Mecca Agreement Could Suggest US-designed Regional Order a Failure Story

Alwaght- Signing the trilateral defense pact by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey is not just making a military alliance, rather, it can signal rise of a new security formation in West Asia that at the end of the road would seriously challenge the US and Israeli regime's interests and lofty ambitions.

 Signed last week by leaders of the three countries in Mecca, the pact rests on the principle of collective defense, meaning that an attack on one is an attack on all. Turkish Defense Minister Yasar Guler said that the structure of this pact technically resembles the article 5 of NATO: An attack on one member will be considered am attack on the whole bloc.

Tel Aviv’s concern

The significance of this pact, from the Israeli perspective, becomes clear the moment you look at who signed it. Pakistan does not recognize Israeli regime. Turkey has emerged as one of the most vocal critics of Tel Aviv’s Gaza policy in recent years. And Saudi Arabia, despite earlier expectations of normalization, has so far refused to establish official ties with this occupational regime. 

In effect, the tripartite defense agreement marks one of the most telling signs yet that the region’s security calculus is shifting, and it poses a direct challenge to the Trump administration’s regional strategy. The deal comes at a moment when Washington finds itself stymied on multiple key objectives across the region.

Countries seeking to break free from US dominance

Mecca agreement comes at a time the Israeli hostilities to regional countries have drastically changed the regional security equations. Analyses emerging on the agreement show that one of the outcomes of this pact can show itself in increased security independence of regional states and decreased reliance on the US security guarantees, something that will restrict the Israeli maneuvering space. 

The stakes grow even higher when you consider that the Mecca pact is not merely a political arrangement, but explicitly aims to build joint defense capacity among the three signatories. Turkey fields one of the region's most powerful militaries and boasts advanced drone capabilities. Pakistan stands as the only nuclear-armed nation in the Muslim world. And Saudi Arabia brings deep financial reserves and the ability to acquire cutting-edge weaponry. If this agreement coalesces into a coherent military framework, that combination of assets could fundamentally reshape the regional balance of power.

The pact comes as the Trump administration was actively working to reorient the region's security and political architecture more tightly around cooperation with Washington and Tel Aviv. This new alignment, however, signals that some traditional US allies are moving toward more independent security arrangements. Analysts read the agreement as a reflection of eroding trust among regional powers in US security guarantees.

Failure of Trump's normalization plan

Israeli media have not dismissed the Mecca pact as just another defense agreement; they view it as a factor that cuts directly into Israel's security calculus and its normalization drive with Arab states. The Jerusalem Post reported that the deal could complicate, and perhaps even derail, Tel Aviv's hopes of advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia.

To be sure, the published text of the pact does not name Israeli regime as an enemy or target. Yet even Israeli analysts have stressed that the Mecca agreement amounts to a military coalition with latent anti-Israel potential, one that, in the event of escalating regional conflict or expanded membership, could morph into one of the most significant strategic obstacles Tel Aviv faces in West Asia. 

In essence, the pact's real significance lies not in naming a specific adversary, but in forging an independent Muslim security bloc outside Washington-led security architectures, a bloc whose three members, each for their own reasons, all hold critical stances toward Israeli policies. Should the agreement expand in the future, its capacity to upend the region's security equations and constrain Israeli influence would only grow, a trajectory running directly counter to US objectives in the region.

For the Trump administration, one of the foremost goals has been to expand the Abraham Accords and bring Saudi Arabia into normalization with Israel. Trump himself declared in July that a US-Saudi civilian nuclear agreement should be tied to Riyadh's accession to the Arab-Israeli normalization deal. Yet Saudi Arabia continues to condition normalization with Tel Aviv on a clear pathway to an independent Palestinian state.

Now, formation of an independent defense pact by Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, and Turkey shows that Riyadh is diversifying its security options. In other words, instead of tying its security to alliance with Washington and Tel Aviv, the Arab kingdom is concocting a multifaceted security network.

Gaza plan: Trump-Netanyahu dispute

Another driver behind the Mecca pact may well be the failure of Trump's broader strategy in West Asia and Gaza. Washington has been pushing a multi-phase plan aimed at establishing a foothold in the region and locking in a political arrangement on its own terms.

But Netanyahu has planted himself squarely in the way of key components of that plan. The Israeli PM has declared that Tel Aviv will not withdraw its forces from Gaza until Hamas is fully disarmed, a stance that effectively stalls any swift implementation of the Trump proposal.

That rift exposes a fundamental reality and it is that even Israeli regime, Washington's closest ally in the region, is not prepared to automatically fall in line with the US president's wishes on a strategic issue of this magnitude.

Iran war: The bigger test

On the other hand, Mecca pact is signed at a time the US and Israeli regime have failed to beat Iran in their aggression. The anti-Iranian war not only failed to bring Washington a sweeping, decisive victory, but also its impacts have rattled Arab states in terms of security, incentivizibg them to seek independent defense mechanisms.

The trilateral pact was forged precisely in this post-war climate. According to published analyses, the US-Israeli strikes on Iran, and the resulting regional anxiety over spillover effects, were a key driver pushing Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Pakistan toward closer defense partnership.

Seen through this lens, the war's outcome cannot be measured on the battlefield alone; its political aftershocks matter just as much. If Washington's aim was to bolster its own deterrence and reassure its Arab allies, the emergence of an independent defense pact among three major Muslim powers suggests the opposite. It suggests that Washington's failure in the war against Tehran has eroded trust among its longtime regional partners, nudging them toward a security framework outside US orbit.

Taken together, these developments paint a picture of West Asia that looks nothing like what the Trump administration envisioned at the start of its new term: broad Israeli-Arab normalization, a cemented US role as the region's ultimate security guarantor, and a new order designed to contain Iran.

But today Saudi Arabia has not yet normalized official ties with Israeli regime, the US plan for Gaza has faced Netanyahu’s pushback, and after Iran war, three Muslim powers have embarked on an independent military structure. 

So, Mecca pact should not be seen just as a military agreement, but a sign of the erosion of the US capability to set the security terms of the new West Asia. From this perspective, the most urgent message of Mecca agreement for Trump’s administration may be that the region is drifting from the US-designed order to one set forth by regional powers themselves. 

Strait of Hormuz Stalemate: Geography Logic Beats Military Power

Alwaght- Over the past few days, a series of diplomatic and military developments have shown that Strait of Hormuz crisis is not a mere regional dispute, rather, it is a scene determining a balance of power among the US, Iran, and the world great powers.

The intensive talks between Iran and Oman over a new transit mechanism in the Strait of Hormuz, ongoing US blockade over Iran, tangible drop in the ship transit, and oil prices rise all show that the two sides have reached a point where there is neither a possibility of outright military win nor a return to the past status of thr strait.

Recent reports suggest Iran and Oman have reached a preliminary agreement on the coordinates of a new maritime route, under which a major portion of the shipping lane would pass through Iranian territorial waters and the remainder through Omani waters.

Washington, however, is still insisting that no country, least of all the Islamic Republic, should oversee vessel traffic, issue transit permits, or levy any fees. The core dispute remains unresolved, and it starts right here: this isn't about reopening a strait, but about who holds sovereignty, and, by extension, control.

Factors leading to Trump's failure in reopening the strait

Meanwhile, the US President is facing a stalemate many observers call a strategic paradox.

Since the start of the 40-day war, the US government has gone to great lengths including launching airstrikes and tightening the sea blockade but none of its actions against Tehran have managed to return the transit in the Strait of Hormuz to normal. So, Trump is facing a reality the US politicians have feared since 1980s: The military superiority does not necessarily mean the power to impose it on the asymmetrical battlegrounds, like Strait of Hormuz crisis.

But the primary reason Washington keeps coming up short is geography. Iran does not just dominate the northern coastline of the Strait of Hormuz, but also it operates an extensive network of missile batteries, drone systems, underground facilities, and strategic islands.

That footprint means that even when the US Navy enjoys overwhelming superiority in open waters, and even after multiple rounds of escalation, Tehran can still disrupt shipping traffic at minimal cost. In effect, Iran's strategy is not about sinking American warships; it is about sowing doubt, driving up costs, and slowly eroding the political will of Washington and its allies.

Then there are the political and economic constraints that Trump and the US are wrestling with.

Sustained operations in the Persian Gulf require dozens of warships, surveillance aircraft, anti-missile systems, and support personnel. On top of that, many military analysts argue that fully securing the key waterway is nearly impossible without ground forces inside Iranian territory. Such a move would not just impose crippling costs on the US, it could also trigger a backlash from the US public, especially at a time when rising energy prices and economic anxieties have become defining issues in domestic politics.

This comes as Trump and the Republican Party have an election ahead. From now, the intert-party voting have made it clear that Trump's failure on the war have substantially impacted the candidates.

Another issue is the nature of hostility in the war. Until recently, the key question was about Iran's capability to close the Strait of Hormuz, but now the question is this: Who has the right to control this waterway?

Iran has effectively tied an end to the conflict to a final resolution on the strait, and to cementing its sovereign authority over its management. Washington, for its part, fears that accepting such an arrangement would set a dangerous precedent for other strategic chokepoints around the world. In that sense, Hormuz is not just a waterway; it is a proxy for the future of the international order.

Meanwhile, Oman has become as a crucial player. Muscat has carefully maintained ties with both sides over the years, and is now leveraging that position to try to restore a non-belligerent status in the region. The fact that both Tehran and Washington trust Oman has turned it into the crisis's most vital mediator. That's why many analysts believe the strait's fate will ultimately be decided less in Tehran or Washington than in Muscat.

Scenarios for Hormuz

There are three scenarios in sight for the future of the strait:

First scenario: a temporary agreement between Iran and Oman, leading to a phased reopening of maritime routes. In this case, Washington, despite official objections, would likely be forced to accept some limited, de facto role for Iran.

Second scenario: a continuation of the current war of attrition, with naval blockades, sporadic strikes, and spiraling insurance and shipping costs dragging on indefinitely.

Third scenario: an escalation into a full-blown regional confrontation that could draw in the Arab Gulf states, China, and even Europe in various ways.

Yet for all that, victory does not appear within reach for any side right now. Iran has clearly figured out that it does not need to fully control the strait to rattle the global economy and pressure Washington, but just needs to create the perception that transit is not entirely safe. The US, in turn, has realized that military supremacy alone can not substitute for political and legal arrangements, nor can it impose a new legal regime on the waterway.

Perhaps that is why the Strait of Hormuz crisis, more than ever, has become a clash between two irreconcilable logics: the logic of power and the logic of geography. And for now, at least, geography seems to be holding the upper hand, leaving Tehran able to keep the pressure on the US by leaning on it.

Countdown to US-Iran Deal Deadline: Returning to War or Continuing Diplomacy?

Alwaght- As we draw closer to expiry of the 60-day agreement between the US and Iran, one question presents itself again: If Washington and Tehran fail to strike a final deal before end of the deadline, what will come next? While the US President Donald Trump has repeatedly talked about "final chance" for Iran to reach a deal with the US, the record of several months of war shows that return to the military options will be costlier than strong-toned remarks of Trump are aimed to suggest.

The reality is that the 40-day war and the subsequent confrontations have caused a serious trouble for the US military: Fast depletion of its precision ammunition and air defense missiles, which are hard to replace in a short time.

The US munitions: A weak spot for a lengthy war

A report by the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) that followed the war showed that in the 39 days of missile and airstrikes, in 4 out of 7 key areas, the US consumed over half of its war ammunitions. Estimates of the think tank suggest that restoration to pre-war levels takes between 1-4 years depending on the type of ammunitions.

But after months of war, the situation has grown even more alarming. Two weeks ago, Reuters reported that the US military had burned through the bulk of its global stockpile of long-range precision missiles, including ATACMS and PrSM, in the war with Iran. The same report flagged growing concern inside the Pentagon about the US readiness for future conflicts.

The air-defense picture is equally grim. According to Reuters, between February and July, the US consumed about 65 percent of its Patriot interceptor inventory, leaving fewer than 850 missiles on hand. And this is not just an Iran-war problem. Washington must simultaneously keep enough munitions in reserve for threats from Russia, China, and the ongoing fight in Ukraine.

That is why continuing a war of attrition with Iran carries a price tag that, given current stockpiles and Washington's limited short-term production capacity, is simply unsustainable.

Iran's missile power at its peak

A significant reality that now exists is the gap between Trump's claims and intelligence estimates about Iran's missile strength.

Trump more than once has alleged he has roughly eliminated Iran's missile power. But a Reuters report in March said that the US at that time had only managed to confirm with confidence destroying one-third of Iranian missile stockpile. It was unclear the missiles were destroyed, damaged, or buried in underground bunkers, the report added. 

Even then, Iran kept firing. Reuters had also cited pre-war estimates ranging from 2,500 to 6,000 missiles, a spread that underscored just how hard it has always been to nail down the true size of Tehran's arsenal.

On top of that, Iran operates an extensive network of underground facilities. Before the war even began, Reuters had reported the existence of at least five known underground "missile cities" scattered across the country, a setup that makes any attempt to fully wipe out Iran's missile capacity exceedingly difficult.

A report from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy shows that between the 2025 and 2026 wars, Iran managed to reproduce roughly 1,000 missiles, an estimated production rate of 100 to 125 per month. The same report noted that as of May, the American and Israeli intelligence assessments indicated that missile production had resumed at some surviving facilities and even at temporary sites.

Later reports pointed to a rapid rebuild of Iran's missile infrastructure. Satellite imagery and assessments from Israeli and Western officials showed Iran reconstructing tunnel entrances, underground bases, and a number of damaged facilities.

The evidence, in short, suggests that Iran has restored portions of its damaged military capacity faster than anticipated, while simultaneously improving its survival tactics, dispersal methods, and use of underground infrastructure.

Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Naghdi, senior adviser to the commander of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), drove the point home in an interview with PBS yesterday. "How are they going to stop us from building missiles?" he said. "With 950 industrial parks and thousands of manufacturing complexes across the country, we produce more missiles daily than we fire. And Iran's defense industry is entirely indigenous."

Emphasizing that Iran's defensive weapons are 100 percent homegrown, Naghdi added: "They are built inside the country and developed according to the needs of the battlefield. There is direct communication between the front lines and our technical and engineering units. We are not dependent on anything from abroad that we would have to wait to run out."

Naghdi further maintained the war could go on for years. "Until the very last day of this war, Iran's missiles will keep flying, and that is possible because of continuous domestic production."

War also gave Iran military lessons

War also demonstrated that the Islamic Republic has managed to, using its military capabilities, force a change to the American calculations.

One example was launching long-range missiles at the US-British Diego Garcia military base in the Indian Ocean. These missiles reportedly did not hit where they supposed to, but the very firing of such missiles showed Iran's operational missile range could easily go beyond estimates. Reuters reported two missile firings at the base by Iran's Aerospace Force. 

Citing a military analyst, AL Jazeera reported that the strike, if the missile specifications are confirmed, could upend previous estimates of Iran's missile range, which had typically been assessed at around 2,000 kilometers.

For Tehran, then, this war has been a massive test: a chance to learn about weak points, preserve hidden capacities, rebuild fast, and reset its military playbook. And by that measure, Iran has shown it can take the lessons of the current fight and use them to expand and sharpen its military capabilities for the next one.

Why is the US returning to negotiations?

Amid this situation, many observers suggest end of the deadline does not necessarily mean return to war. If Washington returns to fighting, it will face an Iran that has had an experience of a long war, restored part of its military infrastructure, and knows that the US is strained in areas of precision munitions and air defense.

Before thinking about returning to war, the US should think about refilling its ammunitions stockpiles in preparation for other global threats. CSIS's report about the 1-4 year span for restoring pre-war munition levels highlights significance of the matter.

That military pressure is now coupled with political headwinds. A Reuters/Ipsos poll in late July found that only about a third of Americans support continuing the war with Iran, with a majority saying Trump has failed to clearly articulate the war's objectives. Another poll in early August put support at just 35 percent, while 58 percent expected gas prices to worsen.

For a Trump administration staring down the midterms, that math stings. A war billed as short but now dragging on for months, and threatening to devolve into another protracted grind, could exact a steeper political toll on the White House.

So if the deal deadline passes, the most likely scenario is not necessarily "immediate war." Instead, Washington's response will probably involve ramped-up pressure, military saber-rattling, fresh sanctions, and parallel back-channel efforts to nail down a new agreement.

Washington will likely leverage military threats to extract concessions from Tehran. But plunging back into all-out war would mean accepting the risks of further depleting missile stocks, eroding air-defense assets, spiking energy prices, and intensifying domestic political blowback.

That is why, according to many analysts, the expiration of the current US-Iran deadline may mark the start of a new phase of bargaining, not necessarily start of a rejuvenated war.

In such conditions, diplomacy is not just a political option for the US, rather, it can show a way out of a costly war; a war that, if continued, can signify failure of the American agenda, especially at a time the US public opinion are uninterested in a war against Iran and the midterm elections of November are fast nearing.

Malek Bennabi and the Crisis of Civilisation: Reclaiming the Soul of the Muslim World.

Salim Mohamed Badat

Introduction.

Among the Muslim intellectuals of the twentieth century, Malek Bennabi (1905 1973) stands as a rare thinker who went beyond political rhetoric to diagnose the deeper malaise afflicting the Muslim world. Born in French-occupied Algeria, Bennabi witnessed first-hand the degradation of colonised societies, not merely through the might of Western imperialism, but through the inner weakness of Muslims themselves.

His central insight was strikingly simple yet profound: before a nation becomes colonized politically, it becomes colonisable morally and intellectually. The true battlefield, Bennabi argued, lies not in the geography of empire but in the psyche of man, in the decay of creativity, the loss of ethical vitality, and the corrosion of faith that make subjugation inevitable.

The Concept of “Colonisability”

In his seminal works, such as The Conditions of Renaissance (Shurut al Nahda) and The Problem of Ideas in the Muslim World, Bennabi outlined the three stages of civilisation: the spiritual phase, the rational phase, and finally, the instinctual phase, the last being one of decay and decline. He observed that Muslim societies had entered this final stage, where material instincts and empty rituals replaced spiritual vigor and intellectual creativity.

“Colonisability,” in Bennabi’s vocabulary, referred to a condition of inner defeat, a passive mental state that welcomes domination, imitates foreign models, and loses faith in divine purpose. He wrote:

“A colonised people is not merely one occupied by an external force, but one that has lost the capacity to think, to will, and to create.”

Thus, liberation for Bennabi was not simply political independence; it was intellectual decolonisation, the recovery of the Muslim mind’s capacity to generate ideas rooted in its own spiritual and cultural foundations.

Cultural and Spiritual Renewal Over Politics.

While many of his contemporaries were absorbed in nationalist struggles or Marxist ideologies, Bennabi took a different path. He insisted that no political revolution can succeed without a moral and spiritual revolution preceding it.

Without ethical rebirth, political independence becomes hollow, a mere change of flags while dependence remains entrenched.

His critique resonates eerily with the post colonial reality of many Muslim nations: independence achieved, but corruption, injustice, and cultural alienation left intact.

For Bennabi, this failure was inevitable because Muslims sought external remedies for internal diseases.

Allama Iqbal and the Revival of the Self.

In this intellectual lineage, Allama Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) stands closest to Bennabi. While Iqbal expressed his message through poetry and philosophy, both men shared a vision of renewal through spiritual self-awareness and intellectual creativity.

Iqbal’s concept of khudi, the self awakened to its divine potential, mirrors Bennabi’s call for inner reconstruction.

Both thinkers rejected fatalism and passivity, urging Muslims to rediscover their role as agents of history, not its victims.

As Iqbal wrote: “Nations are born in the hearts of poets; they prosper and die in the hands of politicians.”

Both Bennabi and Iqbal saw that political liberation without spiritual rebirth would merely reproduce the same colonial mentality in local form.

Ali Shariati: The Revolutionary Counterpoint.

Where Bennabi’s approach emphasized moral and civilizational reform, Ali Shariati (1933–1977) sought a revolutionary reinterpretation of Islam as a weapon against tyranny and social injustice.

Shariati’s writings such as Man and Islam and Martyrdom (Shahadat) urged Muslims to become conscious revolutionaries, defining Islam as a movement of resistance, not mere piety.

Yet, despite his more activist tone, Shariati shared Bennabi’s essential diagnosis, that decay begins when Islam becomes ritual without spirit, culture without creativity, and faith without struggle. Both men sought to revive Islam’s transformative energy, but while Shariati pressed for sociopolitical revolution, Bennabi warned that such change would collapse without moral foundations.

Sayyid Qutb and the Ideological Confrontation.

Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), on the other hand, shared Bennabi’s critique of Western materialism but diverged in method. Qutb’s Milestones framed the modern world as a new jahiliyyah (state of ignorance), to be resisted through ideological struggle and divine sovereignty (hakimiyyah).

While Bennabi believed that Muslims should first purify themselves before challenging external powers, Qutb saw confrontation as the path to purification.

Thus, Bennabi’s approach was organic and educational, whereas Qutb’s was ideological and revolutionary.

The Voice of Imam Ali: Inner Reform Before Outer Victory.

The wisdom of Imam Ali ibn Abi Talib (RA) provides a spiritual echo to Bennabi’s entire thesis. Imam Ali repeatedly reminded his followers that the rot of a nation begins within: “Your sickness is within you, though you do not perceive it; and your remedy is within you, though you do not sense it.”

And in another sermon, he said: “People are slaves to this world; and religion is only a matter of words on their tongues, until they are tested.”

These words embody Bennabi’s concept of colonisability: a society that professes faith outwardly but is inwardly enslaved to materialism and fear.

Imam Ali’s emphasis on self-purification, justice, and inner struggle (jihad al-nafs) offers the timeless spiritual foundation for Bennabi’s intellectual diagnosis.

The Relevance of Bennabi’s Vision Today.

In the 21st century, the Muslim world remains caught between two extremes: blind imitation of Western modernity on one side, and reactionary dogmatism on the other. Neither path leads to revival.

Bennabi’s framework helps us see why: both are symptoms of colonisability, one through intellectual subservience, the other through emotional defensiveness.

The cure lies in reclaiming creative sovereignty, cultivating a generation of thinkers, scientists, and artists rooted in faith but open to universal knowledge.

In practical terms, this means: Education that unites revelation and reason, producing morally conscious and scientifically competent minds.

Spiritual renewal that restores the sense of divine purpose to personal and collective life.

Cultural self-confidence, so Muslims contribute to global civilization not as imitators but as co-creators.

Conclusion: Rebuilding the Inner Civilisation.

Malek Bennabi’s legacy is not merely intellectual; it is moral and spiritual. He taught that civilizations do not fall when their armies are defeated, but when their souls are emptied.

Imam Ali’s wisdom and Bennabi’s insight converge on a single truth: the reform of the world begins with the reform of the self.

Until Muslims heal the colonised mind, through knowledge, ethics, and faith, no system, ruler, or revolution can rescue them. But when the inner light is rekindled, the outer world inevitably transforms.

“Indeed, Allah does not change the condition of a people until they change what is in themselves.” (Quran 13:11)

In this verse lies the essence of Malek Bennabi’s lifelong message, that civilisation is not inherited, it is cultivated, first in the heart, then in the world.

Salim Mohamed Badat

Writer exploring the intersection of faith, politics and justice