Barsam Mohammadi – Regional Affairs Expert
The behind-the-scenes efforts of the United States and the Israeli regime to advance what is termed the “second phase of the Trump plan for Gaza” indicate that the reconstruction of this war-torn strip is envisioned not as a human right, but as a lever to engineer the future security and political order of Gaza. The central axis of this plan is the complete disarmament of Hamas and other Palestinian resistance groups as a precondition for any reconstruction and Israeli military withdrawal from Gaza.
From the perspective of international law, this approach raises fundamental questions: Can the reconstruction of a devastated territory be conditioned upon the disarmament of a force that defines itself within the framework of resistance against occupation? And does such a condition not signify the transfer of occupation from an overt military form to an institutional and security-based format?
The Trump Plan; Solely in the Interest of the Zionist Regime
The aforementioned plan, presented as a 20-article program, emphasizes the monopoly of military power held by an entity known as the “National Committee for the Administration of Gaza.” According to this plan, all armed groups, including internal security forces and local police, must either be dissolved or, after rigorous vetting, be integrated under the direct supervision of this committee. The practical outcome of such a model is the elimination of any independent power outside the structure approved by the United States and Israel; a structure whose nature, composition, and degree of autonomy remain ambiguous.
The first step envisions the complete destruction of tunnels, weapons depots, and weapons manufacturing workshops, followed by the gradual handover of light weapons concurrently with increasing the capacity of the local police. According to this plan, the reconstruction of Gaza is contingent upon the complete fulfillment of this process, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces is defined not as a legal obligation, but as a conditional concession at the end of the process. In practice, this logic transforms reconstruction from a humanitarian and legal obligation into a tool for exerting political pressure.
Legal Challenge
From the perspective of international humanitarian law, this approach faces serious challenges. Under the Geneva Conventions, the occupying power is responsible for providing the basic necessities of the civilian population in the occupied territory. It cannot tie this responsibility to the fulfillment of specific political or security conditions. Conditioning reconstruction on the disarmament of the resistance, in fact, transfers the costs of occupation onto the civilian population and uses humanitarian needs as a bargaining chip; an act that contradicts the spirit and text of humanitarian law.
Within this framework, Hamas’s position is based on rejecting disarmament under conditions of continued occupation. The leaders of this movement have repeatedly emphasized that they consider the weapons of the resistance not as a bargaining tool, but as part of the Palestinian nation’s inherent right to self-defense and the realization of the right to self-determination. This argument, although contentious from the perspective of classical international law, which primarily focuses on states, holds a significant place in contemporary legal literature concerning occupied territories and liberation movements.
Disarming Hamas; A Strategic Objective of the Zionist Regime
In contrast, the Israeli regime has defined disarmament not merely as a security measure but as a strategic objective to eliminate the resistance structure in Gaza. Statements by officials of this regime indicate that the intended disarmament includes not only the collection of heavy weapons but also light and personal arms. Such an approach effectively eliminates any possibility of organized resistance in the future and fundamentally alters the balance of power in Israel’s favor.
Strategic Consequences
At the strategic level, the consequences of this plan extend beyond Gaza. Imposing the disarmament of the resistance in Gaza could become a model for dealing with other resistance files in the region and affect the equations of the West Bank, Lebanon, and even the security order of West Asia. On the other hand, implementing such a plan without regional and international consensus risks exacerbating instability and reproducing violence.
The scenarios ahead are diverse. In one scenario, economic and humanitarian pressures might push a part of the resistance structure to accept a minimal agreement, but such an agreement, lacking social legitimacy, would be fragile. In another scenario, the political deadlock continues, and the reconstruction of Gaza is delayed; a situation that could lead to the re-eruption of violence. A third scenario, less likely but more strategic, is the formation of a comprehensive political framework with international guarantees, in which the issue of resistance weapons is addressed not unilaterally, but within the context of ending the occupation and establishing mutual security mechanisms.
Ultimately, the central question is whether the disarmament of Hamas will lead to peace and stability, or whether it merely reproduces occupation from a direct military form into an institutional and security-based format. Experience demonstrates that sustainable peace is unattainable without addressing the political roots of the conflict, including occupation, the right to self-determination, and mutual security guarantees. In this sense, if the reconstruction of Gaza becomes a tool for unilateral political engineering, it will not only fail to lead to stability but may sow the seeds of a new round of instability in one of the most sensitive points of West Asia.
This text was translated using artificial intelligence and may contain errors. If you notice a clear error that makes the text incomprehensible, please inform the website editors.
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