Now, the most powerful maritime force in West Asia, Turkiye’s naval expansion is not just a military ego trip. Ankara is making a strategic bid for regional dominance, securing energy resources, and reshaping the balance of power in the Mediterranean, Black Sea, and beyond.
The Cradle
The strategic importance of securing energy resources and trade routes has propelled Turkiye into direct competition with regional players, positioning its navy as a key instrument of geopolitical maneuvering.
In the run-up to the presidential elections in May 2023, the TCG Anadolu, which Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan called “the world's first UCAV ship,” toured Turkish ports, not only celebrating its launch but also becoming a symbol of Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) election campaign.
Kemal Kilicdaroglu, the leader of the main opposition party who was Erdogan’s rival at the time, criticized the use of the TCG Anadolu for election campaigns. “Whatever our political debates are, our military has to stay out of it. Just as campaigning cannot be done with the flag, it should not be done with the ship of the army,” Kilicdaroglu said.
‘Local and national’
Beyond its political symbolism, however, the launch of TCG Anadolu signaled a broader transformation: Turkiye was emerging as a serious naval power.
According to Erdogan, the localization rate of the ship was 70 percent. “Local and national” (“yerli ve milli” in Turkish) is one of the pillars of the new Turkish policy of Erdogan, in both domestic and foreign spheres.
This fits into a larger trend: the Turkish Navy currently has 31 warships under construction, including an indigenous aircraft carrier, guided-missile destroyers, multirole frigates, and attack submarines. Expanding its naval capacities has been a focal point for Turkiye, reflecting its aspirations for strategic autonomy and regional dominance.
TCG Anadolu is listed as a “multipurpose amphibious assault ship” in the navy inventory. Its design is based on the Spanish amphibious assault ship Juan Carlos I, with similar specifications in length, height, width, and speed.
Originally planned for American-made F-35 aircraft, TCG Anadolu’s role changed when Turkiye was expelled from the US F-35 program after purchasing Russian S-400 missile defense systems in 2019. Instead, the ship is now being optimized for a fleet of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), which aligns with Turkiye’s growing drone warfare capabilities.
It is noted that the length of the TCG Anadolu deck is not sufficient for the take-off of the F-16 and F-117 jets in the Turkish Armed Forces inventory. Reuters reported that the TCG Anadolu is being re-planned for unmanned aerial vehicle systems following this crisis. With some additions, it is aimed to reach the take-off speed of UAV-UAV systems at 100-150 meters.
More than just warships: A strategic naval doctrine
The capacity of the Turkish navy is not limited to the TCG Anadolu. Turkiye is simultaneously constructing multiple advanced warships. The ADA Class Corvettes, the first four ships produced under the National Ship (MILGEM) Project, are already in service.
From the fifth ship onwards, the construction of the ISTIF Class Frigates has begun, with seven currently under construction. In addition to this, Turkiye is building the HISAR Class Offshore Patrol Vessels, the Reis Class Attack Submarines, and a new type of mine search vessel.
Turkiye is also developing a fully indigenous aircraft carrier under the MUGEM Project and advancing work on the TF-2000 Air Defense Destroyer. A growing arsenal of underwater drones is further strengthening Turkiye’s maritime dominance.
But Turkiye’s naval buildup is not just about expanding its fleet. It is underpinned by the “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) doctrine, which seeks to extend Turkiye’s maritime control over vast areas of the Eastern Mediterranean, Aegean, and Black Sea.
Although Erdogan and the AKP use these developments for domestic political consumption, some critics point out correctly that the construction of a strong navy is a long-term process, and a significant portion of these projects predate the AKP.
Retired Rear Admiral Ali Deniz Kutluk, who served for six years as the director of NATO's Military-Political Headquarters in Brussels, explains to The Cradle that each of these is a project development to meet another requirement. They are developed within the structure envisaged by the Force Planning System, to be implemented in two or three year cycles.
Indeed, since the mid-1990s, the Turkish navy has been exploring national resources to design, develop, and build a fully indigenous corvette. In 2004, the Istanbul Shipyard Command established the MILGEM Project Office to execute and coordinate design, engineering, and construction projects.
It may thus be surprising to recall that the Turkish navy, of which the AKP government is so proud, was once the subject of prosecutions.
Turkish navy Admiral Ozden Ornek, one of the most important officials initiating the MILGEM project during the first part of the 2000s, was at the time blamed for his ‘Coup d’etat diaries’ by the AKP and its once-ally Fethullah Gulen Organization (FTO), for planning a coup against Erdogan and the AKP with his comrade-in-arms.
‘Blue Homeland’ and its implications
Maritime space is a key element in contemporary Turkiye geopolitical doctrine. Until recently, the main point of tension in the maritime domain was with Greece and Cyprus. The development of the technical capacity for drilling for oil and gas at sea, the discovery and exploitation of the Prinos field in the Aegean Sea, and the UN process of drafting the Convention on the Law of the Sea started to change things in the 1970s.
Senior officers of the Turkish Navy adopted and used the term “Blue Homeland” in 2006 to denote the need for Turkiye to claim and defend a wide exclusive economic zone (EEZ). In the 2010s, this doctrine was extended beyond the Aegean and Cyprus to the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.
Since then, Erdogan has become a leading exponent of the “Blue Homeland,” and the concept is considered the foundation of Turkish ‘proactive’ regional politics.
Although the doctrine is also related to the new energy resources in the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, it can be viewed as a broad geopolitical concept that ultimately aspires to control the eastern sea transit routes to Europe.
Kutluk points to this aspect of the doctrine:
“The Mediterranean is an important geopolitical maneuvering ground in many respects. As many as 7,000 merchant ships a day provide a significant part of Europe’s logistics through transportation on this sea. It is the transit route for Middle Eastern oil and gas to the Red Sea, the Mediterranean, the Aegean, the Black Sea, Europe and the Atlantic. Two-way hydrocarbon transportation via this route is important for Turkey and others. Therefore, it can be considered the vital geography of our foreign trade.”
Retired admiral Alaettin Sevim, who was arrested on charges of a “coup attempt” during the “Ergenekon” trials jointly planned by the AKP and the FTO, thinks similarly. He tells The Cradle that the region is important not only for its potential energy resources, but also for ensuring that the energy resources of neighboring regions are transported to markets.
“It is the intersection of important sea routes for world trade, such as the Suez Canal, the Turkish Straits and the Mediterranean routes. The Mediterranean has always been the geostrategic center (heartland) of the world at sea. Today, this center has shifted to the Eastern Mediterranean.”
Additionally, Kutluk thinks that the Turkish navy’s presence in Libya, Somalia, and the Horn of Africa, as well as in Lebanon with the UN UNIFIL force, and in Qatar with other Turkish Armed Forces elements, each have their own reasons. “It is more reasonable to see all of them as related to the expansion of Turkey's spheres of interest and influence,” he posits.
In addition to hydrocarbon resources, including gas hydrate, it is also suitable for energy production from the seas through wind, tidal currents, and by laying solar panels.
Moreover, the island of Cyprus, Kutluk claims, which is the security of Turkiye’s southern coasts, also provides its security through the self-declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).
Between the Big Powers, but tilting towards NATO
Turkiye’s aggressive naval expansion has led to growing tensions with Greece, Egypt, and Israel, all of whom have overlapping claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. Greece, in particular, has reacted strongly to the “Blue Homeland” doctrine, fearing encroachment on its territorial waters.
Turkish naval expansion is, therefore, not just about defense but also about regional power competition. The assertive positioning of Turkish naval forces in these contested waters has increased diplomatic strains and raised concerns about potential military confrontations.
Despite tensions with western allies over issues like the Russian S-400 missile system and energy disputes, Turkiye remains a crucial NATO member. Recent naval exercises with the US, such as the August 2024 joint drill in the Eastern Mediterranean, signal that Ankara continues to maintain strong military ties with Washington.
The exercise was understood to be a ship-to-ship harmonization drill between Turkiye, which has an amphibious assault ship navy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and the US, with the aim of ‘deterring aggression and ensuring stability’ in the region.
The US amphibious warship USS Wasp made its appearance in the Turkish media thanks to its announcement on the warship’s social media account. The “harmonization exercise” between Wasp and TCG Anadolu in the Eastern Mediterranean was accompanied by the US landing ship USS Oakhill and the Turkish frigate TCG Gokova.
Wasp has been in the Mediterranean since late June. It is one of two US amphibious assault ships sent to the region to counter Iranian or Hezbollah attacks on Israel amid the occupation state’s military campaign in Gaza, where more than 50,000 Palestinians have been killed.
Regional ambitions
While it does not yet rival global naval powers like the US or China, Turkiye now possesses the most powerful navy in West Asia and ranks among the top 10 naval forces worldwide.
Retired Admiral Sevim notes that while Turkey’s naval power has expanded considerably, it remains in a transitional phase, being ‘a medium-sized force’ at the global level and ‘a large-scale force’ at the regional level.
He suggests that Turkiye’s future role will depend on how it integrates these naval advancements into a broader geopolitical strategy. Kutluk, on the other hand, emphasizes that peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean should remain a priority, warning that unchecked naval competition could lead to unintended conflicts.
For Kutluk, the Turkish Navy cannot be considered a (high seas) navy with a “global dimension.” Rather, they can be seen as instruments of regional power struggle. While naval power enhances Ankara’s strategic options, it also comes with risks, particularly in an environment where tensions with Greece, Israel, and NATO partners remain unresolved.
This buildup is not just about prestige. It is about securing energy resources, controlling vital trade routes, and asserting Turkiye’s strategic influence from the Mediterranean to Africa. The coming years will test whether Turkiye’s naval ambitions translate into lasting influence or trigger further instability.
For now, its growing fleet and assertive maritime doctrine ensure that it will remain a central player in West Asia’s evolving balance of power.
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