit of the underdeveloped nation. A trained lawyer, he even successfully defended his case at the World Court—a legal decision that the British rejected.
After the coup, the United States helped the shah establish the notorious internal intelligence agency, SAVAK. The CIA trained SAVAK personnel in the most brutal forms of modern, scientific torture to ensure the longevity of the Shah’s rule against a population that increasingly saw him as an American puppet. As a result, according to Amnesty International, the Shah’s regime became one of the world’s worst violators of human rights. The Iranian opposition, which had long reeled under SAVAK’s heavy boot, predictably blamed the United States for the Shah’s repression.
After Britain announced the withdrawal of its naval forces east of the Suez, then-President Richard Nixon went to Iran in 1972 to meet with the Shah to ensure that America’s ally in the Persian Gulf would fill the void. President Nixon offered to sell the Shah the most sophisticated American military hardware short of nuclear weapons to become the policeman of the Persian Gulf. The Shah eagerly obliged by building the most powerful military in the region. By 1976, the United States was selling more weapons to Iran than any other country in the world. In turn, the Iranian opposition criticized the Shah’s multi-billion-dollar arms purchases as a waste of the country’s wealth.
The Shah also had an interventionist record that aligned with American strategy during the Cold War. Bogged down in Vietnam, the United States looked to outsource the fight against Communism to right-wing regimes like the Shah’s. In the early 1970s, Iran dispatched soldiers across the Persian Gulf to help put down Marxist insurrections in places like Dhofar, Oman—interventions that were supported at the time not only by the Americans, but the Saudis as well.
In sum, a “normal” Iran before 1979 was an autocracy that ruthlessly repressed dissent, bought billions in American weapons, protected US interests in the Persian Gulf by intervening in other countries, and even had a Western-backed nuclear programme.
Let us look at other so-called ‘normal nations’ in the West Asia-North Africa region.
Cold War strategic considerations perhaps prompted the United States to consider such “behaviour” as “normal.” Yet, a survey of America’s allies in the post-Cold War era illustrates how the precedent of the Shah is very much consistent with what the United States considers to be “normal” today.
Saudi Arabia is an apt starting point given that US-Saudi relations go back as far as Franklin Roosevelt’s presidency. Today, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates—with the backing of the Trump administration—are spearheading the bombing of the poorest country in the Arab World, Yemen, contributing to what the UN considers the worst humanitarian crisis in the world. The Saudis and Emiratis are also the leading force in the blockade of America’s other ally in the Persian Gulf, that is, Qatar.
They are supporting some of the most extreme elements in Syria—though this support has lessened after the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen diverted resources and attention. Mohamed bin Salman (MBS), the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia, is also credited with ordering the assassination of the US-based Saudi journalist, Jamal Khashoggi, when the latter visited the Saudi consulate in Istanbul, Turkey.
Long before the upstart Heir Apparent, Saudi Arabia had been deploying its oil wealth to spread its Wahhabi cultist interpretation of Islam across the Muslim world. Al-Qaeda and Daesh were born, in part, from this ubiquitous Saudi terroristic conditioning.
Moreover, although President Trump alleges that the Iran nuclear agreement was not stringent enough, his administration quietly signed agreements to sell nuclear technology to the Saudis. What’s more, two American allies in the region, Pakistan and Israel, the former of which borders Iran, possess nuclear arsenals.
In terms of other “normal nations,” Israel’s military occupation of Palestinian territories has endured for more than half a century with no signs of abating. Instead, the Zionist regime frequently announces plans to build more settlements in the West Bank.
The US sends billions of dollars in annual military aid to Israel and Egypt. The latter has jailed thousands of dissidents since the overthrow of its democratically elected government in 2013 – of President Mohammed Morsi. The home to one of the most iconic uprisings in the Arab World has become its seeming deathbed. The current Egyptian regime – of General Abdel-Fattah as-Sisi – is exponentially more authoritarian than the Hosni Mubarak regime that collapsed in 2011 after 30-years of dictatorial rule.
According to Human Rights Watch: Since President Abdel Fattah as-Sisi secured a second term in a largely unfree and unfair presidential election in March, his security forces have escalated a campaign of intimidation, violence, and arrests against political opponents, civil society activists, and many others who have simply voiced mild criticism of the regime. The Egyptian government and state media have framed this repression under the guise of combating terrorism, and as-Sisi has increasingly invoked terrorism and the country’s state of emergency law to silence peaceful activists.
The coup at home was not enough. Egypt, along with the Emiratis and the Saudis, is backing the renegade general, Khalifa Haftar, whom Trump has endorsed, as he attempts to topple the UN-recognized government in neighbouring Libya.
Another so-called “normal nation,” Bahrain—with the aid of Saudi Arabia and the UAE—repressed the most peaceful uprising of all. American support for the Aal-e Khalifa minority regime, however, remained steadfast since the island country is home to the US Fifth Fleet.
As such, “normal” today, as in the past, means pro-US dictators, supposedly religious governments but of the pro-American kind, military occupations, regimes that violate human rights, hosts to US armed forces and high-end customers of the American arms industry, and governments that intervene in the affairs of their neighbours. To be sure, none of this should actually be considered normal.
In reality, the only thing not “normal” about the Islamic Republic of Iran’s actions is that they do not align with US foreign policy goals as they did in the past – during the pro-American Shah’s regime. In other words, a ‘normal nation’ is allowed to do seemingly anything as long as its actions accord with US interests anywhere in the world.

Monday, September 24, 2018

“Preventing Palestine”: A Must Read History of Failed Peace-Making

By James Zogby




Seth Anziska’s “Preventing Palestine: A Political History From Camp David to Oslo” is a deeply insightful and profoundly disturbing book that traces the tortuous path of Middle East peace-making during the past four decades. It was quite painful to read.
Having been a close observer and sometimes participant in many of the developments that have unfolded since the end of the 1973 War, Anziska opened old wounds while shedding new light on the painful events and acts of betrayal that have shaped recent Palestinian history.
Through all of the twists and turns of this period, the brutal wars and the diplomatic initiatives, the one constant that emerges is the Israeli determined refusal to recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination and statehood and the self-serving acquiesce to their intransigence by successive American administrations and key Arab leaders.
The culprits are many. In Anziska’s telling of this history, we can find fault with most of the parties to the conflict—all of the US Administrations that were involved during this period: Israeli Prime Ministers, whether from Labor or Likud; Egyptian Presidents Sadat and Mubarak; Lebanon’s Phalange Party; and, in the end, even the PLO’s Yasser Arafat.
Digging deep into the official records of the Israelis, Egyptians, Americans, Palestinians, and others who participated in the region’s wars and various diplomatic endeavors, Anziska mines government and research center archives unearthing revealing contemporaneous accounts, minutes of meetings, and official communiques—providing the story behind the story of events as they unfolded.
Especially fascinating were: the internal debates that took place in Israeli cabinet meetings and how, at times, they would don a diplomatic mask of accommodation, while clinging to their firm refusal to surrender sovereignty of Palestinian lands or recognize the existence of a Palestinian nation; the discussions that occurred between President Carter and his aides; the frustrations expressed by Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s various Foreign Ministers over his betrayal of the Palestinian cause; the way Israel’s Ariel Sharon rudely manhandled US emissaries and their cowering in the face of his belligerence; the way Israel’s Menachem Begin initially sought to pose as the savior of the Christians of Lebanon only to “turn on a dime” after they refused to sign a peace agreement on Israel’s terms; the insidious plotting of a Phalange leader with the Israelis to end the Palestinian presence in Lebanon; and the short-lived, but still worth noting, instances of frustration of US Presidents Carter and Reagan and Secretaries of State George Schultz and James Baker with the Israelis.
What emerges as key to the denial of Palestinian rights is the self-imposed paralysis of American decision-makers in the face of Israeli intransigence—resulting from successive Administration’s fears of the domestic political fallout that might follow any pressure the US might apply on Israel. Time and again, US principals grew impatient with Israeli ploys and their hardline refusal to recognize and grant national rights to Palestinian, only to back down after advisers cautioned them of the political consequences that might result. There were no American “profiles in courage” emerging from Anziska’s book.
Carter, for example, began his term with a pledge to realize a “homeland” for the Palestinians. In line with his Administration’s commitment to human rights, Carter was moved to end their suffering in exile and under occupation. The vehicle he envisioned to initiate the path toward this goal was an international all-party conference to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Carter’s efforts were ultimately upended by a combination of: Israel’s refusal to participate in any forum that would question their claim of sovereignty over the Palestinian territories; Sadat’s resolve to achieve a separate Israeli-Egyptian peace without the Palestinians, despite his public pronouncements to the contrary; and the pressure from the American Jewish community, which caused sufficient enough discomfort within the White House to cause Carter to back away from pressing Israel to cede land or political rights to the Palestinians.
In the end, Carter acceded to the pressure and sheparded the Camp David peace agreement between Israel and Egypt. The agreement, shaped by largely by the Israelis, promised only future discussions on a vaguely worded plan for Palestinian “autonomy”—which in the Israeli lexicon meant that the Palestinians could realize control of their persons, but not control over land. The result, as Anziska notes was that at Camp David Sadat got the Sinai and Begin got the West Bank. And with Israel’s southern border secured, Begin was free to attempt to “wipe out” the PLO in Lebanon.
Throughout the next four decades the region witnessed the horrific Israeli invasion and occupation of Lebanon (together with the aerial bombardments that devastated Beirut and the massacres in the Palestinian refugee camps), two Palestinian uprisings, and repeated failed American efforts at peace-making. During this time, the US dithered, professing to want to solve the conflict, but refusing to apply the pressure needed to make it happen. As Anziska observes, throughout this entire period, the Israelis, while agreeing to negotiate, insisted on their exclusive sovereignty over the occupied territories and their “God given right” to settle in them. These were not topics they would discuss. In communiques, they repeatedly chided their American interlocutors rejecting the designation “occupied territories” and insisting on the terms “Judea and Samaria.” They also rejected the term “Palestinian people”, referring to them, instead, as “Arab inhabitants.”
As a result of this Israeli intransigence and the weak-kneed American response, the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian lands only deepened. In 1977 there were about Israeli 5,000—8,000 settlers in the West Bank, by 1992 there were 100,000 settlers, and today the number exceeds 600,000.
Despite the euphoria that accompanied the September 1993 signing of the Oslo Accords, Anziska demonstrates the similarities between what Oslo provided for the Palestinians and the autonomy proposal offered by Menachem Begin at Camp David 15 years earlier. The supposed self-rule won by the Palestinians at Oslo was circumscribed by Israel’s insistence that it retain control over land, resources, security, and borders. Like Begin’s proposal at Camp David, there would be no Palestinian sovereignty and no truly independent state. Anziska cites many prominent Palestinians who called Arafat to task for his rush to sign what they termed a “flawed agreement.”
Menachem Begin, while adamantly rejecting a Palestinian state, at times, spoke magnanimously of extending rights to the “Arab inhabitants in Judea and Samaria”—whom he saw as a “minority” living in Eretz Israel. Anziska quotes Begin saying, “What’s wrong with a Jewish majority living together with an Arab minority in peace, in human dignity, in equality of rights?”
Well, here we are in 2018, 40 years after Camp David. The Palestinian dream of an independent state is not only unrealized but is most likely unrealizable. With many Palestinians now favoring a one state solution, they may throw Begin’s words back at him and say, “There’s nothing wrong with that!” The problem for the Israelis, of course, is that the once “Arab minority” is now a majority and Israelis have only themselves to thank for digging this hole. By “Preventing Palestine”, they have given birth a new reality.