Afghanistan-China Revive The Old Silk Road

Brecht Jonkers

Ever since the humiliating defeat and ignominious retreat of US occupation forces from Afghanistan in August 2021, and the subsequent proclamation of the Islamic Emirate by the victorious Taliban forces, the country has been in somewhat of a diplomatic limbo worldwide.

While nobody openly denies the victory of the Afghan resistance forces over the US-led coalition that invaded the country back in October 2001, formal diplomatic recognition of the new government has not been granted. At first, this might have been explained away by the ongoing civil strife in the country following the departure of the official US-backed regime. This was especially the case in the Panjshir Valley, the predominantly Tajik area in northeastern Afghanistan where Ahmad Massoud (son of the US and French-backed warlord Ahmad Shah Massoud) led an insurgency. However, by December 2022, Massoud’s so-called National Resistance Front (NRF) had lost any remaining territory it still held, uniting all of Afghanistan under the Emirate government’s effective control.

Regardless of the undeniable military and political success by the Kabul government led by the Taliban’s Supreme Leader Hibatullah Akhundzada, the new dispensation has not been officially recognised by any foreign government so far. This has led, among other things, to the bizarre situation that the Emirate of Afghanistan’s ambassador to the United Nations, Mohammed Suhail Shaheen, hasn’t been able to actually start his work properly. Meanwhile, his predecessor Naseer Faiq still officially maintains his position at the UN, despite not having an actual government to represent for over three years now.

Outside of the official sphere of diplomacy, however, Afghanistan has managed to make significant progress in fostering relations with several countries. The most significant strides in this regard have been made with the People’s Republic of China. As shown in a recent event in which the Chinese ambassador to Afghanistan joined to celebrate the 70th anniversary of Sino-Afghan diplomatic relations, Beijing and Kabul have worked out an apparently cordial coexistence.

This is not particularly surprising. China has a well-known foreign policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of states with which they engage in diplomatic and economic ties. This is done to the extent that Beijing usually doesn’t even express a particular opinion on domestic matters, which is a far cry from the US and European tendency to bring up the topic of “democracy and human rights” in every discussion, despite being quite hypocritical about them.

In regards to Afghanistan, the mentality is expressed in the poetically named “Three Respects and Three Nevers” policy: China vows to adhere to respect for Afghanistan’s sovereignty, respect for the independent choices of the Afghan people and respect for the religious beliefs and national customs of Afghanistan; while promising to never intervene in Afghan internal affairs, not to seek self-interests within the country and not to seek the inclusion of Afghanistan in a Chinese sphere of influence.

Of course, the argument can be made that these are words, and talk is cheap even in diplomacy. However, China has been quite keen on strengthening its relations with Afghanistan ever since the fall of the US-backed puppet regime. In April 2023, Beijing appointed an official ambassador to Kabul, a major geopolitical move that makes the People’s Republic part of only a handful of countries (including Russia, Pakistan and India) that currently maintain an operational diplomatic presence in the country.

According to Najibullah Jami, professor and political analyst at Kabul University, the Chinese noninterference policy is an honest and legitimate one.

“China does not express its opinion on Afghanistan’s internal affairs and it respects Afghanistan’s territorial integrity,” Jami told Xinhua News Agency in a recent interview. For a country that has experienced a plethora of invasions and foreign interventions in recent decades, such hands-off approach is understandably appealing.

The Emirate’s keenness to enhance cordial ties with Beijing is further shown by the fact that the Chinese state-owned mining company MJAM-MCC has continued operations in the Mes Aynak copper mine, which it had originally started back in 2008, with permission and encouragement from Kabul. Mes Aynak is estimated to contain the second-largest reserve of copper ore in the world.

A key region in the development of Sino-Afghan relations is the Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip of land in northeastern Afghanistan that connects the country to China’s Xinjiang region. This corridor, which runs in between Tajikistan and Pakistan, has gained attention as a potential strategic and economic link between the two countries.

Since the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021, there have been several developments in the Wakhan Corridor, reflecting China’s interest in leveraging this remote region for economic and geopolitical purposes. However, progress has been slow due to logistical challenges, security concerns, and the difficult terrain.

The Wakhan Corridor was initially established in 1893 as part of the so-called Durand Line, officially extending independent Afghanistan to the border with what was then the Qing Empire of China. It was meant as a sort of buffer zone between the competing Russian and British Empires, as it separates Russian Turkestan from the British Raj colony, thereby preventing any future border conflicts between London and Moscow.

At its narrowest point, the Corridor is only 13 kilometers wide, with incredibly rugged terrain at high altitude. The region is sparsely inhabited, with about 17,000 residents of mostly ethnically Iranian origin, such as the Pamiri and Wakhi people.

The relative isolation of the region cannot be overstated: a journalist visiting Wakhan in 2018 described how many of its inhabitants were unaware of the 2001 Afghan War ever having happened, or of the NATO occupation forces even existing at all. However, change is likely to come in the near future.

For China, the Wakhan Corridor represents both a historical link and a potential gateway for the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as the New Silk Road. Its proximity to Xinjiang, a key focus of China’s domestic security and economic development, makes it strategically significant, as the Corridor leads directly into the ethnically Uyghur region through the Wakhjir border crossing.

The fact that the Kabul government, steeped mostly in the Deobandi thought and adherence to the Hanafi school of Islamic law, has shown itself to be virulently opposed to the Wahhabi ideology that tends to dominate in Uyghur separatist circles, has created further enthusiasm in China.

Beijing sees the Wakhan as a possible trade and transport route that could connect Afghanistan to China, bypassing Pakistan and reducing reliance on the Karakoram Highway. This could free up space and traffic for overland trade towards West Asia, as well as access the significant estimated rare-earth mineral wealth of the Afghan province.

It could thus be a supporting route of the massive, $62 billion China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project, which already is a major program in its own right meant to ensure China’s access to West Asia while bypassing the naval routes through the Strait of Malacca.

The mineral wealth of Afghanistan is estimated at around $3 trillion, of which one third is the much-desired lithium alone. Chinese state-owned companies have so far managed to sign contracts with Kabul valued at over $6.5 billion in such sectors as oil, copper, zinc, gold and lead; bringing with it an estimated 120,000 direct jobs.

There are still numerous challenges and questions that need to be answered regarding the future of the Wakhan development project and Sino-Afghan relations in general. Particularly Pakistan, a long-time close partner of China, seems to take issue with the apparent closeness of Beijing to the post-2021 government in Kabul. With Islamabad having a long history of friendly ties to China, its concerns are likely to hold quite some weight in the minds of the Chinese government.

Secondly, it is understandable that a country like Afghanistan, having suffered so much in past decades at the hands of major world powers, could be hesitant to jump on the bandwagon of a colossus such as China. Although it should be mentioned that Beijing has garnered quite a lot of goodwill in this regard, by its principled adherence to non-interference in the many dozens of Global South countries in which it is economically active across Asia, Africa and Latin America.

Just weeks ago, the Afghan government greenlit the second phase of construction of a 71-kilometer road project in the Wakhan Corridor, to be conducted by a local construction company, indicating that progress seems to be steady, if slower than perhaps originally anticipated.

It remains to be seen how the situation will develop in what has often been a politically volatile region in recent decades. But over all, it seems that the resurgence of the ancient Silk Roads, the land bridge connecting Eurasia since time immemorial, has now also arrived in Afghanistan.

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