After leading efforts to rehabilitate Assad, the UAE’s deliberate hesitation to embrace Syria’s new government reveals a strategy aimed at curbing Islamist power, leveraging regional alliances, and safeguarding its own interests in the Levant.
The Cradle
Abu Dhabi is well aware of Syria’s many complexities that may threaten the balance of power it seeks to maintain. By balancing cautious engagement with a strategic reluctance to commit, the UAE aims to protect itself from the uncertainties and potential chaos as the country adjusts to a new political system.
But what exactly fuels Abu Dhabi’s caution, and why might the developments in Syria clash with its long-term goals?
A measured response
When the Syrian opposition declared control over the government last month, Persian Gulf states moved quickly to engage with the new leadership, issuing statements of support and recognition of the Syrian people’s choices.
This pivot came in stark contrast to the slow thaw in relations many of these states had been cultivating with former president Bashar al-Assad after years of regional isolation. But for these countries, adapting to the government’s sudden collapse was a necessity – an attempt to secure influence in a post-Assad Syria where Turkiye and Qatar suddenly held an advantage.
As the first Arab capital to re-establish relations with Assad after the Syrian war, Abu Dhabi approached the December coup with calculated restraint. In its first official statement after the fall of Damascus, the UAE emphasized “the need to safeguard the Syrian national state and its institutions, and to prevent any descent into chaos and instability.”
This concern was echoed at the Riyadh ministerial meetings on Syria during which UAE Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed spoke of the importance of preserving Syria’s unity and rejecting terrorism and exclusionary politics.
Emirati caution was further underscored by Anwar Gargash, diplomatic advisor to UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed (MbZ), who openly warned of the risks posed by the extremist factions now in charge of Syria. He cited groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) – a UN-designated terrorist organization, and the dominant opposition force in the new government with links to the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaeda, as a lingering danger to Syria’s stability.
A questionable first visit
Despite its reservations, Abu Dhabi did not completely close the door to dialogue with Syria’s new leadership. Shortly after Asaad al-Shaibani was appointed as Syria's minister of foreign affairs, Emirati Foreign Minister Abdullah bin Zayed initiated discussions to explore bilateral cooperation. These talks culminated in Shaibani’s visit to the UAE earlier this month, marking the first official trip of a Syrian foreign minister under the new administration – a week after his first trip as a diplomat to Saudi Arabia.
While the visit was framed as part of Syria’s efforts to strengthen ties with Arab states, it quickly became a focal point of controversy.
Critics on social media highlighted the absence of the new Syrian flag during the meetings, interpreting it as a deliberate snub to Shaibani and his lot. Adding to the speculation was the Emirati FM's choice of attire – sneakers during the official reception – widely viewed as a breach of diplomatic protocol. These symbolic details sparked widespread debate, with many questioning the UAE’s true intentions and the nature of its relationship with the new Syrian government.
Observers were quick to draw comparisons with the reception of former president Assad during his 2023 visit to Abu Dhabi, where he was accorded a grand, state-level welcome.
Actions speak louder
The UAE’s skepticism toward Syria’s new administration was further demonstrated through a series of moves that highlighted its hesitancy to fully align with Damascus.
The first came in the form of an abrupt suspension of flights between the two countries. Just a day after Cham Wings Airlines announced the resumption of daily flights between Damascus and Sharjah, Abu Dhabi issued an order halting all air traffic without providing a detailed explanation.
Officially, the decision was attributed to the poor state of Syrian airports, with the UAE citing the need for infrastructure upgrades to meet safety and operational standards. The UAE Aviation Authority also called on the Syrian authorities to obtain a new license after conducting a comprehensive examination of airports.
Simultaneously, the UAE announced the inclusion of 19 individuals and entities on its terrorist watchlist, citing ties to the Muslim Brotherhood. This move served as a clear message of Abu Dhabi’s zero-tolerance policy toward Islamist groups and reinforced its broader opposition to political movements it deems a threat to its security and influence.
As Lebanese journalist and Persian Gulf affairs specialist Ali al-Murad tells The Cradle:
“The UAE, with its anti-political orientation, looked with danger at the acceleration of events in Syria that led to the fall of the Baath regime and the takeover of Islamists with Al-Qaeda and Brotherhood ideological backgrounds, allied with neo-Ottoman Turkiye.”
Murad also reveals information confirming that the UAE instructed factions from southern Syria to quickly enter Damascus on the evening of 7 December, when it became clear to them that the government would fall.
“This was an early indication of Abu Dhabi’s assessment that a central government in Damascus led by political Sunni Islam would have dire consequences for it and for the interests of its Sunni dynastic monarchy,” Murad explains, adding, “We witnessed apathy and a lack of Emirati enthusiasm for establishing a relationship with the Islamists in Damascus, until it came.”
Emirati-backed rebels
Syria’s de facto ruler, Ahmad al-Sharaa (previously known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani), has sought to address Persian Gulf concerns by pledging to dissolve all armed factions and integrate them into the Ministry of Defense.
While this move aims to garner Gulf support and ease sanctions, it faces significant obstacles. The proliferation of armed groups with diverse loyalties and agendas poses a major challenge, particularly in southern Syria.
One notable example is the “Southern Operations Room,” (SOR), a coalition led by Ahmed al-Awda, who commands the Eighth Brigade within the Fifth Corps and enjoys strong ties to the UAE. Sharaa has held several meetings with Awda, but those negotiations have yet to yield results. Awda has reportedly demanded guarantees and privileges for his faction, complicating efforts to achieve unity under a centralized military command.
Abu Dhabi, meanwhile, holds significant leverage through its financial backing of Awda and its ties to influential Syrian businessman Khaled al-Mahamid. Analysts suggest that the UAE could use these connections to influence the political process and potentially derail initiatives that do not align with its vision for Syria.
Murad believes that “the Emiratis did not send a delegation to Damascus as others did, and whoever watches and reads what the Emirati media broadcasts can infer Emirati dissatisfaction with the idea of coexistence with the Islamist authority in Damascus, but since Washington and Riyadh decided to be open to the new regime, the Emirates does not have the flexibility to go out in public and declare that it does not accept this openness.”
As for Abu Dhabi’s future course, it is anticipated that the UAE will await President-elect Donald Trump’s return to the White House before actively working to undermine the authority of HTS in Damascus. This strategy would be aligned with Republican perspectives, given their apparent reluctance to recognize Syria’s new leadership.
Egypt reportedly shares this approach, but persuading Saudi Arabia to support efforts to dismantle the influence of political Islam in Syria may prove to be a more complex task.
What lies ahead for the UAE?
Persian Gulf states have historically harbored deep concerns over the rise of Islamist movements, fearing the repercussions these groups could have on the stability of their sheikhdoms. Against this backdrop, it is still too early to declare with confidence that Syria’s political transition is heading in a direction that aligns with Gulf interests.
Clear discrepancies between internal Syrian visions and external Persian Gulf priorities continue to shape and, at times, complicate the trajectory of governance in the country. In this regard, Murad points out: “When it comes to the relationship with Islamists, the approaches of both the UAE and Saudi Arabia are distinct. The latter has clear experience in employing political Islam movements and does not view these movements with the same degree of danger as the UAE does. What happened in Libya is evidence of that.”
While the UAE took a leading role in backing the commander of the Tobruk-based Libyan National Army (LNA) Khalifa Haftar against Islamist factions supported by Turkiye, Saudi Arabia exhibited less urgency in addressing the issue. Similarly, in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has partnered with a Muslim Brotherhood affiliate, whereas the UAE has waged a war against them through the Southern Transitional Council forces.
This divergence extends to Somalia, where the two Gulf powers have pursued conflicting policies regarding Islamist groups.
Figures such as Ahmed al-Awda could still play a pivotal role in shaping Syria’s future, particularly with Emirati–Egyptian backing. Given his leadership of southern factions, Awda could be instrumental in undermining Sharaa’s authority, both militarily and administratively. This would enhance Abu Dhabi’s position as a key influencer in Syria’s geopolitical arena, positioning it as a counterweight to Turkish and Qatari ambitions in the region.
Syria remains a crucial gateway to the Arab world and an essential trading link with the Persian Gulf. Abu Dhabi is likely to use the Deraa region as a bargaining chip, leveraging its relationship with Awda to secure economic and security concessions.
The UAE’s goal would be to ensure a degree of political participation that aligns with its interests while simultaneously exerting pressure on Damascus – an approach that risks disrupting the fragile political process and plunging Syria into further instability.
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