Years after ISIS Obliteration, Thousands of Iraqis Remain Domestically Displaced

Alwaght- Consecutive years of insecurity and war have turned Iraq into one of the main countries grappling with refugee crisis, to an extent that the case of refugees and the challenges pertaining to them have been one of the top priorities of various Iraqi governments and an obsession of a large part of the society. 

After the obliteration of the self-proclaimed ISIS caliphate that was followed by relative security and the regional and international-supported financial and spiritual backing of the central government to people, it was expected that there would be no big challenge ahead of return of the refugees and the displaced, but the implementation of this process still faces big troubles that itself can be a source of new crises for Iraq. 

According to a July 2021 report of the International Organization for Migration, 1.2 Iraqis were still living in the refugee camps. This is while Iraqi minister of migration and the displaced earlier in 2020 had said that his country will close down all refugees camps by the start of 2021. 

One of the challenges related to the return of the refugees making headlines again and turning controversial is the political differences between the Sunnis and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Recently, Abdulrahim al-Shomari, the deputy governor of Nineveh, confirmed that the Kurdish Peshmerga forces are not leaving the province, warning that “if this situation continues this way, in the future we will witness escalation of tensions by the protesting people.” 

Pointing to the several meetings of the delegations sent to Erbil with Masoud Barzani and his repeated promises to pull out Kurdish forces from the areas they are occupying, al-Shomari accused the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader of escalation and disloyalty. 

He added that the Peshmerga forces still control tens of village in Al-Hamdaniyah, Zummar, Makhmur, and Rabia and block return of local people. 

According to al-Shomari, the Peshmerga forces also prevent people of the Arab villages of Sheikhan, Jadriyah, Saudiah, Mahmoudiyah, Safiyah, and Qahriyah from returning to their farming lands. 

These districts and villages are administratively affiliated to Nineveh province and are located 100 kilometers west of Mosul city as the provincial capital which fell into the hands of Takfiris in the ISIS attack in June 2014, and as a result, thousands of people in the region were displaced. 

In an earlier interview with Aljazeera, al-Shomari had said that the displaced people of this region are either living in camps or distributed in rented houses, but are dropped from the government aid lists due to possession of vast farming lands. 

According to al-Shomari, the population of these villages is so large that only in the villages of Rabia district, about 12,000 people live, and thousands of other people live in Khudhair, Zummar and other districts. 

Commenting on the people's anger with the difficult living conditions and the state of uncertainty they are in, al-Shomari said that after the failure of the UN representative in Iraq to find a solution with the government, about 3,000 people held demonstrations, something showing that if a settlement is not reached, these tribes are likely to resort to other options. 

Ali Abbas Jahangir, the spokesman for the ministry of migration and the displaced, held that 2,400 households of Khudhair camps are Rabia villagers and about 600 families are living in camps of other districts. 

Nineveh plain in addition to Bashiqa includes the towns of Al-Hamdaniyah, Bartalah, Baghidah, Qaraqush, Namroud, Tal Kheyf, Wana, Al-Qush, Faidha, Makhmur, and Al-Sheykhan. 

Before ISIS attack, Christian Arabs accounted for a majority of the inhabitants of Nineveh plain, and after it, they were displaced along with Sunnis, Shabaks, Kurds, and Yazidis. 

After the Iraqi forces regained control of Nineveh and its plains after the defeat of the terrorists, the Kurdish forces affiliated with the KDP gradually began to retreat, but after the operation of the Iraqi forces in October 2017 following the Kurdish independents referendum which included some areas east of Nineveh, this withdrawal were stopped and the Peshmerga forces remained in these areas. 

Erbil claim: Removing the obstacles of return 

While the Al Anbar’s politicians and people argue that the KDP’s obstructions are the main obstacle ahead of the return of the displaced, the KDP lawmaker in the Iraqi parliament Sharwan al-Dubarani told Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed that he blames the current displacement of the Arab residents of Rabia on the Iraqi military campaign of 2017. He adds that the arrangements for return of Khudhair people have finished and they will return home in the upcoming weeks. 

Holding that 5 out of 7 representatives of Nineveh plain's regions in the Iraqi parliament belong to the KDP and, thus, Bashiqa administration is held by the party, al-Dubarani claimed that al-Shomari’s words are election-driven and an effort to mobilize supporters in the parliamentary elections that are set for October. 

Still, Qusay Abbas, a former representative of Mosul in the parliament, accused the KPD of seeking full control of Bashiqa and other areas of Nineveh plain through unilaterally controlling the administrative posts.

According to him, the incompetent management by KDP officials made not only the Sunni Arabs but also representatives of other parties like the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, Dawa Party, Babylonian Movement, and others oppose continuation of the party’s control over these regions. 

Abbas told Al-Arabi Al-Jadeed that Bashiqa region is ruled by the KDP since 2003 and the former manager of this region who is a KDP member is apparently an administratively-failed person. 

Geopolitical and demographic complications 

When we talk about Nineveh plain and its political and stability situations, we should first consider its geographical position. On the one hand, it stretches throughout the disputed regions under the article 140 of the Iraqi constitution that include parts of Diyala, Salaheddin, Kirkuk, Nineveh, and Maysan. On the other hand, Nineveh plain is located on a strategic line that links Iran and Syria via Iraq, and therefore, the interests of foreign actors like Iran and the US are tied in Iraq. Since the defeat of terrorists, the US by all means, from airstrikes on Abu Kamal-Qaim border crossing to push for ISIS revival in Syrian and Iraqi deserts struggled to block activation of Axis of Resistance corridor from Tehran to the Mediterranean. 

But in addition to the competitions deriving from the territorial and geopolitical significance of Nineveh, the province after ISIS rule became one of the outstanding showcases of sectarian and political tensions, breaking with its pre-ISIS picture as a symbol of peaceful ethno-religious coexistence in Iraq. This doubled the challenges of the refugees return. 

For example, later in April, a several-day crisis related to the refugees return case erupted in the province. The tensions sparked after a Yazidi woman who had survived ISIS identified a man from refugee camps who she claimed raped her and kidnapped her father and brother during ISIS captivity. She protested the freedom of the man and said her family remain missing. 

Following the accusations by the girl, widespread protests broke out demanding the government to be more careful and responsible for returning the displaced Arabs to Sinjar. But that was not the whole story and hundreds of angry protesters also set fire to Al-Rahman Mosque, which was the location of declaration of ISIS caliphate, and prevented the return of the displaced families. This incident showed that the Iraqi government has no easy job returning the displaced to their homes without heavy costs and fear of ethno-sectarian tensions. 

From Sinjar agreement under PM al-Kadhimi to administrative committee under PM al-Sudani 

The complexities, significance, and concerns surrounding the return of the displaced people in Nineveh province have caused various Iraqi governments to look for solutions to the crisis. 

For the first time, then Prime Minister Mustafa al-Kadhimi signed comprehensive ‘Sinjar deal’ with the Kurdistan region in September 2020 that included three administration, security, and reconstruction parts. 

According to the administrative part, a joint committee was planned to be established by the two sides for administration of Sinjar region. At security level, the agreement states that the local police and the National Intelligence and Security Agency are exclusively responsible for security and all militant groups including PKK should pull out of Sinjar. Concerning reconstruction, a joint committee was set for establishment with the coordination of the Nineveh local administration, with its extent of duties and leverages determined by the PM. 

Now and after two years after signing this deal, no practical step has been taken to its enforcement. Experts blame this on the KRG’s unwillingness and the incapability of the two sides to force out of Sinjar over 20,000 militants. Before ISIS, Sinjar was the stronghold of the KDP in Nineveh, but terrorist group’s rise and the PKK and government forces’ extensive role in rescuing the Yazidis from terrorists cut the party's influence in the region and motivated the rival Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party to build a foothold there. This is the main driver behind Erbil's reluctance to implement the agreement and withdraw its forces from the region. 

Now and with the eruption of a new round of tensions in this region, government of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani is making moves to quickly send a committee to identify the administrative challenges and find solutions to them in Bashiqa. 

This is yet another promise from the Iraqi officials to thousands of displaced people who are fed up with these promises and who, angry and frustrated with the failure of the government to provide better conditions for them, have to live the cold of winter and heat of the summer in the refugee camps.