by Zayd Alisa
While Iraq’s Prime Minister Mohammed al-Sudani—whose coalition, Construction and Development, came first in the fiercely contested elections—scrambled to attribute the surge in turnout to his government’s accomplishments (which is partially correct), in reality there were other factors at play.
First, with al-Sadr out of the way, the various components of the Coordination Framework (CF)—an alliance of Shia pro-Iran parties and political representatives of armed groups—swiftly moved to contest the elections separately, thus attracting a wider range of voters.
Second, with Sudani turning his back on the CF—which nominated him in 2022 to the premiership—by defiantly forming his own coalition and vying for a second term, CF heavyweights such as Nouri al-Maliki, head of State of Law (SOL), and Hadi al-Amiri, head of the Badr Organisation, joined the fray, reviving interest among voters.
Third, the outrageous atrocities that took place in Syria after the overthrow of the Assad regime—particularly against the Alawites and Druze minorities—coupled with stark sectarian threats against the Shia in Iraq, served as a wake-up call to the Shia heartland.
Fourth, as ever, Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish leaders deliberately stoked sectarian and ethnic tension in order to serve as a rallying cry, sparking more voter interest.
Fifth, the failure of Sunni and Kurdish leaders to embrace al-Sadr’s call to turn the boycott of elections into a tool for combating corruption not only called into question the viability of the boycott but also empowered CF leaders to depict it as a weapon specifically designed to discourage Shia voters.
Sixth, Trump’s envoy to Iraq, Mark Savaya—appointed on 19 October—has been working tirelessly not only to deter Shia voters from supporting pro-Iran blocs but also to brazenly influence the process of forming the next government. He has repeatedly made thinly veiled threats of imposing crippling sanctions. While praising Sudani for what he called guiding the country in the right direction, Savaya nevertheless underlined that the US expects the new Iraqi government to free Iraq from what he termed “malign external interference, including from Iran and its proxies.” His comments reflected Trump’s overriding policy priorities: ending Iraq’s energy-sector dependency on Iran and disentangling Iraq’s economy from Iran.
Apparently, such threats have backfired, as Iraqi voters increasingly perceived them as flagrant interference in Iraq’s sovereignty.
In the eyes of Trump, all his policy objectives in Iraq are unachievable without curbing Iranian influence, which has long been inextricably linked to the Popular Mobilisation Forces (PMF)—a government-controlled alliance of predominantly Shia, Iran-backed armed groups formed in response to Grand Ayatollah al-Sistani’s 2014 call to fight Daesh. Unsurprisingly, Trump’s principal focus has centred on aggressively pushing the Iraqi government to take practical steps to weaken the PMF.
Trump used the Gaza peace summit held in Sharm El-Sheikh on 13 October to send Baghdad—through Sudani—a stark message: “Iraq has so much oil they don’t know what to do with it,” calling it a “big problem.”
Trump ushered in his second term by undertaking a trip on 13 May to Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE, during which he boasted about gaining $5 trillion while also stressing—from Doha—that “Iran should seriously thank the Emir of Qatar, because there are others who want us to deal a hard blow to Iran, unlike Qatar.” This clearly indicated that both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have pressed Trump to target Iran. Both Trump and Mohammed bin Salman (MBS)—Saudi Arabia’s de-facto ruler—are convinced that the Iran-led alliance has already been significantly weakened following the Israel–Iran direct confrontation, the overthrow of Assad’s regime in Syria, and Israel’s relentless attacks against Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza, and the Houthis in Yemen.
As such, they have worked frantically to tighten the screw on the PMF, which has so far been spared any targeting despite participating in the strikes against Israel. Even though Sudani has sought to take credit for that, in reality this has largely been due to Trump’s profound fear that taking on the PMF would destabilise Iraq and lead to an uncontainable surge in oil prices.
Sudani has turned a blind eye to Trump and MBS’s growing alarm that no serious measures have been taken against the PMF. As a result, MBS sought to turn the tables on Sudani by dispatching, on 17 May, a low-level delegation to the Arab League Summit hosted in Baghdad, thereby sabotaging Sudani’s efforts to portray himself as an indispensable Arab leader.
As part of Trump’s campaign to intensify pressure on the PMF, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio successfully compelled the Iraqi government and parliament to ditch plans to pass a new PMF Commission Law, arguing that passing the legislation would bolster Iranian influence. Rubio followed that up in October 2025 by reminding Sudani of the “urgency of disarming Iran-backed militias that undermine Iraq’s sovereignty.”
With the voting over, the political wrangling between the blocs begins. Although Sudani’s bloc secured the largest number of seats—46—it has fallen woefully short of the overwhelming victory needed to avoid protracted and arduous negotiations to form a new government, let alone ensure a second term. Previous government-formation cycles have demonstrated that neither the number of seats won nor participation levels determine who becomes prime minister.
In Iraq’s power-sharing system, positions are distributed according to sectarian and ethnic backgrounds. The Shia nominate the prime minister, the Sunnis the Speaker of Parliament, and the Kurds the President. The toughest challenge is electing the President—requiring 220 votes—who then invites the largest bloc’s nominee to form the government.
To clinch the premiership requires surmounting four hurdles:
First, it is inconceivable to become prime minister without the ringing endorsement of the CF. Al-Sadr, who had 73 seats in 2021, attempted to circumvent the CF by forging an alliance with the largest Sunni and Kurdish blocs while marginalising his Shia rivals in the CF, but he spectacularly failed.
As anticipated, the CF components are expected to unify to form the largest bloc in parliament, paving the way for their nominee to become prime minister. The CF has vehemently opposed Sudani’s second-term bid, accusing him of consolidating power and marginalising them.
Second, the US has shown that it has the capability to block the candidacy of any prime minister who shifts the balance of power in Iran’s favour. Sudani has tried his utmost to placate CF opposition by highlighting that he is best placed to shore up the CF and safeguard the political process due to his credible relationship with Savaya.
Third, it is doubtless that Iran is hell-bent on entrenching its influence in Iraq despite being on the back foot elsewhere in the region. It has not shied away from vetoing the candidacy of any prime minister who imperils its interests.
Fourth, the Shia highest religious authority has rarely intervened in the selection of a prime minister, but when it does, its decision is decisive.
Against this backdrop, Iraq’s new prime minister must strike a delicate balance between US–Iran conflicting interests.
As things stand, Sudani’s prospects of securing a second term are incredibly limited—unless he can persuade Trump that US interests are better served by adopting a flexible rather than confrontational approach, instead of subverting Iraq’s elections by coercing Baghdad into the US–Saudi orbit away from Tehran. Clearly, such a scenario is far-fetched.
On that basis, Sudani had no option but to rejoin the CF on 18 October, making it highly likely that his bloc—consisting of seven incohesive groups—will unravel.
The CF’s unmistakable message to any prospective prime minister is clear:
“We are the kingmakers—and the kingbreakers.”
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