War at home: Lebanon’s media front

As Israeli escalation deepens, a parallel confrontation is unfolding inside Lebanon – fought through media campaigns, legal battles, and an intensifying struggle over the country’s political direction.

Mawadda Iskandar

The Cradle 

Lebanon is living through one of the most dangerous phases of military confrontation in its recent history. Israeli airstrikes continue to expand in scale and intensity, striking Beirut’s southern suburb, the south, and the Bekaa Valley with growing regularity. 

The Ministry of Health has reported a heavy human toll reaching 968 martyrs, including 116 children and 40 health workers, in addition to more than 2,400 wounded. 

Since the renewed aggression began on 2 March, the war has not remained confined to the battlefield. It has steadily penetrated Lebanon’s internal arena, where political tensions, media disputes, and legal confrontations are now unfolding with equal ferocity.

Alongside the bombardment, what many describe as an internal front has begun to crystallize. This front is shaped by sharp media discourse that, according to resistance supporters, moves beyond political criticism and enters the terrain of strategic messaging aligned with external pressure campaigns. 

The overlap between domestic rhetoric and wartime targeting narratives has revived long‑standing anxieties about the role of media actors during moments of national peril. 

For some, this represents legitimate dissent and political accountability. For others, it reflects an internal struggle capable of influencing the trajectory of the confrontation itself.

MTV in the spotlight

Accusations have once again focused on MTV Lebanon, widely viewed by resistance circles as politically hostile to Hezbollah and its allies. On 15 March, the station aired a report by correspondent Mariam Majdoline Lahham alleging the existence of what it described as “Hezbollah prisons” in Beirut’s southern suburb (Dahiye). 

The segment featured a map identifying alleged locations, including a building it claimed was situated behind the pro-Hezbollah Al Manar TV headquarters. It also linked these sites to the case of an Israeli agent reportedly seeking refuge at the Ukrainian Embassy.

The next day, an Israeli strike targeted one of the buildings in question, raising serious questions about the possibility of passing accurate coordinates to the enemy or using the report as a media prelude to the bombing.

MTV’s contentious relationship with resistance supporters predates the current escalation. Since its establishment in 1991, the channel has faced repeated institutional crises, including a court‑ordered closure between 2002 and 2009 over electoral violations and renewed ownership disputes in 2022. 

Following Hamas's Operation Al‑Aqsa Flood in 2023, critics argue that the station adopted a markedly more confrontational editorial line toward the Axis of Resistance. Coverage included the publication of maps identifying buildings in Dahiye, Sidon (Saida), and other areas while linking them to alleged resistance infrastructure. 

Additionally, it broadcast news about the displaced and shelter centers, accusing them of embracing resistance elements and inciting against civil institutions such as the Islamic Health Commission and Qard al-Hassan.

Political talk shows, particularly Marcel Ghanem’s “Time Has Passed,” became prominent platforms for arguments portraying Hezbollah as responsible for the broader climate of war. At the same time, coordinated social media campaigns amplified accusations against medical institutions and humanitarian organizations operating in conflict‑affected regions. 

These dynamics unfolded in parallel with Israeli strikes targeting health workers and infrastructure, contributing to mounting casualties and deepening social polarization.

This approach did not stop with the end of the war, but continued through direct incitement content, as in Rami Naim's report, “Dhimmi Christians in Hezbollah's Pocket,” which published inflammatory lists against prominent figures. 

Mariana el-Khoury's article highlighted an alleged network linked to Hezbollah that sought to collect data on schools and students in Lebanon to use for financial and security purposes. This reflects an escalating path of disinformation and political and sectarian incitement targeting the resistance and its audience.

Legal complaints and public backlash

The Dahiye report triggered widespread anger and prompted several lawyers to file complaints with the Public Prosecution against MTV and the journalist involved. The filings argued that the broadcast constituted incitement and endangered civilians and property, potentially falling under provisions related to threats to state security and the facilitation of violence under Lebanese law.

Complainants pointed to the coincidence between the broadcast and subsequent airstrikes as reinforcing fears that media content could play a role – whether direct or indirect – in shaping targeting dynamics. They stated that documentation had been gathered concerning the use of broadcast and digital platforms to disseminate information capable of facilitating attacks on civilian locations.

In an interview with The Cradle, lawyer May el-Khansa describes the controversy as resembling the presence of an “enemy inside the house.” She argues that internal fragmentation could pose dangers exceeding those of external aggression. 

She notes that the complaint relied on legal provisions carrying severe penalties, including capital punishment in extreme circumstances, and attributes what she views as official inaction to political pressure and foreign influence on Lebanon’s decision‑making process.

Supporters of MTV rejected these accusations, framing the legal campaign as an attempt to suppress dissenting voices. Media figures and political parties opposed to Hezbollah defended the channel under the banner of press freedom. 

Tensions escalated further after a cyberattack claimed by the Fatemiyoun Electronic Team disrupted MTV’s digital infrastructure. The breach reportedly exposed internal databases containing personal data and contact information.

Toward a legal front

Among those pursuing legal action was lawyer Mohammad Zuaiter, who tells The Cradle that a group of legal professionals had decided to confront what they described as recurring incitement campaigns dating back to previous wars. 

He reveals that “two reports and a direct complaint were previously submitted, but they did not lead to any result, because the judiciary was obscuring the case in a flawed manner.”

Zuaiter argues that sectarian agitation, calls for internal confrontation, and the dissemination of information potentially facilitating violence could constitute serious crimes amounting to high treason under Lebanese law. 

He also criticizes what he describes as double standards in enforcement, pointing to the arrest of journalist Ali Barou for insulting political figures while, in his view, more dangerous forms of incitement went unaddressed.

Lawyer Hasan Adel Bazzi likewise frames the current complaints as part of a broader legal trajectory that began during the 66‑day war in 2024, when lawsuits were filed against influential figures accused of inflammatory rhetoric. 

Bazzi warns that escalating discourse risked pushing Lebanon toward civil strife, arguing that certain public statements had crossed from political expression into incitement. 

He adds that the next steps include filing lawsuits on behalf of those affected and requesting precautionary measures such as seizure of funds and property, “because the situation has gone beyond all reason, and the country is now on the brink of civil war. Around 25 instigators are inciting five million people across the country.”

According to the lawyers, the legal filings named a number of media professionals and public figures accused of incitement or of advocating foreign intervention. Among those cited were journalist Rami Naim, who was reported to have called on the Syrian leadership to intervene in Lebanon against Hezbollah, and Nadim Barakat, accused of urging Israeli strikes on Lebanese state infrastructure and even targeting officials and their families. The filings also referenced figures such as Charles Jabbour and Tony Boulos, alongside other personalities described by the complainants as playing a role in mobilizing hostile rhetoric.

Official hesitation

Despite mounting controversy, critics say state institutions have taken few decisive steps. The minister of information convened emergency consultations with media organizations to discuss professional standards during wartime, emphasizing the need to balance freedom of expression with national interests.

A prior circular instructed official media outlets – including the Lebanese National News Agency (NNA) and Lebanon’s public television and radio – to avoid using the term “resistance” when referring to Hezbollah and to limit quotations from its officials. The directive was presented as part of implementing cabinet decisions aimed at regulating security‑related coverage.

The minister of justice also faced criticism for what opponents described as limited engagement with legal accountability measures. Resistance supporters view his stance toward Hezbollah as openly confrontational, even as he insists on adherence to legal procedures. Meanwhile, remarks by the foreign minister drew accusations of inflammatory rhetoric amid reports that stricter regulatory measures could be discussed in upcoming cabinet sessions.

These developments have unfolded under sustained US and Israeli pressure on Lebanon to alter its posture toward Hezbollah and consider normalization with Israel. Such pressure has influenced official discourse, including controversy surrounding statements issued by the Lebanese Presidency that were seen as downplaying Israeli strikes that killed Lebanese soldiers.

Hezbollah moves politically

Against this backdrop of perceived official hesitation, the Loyalty to the Resistance parliamentary bloc held a press conference focusing on judicial independence and equality before the law. MP Hussein al‑Hajj Hassan questioned the impartiality of the judiciary in light of political objections to certain rulings, noting that previous accusations against media figures and politicians had rarely resulted in decisive prosecutions.

The bloc announced plans to intensify legal complaints and pursue personal lawsuits in cases involving calls for foreign intervention or threats to public security. Its representatives stressed the need for unified legal standards ensuring that no individual or institution remains beyond accountability.

Targeting media workers

As the internal confrontation over narratives intensified, Israeli strikes also targeted members of the media sector. At dawn on 18 March, the director of political programs at Al-Manar TV and his wife were killed when their home in Beirut was hit by an Israeli airstrike.

The incident formed part of a broader pattern observed during the current war, in which journalists and technical staff have been killed either while covering events or inside residential areas. Among those reported killed were Al Mayadeen broadcast engineer Mohammad Reda and photographer Ghassan Najjar, Al Manar cameraman Wissam Qassem, correspondent Farah Omar, photographer Rabih al‑Mamari, and Reuters cameraman Issam Abdallah. Hezbollah media official Mohammad Afif and several independent photojournalists were also among the casualties.

Shaping public consciousness 

The struggle over wartime reporting reflects a deeper contest over the power of media narratives to shape collective consciousness. Accusations and mobilization campaigns have extended far beyond a single television channel, encompassing newspapers, online platforms, commentators, writers, and activists participating in the production of public meaning during war.

Despite legal challenges, the absence of firm institutional intervention has allowed this pattern to persist. Coverage portraying Beirut’s southern suburb through a narrow lens focused on weapons and militarization is viewed by resistance supporters as an attempt to impose an exclusionary identity that ignores the area’s social and political complexity.

Such dynamics point to a broader transformation in the function of media during conflict, moving beyond the transmission of events toward the active shaping of perception. Repeated visual and rhetorical associations linking destruction and displacement to specific political actors can reinforce entrenched narratives, influence public expectations, and prepare the ground for future political shifts.

In this sense, the confrontation now unfolding inside Lebanon extends beyond journalistic debate into a wider struggle over national direction. For resistance supporters, the internal media front is inseparable from efforts to weaken the movement’s social base and create conditions conducive to strategic realignment, including potential normalization with Israel. 

Whether these fears ultimately materialize or remain part of wartime polarization, the emergence of this parallel front illustrates how contemporary conflicts unfold simultaneously across military, political, and informational arenas.

Legal complaint submitted by a group of lawyers against MTV and Mariam Majdoline Lahham.

Dragging the army into confrontation with Hezbollah: Power play over Lebanon’s unity

Lebanon’s ruling elite risks reopening the most dangerous chapter of its modern history by attempting to turn the national army into an instrument of internal political confrontation. 

Tamjid Kobaissy

The Cradle 

A new political confrontation is taking shape in Lebanon – one that risks placing the national army in direct opposition to the country’s most powerful resistance force. 

The government decision to “ban Hezbollah’s military activity” earlier this month and classify its military and security role as “illegal” has ignited intense debate across the country, extending far beyond political circles into serious questions about security, stability, and the future cohesion of the military institution.

In practical terms, the move places the Lebanese army before a theoretical implementation task that could push it into confrontation with Hezbollah. This prospect revives painful historical memories of periods when the military institution was dragged into internal power struggles, with devastating consequences for both the army’s cohesion and the country’s fragile stability.

The Lebanese army experienced a major split in 1976 during the civil war. A similar crisis resurfaced during the 6 February 1984 uprising, when political and sectarian divisions penetrated the ranks of the institution itself. 

Revisiting these turning points is essential to understanding the risks inherent in any political path that seeks to position the army against the resistance – particularly within the delicate balance that has governed Lebanon since the end of the war and the adoption of the Taif Agreement.

When the army fractured

In the mid‑1970s, Lebanon entered one of the most dangerous phases of its modern history with the outbreak of civil war in 1975. At the heart of the unfolding turmoil stood the Lebanese army, an institution that was supposed to serve as the guarantor of national unity and stability.

Yet the complex political and sectarian scene gradually eroded the army’s internal cohesion, culminating in the split of 1976. Officer Ahmad al‑Khatib announced his defection alongside a group of officers and soldiers, declaring the formation of a new military force known as the Lebanese Arab Army. Khatib aligned his force with what was then called the Lebanese National Movement, which maintained an alliance with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).

This development did not occur in isolation. It was the product of mounting political and military tensions inside Lebanon. At the time, the Lebanese state attempted to deploy the army to contain escalating clashes between right‑wing Christian forces on one side and Lebanese national forces allied with Palestinian factions on the other.

In the end, the political decision to involve the army in internal confrontations produced the very outcome many had feared. The institution fragmented into rival formations that mirrored the broader political and sectarian rupture gripping the country.

The warning of 6 February 

The crisis of division did not end there. A similar turning point emerged during the 6 February intifada (uprising) in 1984, when sustained political pressure again pushed the army into internal clashes with various Lebanese forces. 

Several military units collapsed or withdrew from their positions, while others saw their personnel join local factions. Once more, the army reflected the country’s deep political and sectarian fractures – reinforcing the lesson that internal confrontation carries existential risks for the institution.

Rebuilding after Taif

Following the end of the civil war and the ratification of the Taif Agreement, serious efforts were launched to rebuild the Lebanese army and prevent a repeat of the division experience.

Former president Emile Lahoud played a key role in this process. A new organizational formula was adopted, integrating officers and soldiers from different sectarian backgrounds within the same brigades and units. 

During the war years, many formations had taken on a sectarian or regional character. The post‑Taif restructuring sought to restore the army’s national identity and make future fragmentation far more difficult.

The goal of this approach was to consolidate the army’s national character and make any attempt to divide it more difficult.

A dangerous internal mission

These historical precedents make one fact clear. Any political decision that pushes the Lebanese army toward internal fighting – particularly while Lebanon faces ongoing aggression from Israel – poses serious dangers to the unity and cohesion of the military institution.

Even so, current indicators suggest that such a scenario remains unlikely in the immediate term. Implementing a government decision of this nature requires both operational capability and an internal military consensus – conditions that are largely absent. 

The army’s limited resources and the firm stance of its commander, Rudolphe Haikal, against confrontation with Hezbollah significantly constrain the feasibility of such a course. The specter of institutional fragmentation further complicates any attempt to impose a military decision in this direction.

In practice, pushing the army toward division would require a major political shift, leading Lebanon toward comprehensive civil war. Such a trajectory would not ultimately serve even influential external actors such as the US and Saudi Arabia. A full internal collapse could produce outcomes that undermine what remains of their political leverage in Lebanon. 

Available information indicates that Haikal is highly cautious in approaching any step that could draw the army into internal conflict. His position became evident during discussions at the most recent cabinet session with Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam, when he reportedly said: “I cannot ask a soldier who earns $200 to fight in the north, in the east, and in the south, and then fight his own people.” 

The ‘National Officers’ 

At the same time, controversy erupted after a short statement published in a local newspaper close to Hezbollah and attributed to a group calling itself the “National Officers” warned against assigning the army the task of “pursuing those confronting an external attack on the country.” The text cautioned that such decisions could “weaken the unifying role of the army and expose its internal unity to dangerous tremors with unpredictable consequences.” 

The statement, which ran only a few lines, quickly moved from a media report to the center of political debate in a country deeply sensitive to any discussion involving the military institution. Observers viewed its publication as an attempt to pressure political authorities amid ongoing plans to place all weapons under exclusive state control.

Army Command swiftly denied any link between the alleged group and the institution, stressing that “there is absolutely no truth to what has been reported regarding army officers,” and affirming that military personnel remain loyal only to the army and the nation. Prime Minister Salam also described the statement as “suspicious and devoid of patriotism,” raising doubts about its authenticity and warning of legal consequences if it were found to incite strife. 

Despite the official denials, the episode deepened anxiety within political circles. Its rapid circulation exposed underlying tensions over the army’s potential role in confronting Hezbollah and highlighted fears that any attempt to draw the institution into internal conflict could shake its cohesion. 

A military source notes to The Cradle that “the army leadership is fully aware of the sensitivity of the current phase, and that preserving the cohesion of the military institution remains a fundamental priority amid the security challenges Lebanon faces.”

The same source stresses that the army command remains acutely aware of the lessons of 1976 and 1984 and is determined to avoid any scenario that might reopen the question of internal division. In its view, the problem lies less with the army itself than with hasty political calculations within the ruling elite that overlook realities on the ground and treat the military institution as a tool in domestic power struggles.

Preserving institutional cohesion, it adds, remains a top priority for the army leadership amid the security challenges Lebanon continues to face.

Power calculations and battlefield realities

A political source discloses to The Cradle that “these calculations and government decisions do not serve the interests of the current administration, whether in relation to [Lebanese] President Joseph Aoun or Prime Minister Nawaf Salam. Any path that weakens the army or draws it into internal division will ultimately be counted against their political tenure.”

The source adds:

“The preliminary political assessments that formed the main factor behind the government decision, alongside external pressure, were based on a hasty reading that Hezbollah had reached a position of weakness that could be exploited internally in parallel with Israeli aggression. However, field developments have shown that this reading was inaccurate and that the party still possesses effective organizational, military, and security capabilities.”

“Had the session been delayed by only a few days, until after the surprise generated by the party’s military strength, it is likely the session would not have been held at all or would not have issued a decision at this level.”

The confrontation also extends beyond a purely local struggle. Hezbollah does not operate in isolation, nor does it face current pressures alone. Contrary to claims promoted in recent months that the party opened a support front on behalf of Iran, several indicators suggest that Tehran itself is actively contributing to supporting Hezbollah in this confrontation.

The party appears to have seized the regional moment to reaffirm its deterrence posture against the Israeli enemy – whether by reinforcing Lebanon’s defensive capacity, halting attacks, or re‑establishing the rules of engagement.

Statements by Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) referring to coordinated military operations with Hezbollah point to a high level of alignment. This coordination reflects the broader concept of the “Unity of Fronts,” linking military confrontation with parallel political and negotiating tracks.

In practice, Hezbollah confronts internal and external pressure as part of a wider regional network. This dynamic gives it greater strategic room to reorganize its domestic and regional position and strengthen its political and military standing in the period ahead.

Judicial pressure as another front

Alongside the political and military debate, the judicial handling of the weapons file has hardened. Information indicates that Justice Minister Adel Nassar has directed a stricter approach, including harsher legal measures against individuals found in possession of unlicensed weapons.

Sources point out that these measures do not affect Hezbollah alone, but also impose a pressing reality on the Lebanese army and Internal Security Forces, placing them before additional challenges.

A familiar and dangerous outcome

Ultimately, the problem in decisions of this nature does not lie within the army itself, but within political calculations inside the ruling authority. Lebanese history repeatedly shows that attempts to use the army to alter internal balances lead to the same result – weakening the institution.

In a country like Lebanon, turning the army into an instrument of political confrontation risks destabilizing its unity. Pushing the institution into conflict with influential domestic forces will not produce decisive political outcomes. 

It risks undermining the state itself and reopening dangerous fault lines within the army – and within Lebanon as a whole.