While Israel’s attempted ground invasion of Lebanon will seek to correct its tactical missteps from 2006, the south and its terrain are Hezbollah’s biggest strength, and these forces are hunkered down, fortified, and prepared to expel Israelis – for the third time.
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Isael probably is less concerned about damaging its international reputation than it was in 2006: after the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians in Gaza, killing more in Lebanon is not likely to make it worse.
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This is what US think-tank Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) concluded in a recent report on how both Israel and Hezbollah have adapted since the Second Lebanon War, focusing on the lessons learned and their applications in the current conflict.
Following last month’s Israeli pager terrorist attack, the assassination of Hezbollah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah, and the intense bombardment of Beirut and Lebanon’s east and south, comparisons to the 2006 Lebanon war have become inevitable.
As Israel prepares for a formal “limited, localized, and targeted” ground invasion of southern Lebanon, reminiscent of the conflict that played out 18 years ago, the entire region stands on the brink of the possibility of a major war spiraling out of control.
In 2006, Hezbollah emerged politically strengthened despite the heavy toll, and now, once again, it faces a familiar adversary with lessons learned from that bloody conflict. Analysts are drawing stark parallels between the present situation and the July 2006 war, noting that Hezbollah’s resilience then, both on the battlefield and in the political arena, shaped its modern strategies.
Israel, too, has evolved its approach, learning from the tactical failures of that war but also adopting more destructive means of warfare that prioritize the indiscriminate and punishing use of military firepower over preserving its international reputation.
The 2006 war ended with the issuance of UN Security Council Resolution 1701, calling on Lebanon and Israel to immediately and permanently cease all military operations, the deployment and reinforcement of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) on the border, and the Israeli withdrawal beyond the Blue Line separating the two states.
The brutality of the current offensive
But in the wake of the assassinations of Nasrallah and other top Hezbollah commanders and strategists, the occupation state has ramped up its offensive in Lebanon, with devastating consequences. Targeted airstrikes on Hezbollah’s communication infrastructure and leadership compounds have claimed the lives of over 37 Hezbollah fighters, but it is the civilian casualties that have been most staggering.
More than 2,000 Lebanese civilians, including women and children, have been killed – almost double the death toll of 2006 – and over 10,000 injured in less than two weeks, leading international organizations to consider these actions potential war crimes. In 2006, during 34 days of Israel’s aggressions, the total death toll was 1,300. The Israeli bombardment of southern Lebanon and Beirut today mirrors the devastation 18 years ago when villages in the Bekaa Valley and the southern suburbs of Beirut were similarly struck.
Despite the enormous setbacks, Hezbollah has continued to launch rocket attacks deep into Israeli territory, demonstrating a resilience that reflects its strategic gains from the 2006 war. In the last few days, the Lebanese resistance appears to have turned the tide further, striking key Israeli port city Haifa with over 200 projectiles in a historically unprecedented attack on the city and its environs.
Learning from 2006: Israel’s ‘Doctrine of Force’
One of the key lessons Tel Aviv appears to have absorbed from its 2006 military campaign is to apply an excessive use of force, regardless of any accompanying international backlash. CSIS report author Daniel Byman points out that Israel’s war on Gaza and its recent assaults on Lebanon “have clearly shown that Israel’s doctrine of using force has also become more destructive.”
In 2008, the head of the Israeli military’s Northern Command, Major General Gadi Eisenkot, warned after the 2006 war that next time, Israel would destroy “every village from which it fires” and make Hezbollah pay a heavy domestic price for its actions.
The CSIS report notes that Israel is less concerned about damaging its international reputation than it was in 2006: “After the deaths of tens of thousands of civilians in Gaza, killing more in Lebanon is not likely to make it worse.”
Despite its overwhelming firepower, Israel’s ground invasion during the 2006 war exposed significant tactical failures. After two weeks of heavy airstrikes, Israel launched “Operation Change of Direction,” deploying thousands of soldiers into southern Lebanon to eliminate Hezbollah fighters.
However, the ground incursion proved disastrous for the Israeli army. The Lebanese resistance, deeply entrenched in underground tunnels and well-versed in guerrilla warfare, inflicted heavy losses on Israeli forces, most notably in the Saluki Valley ambush, where Hezbollah blocked the southern end of a column of tanks, then fired anti-tank missiles to devastate Israeli units who were helpless without artillery and infantry support.
“Anyone dumb enough to push a tank column through Wadi Saluki should not be an armored brigade commander but a cook,” reflected Timur Goksel, a Turkish diplomat, military officer, and former spokesman for the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL).
An ill-advised invasion of south Lebanon
These tactical failures continue to haunt Israel’s military leadership as it contemplates a new ground invasion.
Many military experts, including former Israeli prime minister Ehud Olmert, who oversaw the 2006 war, have cautioned against such a move.
Olmert recently warned that any new invasion “will be tough, it will be difficult, and it will be bloody for all sides,” He also noted that the conflict could “rapidly expand” into a wider regional war with the Axis of Resistance.
In contrast to Tel Aviv’s military’s concerns, Hezbollah emerged from the 2006 conflict stronger and more emboldened. In the years since the war, Hezbollah has significantly expanded its military capabilities, amassing between 120,000 to 200,000 rockets and missiles, compared to the 15,000 it possessed in 2006.
This arsenal includes long-range missiles capable of striking targets across Israel, a capability that has grown increasingly concerning for Israeli military planners. While Israel has also prepared for any possible ground invasion, this time, it has decided to carry out preemptive and tactical strikes against Hezbollah, including targeting alleged stockpile sites in which it claims to have halved the Lebanese resistance’s arsenal.
Repelling the invaders
Hezbollah, however, has fortified its positions in southern Lebanon, developing an even more extensive network of underground tunnels, bolstering its ground forces exponentially, and establishing the elite Radwan Forces to defend its critical border. These preparations reflect a strategic shift following the 2006 war, in which Hezbollah not only survived but also cemented its reputation as a formidable opponent capable of resisting Israeli troop incursions.
While Tel Aviv has invested heavily in pre-emptive airstrikes and targeted assassinations to weaken Hezbollah, the resistance movement’s resilience remains clear on that key border. In the past few days, Israeli ground troops have already faced fierce resistance, with reports of Hezbollah fighters detonating explosive devices targeting Israel’s “elite” Golani Brigade and killing and injuring dozens of enemy troops.
It is fair to say that while both sides have learned certain lessons from 2006, the question is whether they focused on the right ones. For Hezbollah, survival and resilience remain paramount, while Israel continues to prioritize overwhelming force, even at the risk of further damaging its international standing.
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