The fact that a group as dubious as the MKO figures so prominently in the Trump administration’s policy on Iran demonstrates the bankruptcy of that policy, says Paul R. Pillar – a contributing editor at the National Interest and the author of “Why America Misunderstands the World”, in his article titled: “MKO and the Bankrupt US Policy on Iran”.
Among the many indicators of misdirection in the Donald Trump administration’s policy toward Iran, one of the clearest is the fondness for the cult-cum-terrorist group known as the MKO – and scoffed by all Iranians as ‘hypocrites’ for its treason against the Islamic Republic and armed collaboration with Saddam’s Ba’th minority regime during the 8-year imposed on Iran by the US.
Among this dubious group’s most prominent cheerleaders are the US national security advisor, John Bolton, and Donald Trump’s attorney, Rudy Giuliani, both having been featured speakers at its rallies. They and other shills for the MKO refer to the group as if it represented what it decidedly is not: an alternative to the current Iranian political system.
Journalist Arron Merat, an experienced Iran-watcher who formerly was the Economist’s Tehran correspondent, has just published a 6,600-word article about the MKO in the Guardian. The piece is well worth reading as it forms a richly informed and up-to-date portrait that leaves no doubt about the nature of the group and the ghastly inappropriateness of using the MKO in any way as a vehicle for US policy in the region.
The MKO originated as a student movement that opposed the Shah and spouted an ideology that weirdly allied with Marxism. Before the Islamic Revolution, its terrorist operations targeted businesses and it reportedly killed six American citizens in addition to its far more numerous Iranian victims.
The MKO tried to exploit the conditions in Iran after the Islamic Revolution, feigning support for the Islamic Republic, but practically opposing its policies. Among other things, following the Algiers Accord between Iran and the US, for the conditional release of the American spies caught red-handed at the so-called US embassy in Tehran when the revolutionary students took it over, the MKO opposed this deal. The group continued its terrorism, targeting both officials and ordinary citizens of Iran.
With the eight-year Iraqi War already underway, the MKO threw in its lot with Saddam. The Iraqi dictator gave the group weapons, cash, and a compound called Camp Ashraf in return for its continuing attacks inside Iran as well as helping Saddam suppress his own domestic opponents. Iranians understandably viewed this phase in the MKO’s history as an unforgivable act of treason, and whatever support the group previously had in Iran was erased.
Merat’s article provides details of the cult-like aspects of how the MKO has functioned, earlier at Camp Ashraf and more recently, after the group had to leave Iraq, at a compound in Albania. As cult leaders, the husband-and-wife duo of Massoud and Maryam Rajavi have resembled the likes of Jim Jones and Shoko Asahara. Families have been broken up, married couples told to divorce, and women threatened with punishment if they did not “marry” Massoud and endure his sexual abuse. (Massoud dropped out of sight after the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and it is not known whether he is dead or alive. Maryam continues as the public face of the group.) Stomach-turning details continue to emerge from the MKO’s current location in Albania, including stories of forced hysterectomies and would-be escapees subjected to solitary confinement. The former head of Albanian military intelligence says that MKO members live in the group’s current compound as “hostages” amid “extraordinary psychological violence and threats of murder.”
The MKO’s efforts over the past two decades to convey a benign public image completely at odds with this internal reality, and to pose as a force for democracy in Iran, have depended on buying the public endorsements of well-known public figures. This has required money—lots of it. Five-figure speaking fees have flowed freely. Public disclosure forms indicate Bolton received $40,000 for a single appearance at an MKO event in Paris last year, and Merat gives an estimate of $180,000 as the total that Bolton has received for his multiple appearances on behalf of the group.
In addition to the generous big-name fees, lobbying for the MKO has apparently included other well-financed techniques. The crowd at the Paris event this year, for example, was supplemented by bussing in young people from Eastern Europe who enjoyed a free weekend in Paris. The group used the same rent-a-crowd technique for a demonstration outside the US State Department when the MKO was ramping up its lobbying a few years ago to be delisted as a foreign terrorist organization. Some of the participants in that event were recruited at a homeless shelter in New York; they admitted knowing very little about the MKO but appreciated the free meals they were given for attending.
Where the money is coming from is still somewhat of a mystery. But some clues point to regional regimes that are hostile to Iran as the most likely source – especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE.
Two further observations flow from this surprisingly successful but wholly unjustified remaking of the MKO’s image. One concerns how some famous—and perhaps supposedly respectable people—evidently have been willing to prostitute themselves to get in on those fat speaking fees. A wide range of political figures have played the game, from Howard Dean on the left to Bolton and many others on the right. Some of the players may have had little more understanding of the MKO when they got involved than did the guys from the homeless shelter in New York.
Ed Rendell, a former Democratic governor of Pennsylvania, freely admitted that he knew little about the group when he accepted an invitation to speak at an event the MKO staged at a downtown Washington hotel. He then told his audience—in a demonstration of the self-sustaining nature of big-name endorsements—that the reputations of the other speakers at the same event persuaded him that it must be for a worthwhile cause.
Not everyone has succumbed to the monetary temptations. Tip your hat, for example, to Elliott Abrams, a card-carrying neoconservative who has had more than his share of misdirection in Middle East policy, for declining an invitation to speak at an MKO event. Abrams cited the fact that the group was still on the foreign terrorist organization list at the time, but the politically and morally inexcusable nature of advocating for such a group does not depend on such a formal list.
The other observation is that, while the shills have taken their fees to the bank, the fact that a group as dubious as the MKO figures so prominently in the administration’s policy on Iran demonstrates the bankruptcy of that policy. If the MKO is in the game, then we know the game is not about democracy, human rights, or doing right by ordinary Iranians. Bolton and at least some of the others who have touted the group are surely smart enough to realize that and to understand the true nature of the group. They appear to be less interested in democracy in Iran than in the capability for sabotage, destruction, and assassination in Iran—a capability that the MKO still has despite its claims to have forsaken violence.
The fact that a group as dubious as the Mujahedin-e Khalq figures so prominently in the Trump administration’s policy on Iran demonstrates the bankruptcy of that policy.
Fostering that capability may serve the objectives of regional regimes which do their own sabotage, destruction, and assassination aimed against Iran and welcome the augmentation of their capabilities for mayhem that the MKO offers. It increases instability and besmirches the reputation of the United States through associating itself with the MKO.
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