The Cradle
The case seeking to annul the congress was brought by CHP members known to oppose both Ozgur Ozel, who won the party leadership at the congress, and Ekrem Imamoglu, the CHP’s jailed presidential candidate. But the consensus in opposition circles was that the case was politically motivated and orchestrated by the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) to weaken the CHP.
Indeed, under Turkiye’s laws, outcomes of party congresses confirmed by the Supreme Electoral Council (YSK) cannot be legally contested. Nevertheless, the AKP-controlled judiciary accepted the case and initiated proceedings, with ruling party officials publicly calling for the congress to be annulled.
But a year later, the balance of power had shifted, preventing any court decision that could remove the current CHP leadership. The party resisted effectively, and the ruling AKP was unwilling to risk the political and economic fallout of redesigning the CHP via the judiciary. Thus, this case came to a quiet close.
A new probe and a deepening purge
On that very same day – 24 October – as anticipation swirled over the court ruling, an entirely different story broke: a new investigation was launched against CHP's Istanbul Metropolitan Mayor and presidential candidate Imamoglu, already in custody on corruption charges, now accusing him of espionage.
Other names were implicated in the same investigation. While Huseyin Gun was relatively unknown, the public was much more familiar with the other two: Necati Ozkan and Merdan Yanardag.
Ozkan, a PR and advertising expert, had played a key role in Imamoglu’s 2019 and 2024 Istanbul election victories. He too was arrested in the operations that began on 19 March 2025, and remains in detention.
Yanardag, known for his socialist and oppositional identity, had previously been imprisoned multiple times under AKP rule. The TV channel he heads, TELE 1, has long faced heavy state pressure, including fines and broadcast bans from the pro-government media watchdog, RTUK.
In a post on X, the media rights group MLSA revealed that “Searches were conducted at the home and office of TELE 1 editor-in-chief Merdan Yanardag after he was detained in the morning on allegations of espionage.”
Two days after news of the investigation surfaced, Imamoglu – who had yet to be formally indicted or brought before a judge – was taken out of Silivri Prison for the first time in seven months and brought to court. After waiting in a courthouse cell for five hours, he rejected all charges in his statement, calling espionage tantamount to treason and declaring the case a personal insult.
While Imamoglu was being held in the courthouse, pro-government media outlets were loudly reporting that Gun had confessed to spying for the UK. They used this to construct a narrative implying that Imamoglu and Yanardag were also spies, suggesting that Imamoglu won elections thanks to “foreign powers.”
At that very moment, CHP leader Ozel addressed a crowd gathered outside the courthouse, calling Gun’s confession a plot orchestrated by the government against Imamoglu and the CHP. Ozel argued that since previous investigations into Imamoglu had yielded nothing, the government had now resorted to the absurd charge of espionage.
Responding to accusations of UK affiliation, Ozel stated:
“It wasn’t me who worked with British intelligence in Syria, who made plans for the Syrian regime, and who later boasted, ‘I knew what was happening in Syria’ based on those plans. It’s the AKP that’s long been accustomed to collaborating with British intelligence, not us.”
In opposition circles, the general view was that the government, unable to convince the public with corruption allegations, was now trying to smear Imamoglu with espionage. Many opposition commentators also warned that this could pave the way for the appointment of a state trustee – a ‘kayyim’ – to replace the elected Istanbul mayor, as had been done in numerous other municipalities.
Silencing the airwaves
A further dimension of the investigation concerned the state’s policy toward opposition media. Just hours after Yanardag’s arrest – and even before any court had ordered his detention – TELE 1 was seized, and a trustee from the pro-government media was appointed as its new head. The first acts of this new trustee were to cancel all programming and shut down the channel’s YouTube account, effectively wiping out its archive.
Rejecting the espionage allegations in his prosecutor’s statement, Yanardag said:
“I am a leftist and a patriotic journalist. It is unthinkable for me to engage in any activity that would harm my country or my people. This is the vilest accusation that could be made against me. I reject it completely. I believe this is a smear attempt aimed at tarnishing the career I’ve built as a socialist and patriotic journalist. It would be a betrayal of my own life.”
The issue extends beyond media repression. The manner in which TELE 1 was seized – even though Yanardag is not the legal owner of the private company, and no verdict had yet been issued against him – reveals the dire state of the judiciary in Turkiye and the broader threat to fundamental rights and freedoms.
After Sunday’s lengthy interrogations, the prosecutor requested the detention of Imamoglu, Yanardag, and Ozkan. Further arrest orders were issued for Imamoglu and Ozkan, already behind bars. Yanardag was also remanded in custody. Meanwhile, pro-government media began reporting that Gun, having turned state witness, would benefit from the “effective remorse” law and likely be released soon.
Step by step toward a Turkiye without elections
The campaign against Imamoglu and others is part of a broader project to remove all meaningful opposition from the field and ensure that elections, while still formally held, no longer threaten the ruling order.
This strategy, which The Cradle previously described as “de-electoralization,” refers to the hollowing out of electoral politics. The AKP, now firmly fused with the state, cannot risk losing power. But abolishing the ballot outright would provoke too much backlash. Instead, the ballot box is emptied of consequence.
We are witnessing the systematic disqualification of popular challengers like Imamoglu, the criminalization of municipal administrations, and the full-spectrum assault on opposition media. In this model, elections still occur – but they serve only to confirm the dominance of the ruling party.
What comes next depends entirely on the opposition's will. Will it accept its slow dismantling, or choose to resist? Can civil society organise under siege? Will workers, youth, and local movements rise to defend what remains of democratic life?
One thing is certain: the center of political gravity in Turkiye has shifted decisively. And the fight now is not over who wins the next election, but whether elections will mean anything at all.
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