The unresolved US-Israeli war on Iran has pushed the Red Sea and Horn of Africa into the heart of a wider struggle over chokepoints, influence, and maritime deterrence.
The Cradle
A confrontation held back in one arena can still redraw calculations in another, especially at the Bab al-Mandab Strait, where Yemen faces the Horn of Africa and where global trade narrows into a contested maritime passage.
That pressure is now being felt across the Red Sea. What began as a direct US–Israeli campaign against Iran has stretched beyond the Persian Gulf, pulling the Horn of Africa into a security equation shaped by Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, and the movement of energy, trade, and military power. Any tension in the Persian Gulf is therefore felt quickly across the Horn of Africa.
The possibility that any renewed large-scale confrontation with Iran could move into these waters is no longer remote. Iranian and Yemeni officials have repeatedly signaled that maritime corridors will not remain untouched if the war reignites. This has turned the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab into part of the wider confrontation, not a secondary arena adjacent to it.
Against this background, striking political and security indicators have begun to appear inside the Horn. Somalia has issued positions on Israeli shipping and vessels, while the US has moved toward Eritrea in an attempt to draw it into regional arrangements linked to Red Sea security. Gradually, the countries of the Horn of Africa are becoming part of the broader conflict equation tied to the war on Iran.
Somalia enters the maritime equation
Somalia has recently emerged as one of the states inserting itself into the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab equation through a political discourse shaped by regional tensions. This followed statements about preventing the passage of Israeli ships, a move that came against the backdrop of rising tension over the rapprochement between Israel and “Somaliland,” and Tel Aviv’s recognition of the latter as a state within wider security and political arrangements.
The Somali declaration carried political weight beyond the issue of navigation itself. It reflected an attempt by Mogadishu to show that any violation of its territorial integrity, or any Israeli involvement in the “Somaliland” file, could be met with political pressure extending into the maritime space surrounding the Red Sea. For Somalia, the sea becomes a tool to defend sovereignty on land.
These statements have not yet turned into practical measures capable of imposing a de facto closure or forcing a direct change in international navigation. But they reveal an important shift in the nature of political discourse inside the Horn of Africa.
This position also opens the door to limited political or security cooperation between Mogadishu, on one side, and Sanaa or Tehran, on the other. Such cooperation would remain constrained by Somalia’s internal capabilities and by its security and political complexities. But the mere possibility of this alignment is significant at a time when the Red Sea has become a theater of deterrence.
The Somali position gains greater importance in light of the war on Iran and the growing fears linked to another closure of the Strait of Hormuz, along with the prospect that the confrontation could spread to other maritime corridors, especially Bab al-Mandab. Somalia appears to be using the ongoing regional tension and the shifts in the surrounding strategic environment to impose itself, within its capabilities, as a party with a voice inside the Red Sea equation.
Mogadishu is also benefiting from heightened international sensitivity toward navigation security. In this context, Somali rhetoric can be read as one of the indirect repercussions of the war on Iran in the Horn of Africa. The war has opened the door for states once treated as marginal in regional deterrence equations to raise the ceiling of their political discourse in the face of Israeli moves and excesses in the region.
Despite Somalia’s limited capabilities, the importance of this position remains tied to its geography. Somalia directly overlooks the Red Sea approaches and the maritime corridors near Bab al-Mandab. This gives any political shift in its position a strategic weight beyond its actual military capacity, especially as Washington and Tel Aviv fear the expansion of maritime threats.
Eritrea returns to US calculations
Parallel to the Somali case, another equally important development has emerged in reports of a US move to lift sanctions on Eritrea. This step goes beyond the framework of bilateral relations between Washington and Asmara. It is directly tied to the accelerating security transformations in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa produced by the war on Iran.
Eritrea holds a highly sensitive geographical position on the African shore of the Red Sea. For this reason, it has once again become a point of interest in US calculations related to shipping security and the possibility of a wider maritime confrontation in the region.
The US appears to be viewing the Horn as an essential part of any future security arrangements related to Bab al-Mandab. This is especially true as fears grow that maritime threats from the Red Sea front could expand, whether through operations tied to Sanaa or through the broader possibility that the war on Iran could move into international shipping lanes.
Opening channels of communication with Eritrea may therefore reflect a US attempt to secure a strategic margin of action on the opposite bank of Bab al-Mandab. Such a margin would allow Washington to strengthen its security and military presence or build new logistical and intelligence arrangements in the region.
This move also reflects a growing US realization that any long-term disruption at Bab al-Mandab will not remain confined to Yemeni territorial waters. Its effects would extend across the entire maritime space surrounding the Horn of Africa, making Red Sea states, especially Eritrea, part of the broader regional conflict equation.
For that reason, the issue of lifting sanctions cannot be separated from efforts to shape security balances in the Red Sea. Maritime corridors have become one of the most important indirect battlegrounds linked to the war on Iran.
This US move gains greater significance when compared with the recent Somali position. The countries of the Horn of Africa, despite their varying capabilities, have begun to include the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab in their political and security discourse. This is visible both in the tension linked to “Somaliland” and Israeli navigation, and in the repositioning of regional and international powers on the African shore of the Red Sea.
A war economy reaches the Horn
Somalia and Eritrea may appear to be moving on separate tracks, but both point to the same contest over Bab al-Mandab. The war on Iran has accelerated the struggle to shape influence around the strait, while recasting the Horn of Africa as a strategic extension of the Red Sea – one tied directly to Hormuz, the Arabian Sea, and the Persian Gulf.
But the impact of the war on Iran in the Horn is not limited to scattered political positions or diplomatic and security moves. It extends to the strategic environment of the entire region.
The Horn of Africa, which in recent years was often treated as a geographic margin adjacent to the conflicts of West Asia, is gradually turning into a zone that overlaps with regional security equations tied to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The danger of this transformation lies in the fact that the countries of the region, although not direct parties to the war, have become more exposed to its economic, security, and political repercussions.
A disruption of navigation in the Red Sea or an escalation of threats at Bab al-Mandab would threaten economies that depend almost entirely on these corridors. Ethiopia is a clear example, as its trade passes through Djibouti. Djibouti itself is another, since its economic importance rests heavily on its role as a maritime logistics hub.
Any shock to stability in the Persian Gulf, especially in the UAE, would also affect several countries in the Horn of Africa. This is due to Abu Dhabi’s political and security interventions in those states, as well as its economic influence. That influence would be affected by declining investments or by the targeting of Emirati interests in the region, particularly the work of Abu Dhabi Ports Group, which is heavily active across the Horn.
The war has once again highlighted the military and strategic value of the coasts and ports of the Horn of Africa, from Djibouti to Berbera and Assab, as potential anchors for any new security arrangements connected to the wider confrontation.
An analysis by the Horn Institute suggests that the deeper impact of the war on Iran in the Horn of Africa is not limited to the possibility of military operations moving toward Bab al-Mandab or the Red Sea. It is also tied to the region’s structural relationship with the Persian Gulf.
From this perspective, the Horn of Africa represents a direct economic, social, and security extension of the Gulf. Any escalation in the Gulf can therefore rebound quickly on the African shore of the Red Sea. This interdependence is visible through migrant labor remittances, Gulf investments in ports, infrastructure, and agriculture, and the vital dependence of some Horn countries on navigation security in the Red Sea.
The war on Iran has made clear that any deeper Gulf involvement will send direct shockwaves across the Horn of Africa.
Ethiopia offers a clear example of this pattern of indirect exposure, one that goes beyond Bab al-Mandab itself. Its vulnerability to the war is tied to three interconnected circles: global oil, since it imports almost all of its oil needs; Red Sea security, since 95 percent of its trade passes through Djibouti and the Red Sea; and its close economic relationship with the UAE, its largest Gulf partner.
This means any escalation with Iran could produce an internal economic crisis in Addis Ababa, even without a single shot being fired on Ethiopian soil.
Analytical assessments in a report by African Security Analysis indicate that the countries of the Horn of Africa, while not directly involved in the war on Iran, are becoming more exposed to its spillover effects, especially through maritime corridors, supply chains, and energy markets.
The report stresses that the current crisis is not defined by direct military expansion toward Africa. Rather, it is defined by overlapping pressures caused by turmoil in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandab. This creates a kind of “economic and security repercussion zone” extending to the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa.
Red Sea routes and the new influence map
In the end, a crucial issue emerges: the involvement of Gulf states in the war against Iran, and their negative impact on that war, will have direct repercussions for the countries of the Horn of Africa. At the same time, it could also produce a relative decline in Gulf influence inside this region.
Such a decline would open space for the presence and influence of other states that may stand outside the traditional US umbrella. This means the repercussions of the war are not limited to reshaping security balances. They also extend to the redistribution of centers of influence in the Horn of Africa.
From this perspective, the countries of the Horn of Africa may be moving quickly toward approaches based on the priority of their immediate interests and attempts to manage their security away from the circles of polarization and regional conflict. This reflects a growing desire to reduce dependence on external powers and avoid becoming parties to confrontations that were not theirs to begin with.
At the same time, these shifts may push some states to reconsider their traditional alliances or enter new arrangements that move beyond previous alignments. Somalia is one example. Its position on Israeli shipping intersects with the interests of Sanaa and Tehran, while its deep defense and maritime ties with Turkiye give Mogadishu another external lever outside the Gulf-centered order.
More broadly, these dynamics show that one outcome of the war on Iran is its contribution to redefining the position of the Horn of Africa within the regional and international order. These shifts are likely to open the door for other international powers, such as China, to strengthen their economic and strategic presence in the region.
This war, therefore, cannot be seen only as a conflict that passes through or affects maritime corridors. It is a war fought through these corridors, and one that affects the surrounding regional geography. That includes the Horn of Africa, one of the most sensitive spaces in the balance of international power.
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