By Izeth Hussain

The strategy that Kissinger has talked about is fully in compliance with his country’s practical positions on the crises that are sweeping the West Asia region and specifically Iraq, a country the US has invaded under the pretext of existence of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction), however, later Washington has apologized for that, saying that there were no such weapons developed in the country. Years later, the US withdrew forces from Iraq by force of the Iraqi resistant groups. It left for Iraq a legacy of devastation, as it immersed the nation in a sectarian conflict which to date has taken lives of tens of thousands of the Iraqis, in addition to looting reserves of one of the world’s oil-richest countries.
At the present time, Washington is attempting to re-enter Iraq through the window of ISIS terror group and under the excuse of backing the Iraqi army and helping the country recapture the city of Mosul. Such a pretext is considered by many Iraqis as an attempt for covert occupation because deployment of US forces to Iraq would need the country’s parliament approval, as the Iraqi government has not so far given any consent for the American forces to be deployed to the country, according to sources of the Iraqi parliament.
The American game cards become obvious as the country spreads chaos in the region of the West Asia, and as Washington weakens the regional countries whether through supporting the terror organizations or supporting those who act against terrorism, namely supporting everybody in the face of everybody. Washington supports an array of regional warring parties against each other. For example it backs ISIS terror group against both the Iraqi and Syrian armies, as it seeks creating gaps between the Iraqi army and the Public Mobilization Forces. It also endorses the Kurds in the face of the Sunni tribes and the Public Mobilization Forces, the tribal forces against the Public Mobilization Forces and ISIS, the so-called Free Syrian Army, Jaysh al-Islam, al-Nusra Front and Ahrar ash-Sham versus the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s forces and the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) along with the Kurdish Democratic Union Party versus the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his government, and vice versa.
The US policy intends to realize Washington’s interests through two major instruments, the goal of which is to push the region into the stage of comprehensive destruction should Washington fails to gain a full control of it. The first instrument is the direct targeting as it was the case with invasion of Iraq and now with targeting the country’s infrastructure under the guise of the US-led international coalition as well as battle against ISIS terror organization. For example, the city of Ramadi was demolished by 80 percent as a result of the US forces’ operations and before that when the city was held by the terror group. Due to a previously-designed plan, the city fell in ruins, just like Japan’s Hiroshima. The destruction was primarily aimed at the civilians, according to an Iraqi field source. The Iraqi flag is not raised on top of any building due to the massive size of destruction caused by the American forces who were targeting the civilians, the same source maintained. “We don’t find any reason for this silence by the Human Rights organizations or by the UN or even by the (Iraqi) government while a large number of the families have lost their lives as a result of the deliberate US’ bombing. They got caught between the rock and the hard place, namely between ISIS and the Americans”, the source added. Why the battles which were fought by the Pubic Mobilization Forces in Baiji, Jurf Al Nasr and Amirli have not left such a devastation? The answer looks easy. Washington seeks undermining of Iraq while the army, the Mobilization forces and the tribes are going to great lengths to protect their country at an expensive price. The second instrument is concerned with targeting Iraq indirectly through backup of the terror groups, as well as fueling the sectarian disputes with the intention of implementing US’ split project which eyes weakening the region’s countries. It is specifically through watching this policy that we can find a delineation for Washington’s paradoxical policy concerning obliteration of the terror group ISIS. While some American circles note that the time has come to put an end to the terror organization, others say that the battle would take several years to end. Both sides are right when it comes to watching through Washington’s viewpoint. Should the Iraqis approve of the US-intended Iraq partition plan, the terror group would exit as quickly as it entered the country by capturing Mosul in 2014, but if they reject the three-regions split plan, the terror organization would not leave Iraq before it keeps holding ground for several years.
The Ramadi experience was highly painful due to the large size of resultant demolition as well as the large numbers of the civilian victims who lost their lives by the US fighter jets’ firepower. This experience must not be repeated in the upcoming battle of Mosul which the Public Mobilization Forces insist to take part in despite the American “veto.” The absence of the popular forces in the oncoming battle would bring the country grave consequences as Washington seeks seizing the triumphs and partitioning the country.
That is how Washington wants to implement Kissinger’s theory of holding the strings of the global problems. This is the same strategy on the basis of which the American Empire was established through destroying lives of 12 million red Indians. Washington is intending to adopt the same strategy this time in West Asia through shedding bloods of hundreds of thousands of Muslims and Arabs.
It can’t last. The U.S. better get ready.
But is it?
In fact, Saudi Arabia is no state at all. There are two ways to describe it: as a political enterprise with a clever but ultimately unsustainable business model, or as an entity so corrupt as to resemble a vertically and horizontally integrated criminal organization. Either way, it can’t last. It’s past time U.S. decision-makers began planning for the collapse of the Saudi kingdom.
In recent conversations with military and other government personnel, we were startled at how startled they seemed at this prospect. Here’s the analysis they should be working through.
Understood one way, the Saudi king is the CEO of a family business that converts oil into payouts that buy political loyalty. They take two forms: cash handouts or commercial concessions for the increasingly numerous scions of the royal clan, and a modicum of public goods and employment opportunities for commoners. The coercive “stick” is supplied by brutal internal-security services lavishly outfitted with American equipment.
The United States has long counted on the ruling family having bottomless coffers of cash with which to rent loyalty. Even accounting for today’s low oil prices, and even as Saudi officials step up arms purchases and military adventures in Yemen and elsewhere, Riyadh is hardly running out of funds.
Still, expanded oil production in the face of such low prices—until the February 16 announcement of a Saudi-Russian output freeze at very high January levels—may reflect an urgent need for revenue as well as other strategic imperatives. Talk of a Saudi Aramco IPO similarly suggests a need for hard currency.
A political market, moreover, functions according to demand as well as supply. What if the price of loyalty rises?
It appears that is just what’s happening. King Salman had to spend lavishly to secure the allegiance of the notables who were pledged to the late King Abdullah. Here’s what played out in two other countries when this kind of inflation hit. In South Sudan, an insatiable elite not only diverted the newly minted country’s oil money to private pockets but also kept up their outsized demands when the money ran out, sparking a descent into chaos. The Somali government enjoys generous donor support, but is priced out of a very competitive political market by a host of other buyers—with ideological, security, or criminal agendas of their own.
Such comparisons may be offensive to Saudi leaders, but they are telling. If the loyalty price index keeps rising, the monarchy could face political insolvency.
Increasingly, Saudi citizens are seeing themselves as just that: citizens, not subjects. In countries as diverse as Nigeria, Ukraine, Brazil, Moldova, and Malaysia, people are contesting criminalized government and impunity for public officials—sometimes violently. In more than half a dozen countries in 2015, populations took to the streets to protest corruption. In three of them, heads of state are either threatened or have had to resign. Elsewhere, the same grievances have contributed to the expansion of jihadist movements or criminal organizations posing as Robin Hoods. Russia and China’s external adventurism can at least partially be explained as an effort to re-channel their publics’ dissatisfaction with the quality of governance.
For the moment, it is largely Saudi Arabia’s Shia minority that is voicing political demands. But the highly educated Sunni majority, with unprecedented exposure to the outside world, is unlikely to stay satisfied forever with a few favors doled out by geriatric rulers impervious to their input. And then there are the “guest workers.” Saudi officials, like those in other Gulf states, seem to think they can exploit an infinite supply of indigents grateful to work, whatever the conditions. But citizens are now heavily outnumbered in their own countries by laborers who may soon begin claiming rights.
For decades, Riyadh has eased pressure by exporting its dissenters—like Osama bin Laden—fomenting extremism across the Muslim world. But that strategy can backfire: Bin Laden’s critique of Saudi corruption has been taken up by others, and it resonates among many Arabs. And King Salman (who is 80, by the way) does not display the dexterity of his half-brother Abdullah. He’s reached for some of the familiar items in the autocrats’ toolbox: executing dissidents, embarking on foreign wars, and whipping up sectarian rivalries to discredit the demands of Saudi Shiites and boost nationalist fervor. Each of these has grave risks.
One is a factional struggle within the royal family, with the price of allegiance bid up beyond anyone’s ability to pay in cash. Another is foreign war. With Saudi Arabia and Iran already confronting each other by proxy in Yemen and Syria, escalation is too easy. U.S. decision-makers should bear that danger in mind as they keep pressing for regional solutions to regional problems. A third scenario is insurrection—either a nonviolent uprising or a jihadi insurgency—a result all too predictable given episodes throughout the region in recent years.
The United States keeps getting caught off-guard when purportedly solid countries come apart. To do better this time, U.S. military and intelligence officials should at the very least, and immediately, run some rigorous planning exercises to test different scenarios and potential actions aimed at reducing codependence and mitigating risk. They should work hard to identify the most likely, and most dangerous, regional outcomes of a Saudi collapse—or the increasingly desperate efforts of its rulers to avoid one. And above all, they should abandon the automatic-pilot thinking that has been guiding U.S. policy to date.
“Hope is not a policy” is a hackneyed phrase. But choosing not to consider alternatives amounts to the same thing.
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