Iran’s upcoming presidential poll will be pivotal in determining Tehran’s foreign policy trajectory, with candidates proposing different strategies for global engagement, nuclear negotiations, and economic diplomacy while maintaining core policies like the ‘look east’ approach and neighborhood de-escalation.
The Cradle
Past presidents and foreign policies
Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (1989–1997) focused on post-war reconstruction, improving relations with Arab and other neighboring countries, and oversaw the “Critical Dialogue” with the EU. His conservative yet moderate approach aimed to stabilize Iran after the devastating Iran–Iraq war, promoting economic development and regional cooperation.
Following Rafsanjani, reformist president Mohammad Khatami (1997–2005) took the helm, aiming to open up Iran politically and socially and reduce tensions with Europe and the US through his “dialogue among civilizations” initiative. His tenure saw a more liberal domestic policy and efforts to engage the west diplomatically.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad (2005–2013) was the polar opposite of Khatami in the foreign policy realm. Insistent on Iran’s sovereign right to enrich uranium, his presidency was marked by heightened confrontation with the west. Ahmadinejad’s presidency led to UN Security Council sanctions and saw the beginnings of a strategic pivot toward Russia and China with the “look east” policy, moving away from western engagement.
When Hassan Rouhani (2013–2021) was elected president, Iran’s domestic and foreign policy shifted yet again, tending toward social and political liberalism – although not to the extent of Khatami – and espousing “Constructive Interaction,” a policy that sought to balance eastern and western powers. One outcome of this approach was the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the cancellation of sanctions by the UN Security Council.
This deal, which became Rouhani’s foundational foreign policy, failed, however, with the Trump administration’s 2018 unilateral withdrawal, leaving Iran to once again face oppressive US sanctions and economic challenges.
The late Ebrahim Raisi (2021–2024) consolidated Iran’s look east policy, strengthening ties with China and Russia, joining strategic Global South organizations like the BRICS and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and expanding the trade of energy and other exports into new markets, paid for in alternative, non-western currencies.
Raisi’s administration maintained a hardline stance against the west – despite ongoing, occasional nuclear negotiations – launched direct military confrontations with Israel, expanded military exports to like-minded states, and transformed Iran into a lynchpin of emerging multipolarity.
So, despite the Supreme Leader’s centrality in strategic affairs, consecutive Iranian administrations have not maintained a consistent foreign policy discourse since 1989. But “Red Lines” in Iran’s foreign policy, such as the non-recognition of Israel, the non-normalization of relations with the US, and support for the region’s Resistance Axis, have remained constant. Nonetheless, strategies and emphases have varied significantly between conservative and reformist governments.
The 2024 candidates…
Among the six candidates in the upcoming early presidential election, three frontrunners have emerged: Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, Saeed Jalili, and Masoud Pezeshkian.
Ghalibaf, a conservative and former Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) commander, currently serves as speaker of Iran’s parliament, which has helped him foster relationships across the aisle and represents a traditional conservative faction close to that of the Raisi administration. Ghalibaf will likely continue his predecessor’s look east policy, fostering closer ties with Beijing and Moscow and the Eurasian vision they all share.
On the nuclear issue, he is expected to maintain the status quo, leveraging China and Russia’s support to avoid further UN sanctions. In regional diplomacy, Ghalibaf will also likely continue economic diplomacy and de-escalation with neighboring Arab countries.
Saeed Jalili, a hardline conservative, previously served as secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and is known for his firm stances within the “Front of Islamic Revolution Stability.” Jalili is likely to adopt a less flexible stance on the nuclear issue, which may potentially heighten tensions with the west.
During his tenure as Tehran’s top nuclear negotiator, the UNSC imposed several sanctions on Iran, and his administration could see a return to such international pressures. Jalili will likely emphasize strengthening ties with Russia and China, continuing Raisi’s legacy but with a more intolerant approach towards western interactions. Like Khamenei, he views the west as non-deal compliant, and the US exit from the JCPOA provided ample evidence of this for both conservatives and Iranians in general.
Masoud Pezeshkian, a reformist and current member of parliament, advocates for a balanced foreign policy in interactions between east and west, a view supported by former diplomats like Javad Zarif. Pezeshkian is expected to revive former President Hassan Rouhani’s “Constructive Interaction” policy and aim to re-engage with the US and the EU by trying to jumpstart stale JCPOA negotiations to lift sanctions to alleviate Tehran’s economic challenges. In regional diplomacy, Pezeshkian will probably continue the de-escalation with Arab countries while seeking to balance ties with Russia, China, and the west.
Notably, the potential return of Donald Trump to the US presidency could significantly escalate tensions between Tehran and Washington, impacting all candidates’ policies. Reformist candidates like Pezeshkian may then face significant challenges in pursuing diplomatic engagements, whereas conservatives like Qalibaf and Jalili may adopt more defiant stances.
Consistencies in Iran’s foreign policy
Despite differences in approaches, some elements of Iran’s foreign policy will likely remain constant across different administrations. The look east policy, emphasizing strategic and long-term relations with Russia and China, is expected to continue as it has already paid dividends.
The neighborhood policy, improving ties with neighboring Arab countries, and economic diplomacy, which involves bypassing the dollar in international settlements and advancing ties with the SCO, BRICS, and the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), will also likely persist.
For Ghalibaf and Jalili, relations with Russia and China are expected to remain strong, reassuring these allies of continuity. The former may maintain the current approach to the nuclear issue, while the latter may adopt a more hardline stance. Both are likely to continue current policies towards Arab countries and deprioritize normalizing relations with the west.
Pezeshkian, on the other hand, is likely to pursue improving relations with both eastern and western powers. He is expected to prioritize nuclear negotiations and sanctions relief despite potential resistance from conservative elements within Iran’s political structure. Pezeshkian may face skepticism from the two Eurasian great powers, who prefer conservative leadership aligned with their interests.
Future implications
The upcoming election has the potential to reshape the Islamic Republic’s foreign policy direction or further entrench the direction set by the Raisi administration.
De-escalation with Saudi Arabia and other Arab countries is expected to continue but could be influenced by broader regional developments, such as the normalization of relations with Israel, the expansion of the Gaza war to Lebanon and the region, or the emergence of a more confrontational US foreign policy.
Trump’s return to the White House could see Iran face increased pressures and obstacles in diplomatic negotiations, especially concerning the JCPOA and sanctions relief. This scenario could exacerbate the challenges for any Iranian administration, whether conservative or reformist.
The Iranian electorate, as per polls, is currently split fairly equally between the three frontrunners, with a quarter of voters still undecided. If no single candidate receives 51 percent of votes on 28 June – which looks increasingly likely – a runoff election will be held a week from that day.
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