Analysis of the New Security Order in the Region

Strategic Council Online – Guest Note: The recent military aggression by the United States and the Israeli regime against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the early months of 2026, beyond a periodic tension, has acted as a catalyst for a fundamental reconfiguration of the Middle East’s geopolitical order.

Dr. Mohammad Mehdi Mazaheri – University Professor

The relative subsiding of the flames of direct conflict does not mean a return to traditional balance-of-power models or the establishment of sustainable stability; rather, it has placed the regional system into a new, dynamic and differentiated security geometry. The consequences of this structural shift can be explained at four macro levels:

1. Reconfiguration of the Regional Order; Transition Beyond Classical Deterrence

The post–Ramadan War Middle East order has become distinct from predictable patterns of traditional deterrence. The previous red lines that defined the dimensions of the regional order within that framework have been redefined. The main feature of the new order is not established peace, but rather the formation of a kind of “fragile armed balance.” In this environment, the regional security architecture is confronted with a dual reality. On one hand, the Western–Arab axis’s attempt to integrate missile defense systems and radar networks across the territories of aligned actors faced structural challenges in practice; because post-war assessments indicate that these networks have failed to establish absolute deterrence against Iran’s hybrid tactics. On the other hand, Iran’s focus on enhancing its doctrine of asymmetric warfare, employing a strategy of “saturation attacks” and utilizing high-speed and maneuverable projectiles, has effectively caused costly regional defense layers to face operational attrition and a high margin of error. The impact of some of these projectiles on strategic targets demonstrates the reality that the region’s defensive geometry, contrary to the assumptions of its designers, is permeable. This issue has moved the West Asian regional order away from traditional Western alliance-building axes and has pushed Arab capitals toward preventive diplomacy and a smart balance with Tehran.

On the other hand, given Iran’s success in proportionate responses to the aggressions carried out, it will be difficult for Arab states to ignore the success of Iran’s asymmetric strategy, and this will encourage them to adopt similar approaches and develop new military capabilities. This situation places the region in a state of “permanent alert” and a kind of “new arms race,” making sustainable stability unattainable. Consequently, the future regional order is moving toward a fragile armed balance in which maintaining stability requires continuous diplomatic channels for crisis management.

2. Redefinition of Iran’s Strategic Position

Contrary to the initial hypothesis of the architects of the Ramadan War, the illegal military aggression by the United States and the Israeli regime not only did not lead to Iran’s geopolitical isolation or the collapse of its regional influence network, but also demonstrated the effectiveness of the country’s defensive models and strategic resilience. Accordingly, it appears that Iran’s strategic position has been strengthened in the medium term; because the consolidation of asymmetric deterrence capability in practice removed the so-called “regime change” formula or Iran’s absolute isolation from the Western agenda. However, the deepening of the Israeli regime’s military presence on southern borders and the high costs of economic attrition have placed this military achievement under continuous diplomatic challenges, positioning Tehran as a “superior power but encircled within more complex security rings.”

Formation of Tehran–Washington Relations; Transition to New Arrangements

The relationship between Iran and the United States, following the recent ceasefire agreement, has moved beyond the traditional framework of crisis management and entered a phase of redefining the rules of the game. Although this agreement does not mean the resolution of long-standing ideological or political disputes between Iran and the United States, it operates beyond a simple emergency channel. This ceasefire has, at least at the current stage, created a new structure of “costly but stable mutual commitments,” in which Washington, recognizing the high costs of continued war and energy market volatility, has been forced to formally accept part of Iran’s deterrent capability. In return, Tehran has also, by intelligently leveraging this space, focused its diplomacy on consolidating field achievements and reducing sanctions pressure. Based on this new game rule, Washington is shifting its foreign policy approach from the costly strategy of “hard confrontation and attempts at absolute containment” toward a strategy of “smart containment of Iran and reconfiguration of regional security alliances,” in order to limit Tehran’s influence within defined red lines. In contrast, the Islamic Republic of Iran, relying on field achievements, pursues a policy of “consolidating strategic depth and optimizing the doctrine of asymmetric warfare,” in order to preserve its influence network while exploiting the post-ceasefire environment to gradually erode sanctions and strengthen its economic base and domestic social capital.

4. Transformation of the International Order; Emergence of a “Less America-Centered World”

At the macro level, the confrontation between Iran and the offensive coalition led by the United States has deepened existing fractures in the international order and accelerated the transition toward a multipolar system. Accordingly, the failure of Washington’s plans for collapsing Iran’s political structure, fully destroying its defensive capabilities, and forcing unconditional surrender reveals the structural erosion of U.S. supremacy as a hegemonic power; since the essence of hegemony is manifested in its unique capacity to impose its political will and shape the preferred order. In this context, Iran’s successful persistence as a regional power in blocking this will, combined with imposing heavy strategic costs on Washington, has dealt a fundamental blow to America’s global stature and provided the necessary impetus to accelerate the shift of the international order toward pluralism and a post-hegemonic structure. In addition, China and Russia, through their positions during this war, demonstrated that they consider West Asia a key arena for challenging U.S. unilateralism.

Finally, current dynamics indicate that the West Asian region in the post–Ramadan War period is a system with high structural uncertainty. The end of military operations and the ceasefire agreement do not necessarily mean the beginning of a stable order, but rather the start of a multi-layered competition to define new rules of the game. In this emerging space, the consolidation of Iran’s position and security depends on the determination of national administrators to preserve the social capital created during the war, the avoidance by political parties and groups of intensifying divisions, and the capacity of strategic institutions to create balance and synergy between the “field” (hard power tools) and “diplomacy” (soft power tools) in the new regional and global environment.

What’s Behind US-Saudi Attack on Iraq?

Alwaght- Amid unfolding crisis in West Asia, the US and Saudi Arabia have carried out an array of airstrikes in various Iraqi regions, initiating a new round of escalation on Tuesday. 

Washington claimed the attacks targeted Iran-aligned Iraqi resistance groups, but Iraqi resources condemned the strikes as a stark violation of Iraq's national sovereignty and a dangerous step to expansion of the scope of war in the region.

American and Saudi warplanes attacked multiple targets across several Iraqi provinces on Tuesday night, according to Al Mayadeen. The airstrikes came as Washington and Riyadh accused Iraqi resistance factions of carrying out drone attacks on Saudi oil facilities.

In a statement, US Central Command (CENTCOM) said the operation was conducted jointly with Saudi forces and targeted facilities linked to Iran-backed groups. The Pentagon maintains that those groups played a role in planning and executing recent strikes against American personnel and Saudi energy infrastructure.

Washington’s claim of "preemptive defense" 

American officials alleged that the recent attacks came in response to a barrage of drone and rocket strikes aimed at American and Saudi interests. CENTCOM said all of the attacks against American forces were intercepted and so inflicted no damage, but it attacked munition storages and positions of resistance groups in Iraq to prevent further attempts. 

Yet the latest strikes have once again turned Iraq into one of the most critical flashpoints between the US and the Axis of Resistance. Over the past several months, sporadic clashes between American forces and Iraqi militant groups have repeatedly triggered tit-for-tat attacks and ratcheted up tensions across the country.

The airstrikes came just hours after Washington claimed to have intercepted a ballistic missile attack, attributed to Iran’s IRGC, targeting American bases in Jordan. At the same time, escalating confrontations in the Red Sea, the Strait of Hormuz, and along Iraq’s borders have fueled growing fears that the conflict could spill over into new fronts.

Washington forging excuses to broaden the attacks range

Although Washington has framed the latest operation as "preemptive defense," the strikes have drawn sharp condemnation from resistance factions and formal protests from the Iraqi government. Many analysts argue that continued actions of this kind are turning Iraq into an ever more entrenched arena for the region's geopolitical rivalries, severely complicating any effort to de-escalate the crisis.

According to Iraqi sources, the joint strikes have so far killed at least 20 people and wounded more than 32 others.

Meanwhile, many observers argue Washington is working to manufacture the conditions to legitimize its attacks on Iraqi resistance groups. US officials have claimed that Tuesday night's attacks were a response to a drone strike against Saudi Arabia, despite the fact the Yemeni government had already claimed responsibility for that attack. That has led to accusations that the US used the drone incident as a pretext to hit Iraqi territory and target resistance factions.

This is not the first time Washington has resorted to such reasoning to strike resistance forces, which have been key to Iraqi anti-terror fight since 2014. Iraqi security sources had previously warned that suspicious US troop movements along the Iraq-Syria border were aimed at provoking resistance factions and creating a casus belli for military action.

The Pentagon said repeatedly asserted that Iraqi resistance groups have acquired more advanced drone and missile technology, giving them the capability to hit American military bases, which are used against regions. Though those claims have never been independently verified, they have been consistently invoked as justification for the US policy of so-called "preemptive defense" and its campaign of airstrikes.

The goal: Undermining Iraqi resistance

A look at recent developments makes it clear that the US excuses for attacks on resistance forces is more about its push for disarming them. As the US built up its pressure on Baghdad to dissolve and disarm the resistance groups or at least integrate them into the formal military, leading resistance groups have been clear in denying the demand to hand over arms.

These groups assert that these arms are pivotal to defenfing Iraqi national sovereignty and countering the illegitimate US military presence on the Iraqi soil. They add that as long as foreign forces exist in the country against Baghdad's demand and security threats prevail, they will not lay down arms. 

It is notable that a majority of these forces were formed in 2014 following a fatawa by grand Shiite cleric Ayatollah Sayyed Ali al-Sistani after foreign-backed ISIS terrorist organization in a lightning operation seized large tracts of Iraqi territory as Iraqi military units easily fall apart against its progress.

Kata'ib Hezbollah, Al-Nujaba Brigades, Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, and Ansarullah Al-Awfiya Brigades are the most important resistance groups within the framework of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), a recognized formal Iraqi armed force, that have so far rejected disarming push. 

Against that backdrop, the latest US-Saudi strikes appear to be part of a broader Washington strategy to ratchet up military and political pressure on these groups while degrading their operational capabilities. Yet the track record of recent years suggests that this approach has not only failed to eliminate the resistance factions, but also it has often fueled further escalation and widened the scope of conflict across Iraq and the region.

China’s Effort to Recreate a New Global Order

SCFRonline – Opinion: Unlike classical powers, Beijing pursues its preferred order not through territorial occupation, but through technology, capital, standard-setting, and digital governance.

Laleh Bahari – International Affairs Analyst

If the nineteenth century was the era of colonial empires and the twentieth century the era of United States military hegemony, the twenty-first century is likely to be defined by a different type of competition. This competition will be based less on territorial conquest or the expansion of military bases and more on dominance over technology, data, global standards, supply chains, and international governance institutions. At the center of this transformation stands China; a country that, rather than directly replacing the United States, seeks to rewrite the rules upon which the global order is governed.

Many analyses still interpret the Washington–Beijing rivalry as a new Cold War; however, this interpretation overlooks part of the reality. China is less interested in destroying the existing order than in gradually transforming it from within. Beijing seeks to create a network of economic, technological, and institutional dependencies in which political influence is exercised not through hard power, but through control of global infrastructure. Therefore, China’s desired order should be understood less as a military project and more as a project of reconfiguring global governance.

Technology, the Core Pillar of China’s Power

The most important distinction between China’s strategy and that of traditional powers lies in the role of technology in its foreign policy. While classical powers placed military industries at the center of their superiority, China has turned artificial intelligence, semiconductors, cloud computing, next-generation communications, big data, and biotechnology into fundamental elements of national power.

Today, strategic competition over technology is no longer merely economic competition; it is a competition over defining the future rules of the world. A country that can set technical standards for artificial intelligence, digital infrastructure, or communication networks will in practice also shape part of global governance rules.

Within this framework, Beijing has made massive investments in artificial intelligence development, data centers, quantum computing, and scientific research. The extensive role of the Chinese Academy of Sciences in linking research, industry, and policymaking also demonstrates that the state views science not as an academic domain, but as an instrument of geopolitical competition.

From the Silk Road to Digital Governance

Over the past decade, the Belt and Road Initiative has been the most important symbol of China’s foreign policy; however, this project has now entered a new phase. Whereas in the past the focus was on building ports, railways, and physical infrastructure, the new version of this strategy is centered on digital infrastructure, data-driven economies, communication networks, and smart services.

China has clearly recognized that controlling the future of the global economy cannot be achieved solely through ownership of ports or shipping routes. What matters more is control over technical standards, payment systems, AI platforms, cloud services, and data transmission networks.

For this reason, many developing countries today are not primarily purchasing Chinese military equipment but are increasingly using its digital systems, communication technologies, and smart services. This technological dependency gradually creates a form of strategic dependence whose long-term effects are more enduring than many military alliances.

Global Governance with Chinese Characteristics

Unlike some major powers, China speaks less about regime change or direct intervention in the internal affairs of states. Instead, it emphasizes concepts such as national sovereignty, non-interference, shared development, and multilateralism. Western critics, however, argue that these concepts serve in practice as a cover for expanding China’s geopolitical influence.

Nevertheless, the reality is that many countries in the Global South find this narrative more attractive than Western interventionist models. Beijing, understanding this environment, has introduced initiatives such as the Global Development Initiative, Global Security Initiative, and Global Civilization Initiative to present an alternative vision of the future international order.

In this model, international legitimacy is defined not on the basis of leadership by a single power, but through a network of economic, technological, and institutional cooperation. Although there remains a significant gap between China’s declared ambitions and the resources allocated to them, the overall trend indicates that Beijing is making long-term investments in building new institutions and rules.

The Future Battle Will Be Over the Rules

The main competition between China and the United States is no longer merely about GDP or the number of aircraft carriers. The central arena of competition is the drafting of future global rules. Any country that defines standards in artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, digital economy, emerging technologies, and data governance will effectively gain influence beyond military power.

Accordingly, Beijing seeks simultaneously to develop indigenous technologies and encourage more countries to adopt Chinese infrastructure. In response, the United States is attempting to contain this trend through export restrictions, technological alliances, and heavy investment in advanced industries.

This competition is pushing the world toward a form of technological bipolarity, in which states will be forced to choose between different standards, infrastructures, and ecosystems. For this reason, technology has become the most important arena of power politics in the twenty-first century.

China is pursuing a different path from classical powers in constructing a new global order. Instead of consolidating hegemony through warships or military campaigns, Beijing seeks to gradually align technological infrastructures, digital economic rules, international standards, and global governance institutions with its own interests. Therefore, the future of great power competition will be determined less on battlefields and more in artificial intelligence laboratories, data centers, standards organizations, universities, and digital networks. The world is entering an era in which real power lies not in the number of soldiers, but in the ability to write the rules of the game. China has understood this reality earlier than many of its competitors, and precisely for this reason, it has begun constructing the new order from the field of technology.

Unwelcome Guest of White House: How Have Washington-Tel Aviv Ties Taken a Turn for Worse?

Alwaght- Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to the US this week is not what his seven previous meetings with the US Donald Trump were. Rather than a summit to coordinate strategy on regional developments, this visit is about mending a relationship fractured by the fallout from the war with Iran. In the early months of their partnership, the White House and Tel Aviv were closely aligned on most cases. Now, signs of disagreement over the West Asia’s most critical security issues have burst into plain view.

Netanyahu is walking into the White House for the eighth time since Trump returned to power, but he no longer commands the sway over Washington’s decisions that he once did. Sources close to the US administration say the president has in recent months sought to calibrate his regional policies independently of Israeli demands, a shift that has pushed the personal and political ties between the two leaders into uncharted territory.

CNN has uncovered another telling indicator of Netanyahu’s diminished standing at the White House. He had wanted to travel to Washington last week, the network reported, but the White House refused to carve out time for a meeting. According to a US official and an Israeli source, Netanyahu spent weeks angling for a formal invitation to talk Iran and press Trump to take a harder line on Tehran. But Trump showed little interest in hosting him, and was even displeased with some White House aides who tried to arrange a sit-down. In the end, Netanyahu only secured the meeting as a sideline to his trip after announcing he would be in Washington for the funeral of Senator Lindsey Graham. For observers, the whole episode underscores a stark reversal where Netanyahu once secured meetings with the US president swiftly and at the White House’s own initiative, this time he had to lobby for weeks, and ultimately hitch his visit to a funeral to get his foot in the door.

Iran, the center of cleavage

The main item on the table, without question, was Iran. Tel Aviv is pressing its case that military and political pressure on Tehran must persist after the war to ensure Iran cannot rebuild its military and nuclear capabilities. Trump, however, while not taking the military option off the table, is trying to keep a diplomatic channel open to Tehran and avoid being dragged into another broad regional war. His calculus is driven by the staggering costs of a conflict with Iran, and by his overriding domestic concern: the upcoming midterm elections. A Reuters-Ipsos poll found that only 33 percent of Americans support continuing the war with Iran, the lowest level since the fighting began. Roughly 70 percent say the Trump administration has not clearly explained the war's objectives. That is a flashing red warning for Republicans heading into the midterms.

Many US experts argue that the military strikes have failed to achieve Washington's strategic goals. A Reuters analysis shows widespread skepticism that ramping up attacks would force Tehran to bend to American demands, with analysts warning that escalation would only raise the odds of a wider regional conflagration.

In essence, many analysts believe Netanyahu sees sustained military pressure on Iran as beneficial to his own political survival, but Trump does not share that calculation. An Israeli official told Al-Monitor that the difference comes down to this: Trump has the ability to start a war, but no appetite to sustain one given the heavy political and economic toll. Netanyahu, by contrast, may need the crisis to continue for his own political reason, but without US backing, he cannot drive it forward.

Shift of Washington’s priorities

While Netanyahu trained his focus on Iran during his meeting with Trump, the administration is operating with a far wider lens on the region. Beyond the Iran case, the White House has also prioritized Lebanon's future, Syria's trajectory, and Gaza's fate. That divergence in priorities signals that Washington is no longer viewing West Asia solely through Israel's security prism, and that it is increasingly wary of the political costs that come with full alignment with Tel Aviv.

A Middle East Eye report highlights one of Netanyahu's core anxiety, which is the growing independence of Trump administration decision-making on sensitive regional cases. The recent US nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, the review of advanced fighter jet sales to Turkey, and the effort to keep a dialogue channel open with Iran, all of these have been tracked with alarm in Tel Aviv, where Israeli officials have found themselves unable to steer the outcomes. In their view, some of these decisions were made without prior coordination with Israel, underscoring that Tel Aviv's traditional leverage over White House policymaking has eroded.

Trump initially claimed that any nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia would be conditional on Riyadh joining the Abraham Accords and normalizing ties with Israel. But just days later, he pivoted, saying he had not actually discussed the matter with Saudi leaders. For its part, Saudi Arabia has made clear that it has no plans to normalize relations with Israeli regime until Palestinian legitimate rights, including an independent state, are recognized.

Trump skips support to Netanyahu

Netanyahu’s trip to Washington is no routine visit, but carries special political weight for the man himself. He is barreling toward a make-or-break election, and he knows full well that a show of close ties with the US president could pay dividends back home.

Yet Trump has so far refused to offer an official endorsement. While he has praised Netanyahu’s wartime role in public remarks, he has stopped short of any explicit political or electoral backing, a reticence that observers see as the White House hedging its bets on Netanyahu’s political future.

Will past relations be restored?

Al-Monitor has reported that despite the growing friction between Tel Aviv and Washington, neither side wants to let these differences spiral into an open crisis. The US still regards the Israeli regime as its most critical strategic partner in the region, and Israeli officials knows they cannot manage the region's security challenges without American backing.

That said, the reality is that personal relationship between Trump and Netanyahu no longer carries the warmth it once did. Both are now treading more carefully, working to preserve strategic cooperation while pursuing their own independent interests and priorities. In that light, this eighth meeting between the two leaders looks like a test case for the future of a long-standing alliance, one that will determine whether they can manage their recent disputes and revive past collaboration, or whether the emerging chasms are hardening into a permanent feature of US-Israeli relations.

Iran and the Beginning of a Regionally Oriented Security Order in West Asia

SCFRONLINE – Opinion: The war against Iran was not merely a military confrontation, but a turning point that challenged many of the security assumptions of West Asia and even the Western alliance system.

Sina Raymand – International Affairs Analyst

In international relations, not all wars are equally transformative in historical terms. Some wars merely alter the balance of power, while others redefine the foundations of the security order. The recent aggression by the United States and the Zionist regime against Iran must be placed in the second category. The significance of this war was not merely in the scale of attacks or the level of damage, but in its strategic consequences for the security architecture of West Asia, the credibility of deterrence, the position of Western alliances, and the future model of crisis management.

Before this war, many Western analysts assumed that the security structure of West Asia was still based on three pillars: U.S. military superiority, the deterrence of the Zionist regime, and the security dependence of Arab states on Washington’s defense umbrella. However, field developments demonstrated that all three pillars have come under serious question. Accordingly, the fundamental question is no longer who won on the battlefield, but what order is emerging after the war.

The end of Western monopoly on deterrence

Perhaps the most important strategic outcome of this war is the transformation of the concept of deterrence in West Asia. For decades, deterrence was largely understood as the ability of the United States and its allies to prevent military action by adversaries. This perception was based on the assumption that no regional power could impose sustained costs on Washington and its allies.

The recent war altered this perception. Iran’s reciprocal operations demonstrated that even if technological and air superiority remains with the United States, the political, economic, and security costs of any military action against Iran have increased to such an extent that the decision to initiate war is no longer as easy as before.

Some analysts at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute have emphasized that the most important lesson of this war is not firepower, but endurance and resilience. In other words, the ability to sustain resistance and maintain national cohesion has become as important as military destructive capacity. This transformation has taken deterrence out of the monopoly of major powers and turned it into a multidimensional phenomenon.

Questioning the credibility of U.S. security alliances

Another consequence of this war is the weakening of the credibility of the United States’ security alliance network. Since the end of World War II, Washington has sought to create the perception that its allies would receive unwavering U.S. support under all circumstances and that any threat against them would trigger a rapid American response.

However, the recent war showed that this equation no longer functions as simply as before. Crisis management patterns, differences between the United States and some European governments, and the caution of many regional partners raised the question of whether military-security alliances with the United States still retain their previous effectiveness.

Analyses published by the Russian International Affairs Council have also emphasized that one of the key consequences of this war has been the damage to the credibility of the U.S. alliance structure. Even if this assessment is not fully accepted, it cannot be denied that many regional actors are now more inclined than before to diversify their security partners.

This trend can be observed in the expansion of Arab states’ relations with China and Russia, and even in efforts to manage direct relations with Iran. This shift does not mean the end of the U.S. role, but it undoubtedly signifies a reduction in Washington’s security monopoly.

Redefining the regional security architecture

One of the features of the previous West Asian security order was that regional security was largely managed from outside the region. Extensive U.S. military presence, Washington’s decisive role in defense alliances, and the dependence of many regional states on external security guarantees were key characteristics of that structure. However, the recent war demonstrated that this model faces serious limitations. Persian Gulf Arab states realized that any large-scale confrontation between Iran and the United States would threaten their own economies, trade, energy flows, and domestic stability before affecting Tehran or Washington.

At the same time, Europe also realized that any crisis in the Persian Gulf directly affects the continent’s energy security, maritime trade, and economic stability. Even the issue of clearing naval mines and fully reopening shipping routes in the Strait of Hormuz became a European security concern.

Gradually, these developments have strengthened the idea of forming a region-centric security structure, in which regional dialogue, collective security arrangements, and reduced reliance on extra-regional military intervention become more prominent.

West Asia entering an era of flexible balancing

If past wars typically led to rigid security blocs, the recent war revealed a different trajectory. Today, fewer states are willing to tie all their strategic capacity to a single external power.

Arab states, while maintaining security relations with the United States, are expanding economic cooperation with China, preserving political relations with Russia, and simultaneously attempting to manage tensions with Iran. This behavior indicates that the region has entered a new phase of flexible balancing. In such an environment, power is no longer measured solely by the number of military bases or arms sales, but also by the ability to build diversified cooperation networks and simultaneously manage relations with competing actors.

Iran, within this framework, faces both opportunity and responsibility. Increased military deterrence will only translate into a sustainable advantage if it is accompanied by active regional diplomacy, economic cooperation, and initiatives for collective security. Otherwise, deterrence alone cannot create a new order.

Rising demand for region-centric security

The recent war cannot be regarded merely as a temporary military crisis. It has challenged many traditional assumptions of West Asian security and revealed trends likely to shape the region’s structure in the coming years. Deterrence is no longer monopolized by great powers, the U.S. alliance system has been subjected to serious testing, regional states are seeking diversification of their security relations, and the concept of region-centric security has gained increasing traction.

Therefore, although it is still too early to speak of the establishment of a fully consolidated new order, it can be stated with confidence that the war against Iran has initiated a new phase in the transformation of West Asia’s security architecture. The future of this structure will not be based on the dominance of a single power, but on a complex balance of deterrence, diplomacy, economic interdependence, and regional competition management.

Europe’s Enduring Dependence on Persian Gulf Energy

SCFR Online – Opinion: The dominant discourse in the field of European energy security over the past two decades has revolved around diversification of supply sources and the gradual reduction of dependence on fossil fuels. This narrative, which gained particular momentum after the Ukraine gas crisis in 2006 and its intensification in 2014 and 2022, was based on the assumption that Europe could free itself from the geopolitical vulnerabilities arising from dependence on specific suppliers through investment in renewable energy, imports of liquefied natural gas from diversified sources, and the establishment of new infrastructure. However, a closer analysis of energy trade data and the structure of the global oil and gas supply chain presents a different picture. Europe has not only failed to meaningfully reduce its dependence on the Persian Gulf, but in some sectors — particularly in liquefied natural gas imports — this dependence has deepened. This reality, which is often overlooked in public discourse, raises fundamental questions about the sustainability of Europe’s energy security strategies and their impact on regional power equations.

Abed Akbari – International Affairs Expert

The Strait of Hormuz, with a width of only 33 kilometers at its narrowest point, is recognized as the world’s most vital energy chokepoint. According to statistics from the International Energy Agency, around 21 million barrels of crude oil and petroleum products pass through this strait daily, equivalent to one-fifth of global oil consumption. In addition, a significant portion of Qatar’s liquefied natural gas exports, as the world’s largest LNG exporter, transit through this route. The strategic importance of this strait is not limited to the volume of energy passing through it; rather, it lies in the absence of sustainable and economical alternative routes. Existing pipelines in the region, including Saudi Arabia’s East-West Pipeline, which extends from eastern oil fields to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea, have a maximum capacity of 5 million barrels per day and can replace only a small portion of the volume passing through Hormuz. The UAE-Oman pipeline, with its limited capacity of 1.5 million barrels per day, also does not provide a comprehensive solution for bypassing the strait. These structural limitations mean that any serious disruption in passage through the Strait of Hormuz — whether caused by military conflict, security threats, or deterrent actions — could quickly turn into a global energy crisis.

In this context, Europe’s dependence on Persian Gulf energy can be examined in two dimensions: crude oil and natural gas. In the oil sector, European countries, particularly after the extensive sanctions against Russia in 2022, have increasingly turned to oil imports from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq. Eurostat statistics show that the Persian Gulf’s share of Europe’s crude oil imports increased from around 15 percent in 2021 to more than 25 percent in 2023. This increase not only reflects the replacement of Russian oil, but also demonstrates the structural limitations in diversifying supply sources. In the natural gas sector, the situation is more complex. Europe, which before the Ukraine crisis imported more than 40 percent of its gas from Russia, is now heavily dependent on LNG imports from Qatar, the UAE, and Oman. Qatar, which is advancing the largest expansion projects of its gas fields with the aim of increasing LNG production capacity from 77 million tons per year to 126 million tons by 2027, is increasingly becoming a key supplier of gas to Europe. This growing dependence on Persian Gulf LNG, all of which must pass through the Strait of Hormuz, has created a new structural vulnerability for Europe’s energy security.

Under such circumstances, Iran’s deterrence leverage in the Strait of Hormuz rests on three main pillars: first, Iran’s strategic geographical position, which grants it direct control over the northernmost shore of the strait and its key islands, including Abu Musa, Greater Tunb, and Lesser Tunb. This position enables Iran to closely monitor all maritime traffic and exercise control when necessary. Second, Iran’s military capabilities in the naval and missile domains, which have significantly advanced over the past two decades. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, utilizing fast attack boats, small submarines, anti-ship missiles, and naval drones, is capable of creating serious symmetric and asymmetric threats to transiting naval fleets. The experience of tanker seizures in 2019 and 2023, and subsequently the developments of recent days following the beginning of the Ramadan War, demonstrated that Iran can quickly and at relatively low cost conduct limited but effective operations in the strait. Third, and perhaps most importantly, is the absence of sustainable and economical alternative routes, as previously mentioned. The fact that no alternative infrastructure with sufficient capacity exists to bypass the Strait of Hormuz strengthens Iran’s deterrence leverage and dramatically increases the cost of any military action against Iran for the West.

Some analysts believe that Europe’s energy transition toward renewable sources could reduce dependence on the Persian Gulf in the medium term. Although significant progress has been achieved in solar energy, wind power, and energy storage, this view faces serious limitations from several aspects: first, renewable energies are mainly applicable in electricity generation, while in heavy transportation, aviation, shipping, petrochemical industries, and the production of industrial raw materials, oil and gas still play an irreplaceable role. Estimates by the International Energy Agency indicate that even in the most optimistic energy transition scenarios, the share of oil and gas in the global energy mix will remain above 40 percent until 2050. Second, Europe’s energy infrastructure, including transmission networks, refineries, chemical industries, and transportation fleets, has for decades been designed and built on the basis of fossil fuels, and the fundamental transformation of this infrastructure is a costly process that will take several decades. Third, the energy crisis demonstrated that under critical conditions, Europe is compelled to return to fossil fuel sources and even increase the use of coal. This reality shows that energy transition is not a linear and predictable process and that in the face of geopolitical shocks, the security of fossil fuel supply remains the primary priority.

The potential impact of disruption in the Strait of Hormuz on the global economy can be examined through modeling different scenarios. Econometric studies show that the complete closure of the Strait of Hormuz even for two months could raise crude oil prices to more than 200 dollars per barrel. Such a price increase, given the role of oil in all economic sectors, could lead to a 3 to 5 percent increase in global inflation and a 2 to 3 percent reduction in global economic growth. For Europe, whose economy is heavily dependent on energy imports, these impacts could be even more severe. Historical experience also confirms these estimates. During the Iran-Iraq War in the 1980s, attacks on oil tankers in the Persian Gulf led to significant increases in oil prices and maritime insurance costs. In 2019, the attack on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Saudi Arabia, which halted the production of 5.7 million barrels of oil per day, caused the largest single-day jump in oil prices in history. These precedents show that even temporary and limited disruptions in Persian Gulf energy supplies can have extensive and lasting impacts on the global economy.

As a result, Europe’s structural dependence on Persian Gulf energy and the vital role of the Strait of Hormuz in the global energy supply chain constitute a geopolitical reality that fundamentally shapes Western foreign policy. This dependence explains why Europe and the United States are willing to make massive military investments in the region, maintain complex relations with authoritarian Persian Gulf regimes, and accept the political and ethical costs of these relationships. It also explains why any tension with Iran, regardless of its nature, quickly turns into an energy security crisis. As long as real and sustainable alternatives to Persian Gulf energy and the Strait of Hormuz route are not established, Iran’s deterrence leverage and the strategic importance of this region will not only remain intact, but will likely be strengthened given rising global energy demand and the structural limitations in diversifying supply sources. This reality requires policymakers and energy security analysts, instead of relying on optimistic narratives about a rapid transition to renewable energy, to pay attention to current realities and structural limitations and formulate realistic strategies for managing this enduring dependence.

Dim Outlook of Israeli Influence in Central Asia: What Does Russian Analyst Say?

Alwaght- Professor Igor Pankratenko, a historian and senior expert at Russia’s Center for Strategic Assessment and Forecasting, is the kind of analyst who tracks Central Asian geopolitical shifts with a sharp, unblinking eye. To him and his colleagues at Russian research institutes, the region has morphed into a high-stakes arena for great-power rivalry since the Soviet collapse in the early 1990s.

As a traditional heavyweight, Russia has always treated Central Asia as its strategic backyard, and any outside incursion as a direct threat to national security. But the war in Ukraine has drained Moscow’s military and financial muscle, opening the door for other players to maneuver. Among them: Israel, which until now had barely registered a presence there.

Israel’s push for influence into Central Asia is not just about trade or investment. It fits squarely into what strategists call the “New Peripheral Strategy”. 

This is a doctrine dating back to the 1950s that aims to break Israel’s isolation in West Asia by forging alliances with non-Arab states and moderate Muslim communities on the Arab world’s fringes. Today, Central Asia and the Caucasus have become the strategy’s new frontier.

Israel’s core goals in the region include trying to curb Iranian influence by building a ring of partners to Iran’s north and east; expand economic and tech ties, especially in agriculture, water management, cybersecurity, and renewable energy; and, ultimately, burnish its international legitimacy by widening the circle of Muslim-majority nations having friendly ties to Tel Aviv. 

The outcome of this policy is a hidden competition with Iran in the region which some observers dub "Cold War" of West Asia. It is a rivalry that is ongoing in the intelligence networks, trade corridors, and economic projects, rather than battlegrounds.

Russia and the Central Asian states are responding to this new Israeli footprint with a telling mix of wariness, pragmatism, and multi-vector policy.

Moscow is watching Israel's moves closely, and sizing them up as part of a broader competition that already includes Turkish and American influence. But Central Asia, led by Kazakhstan, has adopted a deliberate "multi-vector" playbook: engage with every major power, commit to none. Kazakhstan's signing of the Abraham Accords in November 2025 marked a turning point. That was not about joining an anti-Iran or anti-Turkey coalition. Rather, it was a strategic signal, aimed as much at Washington as at Moscow, that Astana's is growing independent of the Kremlin.

Joining the Abraham Accords is of minor cost to Kazakhstan as the country has had diplomatic ties with Israeli regime since 1992, and it can win American investments and Washington’s favor and at the same time boost independence of action of this country in the face of pressures of the Russians who want it remain within their orbit. 

To experts, this is not really about Israel, Iran, or West Asia. It is about Astana's most consequential foreign-policy project: securing its sovereignty and room to maneuver in a world that is increasingly splintering between rival powers.

The trajectory of Israel's influence in Central Asia remains uncertain, moving in lockstep with broader geopolitical tremors. On one hand, Tel Aviv has made real inroads, winning trust through technology transfers and investment, cementing its reputation as a reliable partner. It would not be surprising if other countries, Uzbekistan among them, eventually sign onto the Abraham Accords.

On the other hand, the delicate balancing act that Central Asian states have struck between Iran, Russia, and the West could collapse under the weight of any major security or political shock, a serious escalation between Iran and Israeli regime, for instance.

As Russian experts like Pankratenko suggest, if Iran unravels, the security vacuum could leave Central Asia exposed to manipulation by players who see the region not as a priority, but as a lever against Moscow and Beijing.

What seems certain, though, is the end of Russia's era of monopoly in Central. The region is becoming a complex, multi-layered chessboard for regional and trans-regional powers alike, and Tel Aviv, resting on its peripheral strategy, is set to play a far more prominent role than it ever has before.