A diplomatic flare-up between Iran and Turkiye has reignited their long-standing rivalry, just as Ankara’s regional policies are set to challenge Tehran’s influence in Syria, the Caucasus, and energy markets.
The Cradle
In an interview with Qatar’s Al Jazeera, Fidan criticized Iran’s reliance on non-state actors, calling it “dangerous” and warning that “If you are trying to cause anxiety in a third country, other countries can also disturb you by supporting groups in your own country.”
The Turkish foreign minister further asserted that Iran’s “resources and capabilities are also available to others,” cautioning that if Tehran seeks to protect its own “glass house” from shattering, it should think twice before “throwing stones at others.”
Diplomatic fallout and Iranian backlash
As would be expected, Fidan’s remarks sparked strong reactions in Tehran. The first official response – a diplomatic one – came from Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman Esmail Baqaei, who posted on X:
“We were the first country to oppose and confront the coup against the Turkish government. We also welcomed the Kurdistan Workers' Party’s (PKK) disarmament as an important step toward strengthening security in Turkiye.”
The Islamic Republic's government spokesperson, Fatemeh Mohajerani, called Fidan’s statements “unconstructive,” and the Iranian supreme leader’s senior advisor, Ali Akbar Velayati, condemned the remarks, stating that “certain Turkish officials must understand that repeating unfounded and interventionist claims does not serve bilateral relations.”
The situation escalated further on 4 March when Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister Mahmoud Heidari summoned Turkish Ambassador Hicabi Kirlangic to condemn Fidan’s statements as “unfounded and reckless.”
In response, Turkish Foreign Ministry spokesman Oncu Keceli announced that the chargé d'affaires of the Iranian embassy in Ankara has been invited to the ministry to exchange views and investigate the accusations of some Iranian officials against Turkiye.
He mentioned that “recently, Iranian officials have been raising their criticism of Turkiye more publicly. A file on this issue was prepared by our country's ministry, which we previously sent to the relevant officials.”
This only raised the tension dial. The backlash in Iran continued, with Ebrahim Rezaei, spokesperson for Iran’s Parliamentary National Security Committee, warning:
“Iran will not wait for a stone to shatter its window – it will dismantle the aggressor’s house first.”
Additionally, Tehran's provisional Friday Prayers Leader Ayatollah Seyyed Ahmad Khatami said on 7 March that “Turkiye’s position is against good neighborhood policy,” urging the Turkish foreign minister to apologize for his statements and avoid repeating them, to ensure Turkiye’s best interest.
Media and strategic shifts
Tensions between the two countries had already been evident before former Syrian president Bashar al-Assad’s fall. On 14 October 2024, Turkish Radio and Television Corporation (TRT) director Mehmet Sobaco made a bizarre statement that suggested the media network had a nefarious agenda inside Iran:
“We are to open the TRT Persian channel at the end of this year. We must disturb Iran; we must disturb Iran!”
Although Sobaco was subsequently dismissed, the controversial comment sparked debate and received strong criticism in Iran. When the Persian-language service of TRT launched on December 2024, in direct response to the Turkish move, the head of the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB), Peyman Jebeli, announced on 21 January that a Turkish-language section of Press TV would begin broadcasting.
Iran fears that Turkiye is leveraging its regional dominance to promote Pan-Turkism and stir ethnic divisions in Iran’s northern Azerbaijani and Kurdish regions. Ankara, having weakened Iranian-supported resistance factions and outmaneuvered Tehran in Syria, appears emboldened by its recent gains. Iran, facing renewed US sanctions under US President Donald Trump's administration, is concerned that Ankara will exploit vulnerabilities to accelerate Turkish expansionism and further destabilize the regional balance.
Geopolitical concerns: The South Caucasus and energy files
Turkiye’s increasing assertiveness in the South Caucasus also troubles Tehran. Iran fears that Ankara could embolden Azerbaijan to launch an offensive against Armenia’s Syunik province to establish the Zangezur Corridor, potentially severing Iran’s direct land link with Armenia.
While Tehran has tolerated Azerbaijan’s access to Nakhichevan through Iranian territory for three decades, it strongly opposes a Turkish-controlled corridor. It will reduce the number of Iran’s neighbors from 15 to 14.
Additionally, Ankara’s $17 billion “Development Road Project” with Iraq could sideline Iran in regional trade routes, undermining Tehran’s strategic position in the Persian Gulf, Iraq, and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Iran and Turkiye’s geopolitical rivalry also extends into the energy sector. In a move diminishing Iran’s influence, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan recently inaugurated the Igdir–Nakhichevan gas pipeline, reducing Nakhichevan’s 30-year energy dependence on Iran.
The 85 km (53 mi) pipeline will have an annual capacity of 500 million cubic meters (mcm) and a daily capacity of 1.5 mcm. If Baku and Ankara succeed in realizing the Zangezur Corridor, Nakhichevan's 30-year transit dependence on Iran will also end.
Tehran is also keenly watching the possible revival of the Qatar–Turkiye pipeline project, which could transport Qatari gas to Europe via Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Syria. If realized, this project would not only threaten Iranian gas exports to Turkiye but also challenge Russia’s dominance in European markets. Such a development would bolster Ankara’s leverage over both Iran and Russia in gas pricing negotiations.
The balance of cooperation and competition
Despite their escalating disputes, Iran and Turkiye also have incentives to maintain stability. Following Assad’s fall, Turkiye’s intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin visited Tehran on 8 February for talks with senior Iranian officials on Syria, Gaza, and counterterrorism efforts against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), ISIS, and other terrorist groups, as well as other shared security threats.
As analyst and The Cradle contributor Giorgio Cafiero noted at the Atlantic Council, Ankara and Tehran maintain a “cooperative rivalry.” While they compete on various fronts, they share common ground in opposing Israel’s war on Gaza, confronting disruptive western influence, and maintaining robust economic ties.
Iran, under renewed US sanctions, still relies on Turkiye for energy trade and financial transactions. As evidence of how these two neighbors continue to manage relations amidst clear rivalries on various fronts, a new agreement allowing Turkmenistan’s gas to transit through Iran to Turkiye was implemented on 7 March.
While the Trump administration would certainly like to see Turkish influence in Syria serve as a bulwark against Iran, it is unlikely that Ankara will approach the Islamic Republic in a manner that fully aligns with any US-led “maximum pressure 2.0” agenda.
On the other hand, Israel’s foreign policy vis-à-vis post-Assad Syria could play a part in bringing Turkiye and Iran’s interests into greater alignment. Ankara and Damascus, under the new government, are exploring a defense pact that could include Turkish airbases in central Syria.
That may fuel tensions between Ankara and Tel Aviv, which could play out in a variety of ways. Even if a Turkish–Israeli military confrontation on Syrian soil seems unlikely at this point, intensifying friction between these two US allies would probably serve Tehran’s interests.
The Kurdish factor
Additionally, the Kurdish issue remains a critical, ongoing aspect of Iran–Turkiye relations. Iran recently welcomed Abdullah Ocalan’s call to disarm the PKK, with its foreign ministry calling it “an important step toward reducing violence.” However, while Iran designates the PKK as a terrorist group, it does not extend the same classification to its Syrian offshoots, such as the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and the People's Defense Units (YPG).
Serhan Afacan, chairman of the Turkey-based Iranian Research Center (IRAM), tells Middle East Eye that:
“Ankara remains highly sensitive to Iran's potential support for the SDF or PKK. It is not possible for Iran to quickly change its stance due to both its issues with the new administration in Damascus and the perception in Tehran that Turkey has ‘taken over’ Syria.”
While he suggests that “the Trump administration's stance on the SDF and YPG would influence Iran's position on the matter,” in reality, SDF commander Mazlum Abdi has already denied any ties with Iran, dismissing Turkish media allegations as attempts to stir conflict between Iran and the US. Meanwhile, Iranian journalist Fereshteh Sadeghi has suggested that Tehran could use the SDF as an intermediary to maintain some access to Lebanon after losing its direct land route – although there is no evidence of this as of yet.
The post-Assad era will significantly shape Iran–Turkiye relations, particularly concerning the Kurdish issue, regional energy dynamics, and geopolitical competition in the South Caucasus and Levant. While tensions continue to rise, both states have strategic incentives to maintain a delicate balance between rivalry and cooperation.
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