Elijah J. Magnier
Elijah J. Magnier
This analysis examines the potential consequences of increased US and Iranian involvement, particularly for key regional players such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Russia. The role of these actors will be crucial in determining whether the region descends into more significant conflict or navigates towards precarious stability.
US involvement
If the US were to increase its involvement in the region by openly supporting Israel’s attacks on Iran, it would likely begin by increasing its military presence at its many military bases throughout the West Asia region. This could include the deployment of additional troops, aircraft carriers and military hardware to its bases in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, Iraq and the UAE. The US would also increase its support for Israel, including intelligence sharing, military aid and increased missile defence systems.
Washington could also escalate its campaign against Iranian allies, launching air strikes against resistance positions in Iraq, Syria and Yemen, where Iran has cultivated considerable influence and robust allies.
In parallel with these military efforts, the US could expand its already maximum sanctions against Iran and groups such as Hizbullah in an attempt to isolate Tehran further financially and diplomatically. Increased sanctions could also target Iran’s oil exports, hoping to limit its ability to finance its regional operations. In addition, the US would likely increase diplomatic pressure on European allies and other international actors to curtail their dealings with Iran to create a united front against Tehran’s regional ambitions.
Iranian escalation
In response to escalated US involvement, Iran would likely rely heavily on its military capabilities while also drawing on the support of its allied forces across West Asia. These allies, which include Hizbullah in Lebanon, Ansar Allah in Yemen and various resistance groups in Iraq and Syria, would play a central role in Iran’s strategy of asymmetric warfare.
Iran has demonstrated its ability to engage in direct conflict with US forces and its strategic ally Israel, and is capable of launching missile and drone attacks against US military installations and assets, as well as the bases of US allies throughout the region.
In addition, cyber attacks would be a central element of Iran’s strategy, as Tehran has demonstrated increasing sophistication in disrupting critical infrastructure, including financial institutions and energy facilities, through advanced cyber operations. Iran’s control of the Strait of Hormuz, a vital waterway for global oil shipments, would provide another key leverage point. Tehran could threaten to disrupt maritime traffic through the strait, a threat that would become more significant if tensions escalate. In addition, Iran's allies control the Red Sea (Ansar Allah) and the Mediterranean (Hizbullah), giving them the ability to disrupt global economic activity in the event of an attack on Iran.
Could Yemen target Aramco facilities again?
Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s state-owned oil giant, symbolises Saudi Arabia’s economic strength and a crucial element of global energy supply. The September 2019 attacks on Aramco facilities, attributed to Ansar Allah in Yemen, exposed the vulnerability of these facilities to ballistic missile and drone attacks. Given this precedent, it is conceivable that Aramco could be targeted again in the event of escalation, especially if Saudi Arabia allows the US to use its airspace and military bases.
But while another large-scale attack on Saudi oil infrastructure would send shockwaves through global markets, Iran may seek to dissuade Ansar Allah from launching a similar attack. The economic impact of disrupting oil production could hurt Saudi Arabia and Iran, whose economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports despite international sanctions. Moreover, such an attack could alienate European countries and other global powers seeking a diplomatic solution to the conflict.
So, while Aramco remains a tempting target, Tehran may prefer its allies to use alternative tactics and avoid the risk of provoking an all-out confrontation that could severely disrupt the global economy.
Would the UAE and Saudi Arabia support Israel and the US?
Saudi Arabia and the UAE have longstanding military ties with the United States, but their relationship with Israel is more deeply rooted. Although both Gulf states, and the UAE in particular, have taken steps to normalise relations with Israel—most notably through the Abraham Accords—their public support for Israel remains constrained by domestic and regional political sensitivities.
If the conflict between the US and Iran escalates, Saudi Arabia would likely be reluctant to offer overt support to the US and Israel in terms of intelligence sharing, logistical support or the use of its airspace.
Riyadh would be particularly wary of publicly siding with Israel, given the potential backlash from its population and other regional actors. Saudi de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) has preferred a more pragmatic foreign policy, which would likely extend to discreet support for US and Israeli actions against Iran rather than open cooperation.
Moreover, MbS has deliberately avoided overt normalisation with Israel, particularly in light of the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, including Israel’s refusal to engage in a two-state solution seriously. These issues have made public alignment with Israel more politically sensitive, further complicating Saudi Arabia’s position in the event of an escalated conflict with Iran.
The UAE, on the other hand, has been more open in its relations with Israel. Since the signing of the Abraham Accords, Abu Dhabi has developed closer economic, military, and commercial ties with Tel Aviv. This would likely allow US forces to use its territory as a base for operations against Iran. The UAE could also contribute to a coordinated air defence system with Israel and the US to counter missile threats from Iran and its allies.
Despite their alliances, Saudi Arabia and the UAE would seek to avoid direct involvement in a protracted conflict. Their primary concern would be to maintain regional stability and protect their economic interests, particularly their oil infrastructure and trade routes.
Russia’s role
Russia occupies a unique position in the Middle East, with close ties to both Iran and Israel. Moscow’s main interest in the region is Syria, where it has supported the Syrian government militarily and diplomatically. Although Russia has historically sided with Iran in various regional conflicts, it has also worked to maintain its relationship with Israel, particularly concerning military coordination in Syria.
In the event of an escalating conflict between the US and Iran, Russia would likely adopt a position of cautious neutrality. While Moscow might provide diplomatic cover for Iran at the United Nations or other international forums, it is unlikely to become directly involved in the conflict. Russia’s military resources are already stretched by the ongoing war in Ukraine, which limits its ability to project power elsewhere.
Moreover, Russia has no interest in seeing West Asia further destabilised, as this could jeopardise its strategic interests in Syria and undermine its influence in the region. Moscow would likely work behind the scenes to mediate between the parties, seeking to de-escalate the situation while protecting its own regional interests.
The shape of escalation
If the US and Iran were to increase their involvement in the ongoing regional conflict, West Asia could face a period of severe instability. The US would likely increase its military and economic pressure on Iran, while Iran would launch direct and asymmetric attacks against US and allied forces and their interests. While supporting the US behind closed doors, Saudi Arabia and the UAE would tread carefully to avoid provoking domestic unrest or damaging their regional reputations.
Russia, caught between its alliances with Iran and Israel, would try to walk a tightrope, providing diplomatic support to Tehran while avoiding direct military involvement. Ultimately, the key risk in this scenario is the potential for miscalculation, where a single attack or misstep could lead to a wider regional war involving multiple actors. Oil facilities such as Saudi Aramco remain vulnerable targets, and any disruption to global energy supplies would have far-reaching consequences.
(Elijah J. Magnier is a veteran war correspondent and a senior political risk analyst with 37 years of experience covering West Asia)
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