Iran nuclear deal, no more a gray deal of compromise

By Mehrdad Torabi

In international affairs, there are real-world situations in which international actors find no incentives to cooperate, primarily because they are both rational and self-interested. In theory, it is always easy to speak of harmony of interests or cooperation. In practice, however, relative gains from cooperation are always disproportional, enough to force one of the parties to defect. In the case of defection, the result is realpolitik, a system of politics or principles based on practical considerations.

When the Trump administration left the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, holding on the one hand nuclear science and the other its missile programs, Iran had already acquired a high level of security and power. The grand strategy of the Islamic Republic to obtain nuclear deterrence without the possession of the actual thing had shaken the foundations of centuries of imperialism and foreign hegemony in the region.

“Threat towards peace and stability” that the United States and mainstream media were trying to intimidate the public with was nothing but a euphemism for the threat towards the United States imperialist interests as much as Iran’s increased security had endangered the Zionist colonial expansion project.

Meanwhile, the so-called Arab Spring project had failed. War in Afghanistan had cost the US $2 trillion and a moral crisis, in which civilians were shot and killed for practice. Iraq, which first looked like a success to serve the interests of the US, had become a breeding ground for resistance against military occupation. In Yemen, the US and its servants’ plans to recreate a regime over the ruins of a newly awakening nation and in Syria, the united fronts of al-Qaeda, Daesh terrorists, and international actors, who saw terrorism as a chance for “regime change,” were defeated.

The withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA was a reaction to Iran's resketching of the power structure in the region. Sanctions were imposed on Iran, Syria, and Lebanon, yet protectionist policies and self-reliance, as well as Iran–China Cooperation Program from a macrocosmic point of view, became another nail in neoliberalism’s coffin. The siege on Yemen was reinforced as more than 20 million lived on the brink of starvation, arms sales to Saudi Arabia hit an unprecedented peak, and indiscriminate airstrikes exacerbated as Ansarullah forces and popular committees advanced towards Marib, the last stronghold of al-Qaeda terrorists and foreign invaders. Even though sponsors of terrorists had conducted over 200 airstrikes on Syria in 2017–2018 alone, resistance forces continued to free cities of terrorist elements. Subversive acts conducted by the Israeli regime targeting Iranian vessels and nuclear facilities did not go unanswered: missiles reached Dimona, ships were targeted, and missile factories burned to ashes. While Iran was producing 84 tons of Triuranium octoxide (yellowcake) per year, its nuclear scientists were assassinated by international actors whose monopoly over science was at risk; acts of assassination and nuclear terrorism, however, not only did not hinder Iran's progress, the Islamic Republic began enriching uranium up to 60% using advanced centrifuges. A British oil tanker confiscated in the Strait of Hormuz, when the United Kingdom seized Iran’s oil shipment in an act of piracy, meant that the era of the UK’s naval dominance was over and that now Iranian oil tankers could dock in Venezuela in defiance of US sanctions. The “deal of the century” was introduced to suppress the Palestinian consciousness risen to its height against apartheid policies of the oppressive regime of Israel—normalizing ties with the Zionist regime was a precondition for its implementation, but the historic victory of the Palestinian people against the Zionist regime in the recent 11-day war on Gaza proved that the resistance front has succeeded in annihilating the calculations of Zionist colonialism. Had the JCPOA been associated with Iran's missile programs or its role in leading the resistance, the whole region would have remained periphery to the imperialist core.

In real-world politics, if gains from cooperation become disproportional, power politics will prevail. However, it is due to the psychological impact of unrealized power that parties to a social dilemma can be forced into a settlement. That means the JCPOA has never been a kind of a deal that parties could enjoy balanced, mutually beneficial, win-win. After all, why would Iran give the US any concession while the US empire is facing a (material and moral) power crisis? It won’t; if nothing else, the resistance axis is the dominant force in the region while people throughout the region now think of the US as a blind giant—powerful enough to destroy the “enemy,” but unable to find him.

The United States did what it could, but what 2,500 years history of international relations really shows is that a collapsing hegemony may never escape the tyrannical consequences of its decisions.

Now, giving an analysis of where do we exactly stand, as regards the power relations, against the United States is a difficult one. But obviously, after the United States unilaterally withdrew from the JCPOA, the gray zone of compromise produced by the nuclear deal in 2015 was transformed into black and white.

The Zionist regime in only 11 days was brought to its knees by Hamas and resistance forces as 4,000 rockets targeted its military campaign against Gaza, which has been under military siege since the 1960s. Resistance in Yemen, despite the blockade (the worst human-made humanitarian crisis), the diplomatic support of some Western countries, and the military aid of the world powers, is just a few steps away from liberating Marib. These two points will suffice to rule out war as a choice for the United States. There is no other alternative for the US but to acknowledge Iran's position of power in the region. It becomes then facile to conclude that the JCPOA is not the one variable that determines the power structure and, consequently, sets the economic conditions, but rather it is the power structure that will decide the fate of the JCPOA.

I will try to describe, in theoretical terms, a parabolic relationship between power and security that has three stages. In the first stage, any increase in a state’s power represents an increase in its security because states with more power can recruit allies and deter rivals (1980s-2000). In the second stage, further increases in power begin to diminish the state’s security because the ongoing accumulation of capabilities causes opponents to mobilize (2000-2015). In the third stage, the state has amassed so much power that opponents have no choice but to bandwagon: absolute security threshold (current).

By looking at the historical events which I tried to touch upon, one can realize the stage we are standing on and predict the future of Iran's nuclear deal. It is a fact international laws and order can guarantee to the Islamic republic that others will adhere to their obligations. However, only after they are forced by means of power politics. The possibility of a deal is wishful thinking; the situation is supposed to remain like a stalemate until realpolitik can finalize it. But as I tried to demonstrate, the realization of a deal is becoming ever-increasingly a possible reality under the achievements of resistance.

In brief, geopolitics and the regional power structure will conclude the outcome, the result of the JCPOA, and not the other way around. The historical development of resistance, Iran’s nuclear deterrence, and the fact that it has achieved an absolute security threshold signify that antagonisms cannot be sustained, and adversaries, including the United States, are left with no choice but to bandwagon. The contexts in which the JCPOA was signed and the United States withdrew from it have changed. The JCPOA is changed: it is no more a gray deal of compromise. We should no more expect a deal, but a deal that is guaranteed by power.

Mehrdad Torabi, is a postgraduate student of International Relations – University of Bologna, department of political sciences.