These high-risk provocations have not only invited promises of retaliation from the Axis of Resistance but have also led to increasing calls within the Islamic Republic to reconsider its decades-old nuclear posture. While Tehran may feel compelled to revise its nuclear strategy, such a move would come with significant risks of its own and potential consequences.
For years, Iran’s nuclear policy has been framed by a fatwa, or religious edict, issued by the Rahbar, Imam Seyyed Ali Khamenei. It explicitly prohibits the development and use of nuclear weapons.
Yet despite reportedly never having been written down, he has repeated that their production, stockpiling and usage are un-Islamic. He has also maintained that it is the armed resistance that will liberate Palestine. In a 2014 statement, Imam Khamanei declared:
“Atomic weapons can only destroy people and lands. What destroys regimes is the power of resistance and the determination and struggle of nations; That this determination and struggle exists in Palestine and by God’s grace it will definitely lead to the overthrow of the zionist regime.”
Nevertheless, this ruling has been a cornerstone of Iran’s diplomatic stance, serving as a moral and religious argument against accusations that Tehran seeks to develop a nuclear arsenal. The fatwa has been cited repeatedly by Iranian officials to reassure both regional and international actors of their peaceful intentions.
Iranian officials have previously hinted at a possible revision to the nuclear doctrine, such as in 2021, because of continued US sanctions. However, more recent statements from Iranian defence officials suggest a serious reconsideration of this policy. This may be interpreted to mean that the door to a nuclear weapons programme is not entirely closed.
One notable example was after Iran’s retaliatory drone and missile strikes on the occupation state in April, in response to the terrorist attack on its consulate in Damascus. Ahmad Haghtalab, an Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander in charge of nuclear security, was quoted as saying: “It is possible to revise our nuclear doctrine and deviate from our previous considerations.”
A month later, Kamal Kharrazi, an adviser to Imam Khamenei stressed: “We have no decision to build a nuclear bomb but should Iran’s existence be threatened, there will be no choice but to change our military doctrine.”
While Majlis member Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani, said he believed that Iran’s decision to risk attacking the occupation state in April was due to the country already being in possession of nuclear weapons.
This might seem contradictory to the “fatwa” at first glance, yet from both a pragmatic and even a jurisprudential perspective, it is plausible for the ruling to be revised in light of current realities and threats to the Islamic Republic.
Earlier this year in an interview with Al Mayadeen, former Iranian diplomat Amir Mousavi stated, “A fatwa is not permanent, according to Ja‘fari Shia jurisprudence. A fatwa is issued in accordance with developing circumstances.”
“Therefore, I believe that if the Americans and zionists act in a dangerous manner, the fatwa might be changed,” he added.
At the heart of this debate is the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the nuclear deal agreed upon in 2015 between Iran and the P5+1 countries (the US, UK, France, Russia, China, and Germany). The European Union was also present in the talks.
The JCPOA was hailed as a diplomatic breakthrough that sought to limit Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for sanctions relief. However, the deal has been on life support since 2018, when the Trump regime unilaterally withdrew from it and re-imposed severe sanctions on Iran.
His successor, the Joe Biden regime, initially expressed interest in reviving the JCPOA but negotiations have stalled. This is primarily due to mutual distrust and refusal of the US to give firm commitments not to violate the agreement again.
Recent events have only heightened Iran’s security concerns, particularly as the US-backed, nuclear-armed occupation army has stepped up attacks on Lebanon, fuelling the prospects of a region-wide war.
Moreover, the brazen assassination of Haniyeh on Iranian soil is a direct provocation that cannot go unanswered. As such it has exacerbated pre-existing calls within Iran’s defence establishment for a more robust nuclear strategy as a deterrence measure.
The debate over whether Iran should revise its nuclear strategy is both complex and multifaceted. The current strategy, anchored in Imam Khamenei’s fatwa and the framework of the JCPOA, has allowed Iran to maintain a degree of international legitimacy and moral high ground.
By adhering to a non-nuclear stance, Iran has positioned itself as a victim of western aggression and Israeli provocations, a narrative that resonates well with many of its regional allies and the broader international community.
However, escalations and the worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza—marked by genocidal zionist policies and the apparent collapse of the nuclear deal—may compel Iran to reconsider its approach.
As a rational state acting in self-interest, the argument for revising Iran’s nuclear strategy is primarily rooted in deterrence. A more assertive nuclear posture, namely the threat of developing nuclear weapons, or at least the capability to do so, could serve as a powerful deterrent against further Israeli aggression and US pressure.
This path, however, is fraught with risks. Any move toward developing nuclear weapons would likely trigger a severe international backlash, including harsher economic sanctions. It could potentially lead to even military action, although an unlikely scenario given the repercussions against US interests in the region.
Additionally, such a move could provoke a nuclear arms race in the region, with Saudi Arabia having previously stated its willingness to develop nuclear weapons of its own in such a scenario.
While maintaining diplomatic channels open remains important, the Islamic Republic must be prepared to adjust its policies to address evolving threats and secure its national interests. In this context, a revised nuclear strategy could be seen as a necessary measure to safeguard Iran’s security and promote stability in the region.
Growing rhetoric from Tel Aviv to go down this brinkmanship-prone path is also all the more pertinent.
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