The prospect of a possible military confrontation between Israel and Türkiye is becoming more and more concerning for countries associated with them, such as Azerbaijan.
Alexandr Svaranc
In reality, Türkiye cannot provide military assistance to Hamas; it is a NATO member, hosts large US military bases, and Washington is Tel Aviv’s main strategic ally. Türkiye is trying to use the military conflict in Gaza to demonstrate its leading role in the Islamic world while being a NATO member.
Ankara is also seeking to initiate a political settlement of the Palestinian issue in accordance with the 1967 UN resolution that establishes the State of Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital. Here it aims at becoming an international security guarantor that can deploy its peacekeeping troops.
However, Türkiye’s military and political success in Syria, i.e., the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the rise to power of pro-Turkish leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa, further complicated relations with Israel. Israel, of course, does not want Türkiye to strengthen its position in the Middle East, which would turn it into a center of international logistics and transit of energy and other goods from Asia to Europe. Tel Aviv itself aspires to establish a sea transit route from India to EU countries via its southern ports in the Mediterranean (i.e., the Gaza Strip). Israel does not benefit from the Turkish port of Mersin becoming a logistics hub for Indian goods—something New Delhi does not want either—given the Turkish-Pakistani alliance. Turkish public support for Hamas is also a point of contention for Israel .
Preventing a new conflict in the Middle East should remain the priority of regional policy
In addition to Syria, Cyprus is becoming another theater of conflict between Israeli and Turkish interests, where Tel Aviv, along with Nicosia and Athens, is entering into a kind of coalition against Ankara. Israel has stepped up military and technical cooperation with the Greek part of Cyprus and is deploying air defense systems there.
Heightened tensions in Turkish-Israeli relations are negatively affecting Azerbaijan
For Azerbaijan, Türkiye and Israel are friendly states, so President Ilham Aliyev has to take into account the key role of Türkiye and Israel in Azerbaijan’s military success in the 2020 Second Karabakh War.
While Azerbaijani-Turkish relations are developing according to the “One nation, two states” formula, Azerbaijani-Israeli relations are defined by close partnership in the fields of defense, security, energy, trade, technology, and political lobbying. For Azerbaijan, Israel is not only a key partner in the supply of modern weapons but also an important lobbyist for Baku’s interests in the United States and Europe. In turn, Azerbaijan is perhaps Israel’s main ally in the Islamic world, supplying oil and providing its territory for matters related to Iran.
In 2019-2022, at a meeting with students of ADA University, Aliyev—by his own admission—became the main mediator in restoring damaged Turkish-Israeli relations. Baku’s active diplomacy reconciled its two important allies. Now, Turkish-Israeli negotiations on Syria are taking place in Azerbaijan behind closed doors. However, the Baku platform has not yet brought the results expected by Aliyev.
Israel’s expanding armed involvement in the Middle East (Gaza, Lebanon, Syria, Iran) could lead to an Israeli-Turkish military clash. Yaakov Kedmi previously ruled out such a prospect due to the lack of spatial contact between Israel and Türkiye, and also recommended the Turks avoid such a conflict; conflict with a country that may possess a nuclear arsenal is a lost cause.
Against the background of the coup in Syria and the IDF advancing in the Golan Heights, the Turkish military presence in Syria, as well as the Greek-Turkish confrontation in Cyprus, the lack of a shared border between Israel and Türkiye is not an obstacle to conflict and ground operations.
Assessments of the military arsenal and combat readiness of troops show that Israel has a sufficient level of military and technical equipment, the strongest air force in the region, and powerful special services, in addition to the IDF’s combat readiness being at a high level. Türkiye has the second largest army in NATO. Perhaps the Turkish army may be superior to the IDF in some ways (for example, in terms of artillery and armored vehicles), but Türkiye does not have the military, technical, and political support of the United States—unlike Israel. It is clear that the Turks are inferior to the Israelis in the level of command staff professional training and troop combat readiness. For example, IDF Chief of the General Staff General Halevi has more combat experience than his Turkish counterpart, General Bayraktaroglu. This is precisely what the Turkish military fears.
Azerbaijan continues to participate actively in joint military exercises with Türkiye, hosts the heads of the Turkish Ministry of Defense and the General Staff, and has Turkish military personnel stationed on its territory (including the institute of advisers, the monitoring center, special forces, etc.). However, Baku is highly concerned about the prospect of a direct military conflict between Türkiye and Israel, where it will be difficult to “sit on the fence,” as they say.
With the conflict in the Gaza Strip raging on and the latest Israeli airstrike on Doha, Azerbaijan has limited itself to statements of concern, calls for respect of international norms, and a political settlement. At the same time, Baku did not interrupt the supply of its oil to Israel through Türkiye, continued its military and technical cooperation with Tel Aviv, and enjoyed the support of the Jewish lobby in the United States.
Iran’s statements (including the recent appeal by Ali Velayati, a senior political adviser to the Supreme Leader in international affairs) about the pointlessness of the Azerbaijani-Israeli partnership and its calls for Islamic solidarity were not met with support in Baku. In this matter, the history of the Persian Empire, Shi’a Islam, and the shared regional neighborhood were of no importance for Azerbaijan.
In the event of war between Israel and Türkiye, Baku will have to make a choice. So far, Azerbaijani experts (for example, head of the Center for Caucasian History, Rizvan Huseynov) believe that there will be no war, and that Azerbaijan will not allow itself to be drawn into such a conflict. Huseynov believes that Israel allegedly will not start a war with Türkiye, since it has no clear military advantage.
It is difficult to say why Baku experts are so confident in this matter. What if the “strong” Türkiye provokes a conflict with the “weak” Israel, as Huseynov put it? The possible ignition of war between Israel and Türkiye may include two theaters, Syria and Cyprus. In addition, for Türkiye, in such a case, the US does not present a threat—just like in the case with Iran.
Preventing a new conflict in the Middle East should remain the priority of regional policy. However, with the aggravation of the conflicting interests of powerful players (Türkiye and Israel), the parties will have to conceal all arrogance.
Alexander Svarants—Doctor of Political Science, Professor, Turkologist, expert on the Middle East
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