Lula’s stakes in a Russia-Ukraine ceasefire

• Hannan Hussain 

• Source: Al Mayadeen English

The peaking threat of recession, limited fiscal space, and utilization of highly destructive weaponry have compelled even the most skeptical of countries to fall back on the diplomacy option and endorse peace. Why should a newly elected Lula presidency be an exception to that trend?

Under President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, Brazil demonstrates vocal support for a negotiated, peaceful settlement in the Ukraine-Russia war. Its approach so far puts a premium on reaching a ceasefire. The heightened risk of a protracted conflict between warring parties has put Brazil in a bit of a limbo. For instance, the country is staring at a situation where mounting international pressure to steer Brazil into a camp weighs down Lula’s aspirations for East-West energy and trade. Similarly, the unified prevention of conflict spillovers needs to materialize through an early ceasefire, which several states in Latin America agree is simply beyond the West.

It is against this backdrop that a Beijing-led proposal to back a peace initiative between both sides can score Lula’s peacemaking objectives home. Early traction in key diplomatic quarters is a welcome sign so far, and Ukraine’s intent to build on it shows a greater degree of promise than any divisive NATO proposal that has come to the fore. 

To Brazil, the 12-point peace proposal is informed by the understanding that Ukraine and Russia should be jointly recognized under one banner of common security, a priority identifying closely with the BRICS economic grouping. Reduction in hostilities can pave the way for a negotiated stop to escalation, and Lula’s urgency to put together a “peace club” with independent messaging to Kiev and Moscow strengthens the case for Brazil’s desired leverage in global peace-building.

In recent times, nations from the West to the East have weighed in on the plan, and Beijing’s time-tested rapport with Russia invites valuable leverage to build off Lula’s own rapport with Moscow. Brazil should read this opportunity in Beijing – the first since Lula’s presidential win – as a blueprint for endorsing its own position: sticking to the UN Charter, and trusting the merits of its studied neutrality on a delicate geopolitical conflict.

In line with Lula’s peace club aspirations, the advancement of the Chinese reconciliation proposal remains critical to guarding middle powers such as Brazil and China against a protracted war. Consider the fact that North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states have been identified as participants to the conflict in the absence of a ceasefire, and the specter of nuclear threats continues to raise eyebrows in an already sensitive geopolitical landscape. Brazil’s desire to be seen as a champion of multilateralism, chiefly under the umbrella of BRICS, makes alignment with Moscow on negotiations a central point of leverage. 

Continued trust deficits between Ukraine and Russia may fail to facilitate new drivers for near-term relief, as Brazil looks to get its economy in higher gear. The absence of a ceasefire can continue to add to sustained and counterproductive downward pressure on the Brazilian economy, affecting its vantage position in Latin American growth forecasts while shrinking the space for Lula’s multilateral conflict resolution aspirations. 

To support Brazil’s economic, security and energy considerations without excessive external pressures, a negotiated ceasefire is of paramount importance this year. Particularly when the arrival of US-led lethal tanks and ammunitions to the battlefield has driven up geopolitical tempers considerably, and failed to incentivize Lula’s landmark visit to the United States rather than Beijing.

Europe – a key player in facilitating energy market stability and a potential ceasefire – is not averse to Brazil’s quest for Ukraine-Russia confidence-building measures. EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell gave a glimpse into the bloc’s non-ideological leaning towards the conflict, by indicating Europe’s willingness to assess and examine the China-led 12-point Ukraine-Russia peaceful settlement plan. To the credit of both sides, this is a plan and approach that aligns with Brazil’s expectations as well. Critical reference points in the negotiation exercise, such as a reduction in strategic risks and supply chain management, call for discontinuity in arms confrontation on-ground first, and Lula’s high-level engagement in China reflects a desire to level the playing field. 

All that is in line with Brazil’s view that the sustainability of the Ukraine conflict to this point reflects poorly on global potential to strike a pause, and cease hostilities. 

After all, the peaking threat of recession, limited fiscal space, and utilization of highly destructive weaponry have compelled even the most skeptical of countries to fall back on the diplomacy option and endorse peace. Why should a newly elected Lula presidency be an exception to that trend? For months, the mistaken logic of ‘defense spending for peace’ has only aggravated security risks and made it difficult for financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund (IMF), to sanction funds to needful nations without working their last nerve. Brazil, which is keen to reorient its foreign policy choices with a focus on prioritizing domestic stability, finds a favorable ally in China to score peace-building merits home.

Taken together, Lula’s visible agenda shift on Ukraine means his country cannot afford to sit back for long as a spectator. A protracted war has pushed energy prices up and contributed to rising instability in the high-growth Latin American region. The 12-point peace proposal making rounds in the world presents an opening to advance ceasefire momentum for Brazil. 

How key parties to the conflict follow up on it will be a key consideration to watch in the near future, with implications for Brazil’s stakes in an East-West rapprochement.