Israel’s offensive in Syria: Geopolitical ramifications, regional fallout of escalating crisis

By Hoda Yousefi

Middle East affairs analyst

Between late December 2024 and March 2025, Israel’s military strikes on southern Syria reached an unprecedented level of intensity and scope. The operations have not only reshaped the battlefield along Syria’s borders and the Golan Heights but have also raised pressing questions about the future balance of power in the Middle East, Iran’s role and resistance groups, and the prospects for stability in a post-Assad era. Citing “security imperatives” and the need to prevent advanced weapon transfers to Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias, Israel ramped up its aerial and naval strikes, wiping out 70% of Syria’s military infrastructure in the south—including key bases in Quneitra and weapons stockpiles.

These actions come as Syria’s new leadership, under Ahmad Al-Sharaa, attempts to carve out an image of moderation and pragmatism to gain international legitimacy. However, Israel’s unilateral scrapping of the 1974 agreement and its seizure of 500 square kilometers of border territory have not only put vital water resources under its control but have also redrawn the region’s security landscape in ways that may prove irreversible.

Military, geostrategic  dimensions:
From occupation to redefining borders
Israel’s offensive in southern Syria goes far beyond a routine counterterrorism operation.  Reports indicate that, deploying a mix of air and naval power, the Israeli military has taken out Syrian military bases as well as radar infrastructure and naval facilities. On March 3, 2025, a strike targeted a weapons site near the port of Tartus—aligning with Israel’s claims about the presence of chemical arms. The attack followed a February 25 operation that struck Hezbollah positions in eastern Lebanon.
On February 23, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu doubled down on his government’s stance, declaring: “We will not allow southern Syria to become a new stronghold for jihadists… The complete demilitarization of this region is essential.”
The annulment of the 1974 agreement—previously overseen by UNDOF, which defined a 235-square-kilometer buffer zone—has given Israel free rein to take hold of Mount Hermon and other key border points.
Beyond military considerations, this area carries strategic value due to its control over the Yarmouk River and the Golan watershed. In effect, by tightening its grip on these regions, Israel is securing both “border security” and “water control”—two pillars of its survival strategy.
Meanwhile, Sharaa’s insistence on adhering to the 1974 agreement and his stated reluctance to engage in conflict with Israel (as per his remarks on December 29, 2024) have done little to ease Israeli concerns. From Israel’s perspective, the lingering presence of the Resistance Axis (Iran and Hezbollah), coupled with reports such as the interception of arms shipments bound for Hezbollah on January 26, 2025, suggests that Syria remains a conduit for weapons transfers.
Even Syria’s January 17, 2025, crackdown on an alleged weapons smuggling attempt to Lebanon has failed to reassure Israeli decision-makers. On February 23, Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Katz made it clear: “We will hold on to our military outposts in the buffer zone indefinitely… There is no going back to the pre-October 7, 2023, reality.”

Regional fallout, future scenarios: Fragile stability or escalation?
While these operations have eroded Syria’s military capabilities, they have also ratcheted up tensions with regional players such as Turkey and Iran. On one hand, Iran’s Leader, during a January 8, 2025, meeting with Iraq’s prime minister, underlined the “need to bolster the Popular Mobilization Forces” and opposed US presence in the region—signaling Tehran’s ongoing efforts to prop up the Resistance Axis.
On the other hand, Turkey—wary of Kurdish territorial gains in northern Syria—may seize the moment to expand its military footprint under the pretext of “counterterrorism,” potentially setting the stage for direct friction with Israeli forces.
Inside Syria, Israel’s actions have deepened the legitimacy crisis facing Sharaa’s government. While some rebel factions near the border (including remnants of the Free Syrian Army and Druze forces) view Israel favorably, the destruction of farmlands and civilian casualties (as documented in UN Security Council reports on February 12, 2025) have sparked public outrage.
Sharaa, who had urged Iran to respect Syria’s sovereignty on December 24, 2024, now finds himself caught between mounting domestic pressure to push back against Israel and the need to court international support.

From Israel’s vantage point, the ideal scenario would see a moderate government in Damascus—one that distances itself from Iran while maintaining the capacity to counter groups like ISIS.
However, the reality on the ground suggests that further weakening Syria could backfire, fueling the rise of jihadist factions like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). The group, which has recently ramped up its rhetoric against Israel, may well exploit public discontent to recruit more fighters.
The growing internationalization of the crisis adds another layer of complexity. The US, by issuing “General License 2” (GL2) on January 6, 2025, has effectively eased sanctions in favor of Syria’s transitional government while keeping an eye on Iran’s role.
Conversely, the Arab League and Turkey have accused Israel of “violating Syria’s sovereignty.” The tensions could soon spill over into the UN Security Council, where, on February 12, 2025, the US envoy blamed Iran for “destabilizing Syria”—a charge that Tehran swiftly dismissed as “baseless.”

Test for Middle East power dynamics
Israel’s assault on Syria is not just another border skirmish; it reflects a deeper power struggle between the Resistance Axis and the Israel-US-Arab coalition. While Israel has, in the short term, succeeded in degrading Syria’s and Hezbollah’s military capabilities, its occupation of buffer zones raises the specter of friction with local populations and further international entanglement.
At the same time, Israel’s claims of Iran’s withdrawal from Syria remain far from certain, given Tehran’s entrenched presence in Iraq and Lebanon. By opting for “buffer zone control” over diplomatic engagement, Israel appears to be walking a tightrope—one that may not secure long-term stability.
Ultimately, Syria’s fate hinges on Sharaa’s ability to form an inclusive government while the international community’s response to Israel’s territorial advances will play a decisive role in shaping the region’s future.