The collapse of the global order will not begin with a war in Asia but with the realization that rules no longer bind the strong and alliances no longer oblige the powerful. At Davos, European and Canadian leaders did not merely criticize US policy; they questioned the durability of the postwar system itself.
Salman Rafi Sheikh
The World Order Is Breaking
When Western leaders usually gather in Davos, they use the ritual to reaffirm neoliberal faith in cooperation, markets, and multilateral institutions. This year, the mood and the intent were different. Instead of confidence in the rules-based order, speeches from European and Canadian leaders conveyed unease about its durability. What stood out was not simply concern about the US policy choices but the recognition that the post–Second World War order is collapsing from within. As it stands, the US has also withdrawn from the World Health Organisation (WHO).
Asian states recognise that no single power can guarantee stability, yet none can be ignored
The post-1945 international system rested on a bargain. The US provided security guarantees and promised to uphold open markets, while its allies accepted American leadership and institutional constraints. This arrangement was never altruistic, but it produced predictability. Even when power was uneven, it was mediated through rules, alliances, and shared procedures. Although these rules were made in the West, the fact that even this bargain is now under strain shows the magnitude of the collapse. At the World Economic Forum in Davos, Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney warned that the global governance system faces a “rupture” rather than a smooth transition, and argued that middle powers must play a more active role in stabilizing international politics. French officials echoed similar concerns, emphasizing the need for European strategic autonomy in response to Washington’s growing unpredictability.
This is precisely because the US has increasingly blurred the line between alliance management and coercion. The episode unsettled European capitals and raised concerns within international financial institutions. The International Monetary Fund, a key institution managing the neo-liberal economic order, has warned that escalating trade disputes and geopolitical tensions could undermine global growth and financial stability.
China, meanwhile, has kept its distance from the Greenland issue itself, but not from its broader implications. Instead, it has chosen to send a familiar message: that Europe should reduce its reliance on US security guarantees and pursue greater strategic autonomy. China’s message is not rhetorical but strategic. It has implications not only for what happens in Europe but also for what might transpire in the Asian region that is watching the unravelling of the ‘old’ global order with a lot of tension.
Asia’s Exposure in a Power-Centric World
In 2024, Asia accounted for nearly 60 per cent of global growth . Even though it had little say in designing the global order, its rising trade share shows that it benefited from it. On the one hand, the US security guarantees—especially in the post-Cold War era—reduced the likelihood of interstate war, while open markets enabled export-led growth across Japan, South Korea, Southeast Asia, and later China. That framework helped suppress regional rivalries without necessarily resolving them. As the system weakens, however, Asia is uniquely exposed. Unlike Europe, it lacks dense institutional mechanisms capable of absorbing shocks when great-power commitments falter. The result is not immediate chaos, but rising uncertainty.
In the context of American policy becoming openly—and aggressively—transactional, US allies in the region are reassessing assumptions once taken for granted. Japan and South Korea are expanding defence capabilities. Southeast Asian states are diversifying security partnerships. Australia is deepening regional ties while maintaining its alliance with Washington. These shifts reflect strategic hedging rather than wholesale realignment.
Economic fragmentation compounds the problem. Asia’s integration into global supply chains depended on openness and predictability. That premise is eroding as trade policy and sanctions are increasingly weaponized. For Asia, this does not mean deglobalization but regionalization and aggressive nationalization of trade and economics without strong rule enforcement and/or a willingness to follow the set rules.
While there might be little denying that the breakdown of the US-led order is inevitably a good riddance insofar as it puts Asian economies in a position to rewrite the rules of the game, the problem for Asia lies precisely in its ability to quickly –and decisively—fill the vacuum. What we are witnessing is probably a decisive turn towards multipolarity. China, unlike the US, does not appear to have imperial ambitions to unilaterally rule the world. For Beijing, a multipolar order works best. Asian economies, therefore, must respond accordingly.
Asia’s Response: Managing Disorder
Asia is unlikely to respond to the collapse of the old order with open resistance. Instead, it is adapting quietly. Expectations of the US leadership are already being lowered. Partnerships are being diversified rather than replaced. Flexibility, not alignment, is becoming the dominant strategy. This is structural realism, not ideological drift. Asian states recognise that no single power can guarantee stability, yet none can be ignored. Strategic hedging offers autonomy without provocation.
Still, managed disorder is not cost-free. Without stronger regional institutions, crisis management will rely increasingly on ad hoc diplomacy and bilateral bargaining, raising uncertainty amidst the risk of escalation. Strengthening regional forums, deepening economic cooperation beyond trade, and developing shared norms in technology and climate governance are no longer optional. This, in simple words, means Asia coming together to rewrite the rules of the game, both for its internal and external trade relations.
The post–Second World War order is not collapsing because it is being replaced by a coherent alternative. It is collapsing because its core sponsor is abandoning its own rules. Asia did not design that order, but it thrived within it. Now it must navigate a world where power is more visible, rules are thinner, and stability must be actively managed rather than assumed. What emerges next will not be decided in Davos alone. It will be shaped by how Asian states respond to uncertainty — whether they treat it as an invitation to rivalry, or as an opportunity to build a more resilient, even if less idealized, regional and global order.
Salman Rafi Sheikh, research analyst of International Relations and Pakistan’s foreign and domestic affairs
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