by Hamed Abu Al-Ezz
The core issue is the lack of substantive concessions from the US or Israel for such an agreement, no matter whether it is a Democratic or Republican president in the White House.
Israel doesn’t make concessions, it seems.
Instead, the focus is always on taking advantage of geopolitical events to push Saudi Arabia towards normalisation.
One of the most obvious examples of this pressure was the period following the political murder of dissident Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The heinous crime was committed in the Saudi Consulate in Istanbul; it sparked global condemnation and put significant strain on Saudi-US relations, not least because Khashoggi worked for the Washington Post at the time. However, behind the scenes, this tragic event became an excuse for American pressure on Bin Salman. It was revealed later that Israeli spyware, Pegasus, was used to monitor Khashoggi and his friends and track their movements.
Another Saudi dissident Canadian resident Omar Abdulaziz, who was close to Khashoggi, had previously filed a lawsuit against an Israeli software company that helped Saudi Arabia hack into his smartphone and spy on communications between Khashoggi and himself.
The implications of such discoveries are multifaceted and indicate that the US is aware of such covert operations and has used this sensitive information to apply further pressure on Saudi Arabia to normalise links with Israel. This strategy is not limited to diplomatic moves, but has also included the withdrawal of Patriot air defence batteries from Saudi Arabia, suggesting that US military protection is conditional on Saudi Arabia’s willingness to move towards normalisation with the settler-colonial state. This form of diplomatic blackmail highlights the complexities and moral concerns surrounding the push for a major deal.
For those who defend normalisation, especially from the American perspective, the path forward seems clear: to establish Israel’s acceptance in the Middle East as a destructive and destabilising force, as we see today in Gaza, where Israel continues to massacre Palestinians.
Moreover, Israel’s ongoing genocide in Gaza further complicates the possibility of normalisation. As a staunch supporter and ally of Israel, the US has been criticised for not using its diplomatic, financial and military leverage to halt Israeli military operations in Gaza. The Arab and Muslim world, including the Saudis, see this as complicity in the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the occupied Palestinian territories. For Saudi Arabia, a state that positions itself as the custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam and a leader in the Muslim world, endorsing a deal with Israel while Israel is committing the worst possible crimes in Gaza would be politically risky. The impression of abandoning the Palestinian cause — a cause that resonates deeply throughout the Arab and Muslim world — could ignite major domestic unrest and diminish Saudi Arabia’s regional and Islamic standing.
There are also hidden US strategic calculations. The facts about the Mossad’s involvement in the Khashoggi assassination and its implications for Saudi-Turkish relations indicate another layer of geopolitical manoeuvring. By isolating Saudi dissidents allied with Turkiye, the US appears to be supporting a strategy of pressuring Saudi Arabia to move towards normalisation, while also limiting Turkiye’s strategic influence in the Kingdom. This dual strategy serves both American and Israeli interests, by strengthening alliances and limiting the strategic strength that Turkiye might have in Saudi Arabia.
A wise observer should therefore understand the full spectrum of historical US-Israeli relations.
For decades, the US has not only supported Israel’s security, but also actively ensured it, integrating it as a core ally in its Middle East strategy. Thus, any move toward normalisation is not just a diplomatic gesture, but also a potential reshaping of the balance of power in the region. For Saudi Arabia, such a move would come with unforeseen consequences, including internal dissent by a population that might view normalisation as a betrayal of Palestinian solidarity. Would it provoke a backlash from regional actors, who might see it as a strategy of containment? Or, worst of all, could this normalisation end any regional or international role that Saudi Arabia might play?
The broader Middle East context, characterised by shifting alliances, civil wars and proxy conflicts, adds layers of complexity to the decision-making process. Saudi Arabia’s recent diplomatic engagements, ranging from mending ties with Iran to navigating relations carefully with Turkiye and Qatar, demonstrate its adoption of a more diverse and pragmatic approach to regional diplomacy. In this context, jumping into normalisation with Israel without a well-calculated strategy and without securing real concessions would be reckless.
In conclusion, the idea of normalisation between Saudi Arabia and Israel is filled with risks for the Saudi leadership. The US strategy of applying pressure, sometimes through military manoeuvres and sometimes through the exploitation of sensitive information, reveals a deeper, more coercive agenda to which the Kingdom should not give in.
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