Crescent International
It broadened the circumstances under which it might deploy nuclear weapons.
The revised policy, formalized in a presidential decree, continues to emphasize nuclear deterrence as a last resort.
There are however, two important changes that introduce two additional scenarios.
The first permits nuclear retaliation in response to large-scale aggression involving conventional forces if such an attack threatens the very existence of the Russian state.
The second scenario authorizes the use of nuclear weapons to defend its allies, provided the attack on them is supported by nuclear-capable states.
While the first scenario is quite understandable and conventional, the second amendment to Russia’s nuclear doctrine is unique and hybrid.
It has the potential to drastically reshape the geopolitical balance of power.
The second amendment provides a political framework for Russia to offer its nuclear “services” to non-nuclear states.
Russia’s inclusion of the term “allies” in a broad sense allows it to interpret and re-interpret its nuclear doctrine in a global manner.
Moscow can now add a nuclear component to its geopolitical pursuits.
This needs explaining.
Even though many media outlets interpreted its “allies” to mean Belorussia, this is merely their opinion.
It has with no influence on Russia’s nuclear doctrine.
It seems Russia deliberately left the term “ally” ambiguous.
By infusing nuclear ambiguity into its external alliances, this vagueness raises serious questions.
By leaving the term “allies” deliberately vague, Russia creates room to leverage nuclear deterrence as a geopolitical bargaining chip, potentially offering “nuclear guarantees” to other states where it has vested interests.
Could it be that in a few years, Russia might include Syria under its nuclear umbrella?
Just as Belorussia is functioning as Russia’s springboard into Europe, Russian military presence in Syria is Moscow’s springboard into West Asia.
Russian forces are present in Syria in an active role and are not going to leave anytime soon.
While it is premature to claim that this is exactly what Russia will do, it cannot be excluded either.
Considering that Russia and Islamic Iran are in the process of signing a strategic cooperation agreement, it is not unrealistic to assume that it will include the nuclear field as well.
Could it be that Russia will assist or enable Iran to go fully nuclear?
None of this can be dismissed as pure speculation because Russia is clearly reframing its nuclear politics.
The expansion of the nuclear umbrella towards allies brings the world into uncharted territory.
Russia’s revised nuclear doctrine represents a hybrid strategy blending traditional deterrence with modern geopolitical ambitions.
By extending nuclear protection to allies—real or potential—Russia not only strengthens its global influence but also reshapes the norms governing nuclear weapons.
It should also be noted that Moscow considers the regions of the former Soviet Union as its privileged sphere of influence.
Russia’s determined actions in Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan show that the Kremlin will not hesitate in keeping it this way and its geopolitical nuclear framing should not be dismissed as bravado.
Moscow can easily apply the new nuclear doctrine in Central Asia.
Offering nuclear protection to countries like Kazakhstan or Uzbekistan will further solidify its influence in this vital region.
Whatever the exact steps Russia might take in its use of nuclear doctrine as part of its foreign policy, one thing is clear: western regimes no longer have a monopoly on restructuring the global security architecture.
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