By Xavier Villar
MADRID – Less than three months after Mohammad Zahid Sabaji, president of Turkey’s State Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), announced the creation of a Persian-language channel, the broadcaster has commenced its operations from Turkish territory.
During the unveiling of the project at an event held at Uluda? University, Sabaji made statements that sparked mixed reactions, particularly among Iranian media. In his remarks, he emphasized the significance of the Persian-language channel, asserting, “We must unsettle Iran.” This comment has been interpreted as a signal of Ankara’s regional strategy, fueling debate over Turkey’s intentions in its West Asia policies.
The channel’s launch takes place within a complex geopolitical context, where Turkey and Iran maintain a relationship characterized by both cooperation and rivalry. The initiative highlights Ankara’s commitment to strengthening its political and media influence beyond its borders, at a time when the balance of power in the region is undergoing significant shifts.
The statements by Mohammad Zahid Sabaji, president of Turkey’s State Radio and Television Corporation (TRT), did not go unnoticed in Iran, drawing sharp criticism both on social media and in official circles. Persian-speaking users strongly condemned Sabaji’s remarks, while Ahmad Norouzi, vice president of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), responded on social media: “While we remain focused on reporting the daily suffering in Palestine and Lebanon, we will not be distracted by reckless comments. However, we reserve the right to respond appropriately. From IRIB, we trust that Turkish authorities will disavow these statements and clarify the situation.”
This verbal exchange highlights a significant shift in Turkey’s regional strategy, moving away from the principles initially championed by the Justice and Development Party (AKP) under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan during his tenure as prime minister (2003–2014). During that period, the AKP advocated a “zero problems with neighbors” policy, aimed at minimizing tensions within its regional sphere.
However, this approach unraveled with the outbreak of the so-called “Arab Spring,” a wave of protests that profoundly reshaped the political landscape across parts of Africa and West Asia. In response, Ankara adopted a more interventionist stance, marking a clear departure from its original non-confrontational doctrine. This strategic pivot continues to shape Turkey’s relations with its neighbors, including Iran and other key regional actors.
According to numerous Iranian analysts, Turkey’s shift in regional policy is rooted in its adoption of the pan-Turkism doctrine. This political movement advocates for the unification of countries with Turkic language, such as Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan, under a shared vision aimed at bolstering Turkey's geopolitical influence in the region.
Among the nations likely to align with this doctrine, Azerbaijan stands out as Turkey’s principal ally. According to Iran’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the rise to power of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey, coupled with what Tehran perceives as an expansionist policy in the South Caucasus, has facilitated the resurgence of pan-Turkism, particularly in Ankara-Baku relations.
The strategic cooperation between the two countries, largely driven by Turkey, is viewed by Tehran as a key factor in the ongoing tensions with Azerbaijan. This partnership underscores the complexities of regional dynamics and highlights the ideological and geopolitical undercurrents influencing Turkey’s foreign policy.
A turning point in this dynamic came in 2020, when Turkey provided significant military support to Azerbaijan during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Beyond backing Baku’s positions, Ankara played a decisive role in operations that led to the occupation of areas in southern Armenia, including the strategic Syunik province. These actions raised concerns in Tehran, which perceives them as an attempt by Ankara to curtail Iran’s geopolitical influence along its northwestern and northern borders.
The growing collaboration between Turkey and Azerbaijan, framed within the pan-Turkist ideology, continues to fuel tensions in a region where political, economic, and cultural interests are in constant contention.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is increasingly wary of any attempt to alter the current borders between Armenia, Iran, and Azerbaijan, a scenario it views as a direct threat to its geopolitical standing in the region. These concerns are deeply tied to the context of pan-Turkist ideology, whose feasibility has gained traction following Azerbaijan’s victory in the second Nagorno-Karabakh war in 2020.
Under the agreements reached after the conflict, Azerbaijan not only secured a military victory but also gained commitments related to the opening of transport routes through Armenian territory. As part of this strategy, Baku has promoted the construction of the so-called "Zangezur Corridor," a project that would connect Azerbaijan with its Nakhchivan enclave, which is separated from the rest of the country by Armenian territory, and extend this connection to Turkey. If realized, the corridor would block direct access between Armenia and Iran, something Tehran considers highly detrimental both from a geopolitical and economic standpoint.
Iranian media have pointed out that the corridor project could involve Azerbaijan taking control of the Armenian province of Syunik, further isolating Armenia, one of Iran’s key regional allies. According to Iranian analysts, this isolation would have a negative impact on regional trade and significantly alter the strategic balance in the South Caucasus.
Despite its close relationship with Armenia, Iran has tried to maintain a neutral stance in the conflict between Baku and Yerevan, advocating for a diplomatic solution. However, Iranian authorities emphasize that their intervention in the first Nagorno-Karabakh war was crucial in preventing Armenia from conquering all of Azerbaijan’s territory, a point that Iranian media often highlight to criticize what they perceive as a "lack of memory and gratitude" from Baku.
In addition to its growing influence in Azerbaijan, Turkey has strengthened its presence in Syria, where the weakening of Bashar al-Assad’s government and the rise of the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) group, with ties to Ankara, have redefined the regional balance of power. For Turkey, the consolidation of HTS has not only provided a security boost along its borders but also offered an opportunity to surpass Saudi Arabia as a regional competitor and increase pressure on Iran.
In this context of competition for regional influence, the recent launch of TRT Persian takes on strategic significance. According to the network’s official website, the channel was created with the aim of offering “accurate, comprehensive, and impartial” content to over 130 million Persian speakers worldwide. However, analysts note that this initiative is part of a broader effort by Ankara to expand its cultural influence in key countries such as Iran, the Persian Gulf states, and the Mediterranean.
Turkey has been accused of adopting a dual approach in its foreign policy: on one hand, military interventions in northern Iraq and Syria that, according to some experts, have contributed to regional instability; on the other, a deployment of "soft power" when military tactics have not yielded the expected results. This approach includes initiatives such as launching foreign-language channels, strengthening cultural diplomacy, and promoting economic ties.
Under the leadership of the AKP, Turkey has used this combination of military force and soft power to consolidate its influence in a region marked by historical rivalries and divergent geopolitical ambitions. In this regard, the launch of TRT Persian reflects a calculated strategy by Ankara to extend its reach in an increasingly competitive regional landscape.
In the competition for regional influence, countries employ strategies that combine elements of hard and soft power. The latter, in its various forms, not only facilitates the projection of sovereignty and the achievement of strategic objectives but also reinforces the ideological perspectives of those who wield it. Turkey, in particular, has intensified its media presence, with a special emphasis on Iran, as part of its soft power strategy.
The recent media expansion of the Turkish government, exemplified by the launch of TRT Persian, responds to a series of multidimensional objectives, according to analysts:
• Regional competition with Iran: The creation of platforms like TRT Persian is part of a strategy aimed at positioning itself in geopolitical rivalries with Tehran.
• Attracting economic investment: One of the key goals of the Persian-language media is to attract Iranian capital, particularly through the promotion of sectors such as tourism and foreign direct investment.
• Strengthening regional influence: Turkey uses these media tools to consolidate its presence in Persian-speaking countries and regions, such as Iran, Afghanistan, and Tajikistan.
• Domestic media impact in Iran: Through these platforms, Ankara aims to develop tools that will allow it to influence political and media narratives within Iran when deemed necessary.
In the specific case of TRT Persian, it is evident that Turkey aims to use this initiative to expand its influence in regions considered strategic within its pan-Turkic vision. The platform not only seeks to shape public opinion in key areas but also to project an image of Turkey as a central actor in regional and global politics.
This approach reflects the combination of soft and hard power that characterizes Turkish foreign policy under the leadership of the AKP. As Ankara progresses with military interventions and diplomatic strategies, media expansion is consolidating as a complementary tool to strengthen its presence in an increasingly competitive regional environment.
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