Thursday, July 30, 2026

Pakistan-Kuwait Defense Agreement and Its Geopolitical Aspects

Alwaght- Kuwait's royal order for ratification of the security agreement with Pakistan three years after signing the draft agreement amid current sensitive regional conditions has drawn many analyses about its aspects and outcomes. Observers majorly focus on four key factors in their assessment of this pact: Changes in regional security order, its distinction from the Pakistani security pact with Saudi Arabia, strategic motivations of the two countries, and the novel place of Pakistan in West Asia's emerging dynamics.

1. Revision of Persian Gulf security order: Dropping trust in US security guarantees

Analysts agree that the primary driving force behind activating this agreement is the weakened Persian Gulf states' confidence in the US security umbrella and to push for diversifying defense partners. Abdulbasit, a security analyst, contends that the US security guarantees in the region have eroded, driving Persian Gulf monarchies toward a "diversify partners" strategy.

The escalation of military tensions in the region and attacks on US targets in Kuwait have convinced the country that relying solely on the US military presence no longer guarantees security. Kuwait's aim with this deal is to bolster its defense capabilities by tapping into Pakistan's military expertise and building a multilayered security network, one that does not compete with the American presence but complements it.

2. Strategic distinction with Saudi-Pakistani pact: Coordination, not mutual defense

Analysts stress one key distinction: the Kuwait agreement is far more limited in scope than Pakistan's joint defense pact with Saudi Arabia.

The Riyadh deal explicitly states that "an attack on either country constitutes an attack on the other." The Kuwait accord carries no such mutual-defense clause, focusing instead on training, technology transfer, logistics, and military-industrial cooperation.

Brigadier General Mahmood Shah, a military analyst, puts it this way: "With Saudi Arabia, the mutual-defense commitment is crystal clear. With Kuwait, itbis strictly about training and structural cooperation." That gap reflects Islamabad's strategic caution—avoiding direct entanglement in regional conflicts while preserving the latitude to act independently in West Asia's complex power games.

3. Mutual advantages: Kuwait eyes Pakistani experience and expertise, Pakistan seeks influence and energy

This deal brings about mutual advantages to the two sides. Kuwait, a wealthy country but with a small population and low military expertise and experience, is seeking to take advantage from the well-trained Pakistani armed forces which are recognized for their war skills, counterterrorism operations, and operational coordination.

On the Pakistani side, Islamabad is seeking economic and energy advantages from this deal. It also seeks markets for its defense products, including JF-17 fighter jets and drones. Some analysts, including India's Pravin Sawhney, see this a move towards formation of an "Islamic security framework" where Pakistan as a nuclear power plays the top role.

4. Pakistan, from being a security consumer to a security exporter

On a broader level, experts view this agreement as a sign that Pakistan is shedding its role as a mere security consumer and emerging as a "security exporter" and a regional security player in its own right.

Bilal Khan, a defense affairs expert, believes that this cooperation agreement demonstrates that Marshan Asim Munir's foreign policy to boost Pakistani regional influence has come to fruition. However, experts warn that activation of this deal can draw reactions from Iran and India and put Islamabad in a hard position between its Arab allies and its eastern neighbor. 

A Geopolitical Trap for Trump: The Outcome of a Potential Ground Operation Against Iran—Political Suicide and Economic Catastrophe

SCFR Online – Report: The joint US-Zionist regime attack on Iran has placed Washington on the verge of one of its most sensitive strategic decisions. Donald Trump, who had previously presented intervention in Venezuela as a successful model for exerting pressure on more steadfast adversaries, now faces the temptation of replicating this model vis-à-vis Iran.

However, a concurrent analysis of public opinion data, macroeconomic indicators, and lessons from prior interventions indicates that any move toward ground operations would not only fail to yield sustainable strategic gains but could also serve as an act of “political suicide” for the Trump presidency and a catalyst for a profound economic recession in the United States.

Political Suicide; Creating a Rift Between Trump and His Electoral Base, and the Breach of Campaign Promises

The first and perhaps most critical obstacle to escalating the conflict into a ground phase is the reaction of domestic American public opinion. Contrary to the assumptions of hawkish factions in Washington, the American social fabric—including traditional Republican supporters—harbors no enthusiasm for entering another quagmire in West Asia. According to a new poll by the AP-NORC Center for Public Affairs Research, while 63 percent of Republicans support air strikes, only 20 percent favor the deployment of US ground forces to Iran. These figures delineate a clear red line: Trump’s voters draw a distinct boundary between demonstrations of air power and costly ground engagements.

This divide runs deeper than poll numbers alone can capture. A Fox News survey indicates that 64 percent of respondents disapprove of Trump’s handling of the war against Iran, while overall dissatisfaction with the US president has reached 62 percent. According to a report published by Foreign Policy, Danny Bessom, a 68-year-old voter from Colorado, articulating the concerns of many like-minded citizens, stated to Trump: “We are in a war costing one billion dollars per day… You have forgotten everything else, and those issues must be addressed first.” This statement encapsulates the peril facing Trump; his core promise was to avoid protracted wars and focus on the domestic economy. Engaging in a ground war would directly rupture this unwritten contract with his MAGA electoral base and could tie his fate in the midterm elections to that of George W. Bush—the president whose wars in Iraq and Afghanistan became a lasting stain on his legacy.

An Economic Catastrophe; Repeating Nixon’s Mistake and the Specter of Economic Recession

While political costs continue to accumulate, economic costs are rapidly evolving into a structural crisis. Niall Ferguson, the eminent historian, warns that the current US aggressive assault follows a pattern pursued by Richard Nixon during the 1973 Yom Kippur War: decisive military action in favor of the Zionist regime, disruption of oil supplies in retaliation for this US action, and economic damage incurred before diplomacy can bear fruit.

Economic data suggests that the US economy stands on the brink of a precipice. Brent crude oil prices recently surpassed $112 per barrel, and experts contend that should oil prices average approximately $125 in the second quarter, the US economy will be drawn into recession. The probability of recession by the end of 2026 has reached 35 percent on market forecasting platforms, representing a 10 percent increase compared to the pre-conflict period.

Beyond the oil shock, the US financial architecture is also under strain. Ferguson notes that US ammunition stockpiles and military budgets have now been depleted due to the war against Iran. The Pentagon’s $200 billion budget request underscores the depth of this fiscal void. Under such circumstances, even assuming a potentially “successful” military operation, such a scenario could still trigger recession, as its economic repercussions—such as an oil embargo or the closure of the Strait of Hormuz—would likely outlast the military campaign itself. The Arab oil embargo of 1973 took four months to resolve, whereas the current Persian Gulf crisis possesses the potential to obstruct European and American energy arteries for an indefinite duration.

The Venezuela Model Mirage for Iran; Trump’s Strategic Miscalculation

Trump has previously characterized the intervention in Venezuela—which resulted in the ouster of Nicolás Maduro and the installation of a Washington-approved government—as a “perfect scenario” for Iran. He had claimed: “What we did in Venezuela, I think, is a perfect scenario regarding my plans for Iran…” However, this analogy constitutes a glaring strategic error.

Field reports from the International Crisis Group on Venezuela indicate that even following this apparent “victory,” economic stability has not been achieved. Annual inflation remains above 600 percent, and over 80 percent of the population lives in poverty. Foreign investors have not returned, disregarding rapid reforms, while concerns regarding political risk and deteriorated infrastructure persist.

Should the Venezuela model face such formidable challenges, its application to Iran—which possesses greater strategic depth, missile capabilities, and a far more complex regional proxy network—could multiply the costs exponentially. Venezuela had neighbors that facilitated intervention, whereas Iran lies at the heart of a region wherein any instability could send global energy prices soaring.

Conclusion

The confluence of three factors—”domestic US opposition to ground war,” “oil shock and economic recession,” and “the regional and structural disparities between Iran and Venezuela”—forms a triangle of peril for the White House. Relying on the Venezuela model, Trump may have believed he could achieve regime change in Iran at minimal cost; however, economic data indicates that even a potentially successful military outcome could culminate in severe economic failure. Moreover, polling data loudly signals that his electoral base would interpret a ground war as a betrayal of campaign promises. Consequently, any decision to deploy ground forces would constitute not a strategic maneuver, but a step toward the political and economic collapse of the current US administration. Thus, it appears that Washington, before becoming ensnared in the trap of “military victory and strategic defeat,” will be compelled to acknowledge the limitations of its power.

From the West’s Dream of Iran’s Collapse to the Reality of Its Resilience

SCFR Online – Note: Articles from Western think tanks confirm that, contrary to Western assumptions, the war has failed to cause Iran's economy to collapse, and this situation has led Washington to seek a pathway for exiting the quagmire.

Mohammad Amiri – Expert on International Affairs

The Gap Between Pressure Theory and On-the-Ground Reality

The architects of the maximum pressure strategy never imagined a day would come when Iran would not only avoid collapse but compel them to request a ceasefire. Washington today finds itself precisely in such a position. Senior analysts at the American Brandeis University, in an article published by this think tank, have emphasized that Iran has endured decades of sanctions and economic pressure, and its capacity for adaptation to the conditions it faces has never been eliminated. Although the costs are extremely heavy, no signs of imminent collapse or strategic submission are visible.

The reaction of Western actors to this resilience indicates helplessness in confronting an unpredicted phenomenon. A recent report from The New Yorker reveals that the current ceasefire between Iran and the United States bears no resemblance to classical ceasefires at all. Analysts at this publication have termed it a “non-ceasefire ceasefire”—a situation in which neither full-scale war is underway nor has sustainable peace been established. Donald Trump, who once spoke of Iran’s rapid defeat, now seeks to sign a one-page memorandum to halt hostilities. The American negotiating team consists not of seasoned diplomats but of the President’s son-in-law and close friend, both of whom are real estate investors.

In contrast, the Iranian delegation is led by senior executive managers and professional politicians. The Speaker of Parliament and Iran’s Foreign Minister have not only demanded the lifting of sanctions and the release of frozen assets but have also requested war reparations and the right to control the Strait of Hormuz—conditions that reflect confidence stemming from proven deterrence.

The Cost of War for Its Perpetrators and Supporters

Perhaps the most compelling evidence of the resistance strategy’s success lies in examining the costs borne by the aggressors themselves and their allies and supporters. The International Monetary Fund has projected severely negative economic growth for Gulf Cooperation Council countries in 2026: Qatar at -14.7 percent, Kuwait at -4.2 percent, Bahrain at -3.8 percent, the UAE at -1.9 percent, and Saudi Arabia at -1.4 percent.

However, the costs for the American side may be even more painful. A report from the Congressional Budget Office in mid-May 2026 announced that the cost of constructing, deploying, and operating the “Golden Dome” system to protect American territory over the next twenty years will be $1.2 trillion—a figure seven times greater than the Trump administration’s initial estimate, which some analysts believe is still lower than actual needs. One analyst has warned that the ratio of this system’s interceptors to enemy missiles could be as high as 1,000 to 1, and even $1.2 trillion may not suffice for complete defense. These are costs that were never previously factored into Washington’s strategic calculations and have now become a determining variable.

A Deadlock Called Costly Victory

Under such circumstances, claims of “victory” are neither heard nor tenable. A recent report from the Quincy Institute, citing a former senior military intelligence official of the Zionist regime, indicates that Netanyahu’s objective is to create a “state of endless war” with Iran—a strategy of “mowing the grass,” meaning periodic attacks to prevent the enemy from accumulating power. However, Iranians are in no way willing to accept such a situation in regional equations.

A senior analyst at the Chatham House Middle East institute also emphasized in an interview with The New Yorker that the international order has become severely fragmented and is no longer capable of providing solutions for sustainable peace. In such an environment, temporary ceasefires themselves become the new normal—a situation bearing no trace of peace yet granting no license for resuming full-scale war. Washington seeks a rapid, demonstrative victory, while Tehran seeks to consolidate the new equation. Now, after months of conflict, the on-the-ground reality is that none of the initial objectives of the US and Zionist regime’s war against Iran have been achieved. The inability to defeat Iran, the inability to fully control the Strait of Hormuz, and the inability to prevent the reconstruction of Iran’s military capabilities are not minor indicators. Perhaps the most significant achievement is nothing other than proving the proposition that maximum pressure, however severe, cannot bring a country with strong social backing and high capacity for adaptation and resilience to its knees. America now seeks a pathway to exit the quagmire—not out of benevolence, but due to calculations regarding the staggering costs of continuing the war—and this constitutes a strategic defeat.

Competition of Great Powers for Dominance over Artificial Intelligence

SCFR Online – Opinion: The competition between China and the United States is no longer solely about economics or military power, but is now centered on the control of algorithms, data, and the governance rules of artificial intelligence.

Masoumeh Taheri – Cyber Affairs Analyst

In the history of international relations, each era has been defined by its dominant technology. The Industrial Revolution shaped the power of European empires. Nuclear energy determined the balance of power during the Cold War, and the Internet transformed the global information order. Today, artificial intelligence is becoming the decisive technology capable of rewriting the rules of power in the twenty-first century. The central question is no longer which country will build the best AI model, but which country will define the rules of its use, data ownership, and global standards.

For this reason, competition over artificial intelligence is no longer purely technological; it has become one of the most important dimensions of national security, foreign policy, and geopolitics. Both China and the United States recognize this reality, but they have chosen different paths to achieve superiority. One relies on market capacity, private companies, and open innovation, while the other is based on state planning, centralized investment, and data governance. The result of this competition will be a world in which political power is more closely tied than ever to computational power.

Artificial Intelligence as the New Pillar of National Security

In the past, national security was mainly assessed through the number of military forces, missile arsenals, or economic capacity. Today, however, artificial intelligence is rapidly becoming one of the most important components of national power. Algorithms capable of analyzing data, detecting cyberattacks, guiding military operations, managing financial networks, and even influencing public opinion are considered part of countries’ security infrastructure.

For this reason, governments are making unprecedented investments in developing indigenous AI models, data processing centers, semiconductors, and cloud infrastructure. Competition over advanced chips, restrictions on technology exports, control of semiconductor supply chains, and the attraction of scientific talent are all part of this major struggle.

Artificial intelligence is no longer merely a tool for economic efficiency; it has become an element of strategic deterrence. A country that can analyze faster, predict more accurately, and make smarter decisions will hold the advantage in many future crises.

Data Is Not the New Oil; It Is the New Sovereignty

For years, data was called “the new oil,” but this metaphor is no longer sufficient. Oil is an economic commodity, whereas data constitutes the foundation of sovereignty in the digital age. The more data a country possesses, the greater its ability to train AI models, develop intelligent services, and shape economic and social behavior.

Therefore, data governance has become one of the most important arenas of geopolitical competition. Disputes between China and the West over cross-border data flows, citizen data protection, cybersecurity, and digital sovereignty are not merely legal disagreements; they reflect two fundamentally different visions of the future of power.

In the American model, private companies are the main engine of innovation, while the state plays a regulatory role. In contrast, China considers data a strategic state asset and organizes AI development within the framework of national strategic objectives. This difference has created two distinct structures for global technological governance.

Washington–Beijing Rivalry Beyond Technology

The competition between China and the United States over AI appears at first to be a race for more advanced models, but in reality, it is a struggle to define the rules of the future world. Any country that defines international standards for artificial intelligence, cybersecurity, data ownership, and digital infrastructure will gain influence beyond military power.

In recent years, China has sought to expand its influence by developing indigenous ecosystems, extensive state support, and technological cooperation with countries of the Global South. In contrast, the United States seeks to maintain its advantage through export restrictions, technological alliances, and investment in advanced industries.

As a result, the world is gradually moving toward the formation of two major technological ecosystems, each with its own standards, infrastructure, and rules. This trend may deepen the technological divide between countries and affect trade, education, healthcare, media, and diplomacy.

Humans Remain the Most Important Strategic Advantage

Despite all technological progress, one of the most important warnings in contemporary strategic literature is that artificial intelligence will not replace human judgment. Major political, military, and diplomatic decisions still require cultural understanding, insight into human motivations, and the ability to analyze political complexity.

Recent studies also show that as AI systems become more advanced, the value of human capital, elite education, and strategic decision-making quality increases as well. Technology can enhance speed and accuracy, but responsibility, ethics, and final judgment remain human domains. Therefore, future competition will not only be about building larger language models or faster processors, but also about training human resources, creating efficient institutions, and establishing responsible governance frameworks for this technology.

Artificial intelligence is becoming the most important arena of great power competition, because it is not merely an economic or scientific tool, but the foundation of national security, governance, military power, cultural influence, and future geopolitical rivalry. The competition between China and the United States is less about producing a technological product and more about designing the digital architecture of the global order. Each seeks to extend its model of data governance, standard-setting, smart infrastructure, and technological regulation to other countries.

The world is entering an era in which power will be measured not only by economic size or military capability, but also by algorithmic production capacity, data ownership, human capital quality, and the ability to define global rules. In such an order, artificial intelligence is no longer an emerging technology; it has become the most important geopolitical component of the twenty-first century.

The Components of Iran’s Deterrence Power

SCFR Online – Opinion: At a time when regional security equations have reached a sensitive stage under the influence of Iran's strategic confrontation with the United States and the Zionist regime, the question of the nature of Tehran's defensive power has gained greater significance than ever before. While Washington and Tel Aviv rely on their technological superiority, the Islamic Republic of Iran has presented a model of deterrence that extends beyond the material calculations of the world's classical militaries. This power, rooted in the connection between "the field" and "the people," has not only altered the balance of power in recent conflicts but has also disrupted adversaries' calculations when confronting Iran's strategic depth.

Seyyed Reza Sadr al-Hosseini – Expert on International Affairs

The strategies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the domain of deterrence are based on the full utilization of the will and capabilities of the people who brought the Islamic Revolution to victory under the leadership of Imam Khomeini (May Allah’s Mercy Be Upon Him) and through the application of religious teachings and Shia components. The most significant factor in the Islamic Republic’s deterrence is the people who, over the 47 years since the Revolution’s victory, have effectively supported the Revolution and its achievements and have striven to develop and deepen them. This matter—namely, leveraging the general capabilities of the people—extends across all strategic domains, including defense, society, economy, politics, and security. This means that the concept of deterrence in the Islamic Republic of Iran is by no means based solely on material tools and resources. Of course, this does not mean abstaining from utilizing material capabilities; rather, these capabilities are accompanied by spiritual backing.

Another important component of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s deterrence is indigenous defensive capability, which—through the full utilization of the country’s general capabilities across various sectors—has today manifested this deterrent power in a manner that even the world’s largest militaries acknowledge the Islamic Republic’s deterrent capacity. Concurrently, the country’s armed forces consider the people their most important support; indeed, it can be said that the people constitute the foundation of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s military equipment. In this connection, it must be noted that another of the most significant components of the Islamic Republic’s deterrence has been the public cohesion of the people. In reality, despite the country’s numerous ethnic and religious fault lines, no issue of discord or division among different ethnicities and denominations is observed. This clear image of deterrence, based on the component of public cohesion, has been well demonstrated in recent weeks through a public campaign named “Jan-Fada” (Life-Sacrifice).

Moreover, we must note that today the Islamic Republic of Iran has effectively demonstrated its deterrent power in both defensive and offensive domains during the 12-day and 40-day wars. By utilizing its indigenous capabilities—achieved by various specialists, including academic experts and activists in the country’s defense industries—the Islamic Republic has been able to present itself to the world as one of the strongest military powers, particularly in the missile and drone domains. In reality, the Islamic Republic of Iran possesses the strongest missile and air defense capabilities in the region and ranks among the world’s top four powers in this field. Of course, it must be noted that the Islamic Republic of Iran’s legitimate defense has today been proven to the world not only in the missile domain but also in cyber warfare and electronic warfare.

Furthermore, the Islamic Republic of Iran’s inspirational role in presenting “novel discourse” to the hearts of people worldwide—in various regions, with priority given to regional countries and diverse movements and groups—has today created numerous currents within the framework of the “Resistance Theory.” This constitutes another component of the Islamic Republic’s deterrence and strategic depth, defined within the framework of resistance movements. Another strategic dimension of the Islamic Republic of Iran’s deterrence is the country’s vast territory, its adjacency to 15 countries with which it shares land and maritime borders, its control over important and critical waterways within the ensemble of international waterways, and—in a word—Iran’s geopolitical position.

There is no doubt that countries’ geographical positions constitute part of their assets and can be utilized as factors of power. Therefore, Iran’s geographical, demographic, territorial capabilities and its geographical position themselves constitute a deterrent factor and have generated power for Iran. Control over the Strait of Hormuz also undoubtedly ranks among the components of Iran’s deterrent power.

Another point that must be added to the Islamic Republic’s deterrence is its justice-oriented discourse, which has today been able to create conditions among a significant segment of the world’s population such that even in adversarial countries such as the United States, the flag of the Islamic Republic of Iran is raised as a model of our country’s discourse, and respectful slogans are chanted toward this flag, which symbolizes the Iranian nation.

Persian Gulf Countries’ Doubts Regarding America’s Security Umbrella

SCFR Online – Opinion: Iran's display of power in the recent imposed war and Washington's turning away from its traditional allies have pushed Persian Gulf countries toward new partners in the East.

Hossein Mohammadnia – Expert on International Affairs

For years, it was assumed that the security of countries along the southern coast of the Persian Gulf was guaranteed through arms contracts and the presence of US military bases. However, the recent war with Iran demonstrated that this umbrella holds little credibility. Despite expressing repeated concerns from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, Washington launched its attack against Iran without coordinating with them.

A report from the Stimson Institute indicates that the war has caused $200 billion in damages to the economies of Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries. More than eighty energy facilities in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman have been targeted in attacks, with reconstruction costs estimated at $58 billion.

The UAE, which for years was a strategic ally of Washington, is now seeking cooperation with the Zionist regime, China, and Russia. Saudi Arabia, too, has embarked on a new path through Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to Moscow and his dialogues with certain regional countries. Qatar and Oman have also always maintained their intelligent distance from the United States. This diversification of partners represents a clear sign of the end of America’s unilateral dominance in the region’s security architecture.

Iran; A Powerful and Undeniable Neighbor

In this strategic rearrangement, Iran has emerged as an irremovable actor. Persian Gulf countries have come to realize that the Strait of Hormuz, energy pipelines, and the region’s skies are all directly influenced by Iran’s military and geographical power. Attempts to eliminate or weaken Iran not only fail to lead to sustainable peace but also entail staggering costs.

These costs are now clearly observable. The International Monetary Fund has projected severely negative economic growth for regional countries in 2026: Qatar at -14.7 percent, Kuwait at -4.2 percent, Bahrain at -3.8 percent, the UAE at -1.9 percent, and Saudi Arabia at -1.4 percent. These figures are released at a time when, prior to the war, these countries were pursuing ambitious long-term development programs.

A report from the Atlantic Council think tank in mid-May 2026 warns that the illusion of “middle powers” should not deceive countries. Neither does Europe have the capacity to replace America, nor has China shown any inclination to accept the role of regional security guarantor; therefore, the only remaining path is de-escalation with Iran and the establishment of a regional mechanism for managing differences.

A recent report from The Guardian also reveals that even during the talks between Chinese and American leaders in Beijing, the issue of Iran and the Strait of Hormuz was raised as one of the three main axes of discussion. This means the world has concluded that without Iran, the lock on energy security and regional stability will not be opened.

China and Russia: Complementary Partners, Not Definitive Replacements

In recent years, Persian Gulf countries have also expanded their relations with the East. China, as the region’s largest oil importer, constitutes a vital trade partner for these countries. Russia, too, has consolidated its position in the region through the sale of missile defense systems and cooperation in the energy market. However, neither of these two powers possesses the inclination or capacity to completely replace America’s security umbrella.

Analysis from the Atlantic Council think tank indicates that even at the height of the Ukraine war and the West Asian crisis, China has maintained a cautious and non-interventionist posture. Beijing has consistently avoided accepting direct responsibility for other countries’ security and has preferred to define its relations on the basis of economics and trade. Russia, too, is entangled in a war of attrition in Europe and has focused its efforts on halting NATO’s advance.

Therefore, rather than making a unilateral choice, regional countries have adopted a risk-hedging strategy. They negotiate with the United States, trade with China, import weapons from Russia, and hold confidential dialogues with Iran—all simultaneously. This multi-layered approach represents a realistic response to a world in which there is no longer a reliable, stability-providing hegemon.

A Guardian report also notes that China cannot and does not wish to play America’s role in guaranteeing its allies’ security. The experience of the Taiwan crisis and China’s pressures on South Korea and Japan has demonstrated that Beijing, in sensitive moments, uses economic levers to exert pressure rather than to create stability. This is precisely the behavior that Persian Gulf countries have also well understood.

A Future Named “Self-Provided Security” on the Distant Horizon

The ultimate outcome of these developments is the gradual transition from the model of “renting security from America” to the model of “producing security within the region.” Persian Gulf Cooperation Council countries have now realized that the heavy costs of war and sanctions, along with growing distrust of Western partners, compel them to invest in domestic capabilities and regional cooperation.

A report from Germany’s SWP institute cites the UAE’s efforts to establish independent logistics corridors in Africa and its cooperation with the Zionist regime in Somalia as an example of this endeavor to achieve strategic depth without reliance on the West. The UAE’s exit from OPEC is also assessed within this framework—an action to gain greater control over its own resources and oil policies. Although these developments by no means signify a complete severance of relations with the United States, they indicate that unilateral and unconditional dependence no longer exists. Saudi Arabia, which was once America’s closest ally in the region, has now elevated its relations with China to the level of strategic partnership and coordinates with Russia within OPEC+. Qatar, too, has always utilized its diplomatic capacities to play a mediating role between Iran and the West.

In the new security architecture of the Persian Gulf, Iran is a neighbor with whom one must engage. China is a partner from whom one must benefit. Russia is a supplier whom one must manage. America is a traditional ally upon whose stability and commitment one can no longer rely. This multi-layered and volatile order, although more complex and costly than the era of American hegemony, possesses at least one undeniable advantage: this new order is based on reality, not illusion. Regional countries have finally understood that no extra-regional power will guarantee their security freely and permanently.

Iran’s Potential Levers of Power

SCFRonline– Opinion: Iran’s geopolitical power is not limited solely to oil and the Strait of Hormuz; the unintended emergence of disruptions in the future global food and energy security chains can also demonstrate Iran’s strategic importance.

Seyed Mohammad Hosseini – Economic Affairs Expert

For decades, analyses of Iran’s power in geopolitical literature have been focused primarily on two elements: vast hydrocarbon reserves and its strategic position in the Strait of Hormuz. Whenever Iran’s levers of pressure have been discussed, the oil market, energy exports, and maritime security in the Persian Gulf have been at the center of attention. However, developments in recent years suggest that the structure of power in the global economy is undergoing rapid change, and new sources of influence and deterrence are emerging.

Today’s world no longer revolves solely around oil. Food security, raw materials for advanced industries, agricultural supply chains, and emerging energy sources have become just as important as oil was in the twentieth century. In such an environment, Iran possesses capacities that have received less attention, yet in the future they may become effective instruments of geopolitical bargaining.

Understanding this reality has become increasingly important for Western policymakers. This is because new economic dependencies are not necessarily defined in the fields of oil and gas, but rather are taking shape in sectors directly linked to the future of global food security and energy security.

Chemical Fertilizer: An Effective and Forgotten Factor in Global Food Security

The war in Ukraine and the crises in global supply chains revealed an important reality. Global food security depends, before anything else, on sustainable access to chemical fertilizers rather than merely on agricultural fields.

The increase in natural gas prices in recent years caused a surge in the cost of producing chemical fertilizers. Numerous economic studies demonstrated that disruptions in the fertilizer market can have effects far broader than disruptions in the market for certain agricultural products. Reduced access to fertilizers directly affects grain production, agricultural output, and food prices. Iran enjoys significant advantages in this field. Access to vast natural gas resources, urea production capacity, and a suitable geographical position for exports to regional markets have made Tehran one of the potentially important players in the chemical fertilizer market.

The significance of this issue becomes even more apparent as many of the world’s major fertilizer producers face export restrictions, environmental pressures, and rising production costs. In recent months, even China has imposed new export quotas on urea in order to manage its domestic market. This trend indicates that the global fertilizer market is gradually entering a sensitive and strategic phase.

Under such circumstances, a country capable of providing stable production and reliable exports in the field of chemical fertilizers will not merely be an exporter of petrochemical products; rather, it will become part of the global food security equation.

Green Hydrogen: The Geopolitics of Energy in the Twenty-First Century

If chemical fertilizer is linked to the future of global food security, green hydrogen is related to the energy security of the coming decades. Many industrialized governments, particularly in Europe, consider hydrogen to be one of the most important tools for the transition away from fossil fuels.

Competition over hydrogen is not merely a technological competition. Just as competition over oil became a geopolitical competition in the twentieth century, competition over the production, transportation, and standardization of hydrogen has acquired strategic importance in the twenty-first century.

Researchers in the field of international relations have repeatedly warned in recent years that the primary battle of the future will not be solely over hydrogen production, but rather over the establishment of governance rules and transfer mechanisms. A country that can secure an effective position in the hydrogen production and transportation chain will play a significant role in the future energy order.

From both geographical and energy perspectives, Iran possesses considerable capacities in this regard. Extensive energy resources, access to open waters, a transit position, and the possibility of connecting to Asian and European markets create conditions under which Iran can, in the long term, become one of the important players in the hydrogen economy. Realizing this potential will, of course, require investment, technology transfer, and long-term planning, but its strategic importance is such that it cannot be excluded from future geopolitical equations.

Power in the Age of Supply Chains

One of the most important lessons of recent crises is that the concept of power is changing. In the past, controlling raw resources alone was important, but today controlling supply chains has become even more significant.

A country capable of maintaining a presence in the vital links of the global economy will enjoy a degree of importance that may even prove more effective than military power. This reality is clearly visible in the fields of semiconductors, rare elements, advanced batteries, and even chemical fertilizers.

Under such circumstances, Iran must move beyond the traditional oil-centered geopolitical perspective. Future economic power will not be defined solely through crude oil exports. Participation in production chains, involvement in strategic industries, and playing a role in global food and energy security will shape new sources of national power.

This transformation is particularly important at a time when many countries are reassessing their economic dependencies. Wars, sanctions, and geopolitical crises have led governments to pay greater attention to the security of supply chains. This trend creates new opportunities for countries capable of presenting themselves as reliable suppliers.

The Role of the Strait of Hormuz in Redefining Iran’s Bargaining Power

For years, it was assumed that Iran’s most important strategic lever was its position in energy transit through the Strait of Hormuz. This assessment still retains its importance, but it no longer explains the entire reality. Today, Iran possesses the capacity to influence global equations in areas extending beyond fossil energy. The chemical fertilizer market, food security, petrochemical supply chains, and the emerging hydrogen economy can all become new sources of geopolitical influence.

The significance of these capacities lies in the fact that, unlike oil, they are less exposed to rapid substitution and are directly connected to the fundamental needs of human societies. Food security and future energy security are two areas toward which governments cannot remain indifferent.

The world is entering a phase in which geopolitical power is no longer measured solely by the number of barrels of oil or the volume of energy exports. Supply chains, food security, advanced technologies, and clean energy have become determining elements of national power. Within this framework, Iran possesses capacities that are defined beyond its traditional role in the oil market. The production of chemical fertilizers, access to inexpensive energy resources, an outstanding transit position, and the capability to participate in the hydrogen economy can create new levers for increasing the country’s bargaining power.

The future of Iran’s geopolitics will not be determined solely in Hormuz. Part of this future will take shape in the world’s agricultural fields, in fertilizer production plants, and in clean energy transmission networks; places where power will be exercised through less visible, yet deeper and more enduring, channels.