by Hamid Bahrami
Armenia is undergoing a profound transformation in its foreign policy. Traditionally aligned with Russia through security frameworks like the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), Armenia is increasingly looking to the West. This shift is driven by dissatisfaction with Moscow’s perceived inaction during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and subsequent tensions with Baku.
The US has seized this opportunity by increasing diplomatic and economic engagement with Yerevan. US Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs James O’Brien’s visit to Armenia signalled Washington’s intent to bolster bilateral ties and support Armenia’s negotiations with Baku. The US has leveraged the Alma-Ata Declaration as a basis for border delimitation, aiming to facilitate a lasting peace agreement that could reduce Russia’s role as the primary security guarantor in the region.
Furthermore, the US has reportedly increased its involvement in Armenia’s defence and security sectors, including diplomatic support, military consultations and efforts to expand Armenia’s defence capabilities through partnerships with Western nations like France. Such moves are designed to erode Armenia’s dependency on Russian military support gradually, signalling a potential long-term shift in the region’s geopolitical alignment. These efforts seem to be bearing fruit, as the Armenian government has asked Russian border guards to withdraw from the regions of Tavush, Syunik, Vayots Dzor, Gegharkunik and Ararat.
However, the Armenian government remains cautious in distancing itself fully from Russia, particularly in withdrawing from the CSTO, as Yerevan views peace negotiations with Baku fragile, facing growing internal pressure to maintain dialogue with Moscow and Donald Trump’s possible re-election in November, which could see Joe Biden’s Armenia policy reversed.
Meanwhile, the EU has played a significant role by deepening its economic ties with Armenia through the Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA). This agreement, implemented fully in 2021, has helped Armenia diversify its economic partners and reduce reliance on Russian trade. The EU has also deployed civilian missions along the Armenia-Azerbaijan border, further asserting its influence in the region and challenging Russia’s traditional role as the primary mediator.
Georgia is already the most pro-Western state in the South Caucasus and is crucial to the US and EU strategy.
The country’s upcoming parliamentary election could potentially accelerate its integration with NATO and the EU, especially if pro-Western forces consolidate power. This would weaken Russia’s influence significantly, particularly if Georgia accelerates its “de-Russification” policies and aligns more closely with Western institutions.
However, Georgia’s current government, led by the Georgian Dream party, has maintained a cautious approach. While it continues to pursue EU membership, it has avoided direct confrontation with Moscow, reflecting a delicate balancing act in its foreign policy. The party’s “foreign agent law” signals to Russia that the current government does not seek to make the country a front line against Moscow. Georgians appear to have learned a costly lesson from the 2008 Russian invasion of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, as well as from the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, underscoring the dangers of becoming a battleground for geopolitical rivalries.
Turkiye’s role in Azerbaijan has become a critical component of the broader Western strategy to limit Russian influence in both the South Caucasus and Central Asia. Acting as a NATO member and key US ally, Turkiye has positioned itself as a pivotal partner for Azerbaijan, exerting significant economic, military and cultural influence. This relationship is framed within the concept of the “Turkic World”, a geopolitical ambition that seeks to connect Turkic-speaking nations from Turkiye to Central Asia. However, due to a lack of deep-rooted historical bases, this ambition has struggled to form an optimal framework to achieve its goals.
Militarily, Turkiye’s support was instrumental during the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, where Turkish drones and military assistance played a decisive role in Azerbaijan’s victory. This military partnership has strengthened Baku’s defence capabilities, reducing its reliance on Russian arms and securing a more independent security posture.
Economically, Turkiye and Azerbaijan are key players in energy infrastructure projects like the Southern Gas Corridor and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, which are crucial for reducing Europe’s dependence on Russian energy. These projects are part of a larger initiative to establish alternative routes that connect Central Asia to Europe via the South Caucasus, bypassing Russian-controlled territories.
Turkiye is fostering deeper economic and cultural links with Azerbaijan while also using the “Turkic World” framework to extend its reach into Central Asia, aligning with Western objectives to counter Russian and Chinese influence in the region.
This strategy of leveraging Turkiye’s influence aligns with broader Western efforts to reshape the geopolitical landscape across Eurasia, further distancing Azerbaijan from Russia. However, it appears that Baku is contemplating an expanded Russian role in regional dynamics, as President Ilham Aliyev hosted President Vladimir Putin this month. This move by Baku seems to be aimed at signalling discontent to the US and the EU over their limited support for Armenia. Moreover, Azerbaijan is unhappy about a possible reopening of the Armenian border with Turkiye without meeting Baku’s demands. The reopening of the border between Yerevan and Ankara, suggested by the West, does not align with the interests of either Russia or Azerbaijan, which could serve as another point of convergence for Baku and Moscow.
Recent developments pose significant challenges for Russia as its influence in the South Caucasus and Central Asia faces increasing pressure from Western powers advancing their strategic interests. The key question is how Moscow will respond to these encroachments. Will it intensify its military and economic leverage, or will it seek new alliances to counterbalance the West’s growing influence?
Russia finds itself with two potential strategies.
First, given Azerbaijan’s dissatisfaction with the Western stance on the Yerevan-Baku conflict — exemplified by French President Macron’s upcoming visit to Armenia — Putin has seized the moment to strengthen ties with Aliyev. During a two-day visit to Baku, he emphasised Russia’s role in mediating in peace negotiations between Azerbaijan and Armenia. Simultaneously, in an effort to exert pressure on Armenia, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov criticised Yerevan’s leadership for what he termed a failure to establish the Zangezur Corridor.
Moscow’s second option involves enhancing Iranian influence in the South Caucasus as a potential strategy to curb Western encroachment, as Iranians view US influence in the region as a threat. However, Lavrov’s remarks on the Zangezur Corridor represent a direct threat to Iran’s national security, as Tehran has consistently asserted that it will never allow its establishment.
Herein lies a notable conflict of interest between Iran and Russia. If the West seeks to undermine this Russian advantage, it should adopt a pragmatic approach focused on distancing Tehran from Moscow, rather than exerting pointless pressure on Tehran related to unconditional support for Tel Aviv amid the Gaza war or allowing the increase of Israeli presence in Baku, actions which Tehran perceives as threats to its national security.
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