The newly declassified documents also show that Iraqi leaders were advised to act in the interest of their people and to avoid the consequences of a prolonged occupation.
On 2 August 1990, Iraqi forces invaded and occupied Kuwait. After Iraq refused to withdraw despite widespread international condemnation, a US-led coalition launched Operation Desert Storm on 17 January 1991. The coalition, which included Arab states such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, was preparing for a ground operation to expel the Iraqi troops.
On 15 February, the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), led by Saddam Hussein, made a surprise ceasefire offer. It linked Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait, as demanded by United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions, to the implementation of UNSC resolutions regarding Israel’s withdrawal from Palestinian and other Arab territories in Syria and Lebanon. The offer also insisted on guarantees for Iraq’s so-called “historical rights” on land and sea and called for political changes in Kuwait based on the will of the Kuwaiti people.
The coalition found the Iraqi proposal unacceptable as it did not guarantee unconditional withdrawal, asserted Iraq’s claim to Kuwait, and failed to accept the restoration of Kuwait’s legitimate government.
According UK Cabinet Office files, released by the British National Archives, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assessed that the offer was likely intended to gain propaganda points and delay the coalition’s ground offensive. However, it also interpreted the move as indicating a potential “shift” in Baghdad’s attitude toward “a political settlement”. The JIC did not rule out the possibility of a “further shift” from Saddam Hussein during upcoming talks in Moscow between Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister Saadoun Hammadi, and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev, scheduled for 17 February.
Despite Pentagon (US Department of Defence) threats that their aircraft could be shot down, the Iraqi delegation proceeded with the visit, which was closely watched internationally.
The documents reveal that the Soviets found the three-hour discussion with the Iraqis difficult. In a detailed briefing to UK Prime Minister John Major, Gorbachev described the meeting as “very uneasy” but “businesslike.” He made it clear to the Iraqis that any progress toward a political solution required Iraq’s “unconditional withdrawal” from Kuwaiti territory.
Gorbachev also expressed dissatisfaction that the Iraqi ceasefire proposal did not even mention the word “Kuwait.” When Aziz argued that its mention was unnecessary because “it goes without saying”, Gorbachev challenged him: “If that is so, why nevertheless is this state not named?”
During the talks, Gorbachev presented a four-point plan, which included:
- A clear statement by Iraq of its intention to withdraw—specifically from Kuwait, not in general terms.
- A declaration of a specific and short deadline for final withdrawal.
- Actual troop withdrawal to begin the day after military activity ceased.
- The withdrawal must be unconditional, with only one requirement: that Iraqi forces not be attacked during their retreat.
Unlike previous encounters with Iraqi officials, this time the Soviets didn’t note “indignant objections” to the proposals. However, the Iraqis did raise several questions, including:
- Would UN sanctions on Iraq be lifted?*
- Would US and coalition troops remain in the region after the crisis?
- How would the Palestinian issue be addressed?
- What about the situations in Lebanon and the broader Middle East?
- What would be the Soviet Union’s stance on Iraq’s access to the sea?
The Soviets “very resolutely” told the Iraqis that linking the liberation of Kuwait to broader Middle East issues was “unacceptable and unrealistic.” However, Gorbachev pledged that, as a permanent member of the Security Council, the Soviet Union “would insist that the UN will energetically address itself to the whole complex for the Middle East settlement”, including regional security system.
He also warned the Iraqi delegation that time was critical. If they “cherish the lives of their countrymen and the destiny of Iraq, they must act without delay.”
Gorbachev, who requested that his briefing remain secret, concluded that he and his officials saw “the beginning of a certain shift on the parts of Hussein and his team in understanding the realities.” Aziz insisted that Iraq didn’t make conditions for withdrawal but a “programme” for a political framework for a broader settlement.
When asked whether the programme implied a refusal to withdraw without resolving those broader Middle East issues or just a reminder of the existence of these issues, Aziz clarified that it was merely intended to guide the political process. He added that the purpose of their visit to Moscow was to “listen to recommendations” that could lead to a “decent and honorable peace.” Aziz promised a prompt response to what he called the “Gorbachev plan.”
At the time of the Iraqi-Soviet meeting, the coalition was reportedly preparing for a ground operation to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait. US President George Bush had rejected a Soviet request to delay any military operations during the Iraqi visit to Moscow. According to General Brent Scowcroft, Bush’s National Security Advisor, Bush told Gorbachev that the US would not adjust anything which they were doing “in order to convenience the Iraqis.”
Although Iraq accepted Gorbachev’s plan, it proposed minor changes to the timeline. The coalition rejected any such amendments and insisted on full and immediate implementation of all relevant UNSC resolutions. On 22 February, Bush issued an ultimatum: Iraq must withdraw from Kuwait by noon on 23 February, or face a ground assault.
While the US acknowledged the Soviet effort as serious and useful, it concluded that Iraq’s proposals still amounted to a conditional withdrawal and failed to fully comply with UN requirements.
In response, the RCC called Bush’s ultimatum “disgraceful” but maintained that Iraq was still pursuing peace. Though the statement did not reject the ultimatum outright, Gorbachev called Major to inform him that Saddam and his leadership had accepted a revised six-point Soviet plan.
According to conversation records, Gorbachev assured Major that they were at the time “very close to the goal of securing immediate and unconditional withdrawal and a political solution”. He urged all parties to stay the course of diplomacy and cooperation to “prevent the situation from taking a tragic turn.”
Major responded by expressing “deep distrust” of Saddam, citing Iraq’s burning of Kuwaiti oil fields as evidence of bad faith. He argued that Iraq was merely trying to ‘drag matters out” and delay the inevitable, and that the only hope for peace lay in full Iraqi compliance with the US ultimatum.
Gorbachev made one last appeal to Bush, requesting a 24–48 hour extension of the deadline in the hope of finalising the peace agreement. But Bush rejected the request. Scowcroft told the British that, given the destruction in Kuwait and uncertainty about civilian suffering, there was no confidence in Saddam’s intentions.
After a four-day ground campaign, Iraqi forces were expelled from Kuwait on 26 February 1991. Iraq was subsequently placed under a severe international blockade for more than a decade, leading to the destruction of its infrastructure and a prolonged economic crisis.
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