Gulf unity cracks: Bahrain on the frontline

Gulf unity is fraying behind closed doors, and Bahrain has become the front line of a new cold war between Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Hasan Qamber

The Cradle 

As the Persian Gulf's internal balance begins to shift, Bahrain finds itself in an unusually exposed position. Once seen as a minor Gulf ally, its role has evolved into something far more instructive: a barometer of deep, emerging rifts within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). 

The intensified rift between Saudi Arabia and the UAE has started to echo through Manama's political halls, threatening to redefine Bahrain's loyalties, dependencies, and internal stability.

Saudi–Emirati rivalry has migrated inward, converging on the smallest GCC state and exposing the early contours of a more fragmented Gulf future. Bahrain, long a loyal appendage to Saudi-led policy, now sits at the heart of a regional contest for influence.

Imported security, outsourced sovereignty

Bahrain's dependency on external military actors is a structural feature of its statehood. British forces, present since the 19th century, never truly left after the 1971 “east of Suez” withdrawal. Instead, their presence was rebranded and gradually expanded, culminating in the 2018 opening of the UK’s largest West Asian base in Sakhir. This post-Brexit security anchor remains relatively low profile compared to its American counterpart but is vital to Britain's residual regional leverage.

Far more consequential, however, is the presence of the US Fifth Fleet headquartered in Juffair. Officially established in 1995 under a 1991 defense agreement, the base entrenches Bahrain within Washington's maritime security grid. 

It also internationalizes any domestic political crisis by turning Bahrain into a node of US strategic interest. This security outsourcing became particularly salient in 2011, when the 14 February popular protests prompted the intervention of Saudi and Emirati forces under the Peninsula Shield umbrella. It was a defining moment as Bahrain's sovereignty was openly subordinated to the regional priorities of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

A Saudi guarantee is no longer unconditional

That intervention marked a sharp deepening of Bahrain's reliance on Saudi protection. Riyadh's presence in Bahrain functioned as both a deterrent and a guardian, particularly during periods of internal volatility. But more than a decade on, there are signs that this arrangement is shifting.

Reports of the early stages of a Saudi military withdrawal from Bahrain – if confirmed – reflects a deliberate political recalibration. Riyadh is drawing new lines for what it expects in return for its security backing. Citing “secret sources,” the Dark Box reveals that: 

“The decision to pull out troops … came after a breakdown in coordination and trust, driven by what Saudi officials perceived as a Bahraini alignment with Emirati positions that run counter to Saudi interests.”

The era of blank checks has ended, and Manama is being told to prove its alignment. The GCC's image of unity is giving way to a quieter reshuffling of roles, where loyalty now carries a price.

This withdrawal, or even the discussion of it, redefines what was once a patron-client relationship. It challenges the illusion of Gulf unanimity, revealing a system more accurately described as a managed rivalry between two regional heavyweights.

Abu Dhabi moves in

The Saudi–Emirati alliance was always more tactical than strategic. As long as their external agendas aligned – in Yemen, Sudan, or Libya – the appearance of unity held. But as their interests drifted, so did their cohesion. The Gulf is no longer shaped by consensus, but by competitive positioning.

Abu Dhabi has increasingly used its influence to gain footholds across the region, from the Red Sea to the eastern Mediterranean. Bahrain, given its size and fragility, offers an attractive entry point. Unlike Riyadh, Abu Dhabi provides fast, less conditional support. It does not insist on obedience – only access.

This has allowed the UAE to embed itself as a crisis manager and daily problem-solver for Manama, in ways Riyadh often overlooks. But this also leaves Bahrain walking a tightrope, leveraging Abu Dhabi's flexibility while avoiding outright alienation from Saudi Arabia. The kingdom wants room to maneuver, but geography and history keep pulling it back into Riyadh’s orbit.

Bahrain is a relatively small country in terms of population and economy, making it vulnerable to any conflict between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It relies heavily on Saudi support, both through financial rescue programs and oil from the Abu Safa field provided on favorable terms, ensuring a stable source of revenue and leaving its financial and political position fragile in the face of any shifts in the stances of its regional neighbors.

The normalization fault line

One of the clearest arenas of tension is the question of normalization with Israel. While Bahrain and the UAE both signed the Abraham Accords in 2020, the dynamics behind each deal were distinct. Abu Dhabi led the charge, seeking to anchor itself in a US-Israeli security matrix. Bahrain followed, but with far less enthusiasm and against a backdrop of open domestic opposition.

For Riyadh, the issue is not normalization per se but control. Saudi Arabia insists that any Gulf–Israel ties proceed under its leadership. Unilateral moves – especially from a junior partner like Bahrain – are viewed as infringements on Riyadh’s domain. 

From the Saudi perspective, Israeli intelligence or security infrastructure embedded in Manama is not only provocative, it is a breach of the kingdom's vital security perimeter.

This explains why even symbolic talk of a Saudi drawdown from Bahrain carries weight – it is pressure by other means. Riyadh does not need to publicly rebuke Manama. A subtle troop movement sends the same message that Manama’s alignment is being monitored.

The GCC is watching from the sidelines

The GCC was created to ensure security coordination among its members. But today it stands paralyzed, unable to mediate the emerging fractures among its core states. As Saudi Arabia and the UAE compete for influence, the mechanisms of collective Gulf diplomacy have been quietly sidelined.

This leaves smaller states like Bahrain dangerously exposed. They are expected to pick sides in a contest where the rules keep changing, and the referees have left the pitch. The logic of security has been replaced by the logic of leverage.

The most likely scenario is not an explosion but a slow grind. Trust, unity, and predictability are being eroded. What emerges in their place is a multi-polar Gulf, fractured by overlapping ambitions and cloaked in silence.

The Bahrain test case

Bahrain will not trigger this unraveling. But it may well be the first to pay the price. If current trends hold, the kingdom risks becoming collateral damage in a larger realignment. It cannot declare loyalty to both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi indefinitely. Sooner or later, the cost of ambiguity will become unbearable.

In an interview with The Cradle, Bahraini opposition figure Ali al-Faiz says that Bahrain is an integral part of the Islamic and Arab nation, deeply rooted in the Gulf with a long history and a clear identity. He notes that his ancestors struggled for sovereignty, rejected foreign domination, and defended Islamic and Arab causes, and that Bahrain existed as a civilization long before modern “states” created by imperial powers, which now control the country through a client regime dependent on external approval. 

He adds that the regime’s political maneuvers represent only itself, relying on regional and international backing, and sees alignment with Zionist powers as essential for its survival at a time when geographic, political, economic, security, cultural, and religious maps are being redrawn. This approach shapes its relationships across multiple levels and drives its security, military, political, media, and economic actions, reflecting a stage that Faiz calls existential – where the world is changing, and the regime embraces a Zionist political identity to maintain tribal authority and protect family interests.

Bahrain's challenge is that it needs not just a sponsor, but a daily manager. The Saudis offer the former. The Emiratis, increasingly, the latter. Yet only one of them has the historical claim to Bahrain's security core. 

This tension – between tactical support and strategic protection – is what makes Manama such a fragile front in the Gulf's cold war.

In the end, Bahrain's predicament reflects a deeper shift in Gulf politics. Alliances are no longer inherited. They are negotiated, often in silence, and always at a price.