How “Israel” Failed to Push Hezbollah Out of Lebanon’s Power Equation

Ali Haidar

Al-Akhbar Newspaper

Since the end of the most recent war and the consolidation of the ceasefire, “Israel” has sought to impose a new equation aimed at removing Hezbollah from two fundamental arenas: the internal Lebanese equation and the equation of confrontation with “Israel”. This was clearly reflected in its inability to convert its tactical and operational achievements into a decisive strategic victory. As a result, it turned to a strategy based on accumulating gains in the post-war phase, hoping—through direct US support—to ultimately decide the battle from within Lebanon itself, with the internal arena completing what the enemy could not.

However, the fundamental question that imposes itself, away from wishes and propagandistic descriptions, is this: why did those military and operational achievements fail to translate into political and strategic resolution? And why did Hezbollah remain a key player in the internal equation and a force preventing resolution in the confrontation with “Israel”?

Achievements Without Resolution

The answer must begin with the results of the war itself, then deconstructing what followed. It is true that the enemy achieved intelligence and operational gains, but the resistance, in turn, succeeded in regaining the initiative during the war. Since October, it adopted a gradual and carefully calibrated escalation in its responses, reaching its peak on the “Missile Sunday.” It managed to prevent the enemy from occupying the area south of the Litani River and maintained its resilience and cohesion despite the enormous sacrifices it made.

All of this prevented the enemy from turning severe blows into an agreement that would entrench its ambitions on the Lebanese scene. Here, precisely, failure began: the ceasefire agreement contained no provisions obligating the resistance to dismantle or disarm itself, or to relinquish its defensive role.

In parallel, forces hostile to the resistance inside Lebanon launched a political and media campaign to market the claim that the agreement granted “Israel” legitimacy to continue its aggression and entrenched the resistance’s acceptance of dismantling its weapons. Yet this narrative collides, first and foremost, with the very text of the agreement. More importantly, had the agreement actually included such terms, “Israel” would not have needed to conclude a side understanding with the United States.

Thus, “Israel” did not sign an agreement that closed the conflict on its own terms, nor did it fundamentally change the rules of the game. Instead, it found itself facing a fragile ceasefire that carried an implicit acknowledgment that force—no matter how intense—was insufficient to achieve resolution. In other words, “Israel” succeeded in inflicting harm, but failed to bring matters to an end. This difference is neither minor nor technical; it is a fundamental distinction between a tactical–operational achievement and a comprehensive strategic failure.

Failure to Erase the Resistance from the Equation

After failing to achieve military resolution, the “Israeli” bet shifted toward attempting to transform weakening into an accumulative process that would erase Hezbollah from the equation, or at least neutralize it. But this wager ran up against a basic reality: achieving such a goal requires one of two outcomes—either an internal collapse in the adversary’s structure, or the imposition of a new reality that renders it incapable of continuing. Neither occurred. Hezbollah’s structure did not disintegrate, it did not lose cohesion, it did not abandon its strategic choices, nor was it compelled to hand over its weapons or relinquish its defensive role.

More importantly, the party succeeded in preventing its opponents from exploiting the results of the war and regional shifts in a way that would grant “Israel” what it failed to achieve militarily. Instead of the phase becoming a moment for an internal pounce, it ended in a state of stalemate, in which everyone recognizes that the cost of attempting erasure exceeds any party’s capacity to bear it. Here lies one of the keys to “Israeli” failure: the inability to convert military superiority into an executable political opportunity.

Domestically, “Israel”—along with the United States—bet that the results of the war would produce a strategic shift leading the Lebanese state to disarm the resistance. Yet this reading ignored the decisive difference between making a decision and being able to implement it within the existing internal equation. Such a decision collides with structural constraints that are difficult to overcome: the failure to defeat the resistance, the continued popular support around it, the unity of resistance forces around their choices, and the nature of the Lebanese system itself, which is built on delicate internal balances that restrain any attempt at coercive imposition.

In this context, Hezbollah did not need to use force to prevent the implementation of such a decision. The solid unity of the core national duo formed the foundation that made political messaging and popular backing sufficient to achieve internal deterrence. Thus, the Lebanese state came to realize that attempting to impose a decision embodying “Israel’s” interests and ambitions by force could explode the country, and that failure to implement it would be less costly than confrontation. Here again, “Israel’s” bets failed.

Management Instead of Collapse

One of the most prominent elements of the anti-resistance narrative has been the attempt to promote the idea that the resistance’s abstention from responding to strikes signifies a loss of legitimacy and popular support. This approach overlooks the fact that responsibility for protecting sovereignty and preventing aggression lies, first and foremost, with the state, and that the resistance’s historical role in filling the vacuum left by the absence of the state neither negates nor cancels this principle.

Moreover, a decline in the level of deterrence does not necessarily mean the loss of defensive capability in the face of any potential occupation. Hezbollah’s restraint is the result of cost–benefit calculations in the broad strategic sense, not the outcome of incapacity or collapse.

Thus, a strained equation takes shape: “Israel” strikes without a decisive horizon, while Hezbollah, for now, is keen to avoid comprehensive escalation, managing the scene through a calculated approach based on adherence to fundamentals, maintaining relative deterrence, safeguarding internal stability, refusing to retreat under pressure and attrition, and simultaneously continuing recovery and reconstruction.

The U.S. administration, like “Israel”, has collided with an internal reality that cannot be bypassed, as the equations and balances of power in Lebanon have limited its range of options. The coming phase may witness an escalation in field pressure or political intimidation as part of exhausting diplomatic options before any decisive decision is reached. However, building on such indicators remains premature so long as the balance of power has not fundamentally changed.

Likewise, “Israeli” planners bet that the scale of destruction and losses would lead to a reversal within Hezbollah’s support base. What occurred, however, was far more complex. Yes, there is fatigue, anger, and criticism, but this has not turned into a collective rejection of the resistance option. The environment, despite its exhaustion, sees no alternative capable of protecting it or filling the vacuum, and understands that abandoning the resistance would mean risking Lebanon and its own very existence.

Here lies yet another failure: “Israel” succeeded in inflicting pain on the environment, but failed to break the bond between it and the resistance, or to produce an alternative political and social environment capable of playing the same role.

In sum, “Israel’s” failure to remove Hezbollah from the equation does not stem from a lack of force or weak tools, but from a misreading of the nature of the adversary it faces. It failed to grasp that this adversary embodies the will of a people, possesses a cohesive structure based on human resilience rather than mere institutions, and represents a defensive choice that has accumulated historical and strategic achievements over decades of conflict. This failure revealed an equation whereby military power, no matter how great, is insufficient on its own to erase the will of a people determined to defend its existence and future.

Thus, Hezbollah was not removed from the equation; rather, it succeeded in preventing its adversaries from achieving resolution and victory. In conflicts of this kind, preventing resolution is itself a strategic achievement, because it turns the adversary’s superiority into a predicament and produces equations that, to this day, remain resistant to erasure.