By Mehdi Bakhtiari
TEHRAN – Operation True Promise stood out from previous missile operations conducted by the IRGC against terrorist positions in Syria and against the United States in Ain al-Asad Air Base for several reasons.
In this operation, the IRGC Aerospace Force deployed weaponry launched from multiple locations across the country, surpassing even the scale of retaliatory actions following the terrorist attack on the martyrdom anniversary of Lieutenant General Qassem Soleimani taking place in the southeastern Iranian city of Kerman on January 3rd, 2024.
Prior operations, preceding True Promise, targeted regions stretching from northern Iraq to eastern Syria, covering distances of several hundred kilometers and employing missiles such as Fateh-110, Fateh-313, Zolfaghar, and Qiam.
During the operation on January 3rd, 2024, the new "Kheibar Shekan" missile made its operational debut, boasting a range of over 1300 kilometers. It was launched from Khuzestan Province and targeted terrorist group positions in northeastern Syria near Idlib, with a total of 24 missiles deployed.
In that operation, three main regions were targeted: the northern Iraqi region, east side of Euphrates in Syria, Idlib in northeastern Syria, along with several other locations. Missile launch sites spanned at least three areas, including Khuzestan, Kermanshah, and West Azarbaijan. Consequently, this operation marked the largest missile attack by Iran since 2017, in response to various terrorist activities by the enemy.
But in Operation True Promise, missile launches were executed from multiple points across the country, strategically timed to target enemy positions. This made it, in terms of the number of missiles deployed, even more extensive than all previous missile operations conducted by Iran, including the 1999 attack on the MKO headquarters.
Operation’s objectives
Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces Major General Mohammad Bagheri stated that this operation had two primary targets: a spy base at the occupied Golan Heights and the Nevatim Air Base, which was used as the launching site for the fighter jets involved in the April 1st incident. These two locations were designated as targets in Iran's retaliatory operation due to their direct involvement in the attack on the Iranian embassy.
Decades ago, the Zionist regime occupied the Golan Heights, which belong to Syria. These heights hold strategic importance due to their commanding position over vast eastern regions, making them crucial for surveillance and espionage operations by this regime. The Nevatim Air Base officially houses stealth fighter squadrons and fifth-generation F-35 aircraft controlled by the Zionist regime. In recent years, alongside F-15 and F-16 fighter jets, these aircraft have played a role in the aggressive actions of this regime after being integrated into the Israeli Air Force.
Weaponry in-use
In this operation against the enemy, three types of weapons were utilized: drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles, all of which are considered the primary offensive weaponry of the IRGC Aerospace Force.
Among them, cruise missiles and suicide drones represent the latest additions to the force's arsenal compared to ballistic missiles, which have been held by the IRGC since 1984. These two newer branches have been domestically developed by experts and scientists of the IRGC Aerospace Force in under two decades.
The initial wave of attack featured the deployment of several suicide drones. Based on available imagery, these drones were predominantly of the Shahed 136 type equipped with a propeller engine, which has gained global recognition in recent years.
These drones were assigned the mission of covering distances exceeding 1000 kilometers flying from Iranian territory. However, concerns arose regarding the choice of these drones for the operation due to the enemy's air defenses and the limited speed and range of these drones.
The IRGC likely had multiple objectives in mind when employing these weapons. Firstly, by sending a swarm of drones towards the enemy, they effectively challenged the aerial surveillance capabilities of the coalition forces supporting the Zionist regime, compelling them to clear the skies over a wide area. This action was somewhat provocative and also demonstrated the IRGC's actual proficiency in detecting and tracking these drones.
Secondly, given the duration of the drone operation, the enemy's aerial resources were largely occupied in dealing with the drones, limiting their capacity to launch a counter-operation against the country's missile bases. By alleviating the strain on tracking activities, there was a possibility of some drones evading detection and reaching occupied territories.
It's evident that another concealed goal behind deploying numerous drone flights was to target objectives should they successfully breach the enemy's frontline air defense layers and those of its allies.
Another round of attacks involved the use of cruise missiles. Based on the footage of missile launches, it's probable that the IRGC Aerospace Force deployed first-generation cruise missiles, likely of the Paveh type with fixed wings, in this operation.
These missiles were launched from mobile truck launchers. Equipped with a turbojet engine located in the upper part of their body, they boast a range of over 1000 to 1650 kilometers across various models.
Thanks to the jet engine, these missiles can achieve flight speeds estimated at over 700 to 900 kilometers per hour, enabling them to reach occupied territories from Iranian soil in under an hour and a half.
Similar to drones, cruise missiles possess the capability to navigate along intricate routes towards their designated targets. Their high flight speed minimizes the window of vulnerability to enemy air defense systems, enhancing the possibility of evading interception. Additionally, flying at low altitudes provides an inherent advantage in evading the majority of ground-based air defense systems for these missile types.
Ballistic missiles: the main axis of operation
The main component of the IRGC's attack in Operation True Promise was ballistic missiles. Launched in the early hours of April 14, these missiles swiftly entered the airspace of the occupied territories. According to published information, the IRGC did not employ Sejjil, Khorramshahr, Haj Qassem, Khyber Shekan 2, or Hypersonic Fateh missiles in this operation.
Among the missiles of the IRGC that were utilized against Israel, the ones remaining for striking Israel include Dezful, with a range exceeding 1000 kilometers, Qiam-2 with a range of 1000 kilometers, Rezvan with a range of 1400 kilometers, Khyber Shekan 1 with a range of 1450 kilometers, Emad with a range of 1650 kilometers, and Ghadr with a range of 1950 kilometers. The first two, considering the distance from launch areas to target areas, are intended for use against the mentioned target in the occupied Golan Heights. Dezful and Khyber Shekan are solid-fuel missiles with inclined missile-launch system, while the rest are liquid-fuel and use a vertical launching system, all equipped with mobile launchers.
Because of the distance between Iran and the occupied territories, enemy systems cannot intercept Iranian projectiles during the initial acceleration phase. Moreover, considering the diverse launch distances of the missiles, it's improbable that any of them will fall within the range of the enemy's known missile defense systems, except for the American Aegis system. This system can only engage missiles flying beyond the atmosphere, given sufficient radar data and only with one of its missiles.
In the early stages of the operation, numerous videos depicting missile flights, engagements with enemy air defenses, and explosion in multiple areas were released. Some videos showcased different perspectives of the same targeted area. These videos highlight several notable points, briefly outlined here.
Some of the images showing missile impacts on target areas seem to be connected to the launch of projectiles containing submunitions, which are essentially cluster munitions.
In additional videos, we can see heavy cluster munitions hitting in rapid succession within a specific area, likely linked to the Nevatim Air Base area.
In certain clips, we can clearly observe the phenomenon of cluster munitions accelerating just before impact and then swiftly altering their trajectory towards the target. These observations suggest that these cluster munitions are guided throughout their flight path, with some even equipped with boosters or accelerators for the final phase.
All missiles employed in the recent operation come with detachable cluster munitions, causing the separated components to typically fall several hundred kilometers away from the target area.
The key point is that Iran employed its standard, familiar equipment in this operation, much of which the enemy had obtained flight data for beforehand. However, due to being in a defensive stance, the Zionist regime was compelled to utilize all available resources, including those of its allies, to fend off Iran's substantial attack. This resulted in the revelation of diverse information regarding their operational capabilities.
In any battle scenario, when the enemy fires their initial defensive missiles in response to Iran's first wave of strike—whether they're old models or mere decoys—it inevitably reveals their deployment sites. Following this, hypersonic ballistic missiles can swiftly reach their targets, often within a time frame estimated by the enemy, usually less than 5 minutes, effectively neutralizing their defense systems from afar. This strategy was recently demonstrated in footage released by Lebanese Resistance Hezbollah targeting an Iron Dome missile defense system.
In any event, acquiring diverse information about the performance of the enemy's air defense network and its effective range will be crucial in the final confrontations with the Israeli regime. While they take months to years to upgrade their defensive missile capabilities, Iran has not only kept its ace cards like the Khaybar Shekan 2, Fateh 1 and 2, and Khorramshahr 4 missiles under wraps but has also refrained from deploying some older missiles like Sejjil, Haj Qassem, and Khorramshahr 2 in this operation, thus maintaining the confidentiality of their operational performance data. Additionally, Iran possesses the capability to enhance its offensive prowess more swiftly by improving the warheads of its missiles rather than redesigning the entire system.
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